Router Keying for BGPsec
draft-ietf-sidr-rtr-keying-15
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Active Internet-Draft (sidr WG)
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2018-04-23
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draft-ymbk-bgpsec-rtr-rekeying
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IETF
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(None)
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Waiting for WG Chair Go-Ahead
(wg milestone:
Jul 2017 - draft-ietf-sidr-rtr-...
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Revised I-D Needed - Issue raised by WGLC
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Responsible AD |
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Alvaro Retana
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aretana.ietf@gmail.com
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Network Working Group R. Bush
Internet-Draft IIJ Lab / Dragon Research Lab
Intended status: Standards Track S. Turner
Expires: October 25, 2018 sn3rd
K. Patel
Arrcus, Inc.
April 23, 2018
Router Keying for BGPsec
draft-ietf-sidr-rtr-keying-15
Abstract
BGPsec-speaking routers are provisioned with private keys in order to
sign BGPsec announcements. The corresponding public keys are
published in the global Resource Public Key Infrastructure, enabling
verification of BGPsec messages. This document describes two methods
of generating the public-private key-pairs: router-driven and
operator-driven.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 16, 2017.
Bush, et al. Expires October 25, 2018 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Router Keying for BGPsec April 23, 2018
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Management / Router Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Exchange Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Set-Up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Generate PKCS#10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5.1. Router-Generated Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.2. Operator-Generated Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.2.1. Using PKCS#8 to Transfer Private Key . . . . . . . . . 5
6. Send PKCS#10 and Receive PKCS#7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. Install Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8. Advanced Deployment Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9. Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9.1. Key Validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9.2. Key Roll-Over . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9.3. Key Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9.4. Router Replacement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
12.1. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Appendix A. Management/Router Channel Security . . . . . . . . . 14
Appendix B. The n00b Guide to BGPsec Key Management . . . . . . . 15
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1. Introduction
BGPsec-speaking routers are provisioned with private keys, which
allow them to digitally sign BGPsec announcements. To verify the
signature, the public key, in the form of a certificate [RFC8209], is
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