NAI-based Dynamic Peer Discovery for RADIUS/TLS and RADIUS/DTLS
draft-ietf-radext-dynamic-discovery-06
RADIUS Extensions Working Group S. Winter
Internet-Draft RESTENA
Intended status: Experimental M. McCauley
Expires: August 29, 2013 OSC
February 25, 2013
NAI-based Dynamic Peer Discovery for RADIUS/TLS and RADIUS/DTLS
draft-ietf-radext-dynamic-discovery-06
Abstract
This document specifies a means to find authoritative RADIUS servers
for a given realm. It is used in conjunction with either RADIUS/TLS
and RADIUS/DTLS.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on August 29, 2013.
Copyright Notice
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. DNS-based NAPTR/SRV Peer Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. DNS RR definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.3. Realm to RADIUS server resolution algorithm . . . . . . . 6
2.3.1. Input . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3.2. Output . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3.3. Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3.4. Validity of results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3.5. Delay considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3.6. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1. Introduction
RADIUS in all its current transport variants (RADIUS/UDP, RADIUS/TLS,
RADIUS/DTLS) requires manual configuration of all peers (clients,
servers).
Where RADIUS forwarding servers are in use, the number of realms to
be forwarded and the corresponding number of servers to configure may
be significant. Where new realms with new servers are added or
details of existing servers change on a regular basis, maintaining a
single monolithic configuration file for all these details may prove
too cumbersome to be useful.
Furthermore, in cases where a roaming consortium consists of
independently working branches, each with their own forwarding
servers, and who add or change their realm lists at their own
discretion, there is additional complexity in synchronising the
changed data across all branches.
These situations can benefit significantly from a distributed
mechanism for storing realm and server reachability information.
This document describes one such mechanism: storage of realm-to-
server mappings in DNS.
This document does not specify how to verify that server information
which was retrieved from DNS was from an authorised party; e.g. an
organisation which is not at all part of a given roaming consortium
may alter its own DNS records to yield a result for its own realm.
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