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Deprecating Insecure Practices in RADIUS
draft-ietf-radext-deprecating-radius-02

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Author Alan DeKok
Last updated 2024-07-09 (Latest revision 2024-04-29)
Replaces draft-dekok-radext-deprecating-radius
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draft-ietf-radext-deprecating-radius-02
RADEXT Working Group                                            A. DeKok
Internet-Draft                                        InkBridge Networks
Intended status: Standards Track                             9 July 2024
Expires: 10 January 2025

                Deprecating Insecure Practices in RADIUS
                draft-ietf-radext-deprecating-radius-02

Abstract

   RADIUS crypto-agility was first mandated as future work by RFC 6421.
   The outcome of that work was the publication of RADIUS over TLS (RFC
   6614) and RADIUS over DTLS (RFC 7360) as experimental documents.
   Those transport protocols have been in wide-spread use for many years
   in a wide range of networks.  They have proven their utility as
   replacements for the previous UDP (RFC 2865) and TCP (RFC 6613)
   transports.  With that knowledge, the continued use of insecure
   transports for RADIUS has serious and negative implications for
   privacy and security.

   The recent publication of the "Blast RADIUS" exploit has shown that
   RADIUS needs to be updated.  It is no longer acceptable for RADIUS to
   rely on MD5 for security.  It is no longer acceptable to send device
   or location information in clear text across the wider Internet.
   This document therefore deprecates many insecure practices in RADIUS,
   and mandates the use of secure TLS-based transport layers.  We also
   discuss related security issues with RADIUS, and give many
   recommendations for practices which increase security and privacy.

About This Document

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   Status information for this document may be found at
   https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-radext-deprecating-
   radius/.

   Discussion of this document takes place on the RADEXT Working Group
   mailing list (mailto:radext@ietf.org), which is archived at
   https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/radext/.  Subscribe at
   https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/radext/.

   Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
   https://github.com/freeradius/deprecating-radius.git.

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Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on 10 January 2025.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.1.  RADIUS over the Internet  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     1.2.  Simply using IPSec or TLS is not enough . . . . . . . . .   8
     1.3.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   3.  Overview of issues with RADIUS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     3.1.  The Blast RADIUS Vulberability  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     3.2.  Information is sent in Clear Text . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     3.3.  MD5 has been broken . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     3.4.  Cracking RADIUS shared secrets is not hard  . . . . . . .  14
     3.5.  Tunnel-Password and CoA-Request packets . . . . . . . . .  15
     3.6.  TLS-based EAP methods, RADIUS/TLS, and IPSec  . . . . . .  17
   4.  All short Shared Secrets have been compromised  . . . . . . .  18
   5.  The Blast RADIUS Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     5.1.  Changes to RADIUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21

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       5.1.1.  Clients and Access-Request  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
       5.1.2.  Servers and Access-Request  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
       5.1.3.  Updated Servers and Legacy Clients  . . . . . . . . .  25
       5.1.4.  Server Responses to Access-Request  . . . . . . . . .  26
       5.1.5.  Clients Receiving Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
       5.1.6.  Status-Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
     5.2.  Related Issues  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
       5.2.1.  Other Mitigations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
       5.2.2.  Documentation and Logging . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
       5.2.3.  Alternative Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
       5.2.4.  Network Operators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
     5.3.  Limitations of the Mitigations  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
       5.3.1.  Vulnerable Systems  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
       5.3.2.  Unaffected Systems  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
       5.3.3.  The Weakest Link  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
     5.4.  Note on Proxy-State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
     5.5.  Intrusion Detection Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
   6.  Deprecating Insecure Transports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
     6.1.  Deprecating UDP and TCP as transports . . . . . . . . . .  35
     6.2.  Mandating Secure transports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
     6.3.  Crypto-Agility  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
   7.  Migration Path and Recommendations  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38
     7.1.  Shared Secrets  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38
     7.2.  Message-Authenticator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
       7.2.1.  Server Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
     7.3.  Recommending TLS-PSK  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  41
   8.  Increasing the Security of RADIUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  41
     8.1.  Minimizing Personal Identifiable Information  . . . . . .  42
       8.1.1.  Chargeable-User-Identity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43
     8.2.  User-Password Visibility  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47
     8.3.  Minimize the use of Proxies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47
     8.4.  Password Visibility and Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48
       8.4.1.  PAP Security Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48
       8.4.2.  CHAP and MS-CHAP Password Storage . . . . . . . . . .  49
       8.4.3.  On-the-wire User-Password versus CHAP-Password  . . .  50
       8.4.4.  PAP vs CHAP Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  51
     8.5.  MS-CHAP can be reversed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  52
     8.6.  EAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  53
     8.7.  Eliminating Proxies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  54
     8.8.  Accounting Considered Imperfect . . . . . . . . . . . . .  54
       8.8.1.  Incorrect Accounting Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  55
   9.  Practical Suggestions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  55
   10. Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  57
   11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  57
     11.1.  Historical Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  58
     11.2.  Practical Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  58
   12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  58
   13. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  58

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   14. Changelog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  59
   15. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  59
     15.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  59
     15.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  60
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  65

1.  Introduction

   The RADIUS protocol [RFC2865] was first standardized in 1997, though
   its roots go back much earlier to 1993.  The protocol uses MD5
   [RFC1321] to authenticate some packets types, and to obfuscate
   certain attributes such as User-Password.  As originally designed,
   Access-Request packets were entirely unauthenticated, and could be
   trivially spoofed as discussed in [RFC3579] Section 4.3.2.  In order
   to prevent such spoofing, that specification defined the Message-
   Authenticator attribute ([RFC3579] Section 3.2) which allowed for
   packets to carry an additional authentication field based on HMAC-
   MD5.

   The insecurity of MD5 has been known for a long time.  It was first
   noted in relation to RADIUS in 1996 on the IETF RADIUS working group
   mailing list [MD5-1996], which also discussed using an HMAC construct
   to increase security.  The first recorded comment that Access-Request
   packets could be spoofed was on the RADIUS working group mailing list
   [DATTACK] in 1998.  There was substantial further discussions about
   the lack of integrity checks on the list over the next few years.
   The only recorded conclusion was the definition of Message-
   Authenticator as an optional HMAC-based attribute.

   This lack of integrity checks for Access-Request packets was deemed
   acceptabled for some situations in [RFC2869], Section 7.1:

      Access-Request packets with a User-Password establish the identity
      of both the user and the NAS sending the Access-Request, because
      of the way the shared secret between NAS and RADIUS server is
      used.

   This conclusion is incorrect, because it does not address the issue
   of dictionary attacks, however.  The text continues with an
   acknowledgement that:

      Access-Request packets with CHAP-Password or EAP-Message do not
      have a User-Password attribute, so the Message-Authenticator
      attribute should be used in access-request packets that do not
      have a User- Password, in order to establish the identity of the
      NAS sending the request.

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   This text was non-normative, and it appears that no implementation
   followed this suggestion.

   The packet forgery issue was further discussed in 2004 in [RFC3579],
   Section 4, and again in 2007 in [RFC5080], Section 2.2.2.  That
   document suggested that implementations require the use of Message-
   Authenticator in order to prevent forgery:

      However, Access-Request packets not containing a Message-
      Authenticator attribute ...  may be trivially forged.  To avoid
      this issue, server implementations may be configured to require
      the presence of a Message-Authenticator attribute in Access-
      Request packets.  Requests not containing a Message-Authenticator
      attribute MAY then be silently discarded.

   To our knowledge, only two RADIUS servers implemented even this
   limited suggestion.  At the time of publication of [RFC5080], there
   was no consensus to require the use of Message-Authenticator in all
   Access-Request packets.  If this recommendation had instead been made
   mandatory, then the recent Blast RADIUS vulnerability would have been
   prevented.

   The state of MD5 security was again discussed in [RFC6151], which
   states in Section 2:

      MD5 is no longer acceptable where collision resistance is required
      such as digital signatures.

   That statement led to RADIUS security being reviewed in [RFC6421],
   Section 3.  The outcome of that review was the text in the remainder
   of [RFC6421], which created crypto-agility requirements for RADIUS.
   The main outcome of those requirements was not any change to RADIUS,
   but instead the definition of RADIUS/TLS in [RFC6614], and RADIUS
   over DTLS in [RFC7360].  The secondary outcome was a conclusion that
   adding crypto-agility to RADIUS was likely not a good idea, and that
   standardizing RADIUS over TLS instead was significantly better.

   While the RADIUS over TLS work is ongoing at the time of this
   writing, there are still a large number of sites using RADIUS over
   UDP.  Those sites need to be supported and secured until they can
   migrate to TLS.

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   To summarize, [RFC6151] is over a decade old as of the time of this
   writing.  [RFC5080] is almost two decades old.  The acknowledgment
   that Access-Request packets lack integrity checks is almost three
   decades old.  Over that entire span of time, there has been no
   solution for addressing the use of MD5 in the RADIUS protocol.  This
   document offers that solution: deprecate insecure practices, and
   mandate secure ones.

   It is no longer acceptable for RADIUS to rely on MD5 for security.
   It is no longer acceptable to send device or location information in
   clear text across the wider Internet.  This document therefore
   deprecates all insecure uses of RADIUS, and mandates the use of
   secure TLS-based transport layers.  We also discuss related security
   issues with RADIUS, and give many recommendations for practices which
   increase security and privacy.

1.1.  RADIUS over the Internet

   As the insecurity of MD5 has been well known for decades, RADIUS
   traffic over the Internet was historically secured with IPSec as
   described in [RFC3579], Section 4.2:

      To address the security vulnerabilities of RADIUS/EAP,
      implementations of this specification SHOULD support IPsec
      (RFC2401) along with IKE (RFC2409) for key management.  IPsec ESP
      (RFC2406) with non-null transform SHOULD be supported, and IPsec
      ESP with a non-null encryption transform and authentication
      support SHOULD be used to provide per-packet confidentiality,
      authentication, integrity and replay protection.  IKE SHOULD be
      used for key management.

   The use of IPSec allowed RADIUS to be sent privately, and securely,
   across the Internet.  However, experience showed that TLS was in many
   ways simpler for implementations and deployment than IPSec.  While
   IPSec required operating system support, TLS was an application-space
   library.  This difference, coupled with the wide-spread adoption of
   TLS for HTTPS, ensures that it was often easier for applications to
   use TLS than IPSec.

   RADIUS/TLS [RFC6614] and RADIUS/DTLS [RFC7360] were then defined in
   order to meet the crypto-agility requirements of [RFC6421].  RADIUS/
   TLS has been in wide-spread use for about a decade, including eduroam
   [EDUROAM], and more recently OpenRoaming [OPENROAMING] and
   [I-D.tomas-openroaming].  RADIUS/DTLS has seen less use across the
   public Internet, but it nonetheless has multiple implementations.

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   However, RADIUS/UDP is still widely used, even though it depends on
   MD5 and "ad hoc" constructions for security.  The recent
   "BlastRADIUS" attack shows just how inadequate this dependency is.
   The Blast RADIUS attack is discussed in more detail below, in
   Section 3.1.

   Even if we ignore the Blast RADIUS attack, problems with MD5 means
   that a hobbyist attacker who can view RADIUS/UDP traffic can brute-
   force test all possible RADIUS shared secrets of eight characters in
   not much more than an hour.  An more resourceful attacker (e.g. a
   nation-state) can test much longer shared secrets with only modest
   expenditures.  See Section 3.4 below for a longer discussion of this
   topic.

   Determining the shared secret will also result in compromise of all
   passwords carried in the User-Password attribute.  Even using CHAP-
   Password offers minimal protection, as the cost of crackng the
   underlying password is similar to the cost of cracking the shared
   secret.  MS-CHAP ([RFC2433] and MS-CHAPv2 [RFC2759]) are
   significantly worse in security than PAP, as they can be completely
   broken with minimal resources, (Section 8.5).

   The use of Message-Authenticator does not change the cost of
   attacking the shared secret.  The Message-Authenticator attribute is
   a later addition to RADIUS, and does does not replace the original
   MD5-based packet signatures.  While that attribute therefore offers a
   stronger protection, it does not change the cost of attacking the
   shared secret.  Moving to a stronger packet signatures (e.g.
   [RFC6218]) would still not fully address the issues with RADIUS, as
   the protocol still has privacy issues unrelated to the the security
   of packet authenticators.

   That is, most attributes in RADIUS are sent in clear-text, and only a
   few attributes such as User-Password and Tunnel-Password have their
   contents hidden.  Even the hidden attributes rely on "ad hoc"
   obfuscation methods using MD5, which are not proven to be secure.
   Peoples locations can (and have) been accurately determined, and
   people have been tracked using location data sent insecurely across
   the Internet ([]{#privacy}).

   The implications for security and individual safety are large, and
   negative.

   These issues are only partly mitigated when the authentication
   methods carried within RADIUS define their own processes for
   increased security and privacy.  For example, some authentication
   methods such EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS, etc. allow for User-Name privacy and
   for more secure transport of passwords via the use of TLS.  The use

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   of MAC address randomization can limit device information
   identification to a particular manufacturer, instead of to a unique
   device.

   However, these authentication methods are not always used, or are not
   always available.  Even if these methods were used ubiquitously, they
   do not protect all of the information which is publicly available
   over RADIUS/UDP or RADIUS/TCP transports.  And even when TLS-based
   EAP methods are used, implementations have historically often skipped
   certificate validation, leading to password compromise ([SPOOFING]).
   In many cases, users were not even aware that the server certificate
   was incorrect or spoofed, which meant that there was no way for the
   user to detect that anything was wrong.  Their passwords were simply
   handed to a spoofed server, with little possibility for the user to
   take any action to stop it.

1.2.  Simply using IPSec or TLS is not enough

   The use of a secure transport such as IPSec or TLS ensures complete
   privacy and security for all RADIUS traffic.  An observer is limited
   to knowing rough activity levels of a client or server.  That is, an
   observer can tell if there are a few users on a NAS, or many users on
   a NAS.  All other information is hidden from all observers.  However,
   it is not enough to say "use IPSec" and then move on to other issues.
   There are many issues which can only be addressed via an informed
   approach.

   For example it is possible for an attacker to record the session
   traffic, and later crack the TLS session key or IPSec parameters.
   This attack could comprise all traffic sent over that connection,
   including EAP session keys.  If the cryptographic methods provide
   forward secrecy ([RFC7525] Section 6.3), then breaking one session
   provides no information about other sessions.  As such, it is
   RECOMMENDED that all cryptographic methods used to secure RADIUS
   conversations provide forward secrecy.  While forward secrecy will
   not protect individual sessions from attack, it will prevent attack
   on one session from being leveraged to attack other, unrelated,
   sessions.

   AAA servers should minimize the impact of such attacks by using a
   total throughput (recommended) or time based limit before replacing
   the session keys.  The session keys can be replaced though a process
   of either rekeying the existing connection, or by opening a new
   connection and deprecating the use of the original connection.  Note
   that if the original connection if closed before a new connection is
   open, it can cause spurious errors in a proxy environment.

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   The final attack possible in a AAA system is where one party in a AAA
   conversation is compromised or run by a malicious party.  This attack
   is made more likely by the extensive use of RADIUS proxy forwarding
   chains.  In that situation, every RADIUS proxy has full visibility
   into, and control over, the traffic it transports.  The solution here
   is to minimize the number of proxies involved, such as by using
   Dynamic Peer Discovery ([RFC7585].

   There are many additional issues on top of simply adding a secure
   transport.  The rest of this document addresses those issues in
   detail.

1.3.  Overview

   The rest of this document begins a summary of issues with RADIUS, and
   shows just how trivial it is to crack RADIUS/UDP security.  We then
   mandate the use of secure transport, and describe what that
   requirement means in practice.  We give recommendations on how
   current systems can be migrated to using TLS.  We give suggestions
   for increasing the security of existing RADIUS transports, including
   a discussion of the authentication protocols carried within RADIUS.
   We conclude with privacy and security considerations.

   As IPSec has been discussed previously in the context of RADIUS, we
   do not discuss it in detail to it here, except to say it is an
   acceptable solution for securing RADIUS traffic.  As the bulk of the
   current efforts are focused on TLS, this document likewise focuses on
   TLS.  However, all of the issues raised here about the RADIUS
   protocol also apply to IPSec transport.

   While this document tries to be comprehensive, it is necessarily
   imperfect.  There may be issues which should have been included, but
   which were missed due to oversight or accident.  Any reader should be
   aware that there are good practices which are perhaps not documented
   here, and bad behaviors which are likewise not forbidden.

   There is also a common tendency to suggest that a particular practice
   is "allowed" by a specification, simply because the specification
   does not forbid that practice.  This belief is wrong.  That is, a
   behavior which is not mentioned in the specification cannot honestly
   be said to be "permitted" or "allowed" by that specification.
   Instead, the correct description for such behaviors is that they are
   not forbidden.  In many cases, documents such as [RFC5080] are
   written to both correct errors in earlier documents, and to address
   harmful behaviors have been seen in practice.

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   By their very nature, documents include a small number of permitted,
   required, and/or forbidden behaviors.  There are a much larger set of
   behaviors which are undefined.  That is, behaviors which are neither
   permitted nor forbidden.  Those behaviors may be good or bad,
   independent of what the specification says.

   Outside of published specifications, there is also a large set of
   common practices and behaviors which have grown organically over
   time, but which have not been written into a specification.  These
   practices have been found to be valuable by implementers and
   administrators.  Deviations from these practices generally result in
   instabilities and incompatibilities between systems.  As a result,
   implementers should exercise caution when creating new behaviors
   which have not previously been seen in the industry.  Such behaviors
   are likely to be wrong.

   It is RECOMMENDED that implementations follow widely accepted
   practices which have been proven to work, even if those practices are
   not written down in a public specification.  Failure to follow common
   industry practices usually results in interoperability failures.

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   *  RADIUS

      The Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service protocol, as
      defined in [RFC2865], [RFC2865], and [RFC5176] among others.

   *  RADIUS/UDP

      RADIUS over the User Datagram Protocol as define above.

   *  RADIUS/TCP

      RADIUS over the Transport Control Protocol [RFC6613]

   *  RADIUS/TLS

      RADIUS over the Transport Layer Security protocol [RFC6614]

   *  RADIUS/DTLS

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      RADIUS over the Datagram Transport Layer Security protocol
      [RFC7360]

   *  TLS

      the Transport Layer Security protocol.  Generally when we refer to
      TLS in this document, we are referring to RADIUS/TLS and/or
      RADIUS/DTLS.

   *  NAS

      Network Access Server, which is a RADIUS client.

   In order to continue the terminology of [RFC2865], we describe the
   Request Authenticator, Response Authenticator, and Message-Authentor
   as "signing" the packets.  This terminology is not consistent with
   modern cryptographic terms, but using other terminology could be
   misleading.  The reader should be assured that no modern
   cryptographic processes are used with RADIUS/UDP.

3.  Overview of issues with RADIUS

   There are a large number of issues with RADIUS.  The most serious is
   the Blast RADIUS vulnerability means that subject to some
   limitations, attackers can leverage MD5 known-prefix collisions to
   cause any user to be authenticated, and then be given any
   authorization.  Multifactor Authentication (MFA) systems can be
   bypassed, and the RADIUS server will in many cases not even be aware
   that an unauthorized user is on the network.

   A related issue is that RADIUS sends most information "in the clear",
   with obvious privacy implications.  Even if packets use Message-
   Authenticator for integrity checks, it is still possible for the
   average hobbyist who observes RADIUS trafic to perform brute-force
   attacks to crack even seemingly complex shared secrets.

   There is no way to fix the RADIUS protocol to address all of these
   issues.  The only solution is to wrap the protocol in a secure
   transport, such as TLS or IPSec.

   We address each of these issues in detail below.

3.1.  The Blast RADIUS Vulberability

   The Blast RADIUS vulnerability is discussed in detail in TBD, and we
   only give a short summary here.  We refer the reader to the original
   paper for a more complete description of the issue.

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   The vulnerability relies on the following property of MD5, where we
   have texts "A", "B", "S", and "+" denotes concatenation.

      If MD5(A) == MD5(B), then MD5(A + S) == MD5(B + S)

   In RADIUS, the Response Authenticator field [RFC2865], Section 3 is
   calculated via a similar construct:

      Response Authenticator = MD5(packet + secret)

   If the attacker can discover two packets "A" and "B" which have the
   same MD5 digest, then the attacker can make the RADIUS server
   calculate MD5(A + secret).  The attacker then can replace packet "A"
   with packet "B", and send that changed packet to the client.  The
   client calculates MD5(B + secret), verifies the Response
   Authenticator, and accepts the packet.

   This process is the basic concept behind the Blast RADIUS
   vulnerability.  We note that this attack does not expose the contents
   of the User-Password attribute.  Instead, it bypasses all server-side
   authentication, and instead fools the client into accepting a forged
   response.

   While this issue requires that an attacker be "on path" and be able
   to intercept and modify packets, the meaning of "on path" is all-too-
   often "the entire Internet".  As such, this attack alone should be
   seen as a cause to deprecate RADIUS/UDP entirely.

3.2.  Information is sent in Clear Text

   With the exception of a few attributes such as User-Password, all
   RADIUS traffic is sent "in the clear" when using UDP or TCP
   transports.  Even when TLS is used, all RADIUS traffic (including
   User-Password) is visible to proxies.  The resulting data exposure
   has a large number of privacy issues.  We refer to [RFC6973], and
   specifically to Section 5 of that document for detailed discussion,
   and to Section 6 of [RFC6973] for recommendations on threat
   mitigations.

   More discussion of location privacy is given in [RFC6280], which
   defines an "Architecture for Location and Location Privacy in
   Internet Applications".  However, that work was too late to have any
   practical impact on the design of the RADIUS protocol, as [RFC5580]
   had already been published.

   That is, any observer of non-TLS RADIUS traffic is able to obtain a
   substantial amount of personal identifiable information (PII) about
   users.  The observer can tell who is logging in to the network, what

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   devices they are using, where they are logging in from, and their
   approximate location (usually city).  With location-based attributes
   as defined in [RFC5580], a users location may be determined to within
   15 or so meters outdoors, and with "meter-level accuracy indoors"
   [WIFILOC].  An observer can also use RADIUS accounting packets to
   determine how long a user is online, and to track a summary of their
   total traffic (upload and download totals).

   When RADIUS/UDP is used across the public Internet, a common Wi-Fi
   configuration allows the location of individuals can potentially be
   tracked in real-time (usually 10 minute intervals), to within 15
   meters.  Their devices can be identified, and tracked.  Passwords can
   often be compromised by a resourceful attacker, or for MS-CHAP, by a
   hobbyist with a laptop.  Even when the packets do not contain any
   [RFC5580] location information for the user, the packets usually
   contain the MAC address of the Wi-Fi access point.  The MAC address
   and physical location of these devices are publicly available, and
   there are multiple services selling databases of this information.

   These issues are not theoretical.  Recently [BRIGGS] noted that:

      Overall, I think the above three examples are just the tip of the
      proverbial iceberg of SS7 and Diameter based location and
      monitoring exploits that have been used successfully against
      targeted people in the USA.

   [BRIGGS] continues with a statement that there have been:

      ... numerous other exploits based on SS7 and Diameter that go
      beyond location tracking.  Some of these involve issues like (1)
      the monitoring of voice and text messages, (2) the delivery of
      spyware to targeted devices, and (3) the influencing of U.S.
      voters by overseas countries using text messages.

   While these comments apply to Diameter [RFC6733], the same location
   tracking and monitoring is also possible with RADIUS.  There is every
   reason to believe that similar attacks on RADIUS are still occuring,
   but are simply less publicized than similar attacks on Diameter.

   The use of clear-text protocols across insecure networks is no longer
   acceptable.  Using clear-text protocols in networks which are
   believed to be secure is not a significantly better solution.  The
   correct solution is to use secure protocols, to minimize the amount
   of private data which is being sent, and to minimize the number of
   third parties who can see any traffic.

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3.3.  MD5 has been broken

   Attacks on MD5 are summarized in part in [RFC6151].  The BlastRADIUS
   work substantially improved the speed of finding MD5 collisions, and
   those improvements are publicly available at [HASHCLASH]

   While there have not been many other new attacks in the decade since
   [RFC6151] was published, that does not mean that further attacks do
   not exist.  It is more likely that no one is looking for new attacks.

3.4.  Cracking RADIUS shared secrets is not hard

   The cost of cracking a a shared secret can only go down over time as
   computation becomes cheaper.  The issue is made worse because of the
   way MD5 is used to authenticate RADIUS packets.  The attacker does
   not have to calculate the hash over the entire packet, as the hash
   prefix can be calculated once, and then cached.  The attacker can
   then begin the attack with that hash prefix, and brute-force only the
   shared secret portion.

   At the time of writing this document, an "off the shelf" commodity
   computer can calculate at least 100M MD5 hashes per second.  If we
   limit shared secrets to upper/lowercase letters, numbers, and a few
   "special" characters, we have 64 possible characters for shared
   secrets.  Which means that for 8-character secrets, there are 2^48
   possible combinations.

   The result is that using consumer-grade machine, it takes
   approximately 32 days to brute-force the entire 8 octet / 64
   character space for shared secrets.  The problem is even worse when
   graphical processing units (GPUs) are used.  A high-end GPU is
   capable of performing more than 64 billion hashes per second.  At
   that rate, the entire 8 character space described above can be
   searched in approximately 90 minutes.

   This is an attack which is feasible today for a hobbyist.  Increasing
   the size of the character set raises the cost of cracking, but not
   enough to be secure.  Increasing the character set to 93 characters
   means that the hobbyist using a GPU could search the entire 8
   character space in about a day.

   Increasing the length of the shared secret has a larger impact on the
   cost of cracking.  For secrets ten characters long, one GPU can
   search a 64-character space in about six months, and a 93 character
   space would take approximately 24 years.

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   This brute-force attack is also trivially parallelizable.  Nation-
   states have sufficient resources to deploy hundreds to thousands of
   systems dedicated to these attacks.  That realization means that a
   "time to crack" of 24 years is simply expensive, but does not take
   much "wall clock" time.  A thousand commodity CPUs are enough to
   reduce the crack time from 24 years to a little over a week.

   Whether the above numbers are precise, or only approximate is
   immaterial.  These attacks will only get better over time.  The cost
   to crack shared secrets will only go down over time.

   Even worse, administrators do not always derive shared secrets from
   secure sources of random numbers.  The "time to crack" numbers given
   above are the absolute best case, assuming administrators follow best
   practices for creating secure shared secrets.  For shared secrets
   created manually by a person, the search space is orders of magnitude
   smaller than the best case outlined above.  Rather than brute-forcing
   all possible shared secrets, an attacker can create a local
   dictionary which contains common or expected values for the shared
   secret.  Where the shared secret used by an administrator is in the
   dictionary, the cost of the attack can drop by multiple orders of
   magnitude.

   It should be assumed that a hobbyist attacker with modest resource
   can crack most shared secrets created by people in minutes, if not
   seconds.

   Despite the ease of attacking MD5, it is still a common practice for
   some "cloud" and other RADIUS providers to send RADIUS/UDP packets
   over the Internet "in the clear".  It is also common practice for
   administrators to use "short" shared secrets, and to use shared
   secrets created by a person, or derived from a limited character set.
   Theses practice are easy to implement and follow, but they are highly
   insecure and SHOULD NOT be used.

   Further requirements in shared secrets are given below in
   Section 7.1.

3.5.  Tunnel-Password and CoA-Request packets

   There are a number of security problems with the Tunnel-Password
   attribute, at least in CoA-Request and Disconnect-Request packets.  A
   full explanation requires a review of the relevant specifications.

   [RFC5176] Section 2.3 describes how to calculate the Request
   Authenticator field for these packets:

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   Request Authenticator

      In Request packets, the Authenticator value is a 16-octet MD5
      [RFC1321] checksum, called the Request Authenticator.  The
      Request Authenticator is calculated the same way as for an
      Accounting-Request, specified in [RFC2866].

   Where [RFC2866] Section 3 says:

      The NAS and RADIUS accounting server share a secret.  The Request
      Authenticator field in Accounting-Request packets contains a one-
      way MD5 hash calculated over a stream of octets consisting of the
      Code + Identifier + Length + 16 zero octets + request attributes +
      shared secret (where + indicates concatenation).  The 16 octet MD5
      hash value is stored in the Authenticator field of the
      Accounting-Request packet.

   Taken together, these definitions mean that for CoA-Request packets,
   all attribute obfuscation is calculated with the Reply Authenticator
   being all zeroes.  In contrast for Access-Request packets, the
   Request Authenticator is mandated there to be 16 octets of random
   data.  This difference has negative impacts on security.

   For Tunnel-Password, [RFC5176] Section 3.6 allows it to appear in
   CoA-Request packets:

     ...
     Change-of-Authorization Messages

     Request   ACK      NAK   #   Attribute
     ...
     0+        0        0    69   Tunnel-Password (Note 5)
     ...
     (Note 5) When included within a CoA-Request, these attributes
     represent an authorization change request.  Where tunnel attributes
     are included within a successful CoA-Request, all existing tunnel
     attributes are removed and replaced by the new attribute(s).

   However, [RFC2868] Section 3.5 says that Tunnel-Password is encrypted
   with the Request Authenticator:

      Call the shared secret S, the pseudo-random 128-bit Request
      Authenticator (from the corresponding Access-Request packet) R,

   The assumption that the Request Authenticator is random data is true
   for Access-Request packets.  That assumption is not true for CoA-
   Request packets.

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   That is, when the Tunnel-Password attribute is used in CoA-Request
   packets, the only source of randomness in the obfuscation is the
   salt, as defined in [RFC2868] Section 3.5;

    Salt
      The Salt field is two octets in length and is used to ensure the
      uniqueness of the encryption key used to encrypt each instance of
      the Tunnel-Password attribute occurring in a given Access-Accept
      packet.  The most significant bit (leftmost) of the Salt field
      MUST be set (1).  The contents of each Salt field in a given
      Access-Accept packet MUST be unique.

   This chain of unfortunate definitions means that there is only 15
   bits of entropy in the Tunnel-Password obfuscation (plus the secret).
   It is not known if this limitation makes it sufficiently easy for an
   attacker to determine the contents of the Tunnel-Password.  However,
   such limited entropy cannot be a good thing, and it is one more
   reason to deprecate RADIUS/UDP.

   Due to the above issues, implementations and new specifications
   SHOULD NOT permit obfuscated attributes to be used in CoA-Request or
   Disconnect-Request packets.

3.6.  TLS-based EAP methods, RADIUS/TLS, and IPSec

   The above analysis as to security and privacy issues focusses on
   RADIUS/UDP and RADIUS/TCP.  These issues are partly mitigated through
   the use secure transports, but it is still possible for information
   to "leak".

   When TLS-based EAP methods such as TTLS or PEAP are used, they still
   transport passwords in an insecure form.  It is possible for an
   authentication server to terminal the TLS tunnel, and then proxy the
   inner data over RADIUS/UDP.  The design of both TTLS and PEAP make
   this process fairly trivial.  The inner data for TTLS is in Diameter
   AVP format, which can be trivially transformed to RADIUS attributes.
   The inner data for PEAP is commonly EAP-MSCHAPv2, which can also be
   trivially transformed to a RADIUS EAP-Message attribute.

   Similar issues apply to RADIUS/TLS and IPSec.  A proxy could
   terminate the secure tunnel, and forward the RADIUS packets over an
   insecure transport protocol.  While this process could arguably be
   seen as a misconfiguration issue, it is never the less possible due
   to the design of the RADIUS protocol.

   The only solution to either issue would be to create a new protocol
   which is secure by design.  Unfortunately that path is not possible,
   and we are left with the recommendations contained in this document.

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4.  All short Shared Secrets have been compromised

   Unless RADIUS packets are sent over a secure network (IPsec, TLS,
   etc.), administrators SHOULD assume that any shared secret of 8
   characters or less has been immediately compromised.  Administrators
   SHOULD assume that any shared secret of 10 characters or less has
   been compromised by an attacker with significant resources.
   Administrators SHOULD also assume that any private information (such
   as User-Password) which depends on such shared secrets has also been
   compromised.

   In conclusion, if a User-Password, or CHAP-Password, or MS-CHAP
   password has been sent over the Internet via RADIUS/UDP or RADIUS/TCP
   in the last decade, you should assume that the underlying password
   has been compromised.

5.  The Blast RADIUS Attack

   This section gives some more detail on the attack, so that the reader
   can be informed as to why this document makes specifc
   recommendations.

   An "on path" attacker can inject one or more Proxy-State attributes
   with special contents into an Access-Request packet.  The Proxy-State
   attribute itself will not trigger any overflow or "out of bounds"
   issue with the RADIUS client or server.  Instead, the contents of the
   attributes will allow the attacker to create an MD5 known-prefix
   collision when the server calculates the Response Authenticator.  In
   effect, the attacker uses the RADIUS server, and its knowledge of the
   shared secret, to unknowingly authenticate packets which it has not
   created.

   The behavior of the Proxy-State attribute is extremely useful to this
   attack.  The attribute is defined in [RFC2865], Section 5.33 as an
   opaque token which is sent by a RADIUS proxy, and is echoed back by
   RADIUS servers.  That is, the contents of the attribute are never
   examined or interpreted by the RADIUS server.  Even better, testing
   shows that all RADIUS clients will simply ignore any unexpected
   Proxy-State attributes which they receive.  And finally,
   implementations generally add Proxy-State to the end of response
   packets, which simplifies the attack.

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   This attribute is therefore ideally suited to an attackers purpose of
   injecting arbitrary data into packets, without that data affecting
   client or server behavior.  It is not clear why Proxy-State is
   defined this way, as the records of the original IETF RADIUS working
   group have either been lost to time, or are missing.  However, the
   design and implementation of Proxy-State is just about ideal for for
   leveraging the attack.

   While it is possible to use other attributes to achieve the same
   effect, the use of Proxy-State is simple, and is sufficient to
   trigger the issue.

   The injected data and resulting MD5 collision allows the attacker to
   modify the packet contents almost at will, and the client will still
   accept the modified packet as being authentic.  The attack allows
   nearly arbitrary attributes to be added to the response.  Those
   attributes are simply part of the MD5 collision calculation, and do
   not increase the cost of that calculation.

   Again, since the RADIUS server can be convinced to authenticate
   packets using a prefix chosen by the attacker, there is no need for
   the attacker to know the shared secret.

   The attack is implemented via the following steps, which are numbered
   the same as in the original paper.

   1.  The attacker requests network access from the RADIUS client
       (NAS).  This action triggers the NAS to send an Access-Request
       packet to the RADIUS server.

   2.  The Access-Request is observed to obtain its contents, including
       the Request Authenticator field.  The attacker prevents this
       packet from reaching the server until the MD5 collision data has
       been calculated..  The NAS will retransmit the packet one or more
       times after a delay, giving the attacker time to calculate the
       chosen prefix.

   3.  Some external resources are used to calculate an MD5 collision
       using the Request Authenticator, and the expected contents of an
       Access-Reject.  As Access-Reject packets are typically empty (or
       can be observed), the expected packet contents are known in their
       entirety.

   4.  Once an MD5 collision is found, the resulting data is placed into
       one or more Proxy-State attributes in the previously seen Access-
       Request.  The attacker then sends this modified Access-Request to
       the RADIUS server.

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   5.  The RADIUS server responds with an Access-Reject, and includes
       the Proxy-State attributes from the modified Access-Request
       packets.

   6.  The attacker discards the original Access-Reject, and uses the
       chosen prefix data to create a different (i.e. modified)
       response, such as an Access-Accept.  Other authorization
       attributes such as VLAN assignment can also be add, modified, or
       deleted.

   7.  The NAS receives the modified Access-Accept, verifies that the
       Response Authenticator is correct, and gives the user access,
       along with the attackers desired authorization.

   The result of this attack is a near-complete compromise of the RADIUS
   protocol.  The attacker can cause any user to be authenticated.  The
   attacker can give almost any authorization to any user.

   While the above description uses Access-Reject responses, we
   reiterate that the root cause of the vulnerability is in the Access-
   Request packets.  The attack will therefore succeed even if the
   server responds with Access-Accept, Access-Challenge, or Protocol-
   Error.

   In addition to forging an Access-Accept for a user who has no
   credentials, the attacker can control the traffic of known and
   authenticated users.  Many modern Broadband Network Gateways (BNG)s,
   Wireless Lan Controllers (WLCs), and Broadband Remote Access Servers
   (BRAS) support configuring a dynamic HTTP redirect using Vendor
   Specific Attributes (VSA)s.  These VSAs are not protected by the
   shared secret, and could be injected into an Access-Accept in order
   to redirect a users traffic.  The attacker could then set up a
   malicious website to launch Zero-Day/Zero-Click attacks, driving
   subscribers to the website using an HTTP redirect.  This issue is
   compounded by the fact that many devices perform automatic HotSpot
   1.0 style walled garden discovery.  The act of simply connecting to
   their home WiFi connect could be enough to compromise a subscriber's
   equipment.

   The result of the attack is a near-total compromise of RADIUS
   security.  The following subsections define mitigations which can be
   used to protect clients and servers from this attack when using
   RADIUS/UDP or RADIUS/TCP.  However, we reiterate here, and in the
   rest of this document that the only long-term solution is to
   deprecate insecure transports entirely.

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5.1.  Changes to RADIUS

   There are a number of changes required to both clients and servers in
   order for all possible attack vectors to be closed.  Implementing
   only some of these mitigations means that an attacker could bypass
   the partial mitigations, and therefore still perform the attack.

   This section outlines the mitigation methods which protect systems
   from this attack, along with the motivation for those methods.

   We note that unless otherwise noted, the discussion here applies only
   to Access-Request packets, and to responses to Access-Request (i.e.
   Access-Accept, Access-Reject, Access-Challenge, and Protocol-Error
   packets).  All behavior involving other request and response packets
   MUST remain unchanged.

   Similarly, the recommendations in this section only apply to UDP and
   TCP transport.  They do not apply to TLS transport, and no changes to
   TLS transport are needed to protect from this attack.  Clients and
   servers MUST NOT apply any of the new configuration flags to packets
   sent over TLS or DTLS transport.  Clients and servers MAY include
   Message-Authenticator in request and responses packets which are sent
   over TLS or DTLS transports, but the attribute serves no security
   purpose.

   We recognize that implementing these mitigation may require a
   significant amount of effort.  There is a substantial amount of work
   to perform in updating implementations, performing interoperability
   tests, changing APIs, changing user interfaces, and updating
   documentation.  This effort cannot realistically be done in a short
   time frame.

   There is therefore a need for an immediate and short-term action
   which can be implemented by RADIUS clients and servers which is both
   simple to do, and which is known to be safe.  The recommendations in
   this section are known to protect implementations from the attack; to
   be simple to implement; and also to allow easy upgrade without
   breaking existing deployments.

   The mitigation methods outlined here allow systems to both protect
   themselves from the attack, while not breaking existing networks.
   There is no global "flag day" required for these changes.  Systems
   which implement these recommendations are fully compatible with
   legacy RADIUS implementations, and can help protect those legacy
   implementations.  However, when these mitigations are not
   implemented, systems are still vulnerable to the attack.

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   Note that in some network architectures, the attack can be mitigated
   simply by upgrading the RADIUS server, so that it sends Message-
   Authenticator as the first attribute in all responses to Access-
   Request packets.  However, the goal of this specification is to fix
   all architectures for RADIUS systems, rather than a limited subset.
   We therefore mandate new behavior for all RADIUS clients and server,
   while acknowledging that some organizations may choose to not deploy
   all of the new functionality.  For overall network security and good
   practice. we still recommend that all RADIUS clients and servers be
   upgraded, and have the new "require Message-Authenticator" flag set.

5.1.1.  Clients and Access-Request

   Clients MUST add Message-Authenticator to all Access-Request packets.

   This behavior MUST NOT be configurable.  Disabling it would open the
   system up to attacks, and would prevent the other mitigation methods
   from working.  The root cause of the attack is that Access-Request
   packets lack integrity checks, so the most important fix is to add
   integrity checks to those packets.

   The Message-Authenticator SHOULD be the first attribute in all
   Access-Request packets.  That is, it should be placed immediately
   after the packet header.

   From a cryptographic point of view, the location of Message-
   Authenticator does not matter, as it just needs to exist somewhere in
   the packet.  However, as discussed below for Access-Accept etc.
   packets, the location of Message-Authenticator does matter.  It is
   better to have consistent and clear messaging for addressing this
   attack, instead of having different recommendations for different
   kinds of packets

   All RADIUS servers will validate the Message-Authenticator attribute
   correctly when that attribute is received in a packet.  We are not
   aware of any RADIUS servers which will reject or discard Access-
   Request packets if they unexpectedly contain a Message-Authenticator
   attribute.

   This behavior has been enabled in the FreeRADIUS server for over a
   decade, and there have been no reports of interoperability problems.
   It is therefore safe for all clients to immediately implement this
   requirement.

   However, many existing RADIUS clients do not send Message-
   Authenticator.  It also may be difficult to upgrade some client
   equipment, as the relevant vendor may have gone out of business, or
   may have marked equipment as "end of life" and thus unsupported.  It

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   is therefore necessary to both work with such systems by not breaking
   existing RADIUS deployments, while at the same time protecting them
   as much as practically possible.

5.1.2.  Servers and Access-Request

   Servers MUST have a per-client boolean configuration flag, which we
   call "require Message-Authenticator".  The default value for this
   flag must be "false" in order to maintain compatibility with legacy
   clients.

   When this flag is set to "true", any Access-Request packets which do
   not contain Message-Authenticator MUST be silently discarded.  This
   action protects the server from packets which have been modified in
   transit to remove Message-Authenticator.

   When this flag is set to "false", RADIUS servers MUST follow legacy
   behavior for validating, and enforcing the existence of Message-
   Authenticator in Access-Request packets.  For example, enforcing the
   requirement that all packets containing EAP-Message also contain a
   Message-Authenticator attributes, but otherwise accepting and
   validating the Message-Authenticator attribute if it is present, but
   taking no action if the attribute is missing.

   The reason for the historical default value to be "false" is that
   many RADIUS clients do not send the Message-Authenticator attribute
   in all Access-Request packets.  Defaulting to a value of "true" means
   that the RADIUS server would be unable to accept packets from many
   legacy RADIUS clients, and existing networks would break.

   If this flag is "false", then the server can be vulnerable to the
   attack, even if the client has been updated to always send Message-
   Authenticator in all Access-Requests.  The attacker could simply
   strip the Message-Authenticator from the Access-Request, and proceed
   with the attack as if client had not been updated.  As a result, this
   flag MAY be set to "false" if the client is a NAS, and SHOULD NOT be
   set to "false" for proxies.

   Administrators can set this flag to "true" for clients which send
   Message-Authenticator, and leave the flag as "false" for clients
   which cannot be upgraded.

   We note that "Section 7.2 of the paper" has the following comment
   about the FreeRADIUS server, which has has this configuration option
   since 2008:

      If support for these old clients is not required, enabling this
      option would make our attacks infeasible.

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   Every network administrator MUST set this flag to "true" for all
   clients which send Message-Authenticator.

   While servers must validate the contents of Message-Authenticator,
   they MUST NOT check the location of that attribute.  There is no
   different meaning in RADIUS if Message-Authenticator is the first,
   second, or last attribute in a packet.  Servers MUST accept a RADIUS
   packet as valid if it passes authentication checks, no matter the
   location of the Message-Authenticator attribute.

   Unfortunately, there is no way for clients and servers to negotiate
   configuration in RADIUS/UDP or RADIUS/TCP.  The server cannot
   determine if the packets are discarded due to an attack, or if they
   are discarded due to a mismatched configuration between client and
   server.  The server SHOULD therefore log the fact that the packet was
   discarded (with rate limits) in order to inform the administrator
   that either an attack is underway, or that there is a configuration
   mismatch between client and server.

   As a special corner case for debugging purposes, instead of
   discarding the packet, servers MAY immediately instead send a
   Protocol-Error or Access-Reject response packet.  This packet MUST
   contain a Message-Authenticator attribute as the first attribute in
   the packet, otherwise an attacker could turn this response into an
   Access-Accept.  The response MUST also contain an Error-Cause
   attribute with value 510 (Missing Message-Authenticator).  The server
   MUST not send this response by default, as it this could cause the
   server to respond to forged Access-Request packets.  This behavior
   MUST be enabled only when specifically configured by an
   administrator.  It MUST also be rate-limited, as there is no need to
   signal this error on every packet received by the server.

   The purpose of this Protocol-Error packet is to allow administrators
   to signal misconfigurations between client and server.  It is
   intended to only be used temporarily when new client to server
   connections are being configured, and MUST be disabled permanently
   once the connection is verified to work.

   As RADIUS clients are upgraded over time, RADIUS servers can
   eventually enable the "require Message-Authenticator" flag by
   default.

   The next question is how to protect systems when legacy clients do
   not send Message-Authenticator.

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5.1.3.  Updated Servers and Legacy Clients

   Where it is not possible for a server to require Message-
   Authenticator in Access-Request packets, it is still possible to
   largely protect servers from the attack.  We can motivate the
   solution by observing that the attack requires the server to receive
   packets containing Proxy-State, while "real" clients (i.e. not
   proxies) will never send Proxy-State.

   The mitigations in this section MUST NOT be used when the "require
   Message Authenticator" flag is set to "false".

   A RADIUS server can still partially protect itself when the "require
   Message Authenticator" flag is set to "false", by adding an
   additional per-client boolean configuration flag, which we call
   "limit Proxy-State".  The intention here is to permit the server to
   accept Access-Request packets which are missing Message-
   Authenticator, but also to discard the modified packets which are a
   vector for this attack.

   When the flag is set to "false", RADIUS servers MUST follow legacy
   behavior for enforcing the existence of Message-Authenticator in
   Access-Request packets, as with the previous section.

   When the flag is set to "true", RADIUS servers MUST require that all
   Access-Request packets which contain a Proxy-State attribute also
   contain a Message-Authenticator attribute.  This flag is motivated by
   the realization that NASes which do not send Message-Authenticator in
   Access-Request packets also never send Proxy-State.  It is therefore
   safe to add a flag which checks for Proxy-State, because well-
   behaving NASes will never send it.  The only time the server will see
   a Proxy-State from a NAS is when the attack is taking place.

   As RADIUS proxies are now mandated to add Proxy-State to all proxied
   packets, this flag MAY be set only when the client is a NAS which
   cannot be upgraded, and MUST NOT be set in other situations.
   Specifically, the flag MUST NOT be set when the client is a proxy,
   the "require Message-Authenticator" flag MUST be used instead.

   The recommended behavior for this flag is to not just drop packets
   which contain Proxy-State, but instead to drop them only if they
   contain Proxy-State, and also do not contain Message-Authenticator.
   The additional checks allow the server to be more flexible in what
   packets it accepts, without compromising on security.

   This flag is necessary because it may not be possible to upgrade some
   RADIUS clients for an extended period of time, or even at all.  Some
   products may no longer be supported, or some vendors have gone out of

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   business.  There is therefore a need for RADIUS servers to protect
   themselves from to this attack, while at the same time being
   compatible with legcy RADIUS client implementations.

   The combination of these two flags is that we both obtain the
   positive result that the systems are protected as much as feasible,
   while at the same time avoiding the negative result of creating
   interoperability issues.  The local RADIUS server will be protected
   from attacks on the client to server path, so long as one of the two
   flags is set.

   While it is theoretically possible to perform the Blast RADIUS attack
   via attributes other than Proxy-State, no such exploits are known at
   this time.  Any such exploit would require that the server receive
   fields under the attackers control (e.g.  User-Name), and echo them
   back in a response.  Such attacks are only possible when the server
   is configured to behave this way, which is not the default behavior
   for most servers.

   It is therefore RECOMMENDED that servers only echo back user-supplied
   data in responses when the "require Message-Authenticator" flag is
   set to "true".  No other configuration is known to protect from all
   possible variants of this attack.

   These two configuration flags will not protect clients (NASes or
   proxies) from servers which have not been upgraded or configured
   correctly.  More behavior changes to servers and clients are
   required.

5.1.4.  Server Responses to Access-Request

   Servers MUST add Message-Authenticator as the first attribute in all
   responses to Access-Request packets.  That is, all Access-Accept,
   Access-Reject, Access-Challenge, and Protocol-Error packets.  The
   attribute MUST be the first one in the packet, immediately after the
   20 octet packet header.

   Adding Message-Authenticator as the first attribute means that for
   the purposes of MD5 known prefixes attacks, essentially the entire
   packet is an unknown suffix.  The attacker is therefore unable to
   leverage a known prefix, and the vulnerability is mitigated.

   This behavior also protects one client to server hop, even if the
   server does not require Message-Authenticator in Access-Request
   packets, and even if the client does not examine or validate the
   contents of the Message-Authenticator.

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   We note that in contrast, adding a Message-Authenticator to the end
   of response packets will not mitigate the attack.  When the Message-
   Authenticator is the last attribute in a packet, the attacker can
   treat the Message-Authenticator as an unknown suffix, as with the
   shared secret.  The attacker can then calculate the prefix as before,
   and have the RADIUS server authenticate the packet which contains the
   prefix.  The attack is only prevented when the Message-Authenticator
   is the first attribute in the packet, i.e. when no other attributes
   appear in the packet before Message-Authenticator.  We direct the
   reader to Section 7.2 of the paper for a more complete description of
   these issues.

   The location of the Message-Authenticator attribute is critical to
   protect legacy clients which do not verify that attribute.  Many
   legacy clients do not send Message-Authenticator in Access-Request
   packets, and therefore are highly likely to not validate it in
   responses to those Access-Requests.  Upgrading all of these clients
   may be difficult, or in some cases impossible.  It is therefore
   important to have mitigation factors which protect those systems.

   The requirement above to send Message-Authenticator first in response
   packets therefore protects those legacy clients, as the known prefix
   attack cannot occur.  The client will still verify the Response
   Authenticator for the unmodified packet, and will then accept the
   unmodified, and properly authenticated packet.

   As it is difficult to upgrade both clients and servers
   simultaneously, we also need a method to protect clients when the
   server has not been updated.  That is, clients cannot depend on the
   Message-Authenticator existing in response packets.  Clients need to
   take additional steps to protect themselves, independent of any
   server updates.

5.1.5.  Clients Receiving Responses

   As discussed above, an attacker can remove or hide Message-
   Authenticator from the response packet, and still perform the attack.
   Clients (and proxies acting as clients) therefore MUST also implement
   a configuration flag "require Message-Authenticator", which mirrors
   the same flag for servers.  When the flag is set to "false", RADIUS
   clients MUST follow legacy behavior for enforcing the existence of
   Message-Authenticator in response packets.

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   When the flag is set to "true", the client MUST silently discard (as
   per RFC 2865 Section 1.2) any response to Access-Request packets
   which does not contain a Message-Authenticator attribute.  This check
   MUST be done before the Response Authenticator or Message-
   Authenticator has been verified.  No further processing of the packet
   should take place.

   While a client MUST validate the contents of Message-Authenticator,
   it MUST NOT check the location of that attribute.  There is no
   different meaning in RADIUS if Message-Authenticator is the first,
   second, or last attribute in a packet.  Clients MUST accept a RADIUS
   packet as valid if it passes authentication checks, no matter the
   location of the Message-Authenticator attribute.

   That is, if the Message-Authenticator exists anywhere in the response
   packet, and that attribute passes validation, then the client can
   trust that the response from the server has not been modified by an
   attacker.

   When the response is discarded, the client MUST behave as if the
   response was never received.  That is, any existing retransmission
   timers MUST NOT be modified as a result of receiving a packet which
   is silently discarded.

   Unfortunately, the client cannot determine if the packets were
   discarded due to an attack, or if they were discarded due to a
   mismatched configuration between client and server.  The client
   SHOULD log the fact that the packet was discarded (with rate limits)
   in order to inform the administrator that either an attack is
   underway, or that there is a configuration mismatch between client
   and server.  The solution to the inability of legacy RADIUS to
   perform signaling and capability negotiation is not to update the
   protocol.  Instead, the solution is to move to TLS.

5.1.6.  Status-Server

   While the attack works only for Access-Request packets, Access-Accept
   or Access-Reject can also be sent in response to Status-Server
   packets.  In order to simplify client implementations, servers MUST
   follow the above recommendations relating to Message-Authenticator
   when sending Access-Accept or Access-Reject packets, even if the
   original request was Status-Server.

   This requirement ensures that clients can examine responses
   independent of any requests.  That is, the client code can do a
   simple verification pass of response packets prior to doing any more
   complex correlation of responses to request.

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5.2.  Related Issues

   This section contains discussions of related issues which do not
   involve changes to the RADIUS protocol.

5.2.1.  Other Mitigations

   RADIUS clients (but not proxies) MAY also check for the existence of
   the Proxy-State attribute in responses to Access-Request packets.
   Since a NAS / GGSN / etc. is not a RADIUS proxy, it will never sent a
   Proxy-State in an Access-Request,, and therefore responses to that
   Access-Request will never contain a Proxy-State attribute.  In
   addition, no standards compliant RADIUS server will respond with a
   Proxy-State when the Access-Request does not contain a Proxy-State
   attribute.

   If the response to an Access-Request does contain a Proxy-State
   attribute, then the client can safely discard the packet, knowing
   that it is invalid.  This behaviour SHOULD always be enabled, and
   should not be configurable.

   This behavior will also help protect the client when the new
   configuration flags described here are not set.

   However, as noted in the Section 7.7 of the Blast RADIUS paper, this
   behavior alone is not sufficient to protect the client.  The attacker
   can not only hide a Message-Authenticator if it is last in a response
   packet, the attacker can use similar techniques to hide Proxy-State
   attributes.  The client would then see a response which does not
   contain Message-Authenticator or Proxy-State.  Instead, the client
   would see a response which does contain attributes that it is known
   to ignore, such as a Vendor-Specific attribute from an unknown
   vendor.

5.2.2.  Documentation and Logging

   It is RECOMMENDED that RADIUS server implementations document the
   behavior of these flags in detail, including how they help protect
   against this attack.  We believe that an informed administrator is
   more likely to engage in secure practices.

   Similarly, when either of the above flags cause a packet to be
   discarded, the RADIUS server SHOULD log a descriptive message
   (subject to rate limiting) about the problematic packet.  This log is
   extremely valuable to administrators who wish to determine if
   anything is going wrong, and what to do about it.

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5.2.3.  Alternative Solutions

   An alternative configuration flag with a similar effect to the "limit
   Proxy-State" flag could be one called "this client is a NAS, and will
   never send Proxy-State".  The intention for such a flag would be to
   clearly separate RADIUS proxies (which always send Proxy-State), from
   NASes (which will never send Proxy-State).  When the flag is set for
   a client, the server could then discard Access-Request packets which
   contain Proxy-State.  Alternatively, the server could also discard
   Proxy-State from all responses sent to that client.

   Such a flag, however, depends on network topology, and fails to
   correct the underlying lack of packet authenticity and integrity.
   The flag may also work for one NAS, but it is likely to be incorrect
   if the NAS is replaced by a proxy.  Where there are multiple
   different pieces of NAS equipment behind a NAT gateway, flag is also
   likely to be correct for some packets, and incorrect for others.

   Setting configuration flags by the desired outcome is preferable to
   setting flags which attempt to control network topology.

   It may be tempting to come up with other "ad hoc" solutions to this
   vulnerability.  Such solutions are NOT RECOMMENDED, as they are
   likely to either break existing RADIUS deployments, or else they will
   not prevent the attack.  The mitigations described in this document
   not only prevent the attack, they do so without affecting normal
   RADIUS operation.  There is therefore no reason to use any other
   methods.

   Other attempted mitigation factors are discussed in the "Blast
   RADIUS" document.  For example, "Blast RADIUS" Section 7.4 explains
   why decreasing timeouts simply increases the cost of the attack
   without preventing it.  Decreasing timeouts also can negatively
   affect normal traffic.

   "Blast RADIUS" Section 7.7 explains why validating Proxy-State, or
   looking for unexpected Proxy-State does not help.  The attacker can
   likely just change the nature of the attack, and bypass those checks.

   There is no reason to implement "ad hoc" solutions when a solution
   exists which has passed reviews by both the Blast RADIUS
   cryptographers, and by the RADIUS working group.  There is every
   reason to believe that cryptographic operations designed by experts
   and subject to rigorous peer review are better than random guesses
   made by programmers lacking relevant cryptographic and RADIUS
   experience.

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5.2.4.  Network Operators

   The most important outcome of this attack for network operators is
   that where possible, all RADIUS traffic should use TLS transport
   between client and server.

   All other methods to mitigate the attack are less secure, they still
   fail at adding privacy, and are therefore less useful.  We recognize
   that not all networking equipment supports TLS transport, so we
   therefore give additional recommendations here which operators can
   follow to help mitigate the attack.

   All networking equipment should be physically secure.  There is no
   reason to have critical portions of networking infrastructure
   physically accessibly to the public.  Where networking equipment must
   be in public areas (e.g. access points), that equipment SHOULD NOT
   have any security role in the network.  Instead, any network security
   validation or enforcement SHOULD be done by separate equipment which
   is in a physically secure location.

   It is RECOMMENDED that all RADIUS traffic be sent over a management
   VLAN.  This recommendation should be followed even if TLS transport
   is used.  There is no reason to mix user traffic and management
   traffic on the same network.

   Using a management network for RADIUS traffic will generally prevent
   anyone other than trusted administrators from performing this attack.
   We say "generally", because security is limited by the least secure
   part of the network.  If a network device has some unrelated
   vulnerability, then an attacker could exploit that vulnerability to
   gain access to the management network.  The attacker would then be
   free to exploit this issue.

   Only the use of TLS will prevent such attacks from being chained
   together.

   Similarly, there are few reasons to use RADIUS/TCP.  Any system which
   supports RADIUS/TCP likely also supports TLS, and that should be used
   instead.

   Finally, any RADIUS/UDP or RADIUS/TCP traffic MUST NOT be sent over
   public networks such the Internet.  This issue is discussed in more
   detail elsewhere in this document.

5.3.  Limitations of the Mitigations

   The above mitigations have some limitations.

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5.3.1.  Vulnerable Systems

   A RADIUS server is vulnerable to the attack if it does not require
   that all received Access-Request packets contain a Message-
   Authenticator attribute.  This vulnerability exists for many common
   uses of Access-Request, including packets containing PAP, CHAP, MS-
   CHAP, or packets containing "Service-Type = Authorize-Only".  The
   vulnerability is also transitive.  If any RADIUS server in a proxy
   chain is vulnerable, then the attack can succeed, and the attacker
   can gain unauthenticated and/or unauthorized access.

   Simply having the Message-Authenticator attribute present in Access-
   Request packets is not sufficient.  In order to be protected, a
   server must require that the attribute is present, and discard
   packets where it is missing.  Similarly, the client must also require
   that the attribute is present, and discard packets where it is
   missing.

   The attack is fully mitigated only when both sides of the RADIUS
   conversation are updated and configured correctly.

5.3.2.  Unaffected Systems

   There are a number of systems which are not vulnerable to this
   attack.  The most important ones are systems which only perform EAP
   authentication, such as with 802.1X / WPA enterprise.  The EAP over
   RADIUS protocol is defined in [RFC3579], Section 3.3 which states
   explicitly:

      If any packet type contains an EAP-Message attribute it MUST also
      contain a Message-Authenticator.

   This requirement reiterates that of [RFC2869], Section 5.13, which
   defines EAP-Message and Message-Authenticator, but which does not get
   into details about EAP.

   This requirement is enforced by all known RADIUS servers.  As a
   result, when roaming federations such as eduroam use RADIUS/UDP, it
   is not possible for the attacker to forcibly authenticate users, but
   it may be possible for the attacker to control the authorization
   attributes for known and valid users.

   Other roaming groups such as OpenRoaming require the use of TLS, and
   are not vulnerable.  Other roaming providers generally use VPNs to
   connect disparate systems, and are also not vulnerable.

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   802.1X / WPA enterprise systems have an additional layer of
   protection, due to the use of the master session keys (MSK) which are
   derived from the EAP authentication. method These keys are normally
   carried in the MS-MPPE-Recv-Key and MS-MPPE-Send-Key attributes in
   the Access-Accept packet.  The contents of the attributes are
   obfuscated via the same method used for Tunnel-Password.

   While an attacker can perhaps force an Access-Accept in some
   situations, or strip the Message-Authenticator from packets, it is
   not currently possible for an attacker to see, modify, or create the
   correct MSK for the EAP session.  As a result, when 802.1X / WPA
   enterprise is used, even a successful attack on the Access-Accept
   packet would likely not result in the attacker obtaining network
   access.

5.3.3.  The Weakest Link

   RADIUS security is done on a "hop by hop" basis, which means that an
   attacker can take advantage of the weakest link in a proxy chain, in
   order to attack other systems which have fully implemented the above
   mitigations.  If the packets are passed through one or more proxies,
   then any one vulnerable proxy will still allow the attack to take
   place.

   If proxies must be used, every single hop in the proxy chain SHOULD
   be verified to follow the highest level of security, otherwise all
   security will be lost.

   Even worse, proxies have full control over packet contents.  A
   malicious proxy can change a reject into an accept, and can add or
   delete any authorization attributes it desires.  While proxies are
   generally part of a trusted network, there is every benefit in
   limiting the number of participants in the RADIUS conversation.

   Proxy chains SHOULD therefore be avoided where possible, and
   [RFC7585] dynamic discovery should be used where possible.  RADIUS
   clients and servers SHOULD also be configured with static IP
   addresses, and static routes.  This static configuration also
   protects them from DHCP related attacks where an attacker spoofs DHCP
   to cause clients or servers to route packets through the a system of
   the attackers choice.

5.4.  Note on Proxy-State

   As the Blast RADIUS paper points out in Appendix A:

      The presence of this attribute makes the protocol vulnerability
      much simpler to exploit than it would have been otherwise.

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   To see why this the case, we go back to the original discussion in
   May 1995:

      The RADIUS proxy may place any state information (subject to the
      length limitations of a RADIUS attribute) that it will need to
      transform a reply from its server into a reply to its client.
      This is typically the original authenticator, identifier, IP
      address and UDP port number of the proxy's RADIUS client.

   There appear to be few, if any, RADIUS servers which implement this
   suggestion.  In part because later discussions note:

      This works only if the NAS is prepared to accept replies from a
      proxy server for a request issued to a different server.

   This stateless proxy design has a number of additional issues, most
   notably violating the [RFC3539] "end-to-end" principle.  It therefore
   negatively impacts the stability of a RADIUS proxy system.

   This definition for Proxy-State later changed in [RFC2865],
   Section 5.33 to

      Usage of the Proxy-State Attribute is implementation dependent.  A
      description of its function is outside the scope of this
      specification.

   In practice, the utility of Proxy-State is limited to detecting proxy
   loops.  Proxies can count the number of Proxy-State attributes in
   received packets, and if the total is more than some number, then a
   proxy loop is likely.

   It is likely that a "hop count" attribute would likely have been
   simpler to implement, but even in 1996, it was likely difficult to
   change due to multiple implementations.

5.5.  Intrusion Detection Systems

   Intrusion detection systems can be updated to detect and/or warn
   about the attack with the following rules.  In the interests of
   brevity and generality, the rules are written as plain text, and not
   as code.

   1.  Access-Request does not contain a Message-Authenticator attribute
       > Action: Warn the administrator that the system is vulnerable,
       and should be upgraded

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   2.  Access-Accept, Access-Reject, or Access-Challenge does not
       contain a Message-Authenticator attribute > Action: Warn the
       administrator that the system is vulnerable, and should be
       upgraded

   3.  Access-Accept, Access-Reject, or Access-Challenge contains a
       Message-Authenticator attribute, but it is not the first
       attribute in the packet > Action: Warn the administrator that the
       system is vulnerable, and should be upgraded

   4.  Access-Request packet received by a RADIUS server contains Proxy-
       State, when the RADIUS client is a NAS > Action: Alert that an
       attack is likely taking place. > Note that the check should be
       for packets received by the RADIUS server, and not for packets
       sent by the NAS.  The attack involves packets being modified
       after they are sent by the NAS, and before they are received by
       the RADIUS server.

   5.  Access-Accept, Access-Reject, or Access-Challenge sent by a
       RADIUS server contain Proxy-State, when the RADIUS client is a
       NAS. > Action: Alert that an attack is likely taking place. >
       Note that the check should be for packets sent by the RADIUS
       server, and not for packets received by the NAS.  The attacker
       can modify packets to "hide" Proxy-State in another attribute,
       such as Vendor-Specific.

   6.  Any RADIUS traffic is sent over UDP or TCP transport, without
       IPSec or TLS. > Action: Warn that the system uses deprecated
       transport protocols, and should be upgraded.

   7.  Any RADIUS traffic is sent external to the organization over UDP
       or TCP transport, without IPSec or TLS. > Action: Warn that this
       is an insecure configuration, and can expose users private data,
       identities, passwords, locations, etc. to unknown attackers.

6.  Deprecating Insecure Transports

   The solution to an insecure protocol which uses thirty year-old
   cryptography is to deprecate the use insecure cryptography, and to
   mandate modern cryptographic transport.

6.1.  Deprecating UDP and TCP as transports

   RADIUS/UDP and RADIUS/TCP MUST NOT be used outside of secure
   networks.  A secure network is one which is believed to be safe from
   eavesdroppers, attackers, etc.  For example, if IPsec is used between
   two systems, then those systems may use RADIUS/UDP or RADIUS/TCP over
   the IPsec connection.

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   However, administrators should not assume that such uses are always
   secure.  An attacker who breaks into a critical system could use that
   access to view RADIUS traffic, and thus be able to attack it.
   Similarly, a network misconfiguration could result in the RADIUS
   traffic being sent over an insecure network.

   Neither the RADIUS client nor the RADIUS server would be aware of any
   network misconfiguration (e.g. such as could happen with IPSec).
   Neither the RADIUS client nor the RADIUS server would be aware of any
   attacker snooping on RADIUS/UDP or RADIUS/TCP traffic.

   In contrast, when TLS is used, the RADIUS endpoints are aware of all
   security issues, and can enforce any necessary security policies.

   Any use of RADIUS/UDP and RADIUS/TCP is therefore NOT RECOMMENDED.

6.2.  Mandating Secure transports

   All systems sending RADIUS packets outside of secure networks MUST
   use either IPSec, RADIUS/TLS, or RADIUS/DTLS.  It is RECOMMENDED, for
   operational and security reasons that RADIUS/TLS or RADIUS/DTLS are
   preferred over IPSec.

   Unlike (D)TLS, use of IPSec means that applications are generally
   unaware of transport-layer security.  Any problem with IPSec such as
   configuration issues, negotiation or re-keying problems are typically
   presented to the RADIUS servers as 100% packet loss.  These issues
   may occur at any time, independent of any changes to a RADIUS
   application using that transport.  Further, network misconfigurations
   which remove all security are completely transparent to the RADIUS
   application: packets can be sent over an insecure link, and the
   RADIUS server is unaware of the failure of the security layer.

   In contrast, (D)TLS gives the RADIUS application completely knowledge
   and control over transport-layer security.  The failure cases around
   (D)TLS are therefore often clearer, easier to diagnose and faster to
   resolve than failures in IPSec.  For example, a failed TLS connection
   may return a "connection refused" error to the application, or any
   one of many TLS errors indicating which exact part of the TLS
   conversion failed during negotiation.

6.3.  Crypto-Agility

   The crypto-agility requirements of [RFC6421] are addressed in
   [RFC6614] Appendix C, and in Section 10.1 of [RFC7360].  For clarity,
   we repeat the text of [RFC7360] here, with some minor modifications
   to update references, but not content.

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   Section 4.2 of [RFC6421] makes a number of recommendations about
   security properties of new RADIUS proposals.  All of those
   recommendations are satisfied by using TLS or DTLS as the transport
   layer.

   Section 4.3 of [RFC6421] makes a number of recommendations about
   backwards compatibility with RADIUS.  [RFC7360] Section 3 addresses
   these concerns in detail.

   Section 4.4 of [RFC6421] recommends that change control be ceded to
   the IETF, and that interoperability is possible.  Both requirements
   are satisfied.

   Section 4.5 of [RFC6421] requires that the new security methods apply
   to all packet types.  This requirement is satisfied by allowing TLS
   and DTLS to be used for all RADIUS traffic.  In addition, [RFC7360]
   Section 3, addresses concerns about documenting the transition from
   legacy RADIUS to crypto-agile RADIUS.

   Section 4.6 of [RFC6421] requires automated key management.  This
   requirement is satisfied by using TLS or DTLS key management.

   We can now finalize the work began in [RFC6421].  This document
   updates [RFC2865] et al. to state that any new RADIUS specification
   MUST NOT introduce new "ad hoc" cryptographic primitives to
   authenticate packets as was done with the Request / Response
   Authenticator, or to obfuscate attributes as was done with User-
   Password and Tunnel-Password.  That is, RADIUS-specific cryptographic
   methods existing as of the publication of this document can continue
   to be used for historical compatibility.  However, all new
   cryptographic work in the RADIUS protocol is forbidden.

   We recognize that RADIUS/UDP will still be in use for many years, and
   that new standards may require some modicum of privacy.  As a result,
   it is a difficult choice to forbid the use of these constructs.  If
   an attack is discovered which breaks RADIUS/UDP (e.g. by allowing
   attackers to forge Request Authenticators or Response Authenticators,
   or by allowing attackers to de-obfuscate User-Password), the solution
   would be to simply deprecate the use of RADIUS/UDP entirely.  It
   would not be acceptable to design new cryptographic primitives in an
   attempt to "secure" RADIUS/UDP.

   All new security and privacy requirements in RADIUS MUST be provided
   by a secure transport layer such as TLS or IPSec.  As noted above,
   simply using IPsec is not always enough, as the use (or not) of IPsec
   is unknown to the RADIUS application.

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   The restriction forbidding new cryptographic work in RADIUS does not
   apply to the data being transported in RADIUS attributes.  For
   example, a new authentication protocol could use new cryptographic
   methods, and would be permitted to be transported in RADIUS.  This
   protocol could be a new EAP method, or it could use updates to TLS.
   In those cases, RADIUS serves as a transport layer for the
   authentication method.  The authentication data is treated as opaque
   data for the purposes of Access-Request, Access-Challenge, etc.
   packets.  There would be no need for RADIUS to define any new
   cryptographic methods in order to transport this data.

   Similarly, new specifications MAY define new attributes which use the
   obfuscation methods for User-Password as defined in [RFC2865]
   Section 5.2, or for Tunnel-Password as defined in [RFC2868]
   Section 3.5.  However, due to the issues noted above in Section 3.5,
   the Tunnel-Password obfuscation method MUST NOT be used for packets
   other than Access-Request, Access-Challenge, and Access-Accept.  If
   the attribute needs to be send in another type of packet, then the
   protocol design is likely wrong, and needs to be revisited.  It is
   again a difficult choice to forbid certain uses of the Tunnel-
   Password obfuscation method, but we believe that doing so is
   preferable to allowing sensitive data to be obfuscated with less
   security than the original design intent.

7.  Migration Path and Recommendations

   We recognize that it is difficult to upgrade legacy devices with new
   cryptographic protocols and user interfaces.  The problem is made
   worse because the volume of RADIUS devices which are in use.  The
   exact number is unknown, and can only be approximated.  Our best
   guess is that at the time of this writing there are likely to be
   millions of RADIUS/UDP devices in daily use.  It takes significant
   time and effort to correct the deficiencies of all of these devices.

   We therefore need to define a migration path to using secure
   transports.  In the following sections, we give a number of migration
   steps which could be done independently.  We recommend increased
   entropy for shared secrets.  We also mandate the use of Message-
   Authenticator in all Access-Request packets for RADIUS/UDP and
   RADIUS/TCP.  Finally, where [RFC6614] Section 2.3 makes support for
   TLS-PSK optional, we suggest that RADIUS/TLS and RADIUS/DTLS
   implementations SHOULD support TLS-PSK.

7.1.  Shared Secrets

   [RFC2865] Section 3 says:

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      It is preferred that the secret be at least 16 octets.  This is to
      ensure a sufficiently large range for the secret to provide
      protection against exhaustive search attacks.  The secret MUST NOT
      be empty (length 0) since this would allow packets to be trivially
      forged.

   This recommendation is no longer adequate, so we strengthen it here.

   RADIUS implementations MUST support shared secrets of at least 32
   octets, and SHOULD support shared secrets of 64 octets.
   Implementations MUST warn administrators that the shared secret is
   insecure if it is 10 octets or less in length.

   Administrators SHOULD use shared secrets of at least 24 octets,
   generated using a source of secure random numbers.  Any other
   practice is likely to lead to compromise of the shared secret, user
   information, and possibly of the entire network.

   Creating secure shared secrets is not difficult.  One solution is to
   use a simple script given below.  While the script is not portable to
   all possible systems, the intent here is to document a concise and
   simple method for creating secrets which are secure, and humanly
   manageable.

      #!/usr/bin/env perl use MIME::Base32; use Crypt::URandom(); print
      join('-', unpack("(A4)*", lc
      encode_base32(Crypt::URandom::urandom(12)))), "\n";

   This script reads 96 bits of random data from a secure source,
   encodes it in Base32, and then makes it easier for people to work
   with.  The generated secrets are of the form "2nw2-4cfi-nicw-3g2i-
   5vxq".  This form of secret will be accepted by all implementation
   which supports at least 24 octets for shared secrets.

   Given the simplicity of creating strong secrets, there is no excuse
   for using weak shared secrets with RADIUS.  The management overhead
   of dealing with complex secrets is less than the management overhead
   of dealing with compromised networks.

   Over all, the security analysis of shared secrets is similar to that
   for TLS-PSK.  It is therefore RECOMMENDED that implementors manage
   shared secrets with same the practices which are recommended for TLS-
   PSK, as defined in [RFC8446] Section E.7 and [RFC9257] Section 4.

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   On a practical node, RADIUS implementers SHOULD provide tools for
   administrators which can create and manage secure shared secrets.
   The cost to do so is minimal for implementors.  Providing such a tool
   can further enable and motivate administrators to use secure
   practices.

7.2.  Message-Authenticator

   The Message-Authenticator attribute was defined in [RFC3579]
   Section 3.2.  The "Note 1" paragraph at the bottom of [RFC3579]
   Section 3.2 required that Message-Authenticator be added to Access-
   Request packets when the EAP-Message as present, and suggested that
   it should be present in a few other situations.  Experience has shown
   that these recommendations are inadequate.

   Some RADIUS clients never use the Message-Authenticator attribute,
   even for the situations where the [RFC3579] text suggests that it
   should be used.  When the Message-Authenticator attribute is missing
   from Access-Request packets, it is often possible to trivially forge
   or replay those packets.

   For example, an Access-Request packet containing CHAP-Password but
   which is missing Message-Authenticator can be trivially forged.  If
   an attacker sees one packet such packet, it is possible to replace
   the CHAP-Password and CHAP-Challenge (or Request Authenticator) with
   values chosen by the attacker.  The attacker can then perform brute-
   force attacks on the RADIUS server in order to test passwords.

   This document therefore requires that RADIUS clients MUST include the
   Message-Authenticator in all Access-Request packets when UDP or TCP
   transport is used.

   In contrast, when TLS-based transports are used, the Message-
   Authenticator attribute serves no purpose, and can be omitted, even
   when the Access-Request packet contains an EAP-Message attribute.
   Servers receiving Access-Request packets over TLS-based transports
   SHOULD NOT silently discard a packet if it is missing a Message-
   Authenticator attribute.  However, if the Message-Authenticator
   attribute is present, it still MUST be validated as discussed in
   [RFC7360] and [RFC3579].

7.2.1.  Server Behavior

   In order to allow for migration from historic client behavior,
   servers SHOULD include a configuration flag which controls the above
   behavior.  The flag could be called "require Message-Authenticator",
   though other names are possible.

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   If the flag is set to "false", then the server behavior is unchanged
   from previous specifications.  If the flag is set to "true", then
   Access-Request packets which are missing the Message-Authenticator
   attribute MUST NOT be accepted by the server.  Instead, the server
   MUST reply immediately with an Access-Reject which contains an Error-
   Cause attribute with value 510 (Missing Message-Authenticator).

   The purpose of this reply is two-fold.  First, the reply is a signal
   the client that the server is still alive.  If the packet was
   silently discarded, the client would have no idea why the server
   failed to respond.  The client could erroneously conclude that the
   server was down, and initiate fail-over procedures.  Such behavior
   leads to network instability, and should be avoided.

   The second purpose of the reply is to inform the administrator of the
   client system as to why the Access-Request was not accepted.  The
   Error-Cause attribute signals the administrator as to the reason for
   the rejection, and indicates the corrective course of action which
   needs to be taken.

7.3.  Recommending TLS-PSK

   Given the insecurity of RADIUS/UDP, the absolute minimum acceptable
   security is to use strong shared secrets.  However, administrator
   overhead for TLS-PSK is not substantially higher than for shared
   secrets, and TLS-PSK offers significantly increased security and
   privacy.

   It is therefore RECOMMENDED that implementations support TLS-PSK.  In
   some cases TLS-PSK is preferable to certificates.  It may be
   difficult for RADIUS clients to upgrade all of their interfaces to
   support the use of certificates, and TLS-PSK more closely mirrors the
   historical use of shared secrets, with similar operational
   considerations.

   Implementation and operational considerations for TLS-PSK are given
   in [I-D.ietf-radext-tls-psk], and we do not repeat them here.

8.  Increasing the Security of RADIUS

   While we still permit the use of UDP and TCP transports in secure
   environments, there are opportunities for increasing the security of
   RADIUS when those transport protocols are used.  The amount of
   personal identifiable information sent in packets should be
   minimized.  Information about the size, structure, and nature of the
   visited network should be omitted or anonymized.  The choice of
   authentication method also has security and privacy impacts.

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   The recommendations here for increasing the security of RADIUS
   transports also applies when TLS is used.  TLS transports protect the
   RADIUS packets from observation by from third-parties.  However, TLS
   does not hide the content of RADIUS packets from intermediate
   proxies, such as ones uses in a roaming environment.  As such, the
   best approach to minimizing the information sent to proxies is to
   minimize the number of proxies which see the RADIUS traffic.

   Implementers and administrators need to be aware of all of these
   issues, and then make the best choice for their local network which
   balances their requirements on privacy, security, and cost.  Any
   security approach based on a simple "checklist" of "good / bad"
   practices is likely to result in decreased security, as compared to
   an end-to-end approach which is based on understanding the issues
   involved.

8.1.  Minimizing Personal Identifiable Information

   One approach to increasing RADIUS privacy is to minimize the amount
   of PII which is sent in packets.  Implementers of RADIUS products and
   administrators of RADIUS systems SHOULD ensure that only the minimum
   necessary PII is sent in RADIUS.

   Where possible, identities should be anonymized (e.g.  [RFC7542]
   Section 2.4).  The use of anonymized identities means that the the
   Chargeable-User-Identifier [RFC4372] should also be used.  Further
   discussion on this topic is below.

   Device information SHOULD be either omitted, or randomized.  e.g.
   MAC address randomization could be used on end-user devices.  The
   details behind this recommendation are the subject of ongoing
   research and development.  As such, we do not offer more specific
   recommendations here.

   Information about the visited network SHOULD be replaced or
   anonymized before packets are proxied outside of the local
   organization.  The attribute Operator-NAS-Identifier [RFC8559] can be
   used to anonymize information about NASes in the local network.

   Location information ([RFC5580] SHOULD either be omitted, or else it
   SHOULD be limited to the broadest possible information, such as
   country code.  For example, [I-D.tomas-openroaming] says:

      All OpenRoaming ANPs MUST support signalling of location
      information

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   This location information is required to include at the minimum the
   country code.  We suggest the country code SHOULD also be the maximum
   amount of location information which is sent over third-party
   networks.

8.1.1.  Chargeable-User-Identity

   Where the Chargeable-User-Identity (CUI) [RFC4372] is used, it SHOULD
   be unique per session.  This practice will help to maximize user
   privacy, as it will be more difficult to track users across multiple
   sessions.  Due to additional constraints which we will discuss below,
   we cannot require that the CUI change for every session.

   What we can do is to require that the home server MUST provide a
   unique CUI for each combination of user and visited network.  That
   is, if the same user visits multiple networks, the home server MUST
   provide different CUIs to each visited network for that user.  The
   CUI MAY be the same across multiple sessions for that user on one
   particular network.  The CUI MAY be the same for multiple devices
   used by that user on one particular network.

   We note that the MAC address is likely the same across multiple user
   sessions on one network.  Therefore changing the CUI offers little
   additional benefit, as the user can still be tracked by the
   unchanging MAC address.  Never the less, we believe that having a
   unique CUI per session can be useful, because there is ongoing work
   on increasing user privacy by allowing more MAC address
   randomization.  If we were to recommend that the CUI remain constant
   across multiple sessions, that would in turn negate much of the
   effort being put into MAC address randomization.

   One reason to have a constant CUI value for a user (or user devices)
   on one network is that network access providers may need to enforce
   limits on simultaneous logins.  Network providers may also need to
   correlate user behavior across multiple sessions in order to track
   and prevent abuse.  Both of these requirements are impossible if the
   CUI changes for every user session.

   The result is that there is a trade-off between user privacy and the
   needs of the local network.  While perfect user privacy is an
   admirable goal, perfect user privacy may also allow anonymous users
   to abuse the visited network.  The network would then likely simply
   refuse to provide network access.  Users may therefore have to accept
   some limitations on privacy, in order to obtain network access.

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   We spend some time here in order to give recommendations for creating
   and managing of CUI.  We believe that these recommendations will help
   implementers satisfy the preceding requirements, while not imposing
   undue burden on the implementations.

   In general, the simplest way to track CUIs long term is to associate
   the CUI to user identity in some kind of cache or database.  This
   association could be created at the tail end of the authentication
   process, and before any accounting packets were received.  This
   association should generally be discarded after a period of time if
   no accounting packets are received.  If accounting packets are
   received, the CUI to user association should then be tracked along
   with the normal accounting data.

   The above method for tracking CUI works no matter how the CUI is
   generated.  If the CUI can be unique per session, or it could be tied
   to a particular user identity across a long period of time.  The same
   CUI could also be associated with multiple devices.

   Where the CUI is not unique for each session, the only minor issue is
   the cost of the above method is that the association is stored on a
   per-session basis when there is no need for that to be done.  Storing
   the CUI per session means that is it possible to arbitrarily change
   how the CUI is calculated, with no impact on anything else in the
   system.  Designs such as this which decouple unrelated architectural
   elements are generally worth the minor extra cost.

   For creating the CUI, that process should be done in a way which is
   scalable and efficient.  For a unique CUI per user, implementers
   SHOULD create a value which is unique both to the user, and to the
   visited network.  There is no reason to use the same CUI for multiple
   visited networks, as that would enable the tracking of a user across
   multiple networks.

   Before suggesting a method for creating the CUI, we note that
   [RFC4372] Section 2.1 defines the CUI as being of data type 'string'
   ([RFC8044] Section 3.5).  [RFC4372] Section 2.1 further suggests that
   the value of the CUI is interpreted as an opaque token, similar to
   the Class attribute ([RFC2865] Section 5.25).  Some organizations
   create CUI values which use the Network Access Identifier (NAI)
   format as defined in [RFC7542].  This format can allow the home
   network to be identified to the visited network, where the User-Name
   does not contain a realm.  Such formats SHOULD NOT be used unless all
   parties involved have agreed to this behavior.

   The CUI SHOULD be created via a construct similar to what is given
   below, where "+" indicates concatenation:

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   CUI = HASH(visited network data + user identifier + key)

   This construct has the following conceptual parameters.

      HASH

         A cryptographic hash function.

      visited network data

         Data which identifies the visited network.

         This data could be the Operator-Name attribute ([RFC5580]
         Section 4.1).

      user identifier

         The site-local user identifier.  For tunnelled EAP methods such
         as PEAP or TTLS, this could be the user identity which is sent
         inside of the TLS tunnel.

      key

         A secret known only to the local network.  The key is generally
         a large random string.  It is used to help prevent dictionary
         attacks on the CUI.

   Where the CUI needs to be constant across multiple user sessions or
   devices, the key can be a static value.  It is generated once by the
   home network, and then stored for use in further CUI derivations.

   Where the CUI needs to be unique per session, the above derivation
   SHOULD still be used, except that the "key" value will instead be a
   random number which is different for each session.  Using such a
   design again decouples the CUI creation from any requirement that it
   is unique per session, or constant per user.  That decision can be
   changed at any time, and the only piece which needs to be updated is
   the derivation of the "key" field.  In contrast, if the CUI is
   generated completely randomly per session, then it may be difficult
   for a system to later change that behavior to allow the CUI to be
   constant for a particular user.

   If an NAI format is desired, the hash output can be converted to
   printable text, truncated if necessary to meet length limitations,
   and then an "@" character and a realm can be appended to it.  The
   resulting text string is then in NAI form.

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   We note that the above recommendation is not invertible.  That is,
   given a particular CUI, it is not possible to determine which visited
   network or user identifier was used to create it.  If it is necessary
   to use the CUI to determine which user is associated with it, the
   local network still needs to store the full set of CUI values which
   are associated with each user.

   If this tracking is too complex for a local network, it is possible
   to create the CUI via an invertible encryption process as follows:

   CUI = ENCRYPT(key, visited network data + user identifier)

   This construct has the following conceptual parameters.

      ENCRYPT

         A cryptographically secure encryption function

      key

         The encryption key.  Note that the same key must not be used
         for more both hashing and encryption.

      visited network data

         Data which identifies the visited network.

         This data could be the Operator-Name attribute ([RFC5580]
         Section 4.1).

      user identifier

         The site-local user identifier.  For tunnelled EAP methods such
         as PEAP or TTLS, this could be the user identity which is sent
         inside of the TLS tunnel.

   However, the use of a hash-based method is RECOMMENDED.

   The intent is for CUI to leak as little information as possible, and
   ideally be different for every session.  However, business
   agreements, legal requirements, etc. may mandate different behavior.
   The intention of this section is not to mandate complete CUI privacy,
   but instead to clarify the trade-offs between CUI privacy and
   business realities.

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8.2.  User-Password Visibility

   The design of RADIUS means that when proxies receive Access-Request
   packets, the clear-text contents of the User-Password attribute are
   visible to the proxy.  Despite various claims to the contrary, the
   User-Password attribute is never sent "in the clear" over the
   network.  Instead, the password is protected by TLS (RADIUS/TLS) or
   via the obfuscation methods defined in [RFC2865] Section 5.2.
   However, the nature of RADIUS means that each proxy must first undo
   the password obfuscation of [RFC2865], and then re-do it when sending
   the outbound packet.  As such, the proxy has the clear-text password
   visible to it, and stored in its application memory.

   It is therefore possible for every intermediate proxy to snoop and
   record all user identities and passwords which they see.  This
   exposure is most problematic when the proxies are administered by an
   organization other than the one which operates the home server.  Even
   when all of the proxies are operated by the same organization, the
   existence of clear-text passwords on multiple machines is a security
   risk.

   It is therefore NOT RECOMMENDED for organizations to send the User-
   Password attribute in packets which are sent outside of the local
   organization.  If RADIUS proxying is necessary, another
   authentication method SHOULD be used.

   Client and server implementations SHOULD use programming techniques
   to securely wipe passwords from memory when they are no longer
   needed.

   Organizations MAY still use User-Password attributes within their own
   systems, for reasons which we will explain in the next section.

8.3.  Minimize the use of Proxies

   The design of RADIUS means that even when RADIUS/TLS is used, every
   intermediate proxy has access to all of the information in the
   packet.  The only way to secure the network from such observers is to
   minimize the use of proxies.

   Where it is still necessary to use intermediate proxies such as with
   eduroam [EDUROAM] and OpenRoaming [OPENROAMING], it is RECOMMENDED to
   use EAP instead of PAP, CHAP, or MS-CHAP.  If passwords are used,
   they can be can be protected from being seen by proxies via TLS-based
   EAP methods such as EAP-TTLS or PEAP.  Passwords can also be omitted
   entirely from being sent over the network, as with EAP-TLS [RFC9190]
   or EAP-pwd [RFC5931].

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8.4.  Password Visibility and Storage

   An attacker may choose to ignore the wire protocol entirely, and
   therefore bypass all of the issues described earlier in this
   document.  An attacker could instead focus on a database which holds
   user credentials such as account names and passwords.  At the time of
   this writing, databases such as [PWNED] claim to have records of over
   twelve billion user accounts which have been compromised.  Such
   databases are therefore highly sought-after targets.

   The attack discussed in this section is dependent on vulnerabilities
   with the credential database, and does not assume an attacker can see
   or modify RADIUS traffic.  As a result, this attack applies equally
   well when TTLS, PEAP, or RADIUS/TLS are used.  The success of the
   attack depends only on how the credentials are stored in the
   database.  Since the choice of authentication method affects the way
   credentials are stored in the database, the security of that
   dependency needs to be discussed and explained.

   Some organizations may desire to increase the security of their
   network by avoiding PAP, and using CHAP or MS-CHAP, instead.  These
   attempts are largely misguided.  If simple password-based methods
   must be used, in almost all situations, the security of the network
   as a whole is increased by using PAP in preference to CHAP or MS-
   CHAP.  The reason is found through a simple risk analysis, which we
   explain in more detail in the next section.

8.4.1.  PAP Security Analysis

   When PAP is used, the RADIUS server obtains a clear-text password
   from the user, and compares that password to credentials which have
   been stored in a user database.  The credentials stored in the
   database can be salted and/or hashed in a form is commonly referred
   to as being in "crypt"ed form.  The RADIUS server takes the input
   clear-text password, performs the same "crypt" transformation, and
   the two "crypt"ed passwords are compared.

   Any compromise the RADIUS server will result in that clear-text
   password leaking.  However, in most cases, the clear-text password is
   available only in the memory of the RADIUS server application, and
   only for a short period of time.  An attacker who desires to obtain
   passwords for all users would have to wait for all users to log in,
   which can take a substantial amount of time.  During that time, an
   administrator may discover the breach, and resolve the issue.

   In addition with PAP, the credentials in the database are stored
   securely at all times (presuming that the administrator only stores
   "crypt"ed credentials).  Any compromise of the database results in

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   the disclosure of minimal information to an attacker.  That is, the
   attacker cannot easily obtain the clear-text passwords from
   compromising the database.

   The result is that the user passwords are visible in clear-text only
   for a short time, and then only on the RADIUS server.  The security
   of this system is not as good as seen with EAP-pwd [RFC5931] for
   example, but it is not terrible.

   While the obfuscation method used for the User-Password attribute has
   not been shown to be insecure, it is not known to be secure.  The
   obfuscation method depends on calculating MD5(secret + Request
   Authenticator), which has a few helpful properties for an attacker.
   The cost of brute-forcing short secrets is not large, Section 3.4
   discusses that cost in detail.  Even for longer secrets which are
   humanly generated, the MD5 state for hashing the secret can be pre-
   calculated and stored on disk.  This process is relatively
   inexpensive, even for billions of possible shared secrets.  The
   Request Authenticator can then be added to each pre-calculated state
   via brute-force, and compared to the obfuscated User-Password data.

   The MD5 digest is 16 octets long, and many passwords are shorter than
   that.  This difference means that the final octets of the digest are
   placed into the User-Password attribute without modificaiton.  The
   result is that a brute-force attack does not need to decode the User-
   Password and see if the decoded password "looks reasonable".
   Instead, the attacker simply needs to compare the final octets of the
   calculated digest with the final octets of the User-Password
   attribute.  The result is an extremely high probability signal that
   the guessed secret is correct.

   The only protection from this attack is to ensure that the secret is
   long, and derived from a cryptographically strong pseudo-random
   number generator.  {#shared-secrets} discusses these issues in more
   detail.

8.4.2.  CHAP and MS-CHAP Password Storage

   In contrast, when CHAP or MS-CHAP is used, those methods do not
   expose a clear-text password to the RADIUS server, but instead a
   hashed transformation of it.  That hash output is in theory secure
   even if an attacker can observe it.  While CHAP is believed to be
   secure, MS-CHAP is not, as we will see below in (Section 8.5).  For
   the purposes of this section, we will focus on the construct of
   "hashed passwords", and will ignore any attacks specific to MS-CHAP.
   We will also note that EAP-MD5 [RFC3748], Section 5.4 is essentially
   CHAP, and has the same security analysis.

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   The hash transformations for CHAP and MS-CHAP depend on a random
   challenge.  The intent was to increase security, but their
   construction makes strong requirements on the form in which user
   credentials are stored.

   The process for performing CHAP and MS-CHAP is inverted from the
   process for PAP.  Using similar terminology as above for illustrative
   purposes, the "crypt"ed passwords are sent to the server.  The server
   must obtain the clear-text (or NT hashed) password from the database,
   and then perform the "crypt" operation on the password from the
   database.  The two "crypt"ed passwords are then compared as was done
   with PAP.  This inverted process has substantial and negative impacts
   on security.

   When CHAP or MS-CHAP are used, all of credentials are stored as
   clear-text passwords (or clear-text equivalent) in the database, all
   of the time.  The database contents might be encrypted, but the
   decryption keys are necessarily accessible to the application which
   reads that database.  Any compromise of the application means that
   the entire database can be immediately read and exfiltrated as a
   whole.  The attacker then has complete access to all user identities,
   and all associated clear-text passwords.

8.4.3.  On-the-wire User-Password versus CHAP-Password

   There is one more security myth which should be put to rest about PAP
   versus CHAP.  There is a common belief that CHAP is more secure,
   because passwords are sent "in the clear" via the User-Password
   attribute.  This belief is false.

   The User-Password attribute is obfuscated when it is sent in an
   Access-Request packet, using keyed MD5 and the shared secret, as
   defined in [RFC2865], Section 5.2.  At the time of this writing, no
   attack better than brute force has been found which allows an
   attacker to reverse this obfuscation.

   There have been claims that it is preferable to use CHAP-Password as
   it does not "send the password in clear-text".  This claim is
   likewise false.

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   The CHAP-Password attribute depends on the hash of a visible Request
   Authenticator (or CHAP-Challenge) and the users password, while the
   obfuscated User-Password depends on the same Request Authenticator,
   and on the RADIUS shared secret.  For an attacker, the difference
   between the two calculations is minimal.  They can both be attacked
   with similar amounts of effort.  As a result, any security analysis
   which makes the claim that "User-Password insecure because it uses
   MD5" ignores the fact that the CHAP-Password attribute is constructed
   through substantially similar methods.

8.4.4.  PAP vs CHAP Conclusions

   A careful security analyis shows that for all of PAP, CHAP, and MS-
   CHAP, the RADIUS server must at some point have access to the clear-
   text version of the password.  As a result, there is minimal
   difference in risk exposure between the different authentication
   methods if a RADIUS server is compromised.

   However, when PAP is used, the user credentials can be stored
   securely "at rest" in a database, while such secure storage is
   impossible with CHAP and MS-CHAP.  There is therefore a substantial
   difference in risk exposure between the different authentication
   methods, with PAP offering substantially higher security due to its
   ability to secure passwords at rest via the "crypt" construct
   mentioned above.  In contrast, CHAP is highly insecure, as any
   database compromise results in the immediate exposure of the clear-
   text passwords for all users.

   This difference is shown not just in the [PWNED] database, but also
   in attacks on RADIUS systems [EXPLOIT], where attackers identify a
   vulnerable RADIUS system and:

      utilized SQL commands to dump the credentials [T1555], which
      contained both cleartext and hashed passwords for user and
      administrative accounts.

   The attack then proceeded to leverage those passwords:

      Having gained credentials from the RADIUS server, PRC state-
      sponsored cyber actors used those credentials with custom
      automated scripts to authenticate to a router via Secure Shell
      (SSH), execute router commands, and save the output.

   This attack is only possible when systems store clear-text passwords.

   The result is that when the system as a whole is taken into account,
   the risk of password compromise is substantially less with PAP than
   with CHAP or MS-CHAP.  It is therefore RECOMMENDED that

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   administrators use PAP in preference to CHAP or MS-CHAP.  It is also
   RECOMMENDED that administrators store passwords "at rest" in a secure
   form (salted, hash), as with the "crypt" format discussed above.

   That being said, other authentication methods such as EAP-TLS
   [RFC9190] and EAP-pwd [RFC5931] do not expose clear-text passwords to
   the RADIUS server, and therefore can lower the risk of password
   exposure even more.  It is RECOMMENDED that administrators avoid
   password-based authentication methods where at all possible.

8.5.  MS-CHAP can be reversed

   MS-CHAP (v1 in [RFC2433] and v2 in [RFC2759]) has major design flaws,
   and should not be used outside of a secure tunnel such as with PEAP
   or TTLS.  As MS-CHAPv1 is less commonly used, the discussion in this
   section will focus on MS-CHAPv2.

   Recent developments demonstrate just how easy it is to attack MS-
   CHAPv2 exchanges, and obtain the "NT-hash" version of the password
   ([SENSEPOST]).  The attack relies on a vulnerability in the protocol
   design in [RFC2759] Section 8.4.  In that section, the response to
   the MS-CHAP challenge is calculated via three DES operations, which
   are based on the 16-octet NT-Hash form of the password.  However, the
   DES operation requires 7 octet keys, so the 16-octet NT-Hash cannot
   be divided evenly into the 21 octets of keys required for the DES
   operation.

   The solution in [RFC2759] Section 8.4 is to use the first 7 octets of
   the NT-Hash for the first DES key, the next 7 octets for the second
   DES key, leaving only 2 octets for the final DES key.  The final DES
   key is padded with zeros.  This construction means that an attacker
   who can observe the MS-CHAP2 exchange only needs to perform 2^16 DES
   operations in order to determine the final 2 octets of the original
   NT-Hash.

   If the attacker has a database which correlates known passwords to
   NT-Hashes, then those two octets can be used as an index into that
   database, which returns a subset of candidate hashes.  Those hashes
   are then checked via brute-force operations to see if they match the
   original MS-CHAPv2 data.

   This process lowers the complexity of cracking MS-CHAP by nearly five
   orders of magnitude as compared to a brute-force attack.  The attack
   has been demonstrated using databases which contain tens to hundreds
   of millions of passwords.  On a consumer-grade machine, the time
   required for such an attack to succeed is on the order of tens of
   milliseconds.

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   While this attack does require a database of known passwords, such
   databases are easy to find online, or to create locally from
   generator functions.  Passwords created manually by people are
   notoriously predictable, and are highly likely to be found in a
   database of known passwords.  In the extreme case of strong
   passwords, they will not be found in the database, and the attacker
   is still required to perform a brute-force dictionary search.

   In fact, MS-CHAP has significantly poorer security than PAP when the
   MS-CHAP data is sent over the network in the clear.  When the MS-CHAP
   data is not protected by TLS, it is visible to everyone who can
   observe the RADIUS traffic.  Attackers who can see the MS-CHAP
   traffic can therefore obtain the underlying NT-Hash with essentially
   zero effort, as compared to cracking the RADIUS shared secret.  In
   contrast, the User-Password attribute is obfuscated with data derived
   from the Request Authenticator and the shared secret, and that method
   has not been successfully attacked.

   Implementors and administrators SHOULD therefore consider MS-CHAP and
   MS-CHAPv2 to be equivalent in security to sending passwords in the
   clear, without any encryption or obfuscation.  That is, the User-
   Password attribute with obfuscation is substantially more secure than
   MS-CHAP.  MS-CHAP offers little benefit over PAP, and has many
   drawbacks as discussed here, and in the previous section.

   As MS-CHAP can be trivially broken by an observer, this document
   therefore mandates that MS-CHAP or MS-CHAPv2 authentication data
   carried in RADIUS MUST NOT be sent in situations where the that data
   is visible to an observer.  MS-CHAP or MS-CHAPv2 authentication data
   MUST NOT be sent over RADIUS/UDP or RADIUS/TCP.

   As MS-CHAP offers no benefits over PAP, MS-CHAP authentication SHOULD
   NOT be used even when the transport protocol is protected, as with
   IPSec or RADIUS over TLS.

   Existing RADIUS client implementations SHOULD deprecate the use of
   MS-CHAP entirely, and SHOULD forbid new configurations from enabling
   MS-CHAP authentication.  New RADIUS clients MUST NOT implement the
   attributes used for MS-CHAPv1 and MS-CHAPv2 authentication (MS-CHAP-
   Challenge and MS-CHAP-Response).

8.6.  EAP

   If more complex authentication methods are needed, there are a number
   of EAP methods which can be used.  These methods variously allow for
   the use of certificates (EAP-TLS), or passwords (EAP-TTLS [RFC5281],
   PEAP [I-D.josefsson-pppext-eap-tls-eap])) and EAP-pwd [RFC5931].

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   We also note that the TLS-based EAP methods which transport passwords
   also hide the passwords from intermediate RADIUS proxies.  However,
   for the home authentication server, those EAP methods are still
   subject to the analysis above about PAP versus CHAP, along with the
   issues of storing passwords in a database.

8.7.  Eliminating Proxies

   The best way to avoid compromise of proxies is to eliminate proxies
   entirely.  The use of dynamic peer discovery ([RFC7585]) means that
   the number of intermediate proxies is minimized.

   However, the server on the visited network still acts as a proxy
   between the NAS and the home network.  As a result, all of the above
   analysis still applies when [RFC7585] peer discovery is used.

8.8.  Accounting Considered Imperfect

   The use of RADIUS/UDP for accounting means that accounting is
   inherently unreliable.  Unreliable accounting means that different
   entities in the network can have different views of accounting
   traffic.  These differences can have multiple impacts, including
   incorrect views of who is on the network, to disagreements about
   financial obligations.  These issues are discussed in substantial
   detail in [RFC2975], and we do not repeat those discussions here.  We
   do, however, summarize a few key issues.  Sites which use accounting
   SHOULD be aware of the issues raised in [RFC2975], and the
   limitations of the suggested solutions.

   Using a reliable transport such as RADIUS/TLS makes it more likely
   that accounting packets are delivered, and that acknowledgements are
   received.  Reducing the number of proxies means that there are fewer
   disparate systems which need to be reconciled.  Using non-volatile
   storage for accounting packets means that a system can reboot with
   minimal loss of accounting data.  Using interim accounting updates
   means that transient network issues or data losses can be corrected
   by later updates.

   Systems which perform accounting are also subject to significant
   operational loads.  Wheres authentication and authorization may use
   multiple packets, those packets are sent at session start, and then
   never again.  In contrast, accounting packets can be sent for the
   lifetime of a session, which may be hours or even days.  There is a
   large cost to receiving, processing, and storing volumes of
   accounting data.

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   However, even with all of the above concerns addressed, accounting is
   still imperfect.  The obvious way to increase the accuracy of
   accounting data is to increase the rate at which interim updates are
   sent, but doing so also increases the load on the servers which
   process the accounting data.  At some point, the trade-off of cost
   versus benefit becomes negative.

   There is no perfect solution here.  Instead, there are simply a
   variety of imperfect trade-offs.

8.8.1.  Incorrect Accounting Data

   Even if all accounting packets were delivered and stored without
   error, there is no guarantee that the contents of those packets are
   in any way reasonable.  The Wireless Broadband Alliance RADIUS
   Accounting Assurance [WBA] group has been investigating these issues.
   While the results are not yet public, a presentation was made at IETF
   118 in the RADEXT working group [RADEXT118].

   The data presented indicated that the WBA saw just about every
   possible counter in RADIUS accouting packets as containing data which
   was blatantly wrong or contradictory.  Some examples include
   extremely short sessions which have impossibly large amounts of data
   being downloaded, or large amounts of data being downloaded while
   claiming neglible packet counters, leading to absurdly large packet
   sizes.  The only conclusion from this analysis is that RADIUS clients
   act as if it is better to produce incorrect accounting data rather
   than producing no data.  This lack of care is disappointing.

   It should go without saying that accounting systems need to produce
   correct data.  However, [RFC2865] makes no requirement that the
   accounting data transported in RADIUS is correct, or is even vaguely
   realistic.  We therefore say that systems which produce accounting
   data MUST generate correct, accurate, and reasonably precise data.
   Vendors of networking equipment SHOULD test their systems to verify
   that the data they produce is accurate.

9.  Practical Suggestions

   In the interest of simplifying the above explanations, this section
   provides a short-form checklist of recommendations.  Following this
   checklist does not guarantee that RADIUS systems are secure from all
   possible attacks.  However, systems which do not follow this
   checklist are likely to be vulnerable to known attacks, and are
   therefore less secure than they could be.

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      -  Do not use RADIUS/UDP or RADIUS/TCP across the wider Internet >
         > Exposing user identifiers, device identifiers, and locations
         is a privacy and security issue.

      -  Avoid RADIUS/UDP or RADIUS/TCP in other networks, too. > > It
         can take time to upgrade equipment, but the long-term goal is
         to entirely deprecate RADIUS/UDP.

      -  Use strong shared secrets > > Shared secrets should be
         generated from a cryptographically strong pseudo-random number
         generator.  They should contain at least 128 bits of entropy.
         Each RADIUS client should have a unique shared secret.

      -  Minimize the use of RADIUS proxies. > > More proxies means more
         systems which could be compromised, and more systems which can
         see private or secret data.

      -  Do not proxy from secure to insecure transports > > If user
         information (credentials or identities) is received over a
         secure transport (IPSec, RADIUS/TLS, TLS-based EAP method),
         then proxying the protected data over RADIUS/UDP or RADIUS/TCP
         degrades security and privacy.

      -  Prefer EAP authentication methods to non-EAP methods. > > EAP
         authentication methods are better at hiding user credentials
         from observers.

      -  For EAP, use anonymous outer identifiers > > There are few
         reasons to use individual identies for EAP.  Identifying the
         realm is usually enough. > > [RFC7542] Section 2.4 recommends
         that "@realm" is preferable to "anonymous@realm", which is in
         turn preferable to "user@realm".

      -  Do not use MS-CHAP outside of TLS-based EAP methods. > > MS-
         CHAP can be cracked with minimal effort.

      -  Prefer using PAP to CHAP or MS-CHAP. > > PAP allows for
         credentials to be stored securely "at rest" in a user database.
         CHAP and MS-CHAP do not.

      -  Store passwords in "crypt"ed form > > Where is is necessary to
         store passwords, use systems such as PBKDF2 ([RFC8018].

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      -  Regularly update to the latest cryptographic methods. > > TLS
         1.0 with RC4 was acceptable at one point in time.  It is no
         longer acceptable.  Similarly, the current cryptographic
         methods will at some point will be deprecated, and replaced by
         updated methods.  Upgrading to recent cryptographic methods
         should be a normal part of operating a RADIUS server.

      -  Regularly deprecate older cryptographic methods. > >
         Administrators should actively deprecate the use of older
         cryptographic methods.  If no system is using older methods,
         then those methods should be disabled or removed entirely.
         Leaving old methods enabled makes the server more vulnerable to
         attacks.

      -  Send the minimim amount of information which is needed,. > >
         Where proxying is used, it is a common practice is to simply
         forward all of the information from a NAS to other RADIUS
         servers.  Instead, the proxy closest to the NAS should filter
         out any attributes or data which are not needed by the "next
         hop" proxies, or by the home server.

10.  Privacy Considerations

   The primary focus of this document is addressing privacy and security
   considerations for RADIUS.

   Deprecating insecure transport for RADIUS, and requiring secure
   transport means that personally identifying information is no longer
   sent "in the clear".  As noted earlier in this document, such
   information can include MAC addresses, user identifiers, and user
   locations.

   In addition, this document suggests ways to increase privacy by
   minimizing the use and exchange of PII.

11.  Security Considerations

   The primary focus of this document is addressing security and privacy
   considerations for RADIUS.

   Deprecating insecure transport for RADIUS, and requiring secure
   transport means that many historical security issues with the RADIUS
   protocol no longer apply, or their impact is minimized.

   We reiterate the discussion above, that any security analysis must be
   done on the system as a whole.  It is not reaonable to put an
   expensive lock on the front door of a house while leaving the window
   next to it open, and then declare the house to be "secure".  Any

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   approach to security based on a simple checklist is at best naive,
   more truthfully is deeply misleading, and at worst such practices
   will decrease security.

   Implementers and administrators need to be aware of the issues raised
   in this document.  They can then make the best choice for their local
   network which balances their requirements on privacy, security, and
   cost.

11.1.  Historical Considerations

   The BlastRADIUS vulnerability is the result of RADIUS security being
   a low priority for decades.  Even the recommenation of [RFC5080],
   Section 2.2.2 that all clients add Message-Authenticator to all
   Access-Request packets was ignored by nearly all implementors.  If
   that recommendation had been followed, then the BlastRADIUS
   vulnerability notification would have been little more than "please
   remember to set the require Message-Authenticator flag on all RADIUS
   servers."

   For MS-CHAP, it has not previously been deprecated for similar
   reasons, even though it has been proven to be insecure for years.

11.2.  Practical Implications

   This document either deprecates or forbids methods and behaviors
   which have been common practice for decades.  While insecure
   practices have been viewed as tolerable, they are no longer
   acceptable.

12.  IANA Considerations

   IANA is instructed to update the RADIUS Types registry, and the
   "Values for RADIUS Attribute 101, Error-Cause Attribute" sub-registry
   with the following addition:

   Value,Description,Reference
   502,Missing Message-Authenticator,[THIS-DOCUMENT]

13.  Acknowledgements

   Thanks to the many reviewers and commenters for raising topics to
   discuss, and for providing insight into the issues related to
   increasing the security of RADIUS.  In no particular order, thanks to
   Margaret Cullen, Alexander Clouter, and Josh Howlett.

   Many thanks to Nadia Heninger and the rest of the BlastRADIUS team
   for extensive discussions and feedback about the issue.

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14.  Changelog

   *  01 - added more discussion of IPSec, and move TLS-PSK to its own
      document,

   *  02 - Added text on Increasing the Security of Insecure Transports

   *  03 - add text on CUI.  Add notes on PAP vs CHAP security

   *  04 - add text on security of MS-CHAP.  Rearrange and reword many
      sections for clarity.

   *  05 - Rework title to deprecating "insecure practices".
      Clarifications based on WG feedback.

   *  00 - adoption by WG.

   *  01 - review from Bernard Aboba.  Added discussion on accounting,
      clarified and re-arranged text.  Added discussion of server
      behavior for missing Message-Authenticator

   *  02 - BlastRADIUS updates.

15.  References

15.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

   [RFC2865]  Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson,
              "Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)",
              RFC 2865, DOI 10.17487/RFC2865, June 2000,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2865>.

   [RFC6421]  Nelson, D., Ed., "Crypto-Agility Requirements for Remote
              Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 6421,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6421, November 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6421>.

   [RFC8044]  DeKok, A., "Data Types in RADIUS", RFC 8044,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8044, January 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8044>.

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   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

15.2.  Informative References

   [BLAST]    al, G. S. et., "RADIUS/UDP Considered Harmful", n.d.,
              <https://www.blastradius.fail/pdf/radius.pdf>.

   [BRIGGS]   Briggs, K., "Comments on the FCC’s Public Notice DA 24-308
              on SS7 and Diameter Vulnerabilities", n.d.,
              <https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/10427582404839/1>.

   [DATTACK]  DeKok, A., "CHAP and Shared Secret", n.d.,
              <https://www.ietf.org/ietf-ftp/ietf-mail-archive/
              radius/1998-11.mail>.

   [EDUROAM]  eduroam, "eduroam", n.d., <https://eduroam.org>.

   [EXPLOIT]  Agency, A. C. D., "People’s Republic of China State-
              Sponsored Cyber Actors Exploit Network Providers and
              Devices", n.d., <https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/
              cybersecurity-advisories/aa22-158a>.

   [HASHCLASH]
              Stevens, M., "Project HashClash - MD5 & SHA-1
              cryptanalytic toolbox", n.d.,
              <https://github.com/cr-marcstevens/hashclash>.

   [I-D.ietf-radext-tls-psk]
              DeKok, A., "RADIUS and TLS-PSK", Work in Progress,
              Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-radext-tls-psk-09, 29 February
              2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-
              radext-tls-psk-09>.

   [I-D.josefsson-pppext-eap-tls-eap]
              Palekar, A., Josefsson, S., Simon, D., and G. Zorn,
              "Protected EAP Protocol (PEAP) Version 2", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-josefsson-pppext-eap-tls-
              eap-10, 21 October 2004,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-josefsson-
              pppext-eap-tls-eap-10>.

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   [I-D.tomas-openroaming]
              Tomas, B., Grayson, M., Canpolat, N., Cockrell, B. A., and
              S. Gundavelli, "WBA OpenRoaming Wireless Federation", Work
              in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-tomas-openroaming-02,
              16 February 2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
              draft-tomas-openroaming-02>.

   [MD5-1996] group, I. R. W., "MD5 Key recovery attack", n.d.,
              <https://www.ietf.org/ietf-ftp/ietf-mail-archive/
              radius/1998-02>.

   [OPENROAMING]
              Alliance, W. B., "OpenRoaming: One global Wi-Fi network",
              n.d., <https://wballiance.com/openroaming/>.

   [PWNED]    Hunt, T., "Have I been Pwned", n.d.,
              <https://haveibeenpwned.com/>.

   [RADEXT118]
              Alliance, W. B., "RADIUS Accounting Assurance at IETF
              118", n.d., <https://youtu.be/wwmYSItcQt0?t=3953>.

   [RFC1321]  Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC1321, April 1992,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1321>.

   [RFC2433]  Zorn, G. and S. Cobb, "Microsoft PPP CHAP Extensions",
              RFC 2433, DOI 10.17487/RFC2433, October 1998,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2433>.

   [RFC2759]  Zorn, G., "Microsoft PPP CHAP Extensions, Version 2",
              RFC 2759, DOI 10.17487/RFC2759, January 2000,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2759>.

   [RFC2866]  Rigney, C., "RADIUS Accounting", RFC 2866,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2866, June 2000,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2866>.

   [RFC2868]  Zorn, G., Leifer, D., Rubens, A., Shriver, J., Holdrege,
              M., and I. Goyret, "RADIUS Attributes for Tunnel Protocol
              Support", RFC 2868, DOI 10.17487/RFC2868, June 2000,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2868>.

   [RFC2869]  Rigney, C., Willats, W., and P. Calhoun, "RADIUS
              Extensions", RFC 2869, DOI 10.17487/RFC2869, June 2000,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2869>.

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   [RFC2975]  Aboba, B., Arkko, J., and D. Harrington, "Introduction to
              Accounting Management", RFC 2975, DOI 10.17487/RFC2975,
              October 2000, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2975>.

   [RFC3539]  Aboba, B. and J. Wood, "Authentication, Authorization and
              Accounting (AAA) Transport Profile", RFC 3539,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3539, June 2003,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3539>.

   [RFC3579]  Aboba, B. and P. Calhoun, "RADIUS (Remote Authentication
              Dial In User Service) Support For Extensible
              Authentication Protocol (EAP)", RFC 3579,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3579, September 2003,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3579>.

   [RFC3748]  Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
              Levkowetz, Ed., "Extensible Authentication Protocol
              (EAP)", RFC 3748, DOI 10.17487/RFC3748, June 2004,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3748>.

   [RFC4372]  Adrangi, F., Lior, A., Korhonen, J., and J. Loughney,
              "Chargeable User Identity", RFC 4372,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4372, January 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4372>.

   [RFC5080]  Nelson, D. and A. DeKok, "Common Remote Authentication
              Dial In User Service (RADIUS) Implementation Issues and
              Suggested Fixes", RFC 5080, DOI 10.17487/RFC5080, December
              2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5080>.

   [RFC5176]  Chiba, M., Dommety, G., Eklund, M., Mitton, D., and B.
              Aboba, "Dynamic Authorization Extensions to Remote
              Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 5176,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5176, January 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5176>.

   [RFC5281]  Funk, P. and S. Blake-Wilson, "Extensible Authentication
              Protocol Tunneled Transport Layer Security Authenticated
              Protocol Version 0 (EAP-TTLSv0)", RFC 5281,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5281, August 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5281>.

   [RFC5580]  Tschofenig, H., Ed., Adrangi, F., Jones, M., Lior, A., and
              B. Aboba, "Carrying Location Objects in RADIUS and
              Diameter", RFC 5580, DOI 10.17487/RFC5580, August 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5580>.

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   [RFC5931]  Harkins, D. and G. Zorn, "Extensible Authentication
              Protocol (EAP) Authentication Using Only a Password",
              RFC 5931, DOI 10.17487/RFC5931, August 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5931>.

   [RFC6151]  Turner, S. and L. Chen, "Updated Security Considerations
              for the MD5 Message-Digest and the HMAC-MD5 Algorithms",
              RFC 6151, DOI 10.17487/RFC6151, March 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6151>.

   [RFC6218]  Zorn, G., Zhang, T., Walker, J., and J. Salowey, "Cisco
              Vendor-Specific RADIUS Attributes for the Delivery of
              Keying Material", RFC 6218, DOI 10.17487/RFC6218, April
              2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6218>.

   [RFC6280]  Barnes, R., Lepinski, M., Cooper, A., Morris, J.,
              Tschofenig, H., and H. Schulzrinne, "An Architecture for
              Location and Location Privacy in Internet Applications",
              BCP 160, RFC 6280, DOI 10.17487/RFC6280, July 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6280>.

   [RFC6613]  DeKok, A., "RADIUS over TCP", RFC 6613,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6613, May 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6613>.

   [RFC6614]  Winter, S., McCauley, M., Venaas, S., and K. Wierenga,
              "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Encryption for RADIUS",
              RFC 6614, DOI 10.17487/RFC6614, May 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6614>.

   [RFC6733]  Fajardo, V., Ed., Arkko, J., Loughney, J., and G. Zorn,
              Ed., "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 6733,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6733, October 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6733>.

   [RFC6973]  Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J.,
              Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy
              Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6973>.

   [RFC7360]  DeKok, A., "Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) as a
              Transport Layer for RADIUS", RFC 7360,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7360, September 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7360>.

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   [RFC7525]  Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
              "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
              Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
              (DTLS)", RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7525>.

   [RFC7542]  DeKok, A., "The Network Access Identifier", RFC 7542,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7542, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7542>.

   [RFC7585]  Winter, S. and M. McCauley, "Dynamic Peer Discovery for
              RADIUS/TLS and RADIUS/DTLS Based on the Network Access
              Identifier (NAI)", RFC 7585, DOI 10.17487/RFC7585, October
              2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7585>.

   [RFC8018]  Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., and A. Rusch, "PKCS #5:
              Password-Based Cryptography Specification Version 2.1",
              RFC 8018, DOI 10.17487/RFC8018, January 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8018>.

   [RFC8446]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446>.

   [RFC8559]  DeKok, A. and J. Korhonen, "Dynamic Authorization Proxying
              in the Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS)
              Protocol", RFC 8559, DOI 10.17487/RFC8559, April 2019,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8559>.

   [RFC9190]  Preuß Mattsson, J. and M. Sethi, "EAP-TLS 1.3: Using the
              Extensible Authentication Protocol with TLS 1.3",
              RFC 9190, DOI 10.17487/RFC9190, February 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9190>.

   [RFC9257]  Housley, R., Hoyland, J., Sethi, M., and C. A. Wood,
              "Guidance for External Pre-Shared Key (PSK) Usage in TLS",
              RFC 9257, DOI 10.17487/RFC9257, July 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9257>.

   [SENSEPOST]
              Sensepost, "Cracking MS-CHAP", n.d.,
              <https://github.com/sensepost/assless-chaps>.

   [SPOOFING] Cudbard-Bell, A., "Wi-Fi Spoofing for Fun and Profit",
              n.d., <https://networkradius.com/articles/2021/08/04/wifi-
              spoofing.html>.

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   [WBA]      Alliance, W. B., "RADIUS Accounting Assurance", n.d.,
              <https://wballiance.com/radius-accounting-assurance/>.

   [WIFILOC]  Alliance, W.-F., "Accurate indoor location with Wi-Fi
              connectivity", n.d.,
              <https://www.wi-fi.org/discover-wi-fi/wi-fi-location>.

Author's Address

   Alan DeKok
   InkBridge Networks
   Email: aland@inkbridgenetworks.com

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