SSH Agent Protocol
draft-ietf-sshm-ssh-agent-16

[Ballot comment]
Thanks for your patience while waiting for my updated ballot.

Thanks also for addressing the DISCUSS issues of my previous ballot [1] and the points raised by Duane Wessels in his int-dir review [2].

Regards,

-éric

[1] https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ssh/xDfWibdzDfgfHKWm4Nl3sjrs-FY/
[2] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/review-ietf-sshm-ssh-agent-12-intdir-telechat-wessels-2025-11-20/

[Ballot comment]
# Review of draft-ietf-sshm-ssh-agent-14

CC @MikeBishop

## Comments

### Section 3.2.5, paragraph 2

A reference to the IANA registry that controls these code-points, both
by name and URL, would be appreciated.

### Section 3.7, paragraph 0
```
    The agent protocol supports requesting that an agent temporarily lock
    itself with a pass-phrase.  When locked, an agent MUST suspend
```
There's a conflict here between "requesting" and "MUST". If it's a request, then
compliance is merely recommended (SHOULD); if it's mandatory behavior, it's more
than a request.

### Section 4, paragraph 1
```
    Microsoft Windows, it is usual to use a Windows Named Pipe.  Access
    to these endpoints should be controlled as discussed in Section 8.
```
SHOULD?

## Nits

All comments below are about very minor potential issues that you may choose to
address in some way - or ignore - as you see fit. Some were flagged by
automated tools (via https://github.com/larseggert/ietf-reviewtool), so there
will likely be some false positives. There is no need to let me know what you
did with these suggestions.

### Typos

#### Section 3.2, paragraph 2
```
-    The generic format for the key SSH_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY message is:
-                              ----
```

"key" can be removed here.

#### Section 3.2, paragraph 3
```
-    public and private components of the key and vary by key type, as
-                                                    ^
+    public and private components of the key and varies by key type, as
+                                                    ^^^
```

#### Section 3.2, paragraph 4
```
-    The SSH_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED is similar, but adds an extra
+    The SSH_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED message is similar, but adds an extra
+                                      ++++++++
```

[Ballot discuss]
Hi Damien,

Many thanks for the effort put into this specification.

I will be definitely balloting Yes. Till then, please find below some points for discussion:

# Absolute Behaviors vs. Policies

Section 2 says:

  For example, an agent may allow only clients
  local to itself to add or remove keys, or make particular subsets of
  keys available to a given client. 

However, there are some absolute behaviors out there that make these policies impossible to follow. An example is the unconditional behavior in the following from Section 3.4:

  A client may request that an agent remove all keys that it stores:

      byte            SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES

  On receipt of such a message, an agent MUST delete all keys that it
  is holding and MUST reply with SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS.

or this one in Section 3.5:

  A client may request a list of keys from an agent using the following
  message:

      byte            SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES

  The agent MUST reply with a message with the following preamble.

      byte            SSH_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER
      uint32          nkeys

A check through the document is needed.

[Ballot comment]
# Client/Agent deployment model

## The deployment model supports multiple clients to interact with a single agent. It would be better if this is explicitly mentioned as that has implications on the operation of the agent, including management considerations.

## Also, and having in mind the specific case of when multiple clients interact with the same agent, I think that some logging would be recommended to help trace use, issues, etc.

# Arbitrary operations

CURRENT:
  Agents MAY implement support for only a subset of operations or
  available key types, and MAY additionally refuse arbitrary operations
  in particular contexts. 

Shouldn’t be safe to recommend that arbitrary operations are discarded unless instructed otherwise instead of the MAY?

# Some MUST statements in sub-sections are redundant with the generic one in 3.1.

## For example, the following from S.3.2

  An agent MUST reply with SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS if the key was
  successfully loaded as a result of one of these messages, or
  SSH_AGENT_FAILURE otherwise.

… is no more than a recontextualization (but not a new one) of this MUST in 3.1:

  On success the agent MUST reply either
  with the single-byte response:

      byte              SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS
  …

## Idem, S.3.1 says:

  SSH_AGENT_FAILURE messages MUST also be sent in reply to
  requests with unknown or unsupported types.

However, Section 3.2 repeats that same MUST:

  If an agent
  does not recognise the type name in a request to add a key, then it
  MUST respond with an SSH_AGENT_FAILURE reply.

Please consider removing duplicate ones.

# Redundant behaviors, again

Section 3.2 preamble has the following:

  An agent MAY support only a subset of the key types defined here and
  MAY support additional key types as described below. 

Section 3.2.5 repeats it again:

  Agents and their clients MAY support additional key types not
  documented here. 

I suggest to keep that behavior in one single place.

# Vendor-specific key types

CURRENT:
  Vendor-specific key types MUST use the domain-
  qualified naming convention defined in Section 6 of [RFC4251] until
  code-points are allocated by IANA.

I’m not sure how to interpret the “until ..” part. I don’t think the registry includes vendor-specific keys: https://www.iana.org/assignments/ssh-parameters/ssh-parameters.xhtml

Wouldn’t be more accurate to simply say?

NEW:
  Vendor-specific key types MUST use the domain-
  qualified naming convention defined in Section 6 of [RFC4251].

# The content of Section 6 is an extract of what is already present in the IANA section

# Nits

## Section 3.4

OLD: it SHOULD NOT caese

NEW: it SHOULD NOT cause

## Section 8

(1)

OLD: On some systems, tokens may invoked by providing a path to shared

NEW: On some systems, tokens may be invoked by providing a path to shared

(2)

Can the “tokey” part be clarified?

CURRENT:

  Protection for existing
  keys from tokey library code may be achieved by loading the token
        ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

Cheers,
Med

[Ballot comment]
Thanks for doing this work. It is long overdue to formally specify something so widely deployed as a core security element. I just have a few minor comments.

I don't think Section 1.1 needs to be deleted. Similar for Section 2.1.

I am not sure what the protocol expectation is when adding an already added key. I know in practice this does not generate an error, but this document does not state whether to return success or failure. Also, if the constrains are set, such as key lifetime, is adding an added key supposed to set the key lifetime to the lifetime specified in the already added, newly added, or longest/shortest value of those two?

[Ballot comment]
# Orie Steele, ART AD, comments for draft-ietf-sshm-ssh-agent-14
CC @OR13

* line numbers:
  - https://author-tools.ietf.org/api/idnits?url=https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-sshm-ssh-agent-14.txt&submitcheck=True

* comment syntax:
  - https://github.com/mnot/ietf-comments/blob/main/format.md

* "Handling Ballot Positions":
  - https://ietf.org/about/groups/iesg/statements/handling-ballot-positions/

## Comments

### UTF-8 extensions & SMTP

I wonder if there is an expectation around deliverability to these extensions?
Is there anything in https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6531 that is relevant here?

## Nits

### caese -> cause

```
497   NOT caese the keys be deleted from the token itself.
```

[Ballot comment]
# Andy Newton, ART AD, comments for draft-ietf-sshm-ssh-agent-14
CC @anewton1998

* line numbers:
  - https://author-tools.ietf.org/api/idnits?url=https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-sshm-ssh-agent-14.txt&submitcheck=True

* comment syntax:
  - https://github.com/mnot/ietf-comments/blob/main/format.md

* "Handling Ballot Positions":
  - https://ietf.org/about/groups/iesg/statements/handling-ballot-positions/

Thanks for putting this specification together to document a protocol that is in very wide use.

Thanks to Martin Thomson for the ARTART review.

I have no objections with this draft.

[Ballot comment]
Section 3.2.7, paragraph 4
>    To fully parse a constraint, it is necessary to know its structure
>    beforehand and it is not possible to safely recover when an
>    unrecognised constraint is encountered.  Given this, if an agent does
>    not recognise or support a requested constraint it MUST abort
>    parsing, refuse the request and return an SSH_AGENT_FAILURE message
>    to the client.

As suggested by Erik, this document could do with an operational considerations section not only for the above concern, but also identify and emphasize some of the areas below.

That section could include considerations such as:

- Ensuring that the protocol is designed so that the private key material MUST NOT be transmitted or exported from the agent.
- That an agent can be killed when the user logs out or is finished with SSH, thus removing the decrypted private key from memory.
- This might be challenging to add, but keys added to the agent can optionally should have a lifetime constraint. Operationally, having a short timeout for keys is a best practice to limit the window of exposure.

The Agent Forwarding case, while convenient opens up the largest operational security risk in my mind. An operational practice that SHOULD NOT use agent forwarding on servers that are not fully trusted, which include build servers, test servers etc.

The IANA review of this document seems to not have concluded yet.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NIT
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

All comments below are about very minor potential issues that you may choose to
address in some way - or ignore - as you see fit. Some were flagged by
automated tools (via https://github.com/larseggert/ietf-reviewtool), so there
will likely be some false positives. There is no need to let me know what you
did with these suggestions.

Duplicate informative references to:
https://www.iana.org/assignments/ssh-parameters/.

Reference [RFC5226] to RFC5226, which was obsoleted by RFC8126 (this may be on
purpose).

Section 2.1, paragraph 2
> y referred to as an "SSH client". Similarly "SSH server" will be used to refe
>                                  ^^^^^^^^^
A comma may be missing after the conjunctive/linking adverb "Similarly".

Section 3.1, paragraph 5
>  type name, for example "ssh-rsa" for a RSA key as defined by [RFC4253]. "ke
>                                      ^
Use "an" instead of "a" if the following word starts with a vowel sound, e.g.
"an article", "an hour".

Section 3.1, paragraph 5
> ry by key type, as specified in sub-sections 3.2.1 through 3.2.4 for commonl
>                                ^^^^^^^^^^^^
This word is normally spelled as one.

Section 3.2, paragraph 3
> NTC_ADD_IDENTITY message over sending a SSH_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED with an
>                                      ^
Use "an" instead of "a" if the following word starts with a vowel sound, e.g.
"an article", "an hour".

Section 3.2, paragraph 5
> o add a key, then it MUST respond with a SSH_AGENT_FAILURE reply. 3.2.1. DSA
>                                        ^
Use "an" instead of "a" if the following word starts with a vowel sound, e.g.
"an article", "an hour".

Section 3.2.4, paragraph 3
>  is left solely up to the agent. Typically only the public components of any
>                                  ^^^^^^^^^
A comma may be missing after the conjunctive/linking adverb "Typically".

Section 3.2.7, paragraph 5
> al or private-use constraints through a extension constraint that supports na
>                                      ^
Use "an" instead of "a" if the following word starts with a vowel sound, e.g.
"an article", "an hour".

Section 3.2.7.1, paragraph 1
> intend (i.e. the agent will fail in a safe way). 3.3. Public key encoding Ke
>                                  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Consider replacing this phrase with the adverb "safely" to avoid wordiness.

Section 3.4, paragraph 10
> illing to generate the signature (e.g. because it doesn't have the specified
>                                      ^^
It seems like there are too many consecutive spaces here.

Section 3.7, paragraph 3
> sion failure SHOULD be signaled using a SSH_AGENT_EXTENSION_FAILURE message:
>                                      ^
Use "an" instead of "a" if the following word starts with a vowel sound, e.g.
"an article", "an hour".

Section 4, paragraph 2
> st, typically it will arrange to make a endpoint (e.g. a listening socket) av
>                                      ^
Use "an" instead of "a" if the following word starts with a vowel sound, e.g.
"an article", "an hour".

Section 7.4, paragraph 3
> dows, access to a named pipe may controlled by attaching a security descript
>                                  ^^^^^^^^^^
Did you mean "be controlled"?

Section 7.5, paragraph 3
> nces in timing, power use or by side-effects in the memory subsystems (e.g.
>                                ^^^^^^^^^^^^
Did you mean "side effects" (=adverse effect, unintended consequence)? Open
compounds are not hyphenated.

Section 8, paragraph 5
> ent and server implementation for Unix- like systems. It has supported the ag
>                                  ^^^^^^^^^^
This word seems to be formatted incorrectly. Consider fixing the spacing or
removing the hyphen completely.

[Ballot discuss]

# Éric Vyncke, INT AD, comments for draft-ietf-sshm-ssh-agent-12
CC @evyncke

Thank you for the work put into this document.

Please find below one blocking DISCUSS points (easy to address), some non-blocking COMMENT points/nits (replies would be appreciated even if only for my own education).

Special thanks to Job Snijders for the shepherd's detailed write-up including the WG consensus and some justification of the intended status.

Other thanks to Duane Wessels, the Internet directorate reviewer (at my request), and I have read Damien's reply to Duane's detailed review:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/review-ietf-sshm-ssh-agent-12-intdir-telechat-wessels-2025-11-20/

I hope that this review helps to improve the document,

Regards,

-éric


## DISCUSS (blocking)

As noted in https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/statement-iesg-handling-ballot-positions-20220121/, a DISCUSS ballot is a request to have a discussion on the points below; I really think that the document would be improved with a change here, but can be convinced otherwise.

### Section 7.1 and others

SSH_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY is not specified in section 6.1 but in section 3.2.

`Reserved for organizational use` is not a use specified in RFC 8126.

[Ballot comment]

## COMMENTS (non-blocking)

### Abstract

s/This document describes/This document *specifies*/ as it is proposed standard ;-)

The 'This note...' should not be in the abstract but in a ``.

### Section 1

Strongly suggest to add references to all RFC 425x that specify the SSH protocol.

### Section 3.2

Where are the components listed in `"contents" consists of the public and private components of the key and vary by key type, they are listed below for standard and commonly used key types`? A forward reference 'as specified in the following sub-sections' would be welcome.

### Section 3.2.6

Why not a "MUST" in `the agent SHOULD also return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE` ?

### Section 3.2.7

`it is necessary to know its structure beforehand and it is not possible to safely recover` this seems like a big issue to me as it mostly ossify the SSH agent. Probably too late to change this as implementations are deployed, but using the usual TLV would have been better.

This should also be described in an operational considerations section.

### Section 5.3

What are the consequences (even if semi obvious) of bypassing the "SHOULD" in `An SSH client SHOULD be prepared`? See also https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/statement-iesg-statement-on-clarifying-the-use-of-bcp-14-key-words/

### Section 6

Unsure whether this section is required or even useful as the IANA section repeats the same data. Consider removing it.

### Section 7.1

Please use the registry URI https://www.iana.org/assignments/ssh-parameters/ssh-parameters.xhtml rather than RFC 4250.

### Section 7.8

This sub-section should really appear *before* section 7.1.

### Section 8

A lot of "SHOULD" in this section without the companion clauses requested by  https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/statement-iesg-statement-on-clarifying-the-use-of-bcp-14-key-words/

IESG/Authors/WG Chairs:

IANA has completed its review of draft-ietf-sshm-ssh-agent-10. If any part of this review is inaccurate, please let us know.

IANA has a question about one of the actions requested in the IANA Considerations section of this document.

IANA understands that, upon approval of this document, there are seven actions which we must complete.

IANA Question --> Sections 7.1, 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 create four new registries related to the key agent protocol for SSH. Where should each of these new registries be located? Are they new registry groups on the IANA Matrix or are they registries of existing registry groups? If registries of an existing registry groups, in which registry group will they be contained?

First, a new registry is to be created called the SSH agent protocol numbers registry. The new registry will be located in a registry group to be determined (see above IANA question). The new registry will be managed via Expert Review as defined by RFC8126. The new registry has initial registrations as follows:

Number(s) Identifier Reference
----------+--------+-----------------------------
1 reserved [ RFC-to-be; Section 6.1.1 ]
2 reserved [ RFC-to-be; Section 6.1.1 ]
3 reserved [ RFC-to-be; Section 6.1.1 ]
4 reserved [ RFC-to-be; Section 6.1,1 ]
5 SSH_AGENT_FAILURE [ RFC-to-be; Section 6.1 ]
6 SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS [ RFC-to-be; Section 6.1 ]
7 reserved [ RFC-to-be; Section 6.1.1 ]
8 reserved [ RFC-to-be; Section 6.1.1 ]
9 reserved [ RFC-to-be; Section 6.1.1 ]
10 reserved [ RFC-to-be; Section 6.1.1 ]
11 SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES [ RFC-to-be; Section 6.1 ]
12 SSH_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER [ RFC-to-be; Section 6.1 ]
13 SSH_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST [ RFC-to-be; Section 6.1 ]
14 SSH_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE [ RFC-to-be; Section 6.1 ]
15 reserved [ RFC-to-be; Section 6.1.1 ]
16 reserved [ RFC-to-be; Section 6.1.1 ]
17 SSH_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY [ RFC-to-be; Section 6.1 ]
18 SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY [ RFC-to-be; Section 6.1 ]
19 SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES [ RFC-to-be; Section 6.1 ]
20 SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY [ RFC-to-be; Section 6.1 ]
21 SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY [ RFC-to-be; Section 6.1 ]
22 SSH_AGENTC_LOCK [ RFC-to-be; Section 6.1 ]
23 SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK [ RFC-to-be; Section 6.1 ]
24 reserved [ RFC-to-be; Section 6.1.1 ]
25 SSH_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED [ RFC-to-be; Section 6.1 ]
26 SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED [ RFC-to-be; Section 6.1 ]
27 SSH_AGENTC_EXTENSION [ RFC-to-be; Section 6.1 ]
28 SSH_AGENT_EXTENSION_FAILURE [ RFC-to-be; Section 6.1 ]
29 SSH_AGENT_EXTENSION_RESPONSE [ RFC-to-be; Section 6.1 ]
30-239 Unassigned
240-255 Reserved for organizational use [ RFC-to-be; Section 6.1 ]

IANA Question --> What does "Reserved for organizational use" mean in this context? Is the intent "Private use" as defined by RFC8126?

Second, a new registry is to be created called the SSH agent key constraint numbers registry. The new registry will be located in a registry group to be determined (see above IANA question). The new registry will be managed via Expert Review as defined by RFC8126. The new registry has initial registrations as follows:

Number Identifier Reference
-------+---------+----------
1 SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME [ RFC-to-be; Section 6.2 ]
2 SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM [ RFC-to-be; Section 6.2 ]
3-254 Unassigned
255 SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_EXTENSION [ RFC-to-be; Section 6.2 ]

Third, a new registry is to be created called the SSH agent signature flags registry. The new registry will be located in a registry group to be determined (see above IANA question). The new registry will be managed via Expert Review as defined by RFC8126. The new registry has initial registrations as follows:

Number Identifier Reference
-------+----------------------+--------------------------
0x01 reserved [ RFC-to-be; Section 6.3 ]
0x02 SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_256 [ RFC-to-be; Section 6.3 ]
0x04 SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512 [ RFC-to-be; Section 6.3 ]

Fourth, a new registry is to be created called the SSH agent extension request names registry. The new registry will be located in a registry group to be determined (see above IANA question). The new registry will be managed via Expert Review as defined by RFC8126. The new registry has an initial registration as follows:

Extension Name Reference
----------------+----------------------------
query [ RFC-to-be; Section 3.8.1 ]

Fifth, in the Extension Names registry in the Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Parameters registry group located at:

https://www.iana.org/assignments/ssh-parameters/

a single new registration will be made as follows:

Extension Name: agent-forward
Reference: [ RFC-to-be ]
Note: Section 5.2

As this document requests registrations in an Expert Review or Specification Required (see RFC 8126) registry, we will initiate the required Expert Review via a separate request. This review must be completed before the document's IANA state can be changed to "IANA OK."

Sixth, in the Connection Protocol Channel Request Names registry in the Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Parameters registry group located at:

https://www.iana.org/assignments/ssh-parameters/

a single new registration will be made as follows:

Request Type: agent-req
Reference: [ RFC-to-be ]
Note: Section 5.2

IANA Question --> Table 6 in Section 7.6 of the current draft has the words "Extension Name" as a column heading, but IANA suggests that it should be "Request Type." Is this correct?

As this also requests registrations in an Expert Review or Specification Required (see RFC 8126) registry, we will initiate the required Expert Review via a separate request. This review must be completed before the document's IANA state can be changed to "IANA OK."

Seventh, in the Connection Protocol Channel Types registry in the Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Parameters registry group located at:

https://www.iana.org/assignments/ssh-parameters/

a single new registration will be made as follows:

Channel Type: agent-connect
Reference: [ RFC-to-be ]
Note: Section 5.3

IANA Question --> Table 7 in Section 7.7 of the current draft has the words "Channel Type" as a column heading, but IANA suggests that it should be "Request Type." Is this correct?

As this also requests registrations in an Expert Review or Specification Required (see RFC 8126) registry, we will initiate the required Expert Review via a separate request. This review must be completed before the document's IANA state can be changed to "IANA OK."

We understand that these are the only actions required to be completed upon approval of this document.

NOTE: The actions requested in this document will not be completed until the document has been approved for publication as an RFC. This message is meant only to confirm the list of actions that will be performed.

For definitions of IANA review states, please see:

https://datatracker.ietf.org/help/state/draft/iana-review

Thank you,

David Dong
IANA Services Sr. Specialist

The following Last Call announcement was sent out (ends 2025-11-11):

From: The IESG
To: IETF-Announce
CC: debcooley1@gmail.com, draft-ietf-sshm-ssh-agent@ietf.org, job@sobornost.net, ssh@ietf.org, sshm-chairs@ietf.org
Reply-To: last-call@ietf.org
Sender:
Subject: Last Call:  (SSH Agent Protocol) to Proposed Standard


The IESG has received a request from the Secure Shell Maintenance WG (sshm)
to consider the following document: - 'SSH Agent Protocol'
  as Proposed Standard

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final
comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
last-call@ietf.org mailing lists by 2025-11-11. Exceptionally, comments may
be sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the beginning
of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

Abstract


  This document describes a key agent protocol for use in the Secure
  Shell (SSH) protocol.

Note

  This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

  In the IANA considerations section, please replace "thisRFC" with
  "RFC" and the assigned number, when known.




The file can be obtained via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sshm-ssh-agent/



No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.

# Document Shepherd Write-Up for Group Documents

*This version is dated 4 July 2022.*

Thank you for your service as a document shepherd. Among the responsibilities is
answering the questions in this write-up to give helpful context to Last Call
and Internet Engineering Steering Group ([IESG][1]) reviewers, and your
diligence in completing it is appreciated. The full role of the shepherd is
further described in [RFC 4858][2]. You will need the cooperation of the authors
and editors to complete these checks.

Note that some numbered items contain multiple related questions; please be sure
to answer all of them.

## Document History

1. Does the working group (WG) consensus represent the strong concurrence of a
  few individuals, with others being silent, or did it reach broad agreement?

There appears to be broad agreement.

2. Was there controversy about particular points, or were there decisions where
  the consensus was particularly rough?

There was no controversy.

3. Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme discontent? If
  so, please summarize the areas of conflict in separate email messages to the
  responsible Area Director. (It should be in a separate email because this
  questionnaire is publicly available.)

No threats of appeal were made, no expressions of (extreme) discontent.

4. For protocol documents, are there existing implementations of the contents of
  the document? Have a significant number of potential implementers indicated
  plans to implement? Are any existing implementations reported somewhere,
  either in the document itself (as [RFC 7942][3] recommends) or elsewhere
  (where)?

Section 9 of draft-ietf-sshm-ssh-agent-06 lists a number of existing implementations, to name a few: OpenSSH, PuTTY, Dropbear, Paramiko, and Go ssh/agent.

## Additional Reviews

5. Do the contents of this document closely interact with technologies in other
  IETF working groups or external organizations, and would it therefore benefit
  from their review? Have those reviews occurred? If yes, describe which
  reviews took place.

No external interactions

6. Describe how the document meets any required formal expert review criteria,
  such as the MIB Doctor, YANG Doctor, media type, and URI type reviews.

N/A

7. If the document contains a YANG module, has the final version of the module
  been checked with any of the [recommended validation tools][4] for syntax and
  formatting validation? If there are any resulting errors or warnings, what is
  the justification for not fixing them at this time? Does the YANG module
  comply with the Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA) as specified
  in [RFC 8342][5]?

N/A

8. Describe reviews and automated checks performed to validate sections of the
  final version of the document written in a formal language, such as XML code,
  BNF rules, MIB definitions, CBOR's CDDL, etc.

N/A

## Document Shepherd Checks

9. Based on the shepherd's review of the document, is it their opinion that this
  document is needed, clearly written, complete, correctly designed, and ready
  to be handed off to the responsible Area Director?

The document is clearly written. The widespread use and existing deployment of this
agent protocol probably is a testament to the design being a good one.

10. Several IETF Areas have assembled [lists of common issues that their
    reviewers encounter][6]. For which areas have such issues been identified
    and addressed? For which does this still need to happen in subsequent
    reviews?

ARTDIR / SECDIR reviews have been requested.

11. What type of RFC publication is being requested on the IETF stream ([Best
    Current Practice][12], [Proposed Standard, Internet Standard][13],
    [Informational, Experimental or Historic][14])? Why is this the proper type
    of RFC? Do all Datatracker state attributes correctly reflect this intent?

Proposed Standard on the Standards Track. The specification is generally stable,
has resolved known design choices, is believed to be well-understood, has received
significant community review, and appears to enjoy enough community interest to be
considered valuable.

12. Have reasonable efforts been made to remind all authors of the intellectual
    property rights (IPR) disclosure obligations described in [BCP 79][7]? To
    the best of your knowledge, have all required disclosures been filed? If
    not, explain why. If yes, summarize any relevant discussion, including links
    to publicly-available messages when applicable.

Yes, see https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ssh/Vyfxe8gBqC1BbG4YKQNDfkfuAVo/

13. Has each author, editor, and contributor shown their willingness to be
    listed as such? If the total number of authors and editors on the front page
    is greater than five, please provide a justification.

Yes, author is willing to be listed.

14. Document any remaining I-D nits in this document. Simply running the [idnits
    tool][8] is not enough; please review the ["Content Guidelines" on
    authors.ietf.org][15]. (Also note that the current idnits tool generates
    some incorrect warnings; a rewrite is underway.)

There is one nit, a downref to RFC 8032 - which is listed in the DOWNREF registry.

15. Should any informative references be normative or vice-versa? See the [IESG
    Statement on Normative and Informative References][16].

Reading [16] it seems listing 8032 as normative reference is correct, but I happily defer this to the IESG.

16. List any normative references that are not freely available to anyone. Did
    the community have sufficient access to review any such normative
    references?

Yes

17. Are there any normative downward references (see [RFC 3967][9] and [BCP
    97][10]) that are not already listed in the [DOWNREF registry][17]? If so,
    list them.

No.

18. Are there normative references to documents that are not ready to be
    submitted to the IESG for publication or are otherwise in an unclear state?
    If so, what is the plan for their completion?

N/A

19. Will publication of this document change the status of any existing RFCs? If
    so, does the Datatracker metadata correctly reflect this and are those RFCs
    listed on the title page, in the abstract, and discussed in the
    introduction? If not, explain why and point to the part of the document
    where the relationship of this document to these other RFCs is discussed.

No changes to existing RFCs

20. Describe the document shepherd's review of the IANA considerations section,
    especially with regard to its consistency with the body of the document.
    Confirm that all aspects of the document requiring IANA assignments are
    associated with the appropriate reservations in IANA registries. Confirm
    that any referenced IANA registries have been clearly identified. Confirm
    that each newly created IANA registry specifies its initial contents,
    allocations procedures, and a reasonable name (see [RFC 8126][11]).

Four new IANA registries are set up through this document, one new entry for
"Extension Names", one new entry for "Connection Protocol Channel Request Names",
and one for "Connection Protocol Channel Types". Initial contents are specified.
The names are clear.

21. List any new IANA registries that require Designated Expert Review for
    future allocations. Are the instructions to the Designated Expert clear?
    Please include suggestions of designated experts, if appropriate.

The instructions for Expert Review could probably be clarified a little bit.
Therefor a revised I-D will be requested.

[1]: https://www.ietf.org/about/groups/iesg/
[2]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4858.html
[3]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7942.html
[4]: https://wiki.ietf.org/group/ops/yang-review-tools
[5]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8342.html
[6]: https://wiki.ietf.org/group/iesg/ExpertTopics
[7]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/bcp79
[8]: https://www.ietf.org/tools/idnits/
[9]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3967.html
[10]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/bcp97
[11]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8126.html
[12]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2026.html#section-5
[13]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2026.html#section-4.1
[14]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2026.html#section-4.2
[15]: https://authors.ietf.org/en/content-guidelines-overview
[16]: https://www.ietf.org/about/groups/iesg/statements/normative-informative-references/
[17]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/downref/

# Document Shepherd Write-Up for Group Documents

*This version is dated 4 July 2022.*

Thank you for your service as a document shepherd. Among the responsibilities is
answering the questions in this write-up to give helpful context to Last Call
and Internet Engineering Steering Group ([IESG][1]) reviewers, and your
diligence in completing it is appreciated. The full role of the shepherd is
further described in [RFC 4858][2]. You will need the cooperation of the authors
and editors to complete these checks.

Note that some numbered items contain multiple related questions; please be sure
to answer all of them.

## Document History

1. Does the working group (WG) consensus represent the strong concurrence of a
  few individuals, with others being silent, or did it reach broad agreement?

There appears to be broad agreement.

2. Was there controversy about particular points, or were there decisions where
  the consensus was particularly rough?

There was no controversy.

3. Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme discontent? If
  so, please summarize the areas of conflict in separate email messages to the
  responsible Area Director. (It should be in a separate email because this
  questionnaire is publicly available.)

No threats of appeal were made, no expressions of (extreme) discontent.

4. For protocol documents, are there existing implementations of the contents of
  the document? Have a significant number of potential implementers indicated
  plans to implement? Are any existing implementations reported somewhere,
  either in the document itself (as [RFC 7942][3] recommends) or elsewhere
  (where)?

Section 9 of draft-ietf-sshm-ssh-agent-06 lists a number of existing implementations, to name a few: OpenSSH, PuTTY, Dropbear, Paramiko, and Go ssh/agent.

## Additional Reviews

5. Do the contents of this document closely interact with technologies in other
  IETF working groups or external organizations, and would it therefore benefit
  from their review? Have those reviews occurred? If yes, describe which
  reviews took place.

No external interactions

6. Describe how the document meets any required formal expert review criteria,
  such as the MIB Doctor, YANG Doctor, media type, and URI type reviews.

N/A

7. If the document contains a YANG module, has the final version of the module
  been checked with any of the [recommended validation tools][4] for syntax and
  formatting validation? If there are any resulting errors or warnings, what is
  the justification for not fixing them at this time? Does the YANG module
  comply with the Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA) as specified
  in [RFC 8342][5]?

N/A

8. Describe reviews and automated checks performed to validate sections of the
  final version of the document written in a formal language, such as XML code,
  BNF rules, MIB definitions, CBOR's CDDL, etc.

N/A

## Document Shepherd Checks

9. Based on the shepherd's review of the document, is it their opinion that this
  document is needed, clearly written, complete, correctly designed, and ready
  to be handed off to the responsible Area Director?

The document is clearly written. The widespread use and existing deployment of this
agent protocol probably is a testament to the design being a good one.

10. Several IETF Areas have assembled [lists of common issues that their
    reviewers encounter][6]. For which areas have such issues been identified
    and addressed? For which does this still need to happen in subsequent
    reviews?

ARTDIR / SECDIR reviews have been requested.

11. What type of RFC publication is being requested on the IETF stream ([Best
    Current Practice][12], [Proposed Standard, Internet Standard][13],
    [Informational, Experimental or Historic][14])? Why is this the proper type
    of RFC? Do all Datatracker state attributes correctly reflect this intent?

Proposed Standard on the Standards Track. The specification is generally stable,
has resolved known design choices, is believed to be well-understood, has received
significant community review, and appears to enjoy enough community interest to be
considered valuable.

12. Have reasonable efforts been made to remind all authors of the intellectual
    property rights (IPR) disclosure obligations described in [BCP 79][7]? To
    the best of your knowledge, have all required disclosures been filed? If
    not, explain why. If yes, summarize any relevant discussion, including links
    to publicly-available messages when applicable.

Yes, see https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ssh/Vyfxe8gBqC1BbG4YKQNDfkfuAVo/

13. Has each author, editor, and contributor shown their willingness to be
    listed as such? If the total number of authors and editors on the front page
    is greater than five, please provide a justification.

Yes, author is willing to be listed.

14. Document any remaining I-D nits in this document. Simply running the [idnits
    tool][8] is not enough; please review the ["Content Guidelines" on
    authors.ietf.org][15]. (Also note that the current idnits tool generates
    some incorrect warnings; a rewrite is underway.)

There is one nit, a downref to RFC 8032 - which is listed in the DOWNREF registry.

15. Should any informative references be normative or vice-versa? See the [IESG
    Statement on Normative and Informative References][16].

Reading [16] it seems listing 8032 as normative reference is correct, but I happily defer this to the IESG.

16. List any normative references that are not freely available to anyone. Did
    the community have sufficient access to review any such normative
    references?

Yes

17. Are there any normative downward references (see [RFC 3967][9] and [BCP
    97][10]) that are not already listed in the [DOWNREF registry][17]? If so,
    list them.

No.

18. Are there normative references to documents that are not ready to be
    submitted to the IESG for publication or are otherwise in an unclear state?
    If so, what is the plan for their completion?

N/A

19. Will publication of this document change the status of any existing RFCs? If
    so, does the Datatracker metadata correctly reflect this and are those RFCs
    listed on the title page, in the abstract, and discussed in the
    introduction? If not, explain why and point to the part of the document
    where the relationship of this document to these other RFCs is discussed.

No changes to existing RFCs

20. Describe the document shepherd's review of the IANA considerations section,
    especially with regard to its consistency with the body of the document.
    Confirm that all aspects of the document requiring IANA assignments are
    associated with the appropriate reservations in IANA registries. Confirm
    that any referenced IANA registries have been clearly identified. Confirm
    that each newly created IANA registry specifies its initial contents,
    allocations procedures, and a reasonable name (see [RFC 8126][11]).

Four new IANA registries are set up through this document, one new entry for
"Extension Names", one new entry for "Connection Protocol Channel Request Names",
and one for "Connection Protocol Channel Types". Initial contents are specified.
The names are clear.

21. List any new IANA registries that require Designated Expert Review for
    future allocations. Are the instructions to the Designated Expert clear?
    Please include suggestions of designated experts, if appropriate.

The instructions for Expert Review could probably be clarified a little bit.
Therefor a revised I-D will be requested.

[1]: https://www.ietf.org/about/groups/iesg/
[2]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4858.html
[3]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7942.html
[4]: https://wiki.ietf.org/group/ops/yang-review-tools
[5]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8342.html
[6]: https://wiki.ietf.org/group/iesg/ExpertTopics
[7]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/bcp79
[8]: https://www.ietf.org/tools/idnits/
[9]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3967.html
[10]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/bcp97
[11]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8126.html
[12]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2026.html#section-5
[13]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2026.html#section-4.1
[14]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2026.html#section-4.2
[15]: https://authors.ietf.org/en/content-guidelines-overview
[16]: https://www.ietf.org/about/groups/iesg/statements/normative-informative-references/
[17]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/downref/