Router Keying for BGPsec

The information below is for an old version of the document
Document Type Active Internet-Draft (sidr WG)
Last updated 2015-07-20
Replaces draft-ymbk-bgpsec-rtr-rekeying
Replaced by draft-ietf-sidrops-rtr-keying, rfc8635
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SIDR Working Group                                             S. Turner
Internet-Draft                                                IECA, Inc.
Intended status: BCP                                            K. Patel
Expires: January 21, 2016                                  Cisco Systems
                                                                 R. Bush
                                         Internet Initiative Japan, Inc.
                                                           July 20, 2015

                        Router Keying for BGPsec


   BGPsec-speaking routers are provisioned with private keys to sign BGP
   messages; the corresponding public keys are published in the global
   RPKI (Resource Public Key Infrastructure) thereby enabling
   verification of BGPsec messages.  This document describes two ways of
   provisioning the public-private key-pairs: router-driven and

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   ( in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of

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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

1.  Introduction

   BGPsec-speaking routers are provisioned with private keys, which
   allow them to digitally sign BGP messages.  To verify the signature,
   the public key, in the form of a certificate [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-
   pki-profiles], is published in the RPKI (Resource Public Key
   Infrastructure).  This document describes two methods for
   provisioning the necessary public-private key-pairs: router-driven
   and operator-driven.

   The difference between the two methods is where the keys are
   generated: on the router in the router-driven method and elsewhere in
   the operator-driven method.  Routers are expected to support either
   one, the other, or both methods to work in various deployment
   environments.  Some routers may not allow the private key to be off-
   loaded while other routers may.  Off-loading of private keys would
   support swapping of routing engines which could then have the same
   private key installed in the soon-to-be online engine that had
   previously been installed in the soon-to-be removed card.

   The remainder of this document describes how operators can use the
   two methods to provision new and existing routers.

   Note: [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles] specifies the format for
   the PKCS #10 request and [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs] specifies the
   algorithms used to generate the signature.

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119] only when they
   appear in all upper case.  They may also appear in lower or mixed
   case as English words, without normative meaning.

   Readers are assumed to be familiar with the BGPsec protocol [I-
   D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview][I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol] and the
   RPKI [RFC6480] as well as the BGPsec-specific PKI (Public Key
   Infrastructure) specifications [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles][I-

3.  Provisioning a New Router

   Depending on the options supported by the new router, operators are
   free to use either the router-driven or operator-driven methods. 

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   Regardless of the method chosen, operators first establish a secure
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