Improve TCP Handling of Out-of-Window Packets to Mitigate Ghost ACKs
draft-ietf-tcpm-tcp-ghost-acks-04

TCPM                                                              Y. Pan
Internet-Draft                                                 C. Rossow
Intended status: Standards TrackCISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security
Expires: 7 October 2026                                     5 April 2026

  Improve TCP Handling of Out-of-Window Packets to Mitigate Ghost ACKs
                   draft-ietf-tcpm-tcp-ghost-acks-04

Abstract

   Historically, TCP as specified in RFC 793 was threatened by the blind
   data injection attack because of the loose SEG.ACK value validation,
   where the SEG.ACK value of a TCP segment is considered valid as long
   as it does not acknowledge data ahead of what has been sent.  RFC
   5961 improved the input validation by shrinking the range of
   acceptable SEG.ACK values in a TCP segment.  Later, RFC 9293
   incorporated the updates proposed by RFC 5961 as a TCP stack
   implementation option.
   However, an endpoint that follows the RFC 9293 specifications can
   still accept a TCP segment containing an SEG.ACK value acknowledging
   data that the endpoint has never sent.  This document specifies small
   modifications to the way TCP verifies incoming TCP segments' SEG.ACK
   value to prevent TCP from accepting such invalid SEG.ACK values.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 7 October 2026.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

Pan & Rossow             Expires 7 October 2026                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft            Ghost ACKs Mitigation               April 2026

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Ghost ACKs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Security Implications of Ghost ACKs . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Mitigation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     4.1.  Mitigation Option 1 (generic) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.2.  Mitigation Option 2 (assumes RFC4898 support) . . . . . .   4
   5.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     5.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     5.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6

1.  Introduction

   TCP as specified in [RFC0793] is widely deployed in today's Internet.
   Against the threat of the blind data injection attack, [RFC5961]
   section 5 proposed to improve the validation of the SEG.ACK field of
   incoming TCP segments.  Currently, [RFC9293] is the latest main
   document for TCP, which obsoletes [RFC0793] and incorporates the
   SEG.ACK validation proposed by [RFC5961] as an optional
   implementation choice.  The SEG.ACK validation introduced in
   [RFC9293] (with or without the [RFC5961] implementation choice)
   accepts a certain range of SEG.ACK values before SND.UNA as
   duplicate/old ACK values.  This also applies to connections without
   data (or with little data) transferred previously.  Consequently,
   current SEG.ACK validation accepts segments with invalid SEG.ACK
   values that acknowledge data that an endpoint has never sent as
   "duplicate/old" SEG.ACK values (ghost ACKs).
   This document aims to improve the SEG.ACK value validation in
   [RFC9293], such that TCP would only accept duplicate/old SEG.ACK
   values acknowledging data already sent by the endpoint, eliminating
   the security risks imposed by ghost ACKs.

Pan & Rossow             Expires 7 October 2026                 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft            Ghost ACKs Mitigation               April 2026

1.1.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   TCP terminology should be interpreted as described in [RFC9293].

2.  Ghost ACKs

   As described in [RFC9293], when receiving a segment, the endpoint
   performs checks on the SEG.ACK field of the incoming segment.
   Suppose the TCP stack has implemented the mitigation for blind data
   injection attack proposed by Section 5 of [RFC5961], an incoming
   segment whose SEG.ACK value satisfies the condition SND.UNA -
   MAX.SND.WND =< SEG.ACK =< SND.NXT is considered acceptable, and the
   segment is further processed.  When the [RFC5961] mitigation is not
   implemented, an incoming segment with SEG.ACK =< SND.NXT is accepted
   and further processed.

   However, there are cases where the number of bytes sent by the
   endpoint is less than MAX.SND.WND or 2^31 - 1, and this can result in
   accepting a segment with an SEG.ACK value acknowledging bytes the
   endpoint has never sent.
   As a concrete example, consider a newly established TCP connection
   without data transferred during the handshake.  There is SND.UNA ==
   SND.NXT == ISS + 1.  In this case, any segments with SEG.ACK <
   SND.UNA acknowledges bytes that the endpoint has never sent, but they
   are still considered acceptable since they satisfy the above SEG.ACK
   validation condition.

3.  Security Implications of Ghost ACKs

   Ghost ACKs allow an attacker to inject payloads into a newly
   established connection.  This extends the threat model as described
   in [RFC5961], where an off-path attacker can perform injection
   attacks against an existing foreign connection.  Ghost ACKs further
   allow attackers that spoof the TCP handshake to use the spoofed TCP
   connection and transmit payloads [SP2024Spoof].

4.  Mitigation

   TCP stacks MAY implement one of the following two mitigations.  Both
   mitigation options assume [RFC5961] is already supported by the TCP
   stack.

Pan & Rossow             Expires 7 October 2026                 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft            Ghost ACKs Mitigation               April 2026

4.1.  Mitigation Option 1 (generic)

   TCP stacks that implement this mitigation SHOULD add the additional
   boolean state variable NO_ISS_CHECK for each established connection.
   This variable SHOULD be initialized to false.  At the beginning of
   the SEG.ACK validation, it SHOULD be checked if the ISS is still
   needed:

             if (!NO_ISS_CHECK && SND.UNA >= ISS + (65535 << Snd.Wind.Shift)) {
                 /* Checking SEG.ACK against ISS is definitely redundant. */
                 NO_ISS_CHECK = true;
             }

   Snd.Wind.Shift is defined in [RFC7323].  Then a local variable
   ACK.MIN SHOULD be computed, which is later used to validate the
   SEG.ACK.  It is used to perform the validation, which is stricter.

             if (NO_ISS_CHECK) {
                 /* Check for too old ACKs (RFC 5961, Section 5.2). */
                 ACK.MIN = SND.UNA - MAX.SND.WND;
             } else {
                 if (ISS + 1 > SND.UNA - MAX.SND.WND) {
                     /* Checking for ghost ACKs is stricter. */
                     ACK.MIN = ISS + 1;
                 } else {
                     /* Checking for too old ACKs (RFC 5961, Section 5.2) is stricter. */
                     ACK.MIN = SND.UNA - MAX.SND.WND;
                 }
             }

   Finally the validation of SEG.ACK SHOULD be performed:

             if (SEG.ACK < ACK.MIN) {
                   send_challenge_ack;
                   return;
             }

4.2.  Mitigation Option 2 (assumes [RFC4898] support)

   TCP stacks that implemented the [RFC4898]
   tcpEStatsAppHCThruOctetsAcked statistics, which tracks the number of
   bytes that are already acknowledged by the peer, can adopt this
   option.

   To implement this mitigation, TCP stacks MUST add the SND.UNA -
   min(MAX.SND.WND, tcpEStatsAppHCThruOctetsAcked) =< SEG.ACK input
   checks for SEG.ACK values of any incoming segments.  Segments with
   ACK values satisfying the above condition are further validated and

Pan & Rossow             Expires 7 October 2026                 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft            Ghost ACKs Mitigation               April 2026

   processed as specified in [RFC9293].  Otherwise, the segment MUST be
   discarded and a challenge ACK sent back.  Though unlikely to happen,
   the 64-bit tcpEStatsAppHCThruOctetsAcked counter can overflow.  An
   implementation has to deal with tcpEStatsAppHCThruOctetsAcked
   overflows.

5.  References

5.1.  Normative References

   [RFC0793]  Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", RFC 793,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC0793, September 1981,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc793>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC4898]  Mathis, M., Heffner, J., and R. Raghunarayan, "TCP
              Extended Statistics MIB", RFC 4898, DOI 10.17487/RFC4898,
              May 2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4898>.

   [RFC5961]  Ramaiah, A., Stewart, R., and M. Dalal, "Improving TCP's
              Robustness to Blind In-Window Attacks", RFC 5961,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5961, August 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5961>.

   [RFC7323]  Borman, D., Braden, B., Jacobson, V., and R.
              Scheffenegger, Ed., "TCP Extensions for High Performance",
              RFC 7323, DOI 10.17487/RFC7323, September 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7323>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC9293]  Eddy, W., Ed., "Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)",
              STD 7, RFC 9293, DOI 10.17487/RFC9293, August 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9293>.

5.2.  Informative References

Pan & Rossow             Expires 7 October 2026                 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft            Ghost ACKs Mitigation               April 2026

   [SP2024Spoof]
              Pan, Y. and C. Rossow, "TCP Spoofing: Reliable Payload
              Transmission Past the Spoofed TCP Handshake",
              DOI 10.1109/SP54263.2024.00182, May 2024,
              <https://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/
              SP54263.2024.00182>.

Acknowledgements

   This template uses extracts from templates written by Pekka Savola,
   Elwyn Davies and Henrik Levkowetz.

   We thank Eric Dumazet for proposing the second mitigation option
   using tcpEStatsAppHCThruOctetsAcked.

Authors' Addresses

   Yepeng Pan
   CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security
   Email: yepeng.pan@cispa.de

   Christian Rossow
   CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security
   Email: rossow@cispa.de

Pan & Rossow             Expires 7 October 2026                 [Page 6]