Deprecating Insecure Practices in RADIUS
draft-ietf-radext-deprecating-radius-08
| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (radext WG) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Alan DeKok | ||
| Last updated | 2025-11-06 | ||
| Replaces | draft-dekok-radext-deprecating-radius | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | WG Document | |
| Associated WG milestone |
|
||
| Document shepherd | Margaret Cullen | ||
| IESG | IESG state | I-D Exists | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | mrcullen42@gmail.com |
draft-ietf-radext-deprecating-radius-08
RADEXT Working Group A. DeKok
Internet-Draft InkBridge Networks
Updates: 2865, 2866, 5176, 7585 (if approved) 6 November 2025
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: 10 May 2026
Deprecating Insecure Practices in RADIUS
draft-ietf-radext-deprecating-radius-08
Abstract
RADIUS crypto-agility was first mandated as future work by RFC 6421.
The outcome of that work was the publication of RADIUS over TLS (RFC
6614) and RADIUS over DTLS (RFC 7360) as experimental documents.
Those transport protocols have been in wide-spread use for many years
in a wide range of networks. They have proven their utility as
replacements for the previous UDP (RFC 2865) and TCP (RFC 6613)
transports. With that knowledge, the continued use of insecure
transports for RADIUS has serious and negative implications for
privacy and security.
The publication of the "BlastRADIUS" exploit has also shown that
RADIUS security needs to be updated. It is no longer acceptable for
RADIUS to rely on MD5 for security. It is no longer acceptable to
send device or location information in clear text across the wider
Internet. This document therefore deprecates many insecure practices
in RADIUS, and mandates support for secure TLS-based transport
layers. Related security issues with RADIUS are discussed, and
recommendations are made for practices which increase both security
and privacy.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Status information for this document may be found at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-radext-deprecating-
radius/.
Discussion of this document takes place on the RADEXT Working Group
mailing list (mailto:radext@ietf.org), which is archived at
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/radext/. Subscribe at
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/radext/.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/freeradius/deprecating-radius.git.
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Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 10 May 2026.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2025 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Review of RADIUS Security and Privacy . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Deprecating Insecure Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. RADIUS/UDP and RADIUS/TCP are Deprecated . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. Secure Transports are Mandated . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2.1. Recommended Practices for TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3. MS-CHAP is Deprecated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.4. New Crypto-Agility Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Securing Access-Request Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.1. New Configuration Flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.2. Clients and Access-Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.3. Servers and Access-Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.3.1. Detecting Configuration Mismatches . . . . . . . . . 14
4.4. Updated Servers and Legacy Clients . . . . . . . . . . . 15
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4.5. Server Responses to Access-Request . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.6. Clients Receiving Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.7. Status-Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.8. Documentation and Logging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.9. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5. New Requirements on Clients and Servers . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.1. Attribute Location and Ordering . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.2. Unknown Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.3. Delaying Access-Rejects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
6. Migrating Away from Insecure Transports . . . . . . . . . . . 24
6.1. Recommending TLS-PSK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
6.2. Network Operators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
6.3. Deploying the BlastRADIUS Mitigations . . . . . . . . . . 25
7. Practices to Increase RADIUS Security and Privacy . . . . . . 27
7.1. Use Long and Complex Shared Secrets . . . . . . . . . . . 27
7.2. Use Constant Time Comparisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
7.3. Limit the use of User-Password . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
7.4. Use PAP in preference to CHAP and MS-CHAP . . . . . . . . 29
7.5. Use EAP Where Possible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
7.6. Minimize the use of Proxies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
7.6.1. Eliminate Proxies Where Possible . . . . . . . . . . 31
7.6.2. There is no RADIUS Routing Protocol . . . . . . . . . 31
7.6.3. Dynamic Discovery and Filtering . . . . . . . . . . . 32
7.7. Minimize Personal Identifiable Information . . . . . . . 34
7.7.1. Creating Chargeable-User-Identity . . . . . . . . . . 35
8. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
9.1. Historical Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
9.2. Practical Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
12. Changelog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Appendix A. Best Practice Checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
1. Introduction
With the publication of [I-D.ietf-radext-radiusdtls-bis], the
[RFC6421] work on crypto-agility is nearing completion. The RADIUS
protocol now has a secure transport which is standards-track. This
specification therefore completes the work of [RFC6421] by
deprecating insecure uses of RADIUS, including RADIUS/UDP and RADIUS/
TCP.
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This specification mandates new behavior for RADIUS to address those
issues, most notably the recent BlastRADIUS vulnerability [BLAST].
In the interest of clarity, these mandates are given with minimal
explanation. The reader is instead directeed to
[I-D.dekok-radext-review-radius] for a detailed review of of the
security and privacy issues in RADIUS.
1.1. Review of RADIUS Security and Privacy
The RADIUS protocol [RFC2865] was first standardized in 1997, though
its roots go back much earlier to 1993. The protocol uses MD5
[RFC1321] to authenticate some packets types, and to obfuscate
certain attributes such as User-Password. As originally designed,
Access-Request packets were entirely unauthenticated, and could be
trivially spoofed ([RFC2869], Section 7.1 and [RFC3579],
Section 4.3.2).
The insecurity of MD5 was first noted in relation to RADIUS in 1996
on the IETF RADIUS working group mailing list [MD5-1996], which also
discussed using an HMAC construct to increase security. While it was
common knowledge at the time, the earliest record of concerns about
Access-Request packets spoofing was on the RADIUS working group
mailing list [DATTACK] in 1998. There was substantial further
discussions about the lack of integrity checks on the list over the
next few years. The outcome of that process was the definition of
Message-Authenticator as an optional HMAC-based attribute in
[RFC2869], Section 5.14.
The packet forgery issue was further discussed in 2004 in [RFC3579],
Section 4, and again in 2007 in [RFC5080], Section 2.2.2. The state
of MD5 security was again discussed in [RFC6151], which states in
Section 2:
MD5 is no longer acceptable where collision resistance is required
such as digital signatures.
That statement led to RADIUS security being reviewed in [RFC6421],
Section 3, but no protocol changes were made at that time. The
outcome of that review was the text in the remainder of [RFC6421],
which created crypto-agility requirements for RADIUS. The work of
[RFC6421] was completed in [I-D.ietf-radext-radiusdtls-bis].
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Another issue is that RADIUS sends most information (but not
passwords) "in the clear", with obvious privacy implications.
Publicly available data includes information such as names, MAC
addresses, locations, etc., which allows individuals to be tracked
with minimal effort. The reader is refered to [RFC6973], and
specifically to [RFC6973], Section 5 for detailed discussion, and to
[RFC6973], Section 6 for recommendations on threat mitigations.
It is no longer acceptable for RADIUS to rely on MD5 for security.
It is no longer acceptable to send device or location information in
clear text across the wider Internet. This document therefore
deprecates all insecure uses of RADIUS, and mandates the use of
secure TLS-based transport layers.
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
* RADIUS
The Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service protocol, as
defined in [RFC2865], [RFC2866], and [RFC5176] among others.
* RADIUS/UDP
RADIUS over the User Datagram Protocol as define above.
* RADIUS/TCP
RADIUS over the Transport Control Protocol [RFC6613]
* RADIUS/TLS
RADIUS over the Transport Layer Security protocol [RFC6614]
* RADIUS/DTLS
RADIUS over the Datagram Transport Layer Security protocol
[RFC7360]
* TLS
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the Transport Layer Security protocol. Generally when we refer to
TLS in this document, we are referring to RADIUS/TLS and/or
RADIUS/DTLS.
* NAS
Network Access Server, which is a RADIUS client.
* MS-CHAP
Microsoft Challenge-Handshake authentication, as defined for MS-
CHAPv1 in [RFC2433], MS-CHAPv2 in [RFC2759], and EAP-MSCHAPv2
[KAMATH]
In order to continue the terminology of [RFC2865], this document
describes the Request Authenticator, Response Authenticator, and
Message-Authenticator as "signing" the packets. This terminology is
not consistent with modern cryptographic terms, but using other
terminology could be misleading to long-term RADIUS imlementers. The
reader is assured that no modern cryptographic methods are used with
RADIUS/UDP.
3. Deprecating Insecure Practices
The solution to an insecure protocol which uses thirty year-old
cryptography is to deprecate the use insecure cryptography, and to
mandate modern cryptographic transport. This section deprecates
insecure transports, mandates the use of secure transports,
officially deprecates MS-CHAP nearly two decades after it was broken,
and finally closes out the [RFC6421] crypto-agility requirements for
RADIUS.
3.1. RADIUS/UDP and RADIUS/TCP are Deprecated
RADIUS/UDP and RADIUS/TCP MUST NOT be used outside of secure
networks. A secure network is one which is believed to be safe from
eavesdroppers, attackers, etc. For example, if IPsec is used between
two systems, then those systems may use RADIUS/UDP or RADIUS/TCP over
the IPsec connection.
However, administrators should not assume that such uses are always
secure. An attacker who breaks into a critical system could use that
access to view RADIUS traffic, and thus be able to attack it.
Similarly, a network misconfiguration could result in the RADIUS
traffic being sent over an insecure network.
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Neither the RADIUS client nor the RADIUS server would be aware of any
network misconfiguration (e.g. such as could happen with IPsec).
Neither the RADIUS client nor the RADIUS server would be aware of any
attacker snooping on RADIUS/UDP or RADIUS/TCP traffic.
In contrast, when TLS is used, the RADIUS endpoints are aware of all
security issues, and can enforce any necessary security policies.
Any use of RADIUS/UDP and RADIUS/TCP is therefore NOT RECOMMENDED,
even when the underlying network is believed to be secure.
3.2. Secure Transports are Mandated
All systems which send RADIUS packets outside of secure networks MUST
use either IPsec, RADIUS/TLS, or RADIUS/DTLS. For operational and
security reasons, it is RECOMMENDED to use RADIUS/TLS or RADIUS/DTLS
instead of IPsec.
Unlike (D)TLS, use of IPsec means that applications are generally
unaware of transport-layer security. Any problem with IPsec such as
configuration issues, negotiation or re-keying problems are typically
presented to the RADIUS servers as 100% packet loss. These issues
may occur at any time, independent of any changes to a RADIUS
application using that transport. Further, network misconfigurations
which remove all security are completely transparent to the RADIUS
application: packets can be sent over an insecure link, and the
RADIUS server is unaware of the failure of the security layer.
In contrast, (D)TLS gives the RADIUS application completely knowledge
and control over transport-layer security. The failure cases around
(D)TLS are therefore often clearer, easier to diagnose and faster to
resolve than failures in IPsec. For example, a failed TLS connection
may return a "connection refused" error to the application, or any
one of many TLS errors indicating which exact part of the TLS
conversion failed during negotiation.
3.2.1. Recommended Practices for TLS
Due to the ability of attackers to record sessions for later
decryption, it is RECOMMENDED that all cryptographic methods used to
secure RADIUS conversations provide forward secrecy. While forward
secrecy will not protect individual sessions from attack, it will
prevent attack on one session from being leveraged to attack other,
unrelated, sessions.
It is RECOMMENEDED that AAA servers minimize the impact of a session
being decrypted by using a total throughput or time based limit.
After that limit has bene reached, the session keys can be replaced
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though a process of either re-keying the existing connection, or by
opening a new connection. The old connection can then be
deprioritized for new traffic, and then closed. Note that if the
original connection if closed before all outstanding requests have
received responses, or before a new connection is full open, it can
cause packet loss.
3.3. MS-CHAP is Deprecated
MS-CHAP (as defined for v1 in [RFC2433], v2 in [RFC2759], and EAP-
MSCHAPv2 [KAMATH]) has major design flaws, as discussed in
[I-D.dekok-radext-review-radius]. MS-CHAP MUST NOT be used in any
situation where it is not protected by a secure transport protocol.
MS-CHAP MUST NOT be sent over RADIUS/UDP or RADIUS/TCP, unless that
data is protected by a a secure transport layer such as IPSec.
As packets can be proxied outside of a secure transport, MS-CHAP
SHOULD NOT be sent over RADIUS/UDP or RADIUS/TCP. For authentication
protocols such as EAP, MS-CHAP SHOULD NOT be used outside of a secure
tunnel such as PEAP or TTLS. This recommendation includes EAP-
MSCHAPv2 [KAMATH].
Implementers and administrators MUST treat MS-CHAP as being
equivalent in security to sending passwords in the clear, without any
encryption or obfuscation. That is, the User-Password attribute with
the [RFC2865], Section 5.2 obfuscation is substantially more secure
than MS-CHAP. MS-CHAP offers little benefit over PAP, and has many
drawbacks as discussed here, and in the next section.
Existing RADIUS client implementations SHOULD deprecate the use of
all authentication methods based on MS-CHAP. Clients SHOULD forbid
new configurations from enabling MS-CHAP authentication. New RADIUS
clients MUST NOT implement MS-CHAPv1, MS-CHAPv2, or EAP-MSCHAPv2.
3.4. New Crypto-Agility Requirements
The crypto-agility requirements of [RFC6421] are addressed in
[RFC6614] Appendix C, and in Section 10.1 of [RFC7360]. For clarity,
we repeat the text of [RFC7360] here, with some minor modifications
to update references, without changing the content.
Section 4.2 of [RFC6421] makes a number of recommendations about
security properties of new RADIUS proposals. All of those
recommendations are satisfied by using TLS or DTLS as the transport
layer.
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Section 4.3 of [RFC6421] makes a number of recommendations about
backwards compatibility with RADIUS. [RFC7360] Section 3 addresses
these concerns in detail.
Section 4.4 of [RFC6421] recommends that change control be ceded to
the IETF, and that interoperability is possible. Both requirements
are satisfied.
Section 4.5 of [RFC6421] requires that the new security methods apply
to all packet types. This requirement is satisfied by allowing TLS
and DTLS to be used for all RADIUS traffic. In addition, [RFC7360]
Section 3, addresses concerns about documenting the transition from
legacy RADIUS to crypto-agile RADIUS.
Section 4.6 of [RFC6421] requires automated key management. This
requirement is satisfied by using TLS or DTLS key management.
This specification finalizes the work began in [RFC6421]. This
document updates [RFC2865] to state that any new RADIUS specification
MUST NOT introduce new "ad hoc" cryptographic primitives to
authenticate packets as was done with the Request / Response
Authenticator, or to obfuscate attributes as was done with User-
Password and Tunnel-Password. We allow legacy RADIUS-specific
cryptographic methods existing as of the publication of this document
to be used for historical compatibility. However, all new
cryptographic work which is specific to the RADIUS protocol is
forbidden.
We recognize that RADIUS/UDP will still be in use for many years, and
that new standards may require some modicum of privacy. As the
BlastRADIUS attack shows ([BLAST] and
[I-D.dekok-radext-review-radius] Section TBD), RADIUS/UDP security is
inadequate for modern networks. The solution is not to fix RADIUS/
UDP. The solution is to deprecate it entirely.
All new security and privacy requirements in RADIUS MUST be provided
by a secure transport layer such as TLS or IPsec. As noted above,
simply using IPsec is not always enough, as the use (or not) of IPsec
is unknown to the RADIUS application.
The restriction forbidding new cryptographic work in RADIUS does not
apply to the data being transported in RADIUS attributes. For
example, a new authentication method could use new cryptographic
methods, and would be permitted to be transported in RADIUS. This
authentication method could be a new EAP method, or any other data
which is opaque to the RADIUS transport. In those cases, RADIUS
serves as a transport layer for the authentication method. The
authentication data is treated as opaque data for the purposes of
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Access-Request, Access-Challenge, etc. packets. There would be no
need for the RADIUS protocol to define any new cryptographic methods
in order to transport this data.
Similarly, new specifications MAY define new attributes which use the
obfuscation methods for User-Password as defined in [RFC2865]
Section 5.2, or for Tunnel-Password as defined in [RFC2868]
Section 3.5. However, due to the issues noted in
[I-D.dekok-radext-review-radius], the Tunnel-Password obfuscation
method MUST NOT be used for packets other than Access-Request,
Access-Challenge, and Access-Accept. If the attribute needs to be
send in another type of packet, then the protocol design is likely
wrong, and needs to be revisited. It is again a difficult choice to
forbid certain uses of the Tunnel-Password obfuscation method, but we
believe that doing so is preferable to allowing sensitive data to be
obfuscated with less security than the original design intent.
4. Securing Access-Request Packets
Despite the above mandates to use secure transports for RADIUS, the
reality is that RADIUS/UDP is likely to remain in wide-spread use for
many years. It is therefore important to update RADIUS/UDP and
RADIUS/TCP in order to secure them from the BlastRADIUS attack
([BLAST]).
There are a number of changes required to both clients and servers in
order for all possible attack vectors to be closed. Implementing
only some of these mitigations means that an attacker could bypass
those partial mitigations, and therefore still perform the attack.
This section outlines the mitigations which protect RADIUS/UDP and
RADIUS/TCP systems from the BlastRADIUS attack. These mitigations
MUST be applied to RADIUS/UDP and RADIUS/TCP, and MUST NOT be applied
to RADIUS/TLS or RADIUS/DTLS.
Unless otherwise noted, the discussion here applies only to Access-
Request packets, and to responses to Access-Request (i.e. Access-
Accept, Access-Reject, Access-Challenge, and Protocol-Error packets).
All behavior involving other types of request and response packets
MUST remain unchanged.
The mitigation methods outlined here allow systems to both protect
themselves from the attack, while not breaking existing networks.
There is no global “flag day” required for these changes. Systems
which implement these recommendations are fully compatible with
legacy RADIUS implementations, and can help to protect those legacy
implementations. However, when these mitigations are not fully
implemented, systems may still be vulnerable to the attack.
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Note that when the RADIUS system does not do proxying, the attack can
be mitigated simply by upgrading the RADIUS server, so that it sends
Message-Authenticator as the first attribute in all responses to
Access-Request packets. However, the goal of this specification is
to fix all architectures supported by RADIUS systems, rather than a
limited subset. We therefore mandate new behavior for all RADIUS
clients and servers, while acknowledging that some organizations may
choose to not deploy all of the new functionality.
For overall network security and good practice, we still recommend
that all RADIUS clients and servers be upgraded to use the new
software which contains the mitigations, and also be configured with
the highest level of security. Doing so will ensure that
configuration mistakes on one system will not reintroduce the
vulnerability.
4.1. New Configuration Flags
Clients and servers MUST implement the new configuration flags
defined below, when RADIUS/UDP or RADIUS/TCP is used. These flags
MUST NOT be exposed in any administrative interface, or examined when
RADIUS/DTLS or RADIUS/TLS is used.
The behavior and meaning of these flags will be discussed in the
following sections. Introducing these flags before discussing their
meaning makes the subsequent discussion simpler and easier to
understand.
The goal of these flags is to secure the RADIUS protocol without
preventing communication between clients and servers, even when only
one party has been upgraded. These flags are designed to allow a
gradual migration from both parties using legacy RADIUS, to fully
upgraded and secured systems with all of the mitigations in place.
Clients MUST have a per-server boolean configuration flag, which
we call “require Message-Authenticator”. The default value for
this flag MUST be “false” in order to maintain compatibility with
legacy servers.
Servers MUST have a per-client boolean configuration flag, which
we call “require Message-Authenticator”. The default value for
this flag MUST be “false” in order to maintain compatibility with
legacy clients.
Servers MUST have a per-client boolean configuration flag, which
we call “limit Proxy-State”. The default value for this flag MUST
be “false” in order to maintain compatibility with legacy clients.
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It is RECOMMENDED that implementations support both a global setting,
and per-client or per-server setting for the above flags. For
example, an implementation could support a global setting which is
over-ridden by a more specific per-client or per-server setting. The
global setting could also be used if there was no more specific
setting defined.
The combination of global and more narrow configuration allows
administrators to upgrade systems gradually, without requiring a
"flag day" when everything changes on a global basis.
The following sections explain how these flags are used, by following
the flow of an Access-Request packet being sent from the client, to
being received by the server, to the server sending a response, and
finally to that response being received by the client.
4.2. Clients and Access-Request
The following new behavior is mandated for RADIUS/UDP and RADIUS/TCP
clients:
Clients MUST add Message-Authenticator to all Access-Request
packets.
This behavior MUST NOT be configurable. Disabling it would open the
system up to attack, and would prevent the other mitigation methods
from working. The root cause of the attack is that Access-Request
packets lack integrity checks. Therefore, the most important fix is
to add integrity checks to those packets.
The Message-Authenticator SHOULD be the first attribute in all
Access-Request packets. That is, it should be placed immediately
after the packet header. Implementations MAY place the Message-
Authenticator elsewhere in an Access-Request packet.
From a cryptographic point of view, the location of Message-
Authenticator does not matter for Access-Request packets, it just
needs to exist somewhere in the packet. However, the location of
Message-Authenticator does matter for responses to Access-Request
(Access-Accept, etc.). It is better to have consistent and clear
messaging for addressing this attack, instead of having different
recommendations for different kinds of packets.
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However, many existing RADIUS clients do not currently send Message-
Authenticator. It also may be difficult to upgrade some client
equipment, as the relevant vendor may have gone out of business, or
may have marked equipment as “end of life” and thus unsupported. It
is therefore necessary for servers to work with such systems so as to
not break existing RADIUS deployments, while at the same time
protecting them as much as practically possible.
4.3. Servers and Access-Request
The following new behavior is mandated for for RADIUS/UDP and RADIUS/
TCP servers:
When receiving an Access-Request, servers MUST consult the value
of the "require Message-Authenticator" flag prior to accepting the
packet for processing. This flag MUST NOT be consulted for other
types of request packets.
If the "require Message-Authenticator" flag is set to “false”,
servers MUST follow legacy behavior for validating and enforcing
the existence of Message-Authenticator in Access-Request packets.
For example, enforcing the requirement that all packets containing
EAP-Message also contain a Message-Authenticator attributes, but
otherwise accepting and validating the Message-Authenticator
attribute if it is present, while taking no action if the
attribute is missing.
If the "require Message-Authenticator" flag is set to "false",
servers MUST also check the value of the "limit Proxy-State" flag
and either accept or discard the packet, based on the checks
discussed in Section 4.4, below.
If the "require Message-Authenticator" flag is set to “true”, the
server MUST examine the Access-Request packets for the existence
of the Message-Authenticator attribute. Access-Request packets
which do not contain Message-Authenticator MUST be silently
discarded. This discard process MUST occur before the Message-
Authenticator or Request Authenticator have been validated.
For packets which are not discarded by the preceding check, the
server MUST then validate the contents of the Message-
Authenticator and then discard packets which fail this validation
as per [RFC2869], Section 5.14.
Servers MUST NOT discard a packet based on the location of the
Message-Authenticator attribute. We extend [RFC2865], Section 5
to state that RADIUS clients and servers MUST NOT discard packets
based on the order or location of any attribute. If Message-
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Authenticator passes validation, then the packet is authentic and
it has not been modified. The location of Message-Authenticator
within the packet does not matter for authenticated packets.
The default value for the "require Message-Authenticator" flag is
“false” because many clients do not send the Message-Authenticator
attribute in all Access-Request packets. Defaulting to a value of
"true" would mean that the server would be unable to accept packets
from many legacy clients, and existing networks would break.
We note that if this flag is “false”, the server can be vulnerable to
the attack, even if the client has been updated to always send
Message-Authenticator in all Access-Requests. An attacker could
simply strip the Message-Authenticator from the Access-Request, and
proceed with the attack as if client had not been updated. The
server then does not see Message-Authenticator in the Access-Request,
and accepts the modified packet for processing.
When the "require Message-Authenticator" flag is set to "true", the
server is protected from the BlastRADIUS attack on this client to
server link. Any packet which has been modified by the attacker to
remove Message-Authenticator will be discarded by the server. Any
packet containing Message-Authenticator will be validated using the
HMAC-MD5 construct, which is not vulnerable to this attack.
The server may still, however, be vulnerable to the attack if it
proxies packets to another server. That is, the system as a whole is
secure only when all possible client to server links are secured.
Unfortunately, there is no way for clients and servers to negotiate
protocol-layer features in RADIUS/UDP or RADIUS/TCP. A server cannot
know if invalid packets are being discarded due to an ongoing attack,
or if they are being discarded due to a mismatched configuration
between client and server. Servers SHOULD therefore log the fact
that an Access-Request packet was discarded (with rate limits) in
order to inform the administrator that either an attack is underway,
or that there is a configuration mismatch between client and server.
4.3.1. Detecting Configuration Mismatches
As a special case for debugging purposes, instead of discarding the
packet, servers MAY instead send a Protocol-Error or Access-Reject
response packet. This packet MUST contain a Message-Authenticator
attribute as the first attribute in the packet, otherwise an attacker
could turn this response into an Access-Accept. The response MUST
also contain an Error-Cause attribute with value 510 (Missing
Message-Authenticator). The server MUST not send this response by
default, as it this could cause the server to respond to forged
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Access-Request packets.
The purpose of this Protocol-Error packet is to allow administrators
to signal misconfigurations between client and server. It is
intended to only be used temporarily when new client to server
connections are being configured, and MUST be disabled permanently
once the connection is verified to work.
This behavior SHOULD only be enabled when specifically configured by
an administrator. It MUST also be rate-limited, as there is no need
to signal this error on every packet received by the server. It
SHOULD be automatically disabled when the server receives an Access-
Request from a client which contains Message-Authenticator.
Implementations MAY instead automate this process, by sending a few
such responses when packets from a client are first seen, and then
not sending responses thereafter.
As RADIUS clients are upgraded over time, RADIUS server
implementations SHOULD enable the “require Message-Authenticator”
flag by default.
The next question is how to protect systems when legacy clients do
not send Message-Authenticator.
4.4. Updated Servers and Legacy Clients
The following new behavior is mandated for RADIUS/UDP and RADIUS/DTLS
servers:
When receiving an Access-Request and where the "require Message-
Authenticator" flag is set to "false", servers MUST then consult
the value of the "limit Proxy-State" flag for the client.
If the "limit Proxy-State" flag is set to "false", servers MUST
follow legacy behavior for validating and enforcing the existence
of Message-Authenticator in Access-Request packets. For example,
enforcing the requirement that all packets containing EAP-Message
also contain a Message-Authenticator attributes, but otherwise
accepting and validating the Message-Authenticator attribute if it
is present, while taking no action if the attribute is missing.
This behavior is the same as mandated by the previous section.
If the "limit Proxy-State" flag is set to "true", servers MUST
require that all Access-Request packets which contain a Proxy-
State attribute also contain a Message-Authenticator attribute.
Access-Request packets which contain Proxy-State but no Message-
Authenticator MUST be silently discarded.
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If the packet does contain a Message-Authenticator. servers MUST
validate its contents, and discard packets which fail this
validation ([RFC2869], Section 5.14).
This flag is motivated by the realization that most NASes (i.e. not
proxies) will never send Proxy-State in an Access-Request packet. If
a server sees Proxy-State in a packet from a NAS, it is a strong
signal that an attacker is attempting the BlastRADIUS attack. The
BlastRADIUS attack depends on the construction and behavior of Proxy-
State, and the attack is essentially impossible without using Proxy-
State in an Access-Request.
It is therefore safe to add a configuration flag which checks for
Proxy-State, because well-behaving NASes will never send it. The
only time the server will see a Proxy-State from a NAS is when the
attack is taking place.
The behavior of this flag is not to simply discard Access-Request
packets which contain an "unexpected" Proxy-State. Instead, the
behavior is to require such packets to be authenticated. If a packet
is authenticated via the existence of Message-Authenticator with
validated contents, then the existence (or not) of Proxy-State does
not matter; the packet should be accepted and processed by the
server.
On the other hand, if the packet cannot be authenticated by
validating its Message-Authenticator, then the existence of an
unexpected Proxy-State is suspicious, and the packet should be
discarded.
As with the previous section, servers SHOULD log a message when
packets are discarded due to this flag. Servers MAY also send an
error response as discussed above, subject to the caveats and
considerations described in the previous section for those responses.
4.5. Server Responses to Access-Request
The following behavior is mandated for RADIUS/UDP and RADIUS/TCP
servers, when sending responses to Access-Request packets:
Servers MUST add Message-Authenticator as the first attribute in
all responses to Access-Request packets. That is, all Access-
Accept, Access-Reject, Access-Challenge, and Protocol-Error
packets. The attribute MUST be the first one in the packet,
immediately after the 20 octet packet header.
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Adding Message-Authenticator as the first attribute means that for
the purposes of MD5 known prefix attacks, the unknown suffix begins
with the Message-Authenticator, and continues for the remainder of
the packet. The attacker is therefore unable to leverage the attack
using a known prefix, and the vulnerability is mitigated.
As it is difficult to upgrade both clients and servers
simultaneously, we also need a method to protect clients when the
server has not been updated. That is, clients cannot depend on the
Message-Authenticator existing in response packets. Clients need to
take additional steps to protect themselves, independent of any
server updates.
4.6. Clients Receiving Responses
The following new behavior is mandated for RADIUS/UDP and RADIUS/TCP
clients:
When receiving any response to an Access-Request packet (Access-
Accept, Access-Challenge, Access-Reject, or Protocol-Error),
clients MUST consult the "require Message authenticator" flag
prior to accepting the packet for processing. This flag MUST NOT
be consulted for responses to other types of request packets.
If the "require Message-Authenticator" flag is set to “false”,
clients MUST follow legacy behavior for validating and enforcing
the existence of Message-Authenticator in response packets. For
example, enforcing the requirement that all packets containing
EAP-Message also contain a Message-Authenticator attributes, but
otherwise accepting and validating the Message-Authenticator
attribute if it is present, while taking no action if the
attribute is missing.
If the "require Message-Authenticator" flag is set to “true”, the
client MUST examine the response packets for the existence of the
Message-Authenticator attribute. Response packets which do not
contain Message-Authenticator MUST be silently discarded. This
check MUST be done before the Response Authenticator or Message-
Authenticator has been verified. No further processing of
discarded packets should take place.
The client MUST validate the contents of the Message-Authenticator
and discard packets which fail this validation ([RFC2869],
Section 5.14).
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Clients MUST NOT discard a packet based on the location of the
Message-Authenticator attribute. If Message-Authenticator passes
validation, then the packet is authentic and it has not been
modified. The location of Message-Authenticator within the packet
does not matter for authenticated packets.
When the response is discarded, the client MUST behave as if no
response was received. That is, any existing retransmission timers
MUST NOT be modified as a result of receiving a packet which is
silently discarded.
Unfortunately, the client cannot determine if invalid packets are
being discarded due to an ongoing attack, or if they are being
discarded due to a mismatched configuration between client and server
(e.g. mis-matched shared secret). The client SHOULD log the fact
that the packet was discarded (with rate limits) in order to inform
the administrator that either an attack is underway, or that there is
a configuration mismatch between client and server.
The above discussions have followed the complete path from client, to
server, and back again. If each client to server hop is secured via
the above methods, then by construction, systems using RADIUS/UDP or
RADIUS/TCP are no longer vulnerable to the BlastRADIUS attack.
4.7. Status-Server
While the BlastRADIUS attack works only for Access-Request packets,
Access-Accept or Access-Reject can also be sent in response to
Status-Server packets ([RFC5997]). In order to simplify client
implementations, we mandate the following new behavior with respect
to Status-Server:
Servers MUST follow the above recommendations relating to Message-
Authenticator when sending Access-Accept, Access-Challenge, or
Access-Reject packets, even if the original request was Status-
Server.
This requirement ensures that clients can examine responses
independent of any requests. That is, a client can perform a simple
verification pass of response packets prior to doing any more complex
correlation of responses to request.
We note that [RFC5997], Section 3 states:
.. all Status-Server packets MUST include a Message-Authenticator
attribute. Failure to do so would mean that the packets could be
trivially spoofed.
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As a result, compliant implementations of [RFC5997] do not need to
change their behavior with respect to sending or receiving Status-
Server packets: they are already protected against the BlastRADIUS
attack.
4.8. Documentation and Logging
It is RECOMMENDED that RADIUS server implementations document the
behavior of these flags in detail, including how they help protect
against this attack. An informed administrator is more likely to
engage in secure practices.
Similarly, when any of the above flags cause a packet to be
discarded, the system SHOULD log a descriptive message (subject to
rate limiting) about the problematic packet. This log is extremely
valuable to administrators who wish to determine exactly what is
going wrong, and what actions can be taken to correct the issue.
4.9. Summary
The following list outlines the requirements on client
implementations, and references the prior sections which contain the
normative text. The intent is to give readers a short checklist
which lets them quickly validate that their implementations are
correct. While the following list does not contain normative text
(in order to avoid potential conflict or confusion), the reader
should follow the references below to verify that the behavior
described below is truly normative.
* clients include Message-Authenticator in all Access-Request
packets, Section 4.2
- clients can place Message-Authenticator as the first attribute
in all Access-Request packets, but this placement is not
required for security.
* clients validate the contents of Message-Authenticator in all
packets that they receive, [RFC2869], Section 5.14
* clients do not check the location of Message-Authenticator in any
response packet that they receive, Section 4.6
* clients do not discard packets which contain unknown attributes,
Section 5.2
* clients implement a boolean configuration flag "require Message-
Authenticator", Section 4.1
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- If set to "false", clients do not take any additional steps.
- if set to "true", clients discard all responses to Access-
Request packets which do not contain Message-Authenticator.
This discard happens before the Response Authenticator or
Message-Authenticator are validated.
The following list outlines requirements on server implementations,
with the same explanations and caveats given above for the list of
requirements on client implementations.
* servers validate the contents of Message-Authenticator in all
packets that they receive, Section 4.3
* server do take check the location of Message-Authenticator in any
request packet that they receive, Section 4.5
* servers do not discard packets which contain unknown attributes,
Section 5.2
* servers implement a boolean configuration flag "require Message-
Authenticator", Section 4.1
- If set to "false", servers implement checks for the "limit
Proxy-State" flag.
- if set to "true", servers discard all Access-Request packets
which do not contain a Message-Authenticator attribute. This
discard happens before the Request Authenticator or Message-
Authenticator are validated. Servers then do not implement the
checks for the "limit Proxy-State" flag.
* servers implement a boolean configuration flag "limit Proxy-
State", Section 4.1 and Section 4.4.
- servers check this flag only when the "require Message-
Authenticator" flag is set to "false".
- If set to "false", servers take no further action.
- If set to "true", servers discard all Access-Request packets
which do not contain Message-Authenticator, and which also
contain one or more Proxy-State attributes. This discard
happens before the Request Authenticator or Message-
Authenticator are validated.
* servers include Message-Authenticator in all responses to Access-
Request packets, Section 4.5
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* servers include Message-Authenticator in all Access-Accept,
Access-Reject, Access-Challenge, and Protocol-Error packets,
Section 4.5 and Section 4.7
* servers place Message-Authenticator as the first attribute in all
responses to Access-Request packets, and in all Access-Accept,
Access-Reject, and Access-Challenge packets, Section 4.5.
5. New Requirements on Clients and Servers
This section defines a number of updates to the RADIUS protocol, in
order to address interoperability issues. While these updates do not
directly increase the security of the protocol, they correct
implementation errors which cause the protocol to be more fragile.
5.1. Attribute Location and Ordering
While [RFC2865], Section 5 states that attribute ordering does not
matter, some implementations would discard packets attributes were
not received in a particular order chosen by the implementer.
Specifically, some implementations misunderstood the requirement
(from the BlastRADIUS mitigations) that Message-Authenticator is sent
as the first attribute in responses to Access-Request packets.
Despite the mandate that clients do not check the location of
Message-Authenticator, non-compliant implementations would discard
valid and authentic Access-Request packets where Message-
Authenticator was not the first attribute. This behavior is not
appropriate.
The [RFC2865], Section 5 text defining attribute order (quoted below)
does not cover all possible cases:
If multiple Attributes with the same Type are present, the order of
Attributes with the same Type MUST be preserved by any proxies. The
order of Attributes of different Types is not required to be
preserved. A RADIUS server or client MUST NOT have any dependencies
on the order of attributes of different types. A RADIUS server or
client MUST NOT require attributes of the same type to be contiguous.
We add a missing case here.
A RADIUS client or server MUST NOT have dependencies on the order or
location of a particular attribute. A RADIUS client or server MUST
NOT discard otherwise valid packets which have attributes in an order
which is unexpected to the implementation, but which is valid by the
above rules.
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For example, if Message-Authenticator passes validation, then the
packet is authentic and it has not been modified. The location of
Message-Authenticator within the packet does not matter for
authenticated packets. If can be the first, second, or last
attribute, without any difference in meaning.
5.2. Unknown Attributes
Another outcome of the BlastRADIUS mitigations was the discovery that
some implementations would discard packets which contained an
attribute that they did not recognize. While this behavior is not
explicitly permitted by previous specifications, it is not explicitly
forbidden, either. This document corrects that failure.
Unknown attributes are defined as attributes which are well-formed,
but which are not recognized by the implementation. Processing of
unknown attributes is discussed in [RFC2866], Section 5:
A RADIUS server MAY ignore Attributes with an unknown Type.
A RADIUS client MAY ignore Attributes with an unknown Type.
We note this recommendation is to "ignore" these attributes, and not
to discard the encapsulating packet. Instead of ignoring unknown
attributes, some implementations erroneously discard those packets.
This behavior leads to interoperability issues and network problems.
We update [RFC2865] to require that implementations MUST ignore
Attributes with an unknown Type. Those attributes MUST be treated in
the same manner as an "Invalid Attribute" which is defined in
[RFC6929], Section 2.8. The only exception to the above requirements
is CoA-Request and Disconnect-Request packets, as discussed in
[RFC8559], Section 4.3.2.
For all situations other than the ones discussed in [RFC8559],
Section 4.3.2, implementations MUST NOT discard a packet if it
contains an attribute with an unknown Type.
This behavior is secure, so long as implementations follow some
additional guidance for Access-Accept packets. This guidance follows
logically from existing text in [RFC2865], Section 4.4 for similar
situations with Access-Challenge:
If the NAS does not support challenge/response, it MUST treat an
Access-Challenge as though it had received an Access-Reject
instead.
And also for Service-Type in [RFC2865], Section 5.6:
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A NAS is not required to implement all of these service types, and
MUST treat unknown or unsupported Service-Types as though an
Access-Reject had been received instead.
A client is not required to implement all possible authorizations
which can be sent in an Access-Accept. We therefore extend the above
scenarios to packets which contain unknown Types. A client MUST
treat Access-Accepts with no known or supported authorizations as
though an Access-Reject had been received instead.
This requirement for unknown Types is already met by most, if not
all, RADIUS implementations. That is, experience has shown that
discarding packets for arbitrary reasons causes problems. Existing
implementations have largely chosen to follow reasonable practices,
and the recommendation here simply documents that wide-spread
practice.
5.3. Delaying Access-Rejects
Anyone can cause a NAS to send Access-Request packets at will, simply
by attempting to requesting network access, or login permissions from
the NAS. If this login process is not rate-limited, it can be abused
by an attacker to perform dictionary attacks.
In order to prevent these brute-force attacks, servers which directly
receive packets from a NAS MUST enforce a minimum delay between
reception of the Access-Request and transmission of any corresponding
Access-Reject. This delay SHOULD be configurable. Experience shows
that values of about one (1) second work well in practice.
Implementers should note that this delay requirement does not need to
be implemented proxies or home servers. A proxy or home server MAY
enforce a similar delay between reception of the Access-Request and
transmission of a corresponding Access-Reject. For proxies, this
delay MUST NOT be additive. That is, proxies do not add a fixed
delay to Access-Reject packets. Instead, proxies can enforce a
minimum delay between Access-Request and Access-Reject.
If multiple servers in a chain of proxies were to each add a delay,
the delays woud be cumultative, and therefore problematic.
Therefore, the requirement is for proxies to enforce a minimum delay.
Servers SHOULD also add a small random jitter to any preconfigured
delay, in order to better protect themselves from timing attacks.
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6. Migrating Away from Insecure Transports
We recognize that it is difficult to upgrade legacy devices with new
cryptographic protocols and user interfaces. The problem is made
worse because of the volume of RADIUS devices which are in use. The
exact number is unknown, and can only be approximated. Our best
guess is that at the time of this writing there are millions of
devices supporting RADIUS/UDP in daily use. It takes significant
time and effort to correct the deficiencies of all of them.
This section therefore documents a migration path from RADIUS/UDP to
secure transports. In the following sections, we give a number of
migration steps which could each be done independently. We recommend
increased entropy for shared secrets. Finally, where [RFC6614]
Section 2.3 makes support for TLS-PSK optional, we suggest that
RADIUS/TLS and RADIUS/DTLS implementations SHOULD support TLS-PSK.
6.1. Recommending TLS-PSK
Given the insecurity of RADIUS/UDP, the absolute minimum acceptable
security is to use strong shared secrets. However, administrator
overhead for TLS-PSK is not substantially higher than for shared
secrets, and TLS-PSK offers significantly increased security and
privacy.
It is therefore RECOMMENDED that implementations support TLS-PSK. In
some cases TLS-PSK is preferable to certificates. It may be
difficult for RADIUS clients to upgrade all of their interfaces to
support the use of certificates, and TLS-PSK more closely mirrors the
historical use of shared secrets, with similar operational
considerations.
Additional implementation and operational considerations for TLS-PSK
are given in [I-D.ietf-radext-tls-psk].
6.2. Network Operators
It is RECOMMENDED that all RADIUS traffic be sent over a management
VLAN. This recommendation should be followed even if TLS transport
is used. There is no reason to mix user traffic and management
traffic on the same network.
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Using a management network for RADIUS traffic will generally prevent
anyone other than trusted administrators from attacking RADIUS. We
say “generally”, because security is limited by the least secure part
of the network. If a network device has some unrelated
vulnerability, then an attacker could exploit that vulnerability to
gain access to the management network. The attacker would then be
free to exploit the RADIUS infrastructure.
As noted above, it is RECOMMENED that all RADIUS traffic use TLS
transport between client and server, even when the local network is
believed to be secure. While IPSec is useful to connect disparate
sites across untrusted networks, it is still useful to use TLS
transport to secure RADIUS traffic. A defense in depth strategy
helps to protect the network from both active attacks, and from
accidental changes which decrease network security.
All networking equipment should be physically secure. There is no
reason to have critical portions of networking infrastructure
physically accessibly to the public. Where networking equipment must
be in public areas (e.g. access points), that equipment SHOULD NOT
have any security role in the network. Instead, any network security
validation or enforcement SHOULD be done by separate equipment which
is in a physically secure location.
Similarly, the use of RADIUS/TCP in any circumstances is NOT
RECOMMENDED. Any system which supports RADIUS/TCP is also likely to
support TLS, and that SHOULD be used instead.
6.3. Deploying the BlastRADIUS Mitigations
The preceding sections define requirements for client and server
implementations which address the BlastRADIUS attack. It is useful
to also provide guidelines for administrators as to how, and when, to
set the new configuration flags. The guidelines provided in this
section are a suggestion only. Administrators are free to take other
actions as they see fit.
The guidelines provided here are known to provide minimal outages
while upgrading complex systems. As such, it is RECOMMENDED that
administrators follow the steps outlined here, in order, so that
RADIUS systems can be upgraded with minimal impact to operational
networks.
1. Administrators SHOULD upgrade servers before upgrading clients.
There are many fewer clients than servers, and upgrading servers
can often protect clients which are not upgraded.
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2. Administrators SHOULD configure servers to set "limit Proxy-
State" to "true" for all clients which are NASes. i.e. clients
which are not proxies.
3. Administrators of servers which proxy packets SHOULD verify that
all "next hop" proxies have been upgraded, and that they return
Message-Authenticator in all responses to Access-Request packets.
4. Once step (3) has been validated, administrators SHOULD configure
their proxy so that the outgoing client configuration sets the
"require Message-Authenticator" flag to "true".
5. Administrators of servers which receive proxied packets (i.e.
packets not from a NAS) SHOULD configure the server to set the
the "require Message-Authenticator" flag to "true" for each
client which is an upgraded proxy.
Once the above five steps are followed, the network should be secure,
and any client upgrade and configuration can be done over time.
For client upgrades, administrators can proceed with the following
steps:
1. Administrators SHOULD upgrade clients individually, i.e. one at a
time. Upgrading multiple clients at the same time is NOT
RECOMMENDED.
2. Once a client has been upgraded, administrators SHOULD verify
that it sends Message-Authenticator in all Access-Request
packets.
3. Once step (2) has been validated, administrators SHOULD configure
each server that receives packets from that client to set the
"require Message-Authenticator" flag to "true" for that client.
4. If a server has been updated, administrators SHOULD verify that
it sends Message-Authenticator as the first attribute in all
responses to Access-Request packets.
5. Once step (4) has been validated, administrators SHOULD configure
each client receiving packets from that server to set the
"require Message-Authenticator" flag to "true" for that server.
Once all of the above steps are followed for all clients and servers,
the network is secure from the BlastRADIUS attack.
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7. Practices to Increase RADIUS Security and Privacy
While we still permit the use of UDP and TCP transports in secure
environments, there are opportunities for increasing the security of
RADIUS when those transport protocols are used. The amount of
personal identifiable information (PII) sent in packets should be
minimized. Information about the size, structure, and nature of the
visited network should be omitted or anonymized. The choice of
authentication method also has security and privacy impacts.
The recommendations here for increasing the security of RADIUS
transports also applies when TLS is used. TLS transports protect the
RADIUS packets from observation by from third-parties. However, TLS
does not hide the content of RADIUS packets from intermediate
proxies, such as ones uses in a roaming environment. As such, the
best approach to minimizing the information sent to proxies is to
minimize the number of proxies which see the RADIUS traffic, and to
minimize the amount of PII which is sent.
Implementers and administrators need to be aware of all of these
issues, and then make the best choice for their local network which
balances their requirements on privacy, security, and cost. Any
security approach based on a simple "checklist" of "good / bad"
practices is likely to result in decreased security as compared to an
end-to-end approach which is based on understanding the issues
involved.
7.1. Use Long and Complex Shared Secrets
[RFC2865] Section 3 says:
It is preferred that the secret be at least 16 octets. This is to
ensure a sufficiently large range for the secret to provide
protection against exhaustive search attacks. The secret MUST NOT
be empty (length 0) since this would allow packets to be trivially
forged.
This recommendation is no longer adequate, so we strengthen it here.
RADIUS implementations MUST support shared secrets of at least 32
octets, and SHOULD support shared secrets of 64 octets.
Implementations MUST warn administrators that the shared secret is
insecure if it is 12 octets or less in length.
Administrators SHOULD use shared secrets of at least 24 octets,
generated using a source of secure random numbers. Any other
practice is likely to lead to compromise of the shared secret, user
information, and possibly of the entire network.
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Creating secure shared secrets is not difficult. The following
figure outlines four separate ways to create shared secrets.
openssl rand -base64 16
dd if=/dev/urandom bs=1 count=16 | base64
dd if=/dev/urandom bs=1 count=16 | base32
dd if=/dev/urandom bs=1 count=16 |
(hexdump -ve '/1 "%02x"' && echo)
Only one of the above commands should be run, as they are
functionally equivalent. Each command reads 128 bits (16 octets) of
random data from a secure source, and encodes it as printable /
readable ASCII. This form of PSK will be accepted by any
implementation which supports at least 32 octets for PSKs. Larger
PSKs can be generated by changing the "16" number in the command to a
larger value. The above derivation assumes that the random source
returns one bit of entropy for every bit of randomness which is
returned. Sources failing that assumption are NOT RECOMMENDED.
Given the simplicity of creating strong secrets, there is no excuse
for using weak shared secrets with RADIUS. The management overhead
of dealing with complex secrets is less than the management overhead
of dealing with compromised networks.
Over all, the security analysis of shared secrets is similar to that
for TLS-PSK. It is therefore RECOMMENDED that implementers manage
shared secrets with same the practices which are recommended for TLS-
PSK, as defined in [RFC8446] Section E.7 and [RFC9257] Section 4.
On a practical note, implementers SHOULD provide tools for
administrators to help them create and manage secure shared secrets.
The cost to do so is minimal for an implementer. Providing such
tools can further enable and motivate administrators to use secure
practices.
7.2. Use Constant Time Comparisons
Both clients and servers SHOULD use constant-time operations to
compare received versus calculated values which depend on secret
information. If comparison operations are stopped as soon as a
difference is seen, an attacker could using timing attacks to
determine the correct underlying values, even without seeing them. A
constant-time operation instead compares the entire value,
accumulating the result along the way. Only when the entire value
has been examined does the comparison return a "match" or "no-match"
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result.
Constant-time operations SHOULD be used for the Request Authenticator
and Response Authenticator fields. Constant time comparisons SHOULD
be used for attributes which directly contain secret values (e.g.
User-Password), or are derived from secret values (e.g. CHAP-
Password, and Message-Authenticator).
7.3. Limit the use of User-Password
The design of RADIUS means that when proxies receive Access-Request
packets, the clear-text contents of the User-Password attribute are
visible to the proxy. Despite various claims to the contrary, the
User-Password attribute is never sent "in the clear" over the
network. Instead, the password is protected by TLS (RADIUS/TLS) or
via the obfuscation methods defined in [RFC2865], Section 5.2.
However, the nature of RADIUS means that each proxy must first undo
the password obfuscation of [RFC2865], and then re-do it when sending
the outbound packet. As such, the proxy has the clear-text password
visible to it, and stored in its application memory.
It is therefore possible for every intermediate proxy to snoop and
record all User-Name and User-Password values which they see. This
exposure is most problematic when the proxies are administered by an
organization other than the one which operates the home server. Even
when all of the proxies are operated by the same organization, the
temporary existence of clear-text passwords on multiple machines is a
security risk.
It is therefore NOT RECOMMENDED for organizations to send the User-
Password attribute in packets which are sent outside of the
organization. If RADIUS proxying is necessary, another
authentication method which provides for end-to-end security of user
information SHOULD be used, such as EAP-TLS, TTLS, or PEAP.
Organizations MAY still use User-Password attributes within their own
systems.
Client and server implementations MUST use secure programming
techniques to wipe passwords and other sensitive data from memory
when they are no longer needed.
7.4. Use PAP in preference to CHAP and MS-CHAP
When the system as a whole is taken into account, the risk of
password compromise is substantially less with PAP than with CHAP or
MS-CHAP. The full reasons are outlined in
[I-D.dekok-radext-review-radius] an Section 3.3.
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It is therefore RECOMMENDED that administrators use PAP in preference
to CHAP or MS-CHAP. It is also RECOMMENDED that administrators store
passwords "at rest" in a secure form (salted, hashed), as with the
"crypt" format discussed above.
That being said, other authentication methods such as EAP-TLS
[RFC9190] and EAP-pwd [RFC5931] do not expose clear-text passwords to
the RADIUS server or any intermediate proxy. Thor methods therefore
lower the risk of password exposure even more than using PAP. It is
RECOMMENDED that administrators avoid password-based authentication
methods where at all possible.
7.5. Use EAP Where Possible
If more complex authentication methods are needed, there are a number
of EAP methods which can be used. These methods variously allow for
the use of certificates (EAP-TLS), or passwords (EAP-TTLS [RFC5281],
PEAP [I-D.josefsson-pppext-eap-tls-eap])) and EAP-pwd [RFC5931].
We also note that the TLS-based EAP methods which transport passwords
also hide the passwords from intermediate RADIUS proxies, which also
increases security.
Finally, password-based EAP methods still send PAP / CHAP / MS-CHAP
inside of the TLS tunnel. As such, the security of a home server
which checks those passwords is subject to the analysis above about
PAP versus CHAP, along with the issues of storing passwords in a
database.
7.6. Minimize the use of Proxies
The design of RADIUS means that even when RADIUS/TLS is used, every
intermediate proxy has access to all of the information in each
packet. The only way to secure the network from such observers is to
minimize the use of proxies.
Where it is still necessary to use intermediate proxies such as with
eduroam [EDUROAM] and OpenRoaming [OPENROAMING], it is RECOMMENDED to
use EAP methods instead of bare PAP, CHAP, or MS-CHAP. If passwords
are used, they can be can be protected from being seen by proxies via
TLS-based EAP methods such as EAP-TTLS or PEAP. Passwords can also
be omitted entirely from being sent over the network, as with EAP-TLS
[RFC9190] or EAP-pwd [RFC5931].
In many cases, however, the existence of proxies is to either due
contractual obligations, or to a need to solve "N by M" connection
problems. A centralized proxy system can often simplify overall
network management and maintenance.
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7.6.1. Eliminate Proxies Where Possible
The best way to avoid malicious proxies is to eliminate proxies
entirely. The use of dynamic peer discovery ([RFC7585]) means that
the number of intermediate proxies is minimized.
However, the server on the visited network still acts as a proxy
between the NAS and the home network. As a result, all of the above
analysis still applies when [RFC7585] peer discovery is used. There
is an intermediate system which may have access to passwords or PII.
The only solution is using end-to-end security for AAA, which would
involve a completely new protocol.
7.6.2. There is no RADIUS Routing Protocol
While [RFC7585] allows for a client to connect directly to a server,
that configuration is not always used. Historically, RADIUS systems
implemented realm [RFC7542] roaming, where multiple visited networks
were connected to multiple home via chains of intermediate proxies
[RFC2194]. As there is no RADIUS routing protocol to control realm
forwarding through these proxies, there is therefore no way to
automatically determine which realms are routable, or how best to
route packets for known realms.
The outcome of this limitation is that all such realm routing rules
are largely configured statically, manually, and individually on
multiple systems. This process can be automated within one
administrative system, but it is open to mistakes or abuse in multi-
system networks.
In RADIUS, each proxy which sees traffic is completely trusted. It
can modify, filter, or record any packets which transit the proxy.
This ability means that a proxy can engage in a large number of
negative behaviors. For example, a proxy could forge Access-Request
packets for realms which it knows about, and potentially perform
dictionary attacks on home networks. A proxy could also alter or
invent data in Accounting-Request packets, in order to defraud a home
server of revenue. A proxy could also observe Accounting-Request
traffic, and use the obtained information to forge Disconnect-Request
packets.
Proxies can also inject traffic for realms which do not normally
transit the proxy. Without a routing protocol, there is no way for a
home server to automatically control which set of realms is allowed
to be sent from a particular client. There is also no general way
for a proxy to signal that a particular Access-Request or Accounting-
Request is non-routable: it must be either rejected or discarded.
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Visited sites also have no control over proxies past the ones that
they have relationships with. Subsequent proxies are completely
unknown, and unknowable to the visited network. Despite these
systems being completely unknown, they are completely trusted due to
limitations in the RADIUS protocol.
That is, there is no fine-grained way for a visited or home network
to limit which intermediary systems see traffic for their realms, or
what traffic can be seen by those systems. While these filtering
rules can be manually documented as seen in [FILTER], this process is
error-prone, and fragile.
Administrators should be aware of the above issues: fraud, forgery,
and filtering are all possible in a "trusted" RADIUS ecosystem.
Historically, these issues do not appear to have been widely
exploited. The most common defense against these attacks is to limit
RADIUS relationships to entities which share a contractual
relationship. This relationship can be direct between clients,
servers, and proxies. This relationship can also be indirect, as
when multiple organizations are members of a shared consortium such
as eduroam.
Implementations therefore SHOULD provide methods by which routing
information can be tied to particular clients and to particular home
servers. Implementations SHOULD allow packets to be filtered by some
combination of realm and client or home server. Administrators
SHOULD take advantage of these filters to double-check that received
traffic is coming from the expected sources, and contains the
expected realms.
7.6.3. Dynamic Discovery and Filtering
When [RFC7585] dynamic discovery is used, intermediate proxy hops are
avoided. There are a number of possible attacks here, though
[RFC7585], Section 5 largely limits its discussion to rate limiting
of connections.
A client which supports dynamic discovery of home servers still has
to perform filtering on NAI realms before doing any lookups. When no
filtering takes place, an attacker can cause a RADIUS client to do
DNS lookups for arbitrary domains, and then cause it to connect to
arbitrary servers. As there is no RADIUS routing protocol, there is
no general way for a client to determine which realms are part of a
particular organization, and are thus permitted for dynamic DNS
lookups.
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Organizations relying on dynamic discovery SHOULD have some way of
automatically sharing which realms are valid, and which are not.
There are a number of possibilities here, and choosing the best one
is up to each individual organization.
Clients supporting dynamic discovery SHOULD require that servers use
certificates from a private Certification Authority (CA). Clients
MUST NOT automatically accept server certificates rooted from public
CAs (e.g. as is done for web servers). Instead, clients MUST be
configurable to use only a limited set of CAs. The default list of
accepted CAs SHOULD be empty.
Similarly, servers SHOULD require that clients use certificates from
a private Certification Authority (CA). Servers MUST NOT accept
client certificates rooted from a public CA.
Servers which accept connections from dynamic discover are
necessarily open to the Internet. Administrators SHOULD limit the
source IP of allowed connections. Server SHOULD filter received
packets by NAI, and close connections when the NAIs in incoming
packets do not match the NAI(s) that the server expects. This
mismatch indicates either a misconfigured or malicious client.
Both clients and servers can send any data inside of a TLS tunnel.
Implementations SHOULD take care to treat the data inside of a TLS
tunnel as a potential source of attacks.
Where multiple realms resolve to the same destination IP address,
implementations MAY send packets for multiple realms across a
connection to that IP address. Clients SHOULD use SNI to indicate
which realm they are connecting to. Servers SHOULD present a
certificate for the requested realm, instead of using a shared or
"hosting" certificate which is owned by the hosting provider, and is
used by multiple realms. Such certificate sharing decreases
security, and increases operational costs.
Where systems do not have a pre-defined list of allowed realms,
implementations MUST support negative caching. That is, if the
lookup for a particular realm fails, or a connection to that realm
fails, then the implementation needs to cache that negative result
for a period of time. This cache needs to be examined prior to any
new lookup or connection being made. If there is an entry in the
negative cache, then the server MUST skip the lookup or connection
attempt, and instead return an immediate error. This negative cache
time SHOULD be configurable.
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Other attacks are possible. If there are implementation bugs in a
clients TLS library, an attacker could use dynamic discovery to cause
the client to connect to a malicious server, and then use the server
to attack the client. A malicious server could also slow down its
TCP connection to engage client resources for extended periods of
time. This process could even be done even before any TLS
credentials are exchanged.
In general, [RFC7585] dynamic discovery is substantially different
from normal application protocols which use TLS. There is
substantial attack surface added by an unknown, and unauthenticated
user who can cause a RADIUS client to connect to arbitrary systems
under an attacker control. Dynamic discovery should be used with
care, and only with substantial amounts of filtering on the NAI
realms which are allowed, and only with stringent limits on the
number of lookups, connection attempts, open connections, etc.
7.7. Minimize Personal Identifiable Information
One approach to increasing RADIUS privacy is to minimize the amount
of PII which is sent in packets. Implementers of RADIUS products and
administrators of RADIUS systems SHOULD ensure that only the minimum
necessary PII is sent in RADIUS.
Where possible, identities should be anonymized (e.g. [RFC7542]
Section 2.4). The use of anonymized identities means that the the
Chargeable-User-Identifier [RFC4372] should also be used. Further
discussion on this topic is below.
Device information SHOULD be either omitted, or randomized. e.g. MAC
address randomization could be used on end-user devices. The details
behind this recommendation are the subject of ongoing research and
development. As such, we do not offer more specific recommendations
here.
Information about the visited network SHOULD be replaced or
anonymized before packets are proxied outside of the local
organization. The attribute Operator-NAS-Identifier [RFC8559] can be
used to anonymize information about NASes in the local network.
Location information ([RFC5580] SHOULD either be omitted, or else it
SHOULD be limited to the broadest possible information, such as
country code. For example, [I-D.tomas-openroaming] says:
All OpenRoaming ANPs MUST support signaling of location
information
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This location information is required to include at the minimum the
country code. We suggest the country code SHOULD also be the maximum
amount of location information which is sent over third-party
networks.
7.7.1. Creating Chargeable-User-Identity
Where the Chargeable-User-Identity (CUI) [RFC4372] is used, it SHOULD
be unique per session. This practice will help to maximize user
privacy, as it will be more difficult to track users across multiple
sessions. Due to additional constraints which we will discuss below,
we cannot require that the CUI change for every session.
What we can do is to require that the home server MUST provide a
unique CUI for each combination of user and visited network. That
is, if the same user visits multiple networks, the home server MUST
provide different CUIs to each visited network for that user. The
CUI MAY be the same across multiple sessions for that user on one
particular network. The CUI MAY be the same for multiple devices
used by that user on one particular network.
We note that the MAC address is likely the same across multiple user
sessions on one network. Therefore changing the CUI offers little
additional benefit, as the user can still be tracked by the
unchanging MAC address. Never the less, we believe that having a
unique CUI per session can be useful, because there is ongoing work
on increasing user privacy by allowing more MAC address
randomization. If we were to recommend that the CUI remain constant
across multiple sessions, that would in turn negate much of the
effort being put into MAC address randomization.
One reason to have a constant CUI value for a user (or user devices)
on one network is that network access providers may need to enforce
limits on simultaneous logins. Network providers may also need to
correlate user behavior across multiple sessions in order to track
and prevent abuse. Both of these requirements are impossible if the
CUI changes for every user session.
The result is that there is a trade-off between user privacy and the
needs of the local network. While perfect user privacy is an
admirable goal, perfect user privacy may also allow anonymous users
to abuse the visited network. The network would then likely simply
refuse to provide network access. Users may therefore have to accept
some limitations on privacy, in order to obtain network access.
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Although the CUI contents are not directly related to security, we
still give recommendations for creating and managing of the CUI. We
believe that these recommendations will help implementers satisfy the
preceding requirements, while not imposing undue burden on the
implementations.
In general, the simplest way to track CUIs long term is to associate
the CUI to user identity in some kind of cache or database. This
association could be created at the tail end of the authentication
process, and before any accounting packets were received. This
association should generally be discarded after a period of time if
no accounting packets are received. If accounting packets are
received, the CUI to user association should then be tracked along
with the normal accounting data.
The above method for tracking CUI works no matter how the CUI is
generated. If the CUI can be unique per session, or it could be tied
to a particular user identity across a long period of time. The same
CUI could also be associated with multiple devices.
Where the CUI is not unique for each session, the only minor issue is
the cost of the above method is that the association is stored on a
per-session basis when there is no need for that to be done. Storing
the CUI per session means that is it possible to arbitrarily change
how the CUI is calculated, with no impact on anything else in the
system. Designs such as this which decouple unrelated architectural
elements are generally worth the minor extra cost.
For creating the CUI, that process should be done in a way which is
scalable and efficient. For a unique CUI per user, implementers
SHOULD create a value which is unique both to the user, and to the
visited network. There is no reason to use the same CUI for multiple
visited networks, as that would enable the tracking of a user across
multiple networks.
Before suggesting a method for creating the CUI, we note that
[RFC4372] Section 2.1 defines the CUI as being of data type 'string'
([RFC8044] Section 3.5). [RFC4372] Section 2.1 further suggests that
the value of the CUI is interpreted as an opaque token, similar to
the Class attribute ([RFC2865] Section 5.25). Some organizations
create CUI values which use the Network Access Identifier (NAI)
format as defined in [RFC7542]. This format can allow the home
network to be identified to the visited network, where the User-Name
does not contain a realm. Such formats SHOULD NOT be used unless all
parties involved have agreed to this behavior.
The CUI SHOULD be created via a construct similar to what is given
below, where "+" indicates concatenation:
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CUI = HASH(Visited Network Data + User Identifier + Key)
This construct has the following functional parameters.
HASH
A cryptographic hash function. It is RECOMMENDED to use an
HMAC instead of a hash function.
Visited Network Data
Data which identifies the visited network.
This data could be the Operator-Name attribute ([RFC5580]
Section 4.1).
User Identifier
The site-local user identifier. For tunneled EAP methods such
as PEAP or TTLS, this could be the user identity which is sent
inside of the TLS tunnel.
Key
A secret known only to the local network. The key is generally
a large random string. It is used to help prevent dictionary
attacks on the CUI.
Where the CUI needs to be constant across multiple user sessions or
devices, the key can be a static value. It is generated once by the
home network, and then stored for use in further CUI derivations.
Where the CUI needs to be unique per session, the above derivation
SHOULD still be used, except that the "key" value will instead be a
random number which is different for each session. Using such a
design again decouples the CUI creation from any requirement that it
is unique per session, or constant per user. That decision can be
changed at any time, and the only piece which needs to be updated is
the derivation of the "key" field. In contrast, if the CUI is
generated completely randomly per session, then it may be difficult
for a system to later change that behavior to allow the CUI to be
constant for a particular user.
If an NAI format is desired, the hash output can be converted to
printable text, truncated if necessary to meet length limitations,
and then an "@" character and a realm appended to it. The resulting
text string is then in NAI form.
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We note that the above recommendation is not invertible. That is,
given a particular CUI, it is not possible to determine which visited
network or user identifier was used to create it. If it is necessary
to use the CUI to look up a user, the home network needs to store the
full set of CUI values which a user has been assigned.
If this tracking is too complex for a network, it is possible to
create the CUI via an invertible encryption process as follows:
CUI = ENCRYPT(Key + Visited Network Data + User Identifier)
This construct has the following functional parameters.
ENCRYPT
A cryptographically secure encryption function.
Key
The encryption key. Note that the same key must not be used
for more both hashing and encryption.
Visited Network Data
Data which identifies the visited network.
This data could be the Operator-Name attribute ([RFC5580]
Section 4.1).
User Identifier
The site-local user identifier. For tunneled EAP methods such
as PEAP or TTLS, this could be the user identity which is sent
inside of the TLS tunnel.
However, it is RECOMMENDED that HMAC based methods are used instead
of methods based on reversible encryption.
The intent is for CUI to leak as little information as possible, and
ideally be different for every session. However, business
agreements, legal requirements, etc. may mandate different behavior.
The intention of this section is not to mandate complete CUI privacy,
but instead to clarify the trade-offs between CUI privacy and
business realities.
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8. Privacy Considerations
The primary focus of this document is addressing privacy and security
considerations for RADIUS.
Deprecating insecure transport for RADIUS, and requiring secure
transport means that personally identifying information is no longer
sent "in the clear". As noted earlier in this document, such
information can include MAC addresses, user identifiers, and user
locations.
In addition, this document suggests ways to increase privacy by
minimizing the use and exchange of PII.
9. Security Considerations
The primary focus of this document is addressing privacy and security
considerations for RADIUS.
Deprecating insecure transports for RADIUS, and requiring secure
transports, means that many historical security issues with the
RADIUS protocol are mitigated.
We reiterate the discussion above that any security analysis must be
done on the system as a whole. It is not reasonable to put an
expensive lock on the front door of a house while leaving the window
next to it open, and then somehow declare the house to be "secure".
Any approach to security based on a simple checklist is at best
naive, and more truthfully is deeply misleading. At worst, such
practices will decrease security by causing people to follow false
security practices, and to ignore real security practices.
Implementers and administrators need to be aware of the issues raised
in this document. They can then make the best choice for their local
network which balances their requirements on privacy, security, and
cost. Only informed choices will lead to the best security.
9.1. Historical Considerations
The BlastRADIUS vulnerability is the result of RADIUS security being
a low priority for decades. Even the recommendation of [RFC5080],
Section 2.2.2 that all clients add Message-Authenticator to all
Access-Request packets was ignored by nearly all implementers. If
that recommendation had been followed, then the BlastRADIUS
vulnerability notification would have been little more than "please
remember to set the require Message-Authenticator flag on all RADIUS
servers."
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For MS-CHAP, it has not previously been deprecated for similar
reasons, even though it has been proven to be insecure for decades.
This continued use of MS-CHAP has likely resulted in the leaking of
many users clear-text passwords.
9.2. Practical Implications
This document either deprecates or forbids methods and behaviors
which have been common practice for decades. While insecure
practices have been viewed as tolerable, they are no longer
acceptable.
10. IANA Considerations
IANA is instructed to update the RADIUS Types registry, and the
"Values for RADIUS Attribute 101, Error-Cause Attribute" sub-registry
with the following addition:
Value,Description,Reference
510,Missing Message-Authenticator,[THIS-DOCUMENT]
11. Acknowledgements
Thanks to the many reviewers and commenters for raising topics to
discuss, and for providing insight into the issues related to
increasing the security of RADIUS. In no particular order, thanks to
Margaret Cullen, Alexander Clouter, and Josh Howlett.
Many thanks to Nadia Heninger and the rest of the BlastRADIUS team,
along with Heikki Vatiainen, for extensive discussions and feedback
about the issue.
The author is deeply indebted to the late Bernard Aboba for decades
of advice and guidance.
12. Changelog
* 01 - added more discussion of IPsec, and move TLS-PSK to its own
document,
* 02 - Added text on Increasing the Security of Insecure Transports
* 03 - add text on CUI. Add notes on PAP vs CHAP security
* 04 - add text on security of MS-CHAP. Rearrange and reword many
sections for clarity.
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* 05 - Rework title to deprecating "insecure practices".
Clarifications based on WG feedback.
* 00 - adoption by WG.
* 01 - review from Bernard Aboba. Added discussion on accounting,
clarified and re-arranged text. Added discussion of server
behavior for missing Message-Authenticator
* 02 - BlastRADIUS updates.
* 03 - add delay Access-Reject, constant-time comparison, no routing
protocol. Updated the text significantly and made it more
consistent with the BlastRADIUS recommendations. Add "updates"
other RFCs.
* 04 - updates with review from Fabian Mauchle
* 05 - merge in spelling fixes from Andrew Wood. Update and rewrite
BlastRADIUS mitigations to make them clearer. Add section
describing processes administrators can use to upgrade their
networks.
* 06 - updates and clarifications based on reviews.
* 07 - move "review" text into draft-dekok-radext-review-radius
13. References
13.1. Normative References
[I-D.dekok-radext-review-radius]
"*** BROKEN REFERENCE ***".
[I-D.ietf-radext-radiusdtls-bis]
Rieckers, J. and S. Winter, "(Datagram) Transport Layer
Security ((D)TLS) Encryption for RADIUS", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-radext-radiusdtls-
bis-10, 20 October 2025,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-radext-
radiusdtls-bis-10>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
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[RFC2865] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson,
"Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)",
RFC 2865, DOI 10.17487/RFC2865, June 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2865>.
[RFC6421] Nelson, D., Ed., "Crypto-Agility Requirements for Remote
Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 6421,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6421, November 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6421>.
[RFC8044] DeKok, A., "Data Types in RADIUS", RFC 8044,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8044, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8044>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
13.2. Informative References
[BLAST] Goldberg, S , et al, "RADIUS/UDP Considered Harmful",
n.d., <https://www.blastradius.fail/pdf/radius.pdf>.
[DATTACK] DeKok, A., "CHAP and Shared Secret", n.d.,
<https://www.ietf.org/ietf-ftp/ietf-mail-archive/
radius/1998-11.mail>.
[EDUROAM] eduroam, "eduroam", n.d., <https://eduroam.org>.
[FILTER] Committee, J. I. S., "Filtering of Invalid Realms", n.d.,
<https://community.jisc.ac.uk/library/janet-services-
documentation/filtering-invalid-realms>.
[I-D.ietf-radext-tls-psk]
DeKok, A., "Operational Considerations for RADIUS and TLS-
PSK", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-radext-
tls-psk-12, 21 January 2025,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-radext-
tls-psk-12>.
[I-D.josefsson-pppext-eap-tls-eap]
Palekar, A., Josefsson, S., Simon, D., and G. Zorn,
"Protected EAP Protocol (PEAP) Version 2", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-josefsson-pppext-eap-tls-
eap-10, 21 October 2004,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-josefsson-
pppext-eap-tls-eap-10>.
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[I-D.tomas-openroaming]
Tomas, B., Grayson, M., Canpolat, N., Cockrell, B. A., and
S. Gundavelli, "WBA OpenRoaming Wireless Federation", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-tomas-openroaming-06,
16 September 2025, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-tomas-openroaming-06>.
[KAMATH] Palekar, R. H. and A., "Microsoft EAP CHAP Extensions",
June 2007.
[MD5-1996] group, I. R. W., "MD5 Key recovery attack", n.d.,
<https://www.ietf.org/ietf-ftp/ietf-mail-archive/
radius/1998-02>.
[OPENROAMING]
Alliance, W. B., "OpenRoaming: One global Wi-Fi network",
n.d., <https://wballiance.com/openroaming/>.
[RFC1321] Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1321, April 1992,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1321>.
[RFC2194] Aboba, B., Lu, J., Alsop, J., Ding, J., and W. Wang,
"Review of Roaming Implementations", RFC 2194,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2194, September 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2194>.
[RFC2433] Zorn, G. and S. Cobb, "Microsoft PPP CHAP Extensions",
RFC 2433, DOI 10.17487/RFC2433, October 1998,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2433>.
[RFC2759] Zorn, G., "Microsoft PPP CHAP Extensions, Version 2",
RFC 2759, DOI 10.17487/RFC2759, January 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2759>.
[RFC2866] Rigney, C., "RADIUS Accounting", RFC 2866,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2866, June 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2866>.
[RFC2868] Zorn, G., Leifer, D., Rubens, A., Shriver, J., Holdrege,
M., and I. Goyret, "RADIUS Attributes for Tunnel Protocol
Support", RFC 2868, DOI 10.17487/RFC2868, June 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2868>.
[RFC2869] Rigney, C., Willats, W., and P. Calhoun, "RADIUS
Extensions", RFC 2869, DOI 10.17487/RFC2869, June 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2869>.
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[RFC3579] Aboba, B. and P. Calhoun, "RADIUS (Remote Authentication
Dial In User Service) Support For Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP)", RFC 3579,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3579, September 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3579>.
[RFC4372] Adrangi, F., Lior, A., Korhonen, J., and J. Loughney,
"Chargeable User Identity", RFC 4372,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4372, January 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4372>.
[RFC5080] Nelson, D. and A. DeKok, "Common Remote Authentication
Dial In User Service (RADIUS) Implementation Issues and
Suggested Fixes", RFC 5080, DOI 10.17487/RFC5080, December
2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5080>.
[RFC5176] Chiba, M., Dommety, G., Eklund, M., Mitton, D., and B.
Aboba, "Dynamic Authorization Extensions to Remote
Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 5176,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5176, January 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5176>.
[RFC5281] Funk, P. and S. Blake-Wilson, "Extensible Authentication
Protocol Tunneled Transport Layer Security Authenticated
Protocol Version 0 (EAP-TTLSv0)", RFC 5281,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5281, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5281>.
[RFC5580] Tschofenig, H., Ed., Adrangi, F., Jones, M., Lior, A., and
B. Aboba, "Carrying Location Objects in RADIUS and
Diameter", RFC 5580, DOI 10.17487/RFC5580, August 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5580>.
[RFC5931] Harkins, D. and G. Zorn, "Extensible Authentication
Protocol (EAP) Authentication Using Only a Password",
RFC 5931, DOI 10.17487/RFC5931, August 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5931>.
[RFC5997] DeKok, A., "Use of Status-Server Packets in the Remote
Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS) Protocol",
RFC 5997, DOI 10.17487/RFC5997, August 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5997>.
[RFC6151] Turner, S. and L. Chen, "Updated Security Considerations
for the MD5 Message-Digest and the HMAC-MD5 Algorithms",
RFC 6151, DOI 10.17487/RFC6151, March 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6151>.
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[RFC6613] DeKok, A., "RADIUS over TCP", RFC 6613,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6613, May 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6613>.
[RFC6614] Winter, S., McCauley, M., Venaas, S., and K. Wierenga,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Encryption for RADIUS",
RFC 6614, DOI 10.17487/RFC6614, May 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6614>.
[RFC6929] DeKok, A. and A. Lior, "Remote Authentication Dial In User
Service (RADIUS) Protocol Extensions", RFC 6929,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6929, April 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6929>.
[RFC6973] Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J.,
Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy
Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6973>.
[RFC7360] DeKok, A., "Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) as a
Transport Layer for RADIUS", RFC 7360,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7360, September 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7360>.
[RFC7542] DeKok, A., "The Network Access Identifier", RFC 7542,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7542, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7542>.
[RFC7585] Winter, S. and M. McCauley, "Dynamic Peer Discovery for
RADIUS/TLS and RADIUS/DTLS Based on the Network Access
Identifier (NAI)", RFC 7585, DOI 10.17487/RFC7585, October
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7585>.
[RFC8018] Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., and A. Rusch, "PKCS #5:
Password-Based Cryptography Specification Version 2.1",
RFC 8018, DOI 10.17487/RFC8018, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8018>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446>.
[RFC8559] DeKok, A. and J. Korhonen, "Dynamic Authorization Proxying
in the Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS)
Protocol", RFC 8559, DOI 10.17487/RFC8559, April 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8559>.
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[RFC9190] Preuß Mattsson, J. and M. Sethi, "EAP-TLS 1.3: Using the
Extensible Authentication Protocol with TLS 1.3",
RFC 9190, DOI 10.17487/RFC9190, February 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9190>.
[RFC9257] Housley, R., Hoyland, J., Sethi, M., and C. A. Wood,
"Guidance for External Pre-Shared Key (PSK) Usage in TLS",
RFC 9257, DOI 10.17487/RFC9257, July 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9257>.
Appendix A. Best Practice Checklist
In the interest of simplifying the above explanations, this section
provides a short-form checklist of recommendations. Following this
checklist does not guarantee that RADIUS systems are secure from all
possible attacks. However, systems which do not follow this
checklist are likely to be vulnerable to known attacks, and are
therefore less secure than they could be.
- Do not use RADIUS/UDP or RADIUS/TCP across the wider Internet
Exposing user identifiers, device identifiers, and locations is a
privacy and security issue.
- Avoid RADIUS/UDP or RADIUS/TCP in other networks, too.
It can take time to upgrade equipment, but the long-term goal is
to entirely deprecate RADIUS/UDP.
- Implement the BlastRADIUS mitigations
Both Implementers and administrators should implement the
mitigations in order to secure Access-Request packets.
- Use strong shared secrets
Shared secrets should be generated from a cryptographically strong
pseudo-random number generator. They should contain at least 128
bits of entropy. Each RADIUS client should have a unique shared
secret.
- Minimize the use of RADIUS proxies.
More proxies means more systems which could be compromised, and
more systems which can see private or secret data.
- Do not proxy from secure to insecure transports
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If user information (credentials or identities) is received over a
secure transport (IPsec, RADIUS/TLS, TLS-based EAP method), then
proxying the protected data over RADIUS/UDP or RADIUS/TCP degrades
security and privacy.
- Prefer EAP authentication methods to non-EAP methods.
EAP authentication methods are better at hiding user credentials
from observers.
- For EAP, use anonymous outer identifiers
There are few reasons to use individual identities for EAP.
Identifying the realm is usually enough.
[RFC7542] Section 2.4 recommends that "@realm" is preferable to
"anonymous@realm", which is in turn preferable to "user@realm".
- Prefer using PAP over CHAP or MS-CHAP.
PAP allows for credentials to be stored securely "at rest" in a
user database. CHAP and MS-CHAP do not.
- Do not use MS-CHAP outside of TLS-based EAP methods such as
PEAP or TTLS.
MS-CHAP can be cracked with minimal effort. The attack has been
available for two decades.
- Store passwords in "crypt"ed form
Where is is necessary to store passwords, use systems such as
PBKDF2 ([RFC8018].
- Regularly update to the latest cryptographic methods.
TLS 1.0 with RC4 was acceptable at one point in time. It is no
longer acceptable. Similarly, the current cryptographic methods
will at some point will be deprecated, and replaced by updated
methods. Upgrading to recent cryptographic methods should be a
normal part of operating a RADIUS server.
- Regularly deprecate older cryptographic methods.
Administrators should actively deprecate the use of older
cryptographic methods. If no system is using older methods, then
those methods should be disabled or removed entirely. Leaving old
methods enabled makes the server more vulnerable to attacks.
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- Send the minimum amount of information which is needed,.
Where proxying is used, it is a common practice is to simply
forward all of the information from a NAS to other RADIUS servers.
Instead, the proxy closest to the NAS should filter out any
attributes or data which are not needed by the "next hop" proxies,
or by the home server.
Author's Address
Alan DeKok
InkBridge Networks
Email: aland@inkbridgenetworks.com
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