Router Keying for BGPsec
draft-ietf-sidr-rtr-keying-14

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (sidr WG)
Last updated 2017-10-20
Replaces draft-ymbk-bgpsec-rtr-rekeying
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Network Working Group                                            R. Bush
Internet-Draft                             IIJ Lab / Dragon Research Lab
Intended status: Standards Track                               S. Turner
Expires: April 23, 2018                                            sn3rd
                                                                K. Patel
                                                            Arrcus, Inc.
                                                        October 20, 2017

                        Router Keying for BGPsec
                     draft-ietf-sidr-rtr-keying-14

Abstract

   BGPsec-speaking routers are provisioned with private keys in order to
   sign BGPsec announcements.  The corresponding public keys are
   published in the global Resource Public Key Infrastructure, enabling
   verification of BGPsec messages.  This document describes two methods
   of generating the public-private key-pairs: router-driven and
   operator-driven.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to
   be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119] only when they
   appear in all upper case.  They may also appear in lower or mixed
   case as English words, without normative meaning.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 16, 2017.

 

Bush, et al.             Expires April 23, 2018                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft          Router Keying for BGPsec        October 20, 2017

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2
   2.  Management / Router Communication  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   3.  Exchange Certificates  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   4.  Set-Up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   5.  Generate PKCS#10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     5.1.  Router-Generated Keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     5.2.  Operator-Generated Keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
       5.2.1.  Using PKCS#8 to Transfer Public Key  . . . . . . . . .  5
   6.  Send PKCS#10 and Receive PKCS#7  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   7.  Install Certificate  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   8.  Advanced Deployment Scenarios  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   9.  Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     9.1.  Key Validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     9.2.  Key Roll-Over  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     9.3.  Key Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     9.4.  Router Replacement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   10.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   11.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   12.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     12.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     12.1.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   Appendix A.  Management/Router Channel Security  . . . . . . . . . 14
   Appendix B.  The n00b Guide to BGPsec Key Management . . . . . . . 14
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

1.  Introduction

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