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Router Keying for BGPsec
draft-ietf-sidr-rtr-keying-04

Document type: Active Internet-Draft (sidr WG)
Document stream: IETF
Last updated: 2013-12-17
Intended RFC status: Unknown
Other versions: plain text, pdf, html

IETF State: WG Document
Consensus: Unknown
Document shepherd: No shepherd assigned

IESG State: I-D Exists
Responsible AD: (None)
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SIDR Working Group                                             S. Turner
Internet-Draft                                                IECA, Inc.
Intended status: BCP                                            K. Patel
Expires: June 20, 2014                                     Cisco Systems
                                                                 R. Bush
                                         Internet Initiative Japan, Inc.
                                                       December 17, 2013

                        Router Keying for BGPsec
                     draft-ietf-sidr-rtr-keying-04

Abstract

   BGPsec-speaking routers must be provisioned with private keys and the
   corresponding public key must be published in the global RPKI
   (Resource Public Key Infrastructure).  This document describes two
   ways of provisioning public/private keys, router-driven and operator-
   driven.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 27, 2013.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
 

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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

1.  Introduction

   BGPsec-speaking routers must be provisioned with private keys and the
   corresponding public key must be published in the global RPKI
   (Resource Public Key Infrastructure).  The public key is published in
   the RPKI in the form of a certificate [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-
   profiles].  This document describes two methods for generating the
   necessary public/private key-pair: router-driven and operator-driven.

   The difference between the two methods is where the keys are
   generated: on the router in the router-driven method and elsewhere in
   the operator-driven model.  Different equipment necessitates the two
   methods.  Some equipment doesn't allow the private key to be off-
   loaded while other equipment does.  Off-loading private keys supports
   hot-swappable routers that need to have the same private key needs
   installed in the soon-to-be online router that was installed in the
   soon-to-be offline router.

   The remainder of this document describes how operators can use the
   two methods to provision new and existing routers.

   Note that in both models, the key pair is for algorithms defined in
   [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs].  The first version specifies ECDSA on
   the P-256 curve.

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC
   2119 [RFC2119].

   It is assumed that the reader understands BGPsec [I-D.ietf-sidr-
   bgpsec-overview] [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol], the RPKI [RFC6480],
   and [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles].

3.  Provisioning a New Router

   When commissioning a new router, operators may use either the router-
   driven or operator-drive methods.  Regardless of the method chosen,
   the operator first needs to establish a secure communication channel
   with the router.  Operators use the router-specific procedures to
   enable them to connect to the router via an SSH session.

 

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