Router Keying for BGPsec
SIDR Working Group S. Turner
Internet-Draft IECA, Inc.
Intended status: BCP K. Patel
Expires: January 21, 2016 Cisco Systems
Internet Initiative Japan, Inc.
July 20, 2015
Router Keying for BGPsec
BGPsec-speaking routers are provisioned with private keys to sign BGP
messages; the corresponding public keys are published in the global
RPKI (Resource Public Key Infrastructure) thereby enabling
verification of BGPsec messages. This document describes two ways of
provisioning the public-private key-pairs: router-driven and
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
Turner, et al. Expires January 21, 2016 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Router Keying for BGPsec July 20, 2015
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
BGPsec-speaking routers are provisioned with private keys, which
allow them to digitally sign BGP messages. To verify the signature,
the public key, in the form of a certificate [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-
pki-profiles], is published in the RPKI (Resource Public Key
Infrastructure). This document describes two methods for
provisioning the necessary public-private key-pairs: router-driven
The difference between the two methods is where the keys are
generated: on the router in the router-driven method and elsewhere in
the operator-driven method. Routers are expected to support either
one, the other, or both methods to work in various deployment
environments. Some routers may not allow the private key to be off-
loaded while other routers may. Off-loading of private keys would
support swapping of routing engines which could then have the same
private key installed in the soon-to-be online engine that had
previously been installed in the soon-to-be removed card.
The remainder of this document describes how operators can use the
two methods to provision new and existing routers.
Note: [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles] specifies the format for
the PKCS #10 request and [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs] specifies the
algorithms used to generate the signature.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to
be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119] only when they
appear in all upper case. They may also appear in lower or mixed
case as English words, without normative meaning.
Readers are assumed to be familiar with the BGPsec protocol [I-
D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview][I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol] and the
RPKI [RFC6480] as well as the BGPsec-specific PKI (Public Key
Infrastructure) specifications [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles][I-
3. Provisioning a New Router
Depending on the options supported by the new router, operators are
free to use either the router-driven or operator-driven methods.
Show full document text