HTTPS Token Binding with TLS Terminating Reverse Proxies
draft-ietf-tokbind-ttrp-09
Internet Engineering Task Force B. Campbell
Internet-Draft Ping Identity
Intended status: Standards Track July 5, 2019
Expires: January 6, 2020
HTTPS Token Binding with TLS Terminating Reverse Proxies
draft-ietf-tokbind-ttrp-09
Abstract
This document defines HTTP header fields that enable a TLS
terminating reverse proxy to convey information to a backend server
about the validated Token Binding Message received from a client,
which enables that backend server to bind, or verify the binding of,
cookies and other security tokens to the client's Token Binding key.
This facilitates the reverse proxy and backend server functioning
together as though they are a single logical server side deployment
of HTTPS Token Binding.
Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on January 6, 2020.
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Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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Campbell Expires January 6, 2020 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Token Binding and TLS Termination July 2019
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements Notation and Conventions . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. HTTP Header Fields and Processing Rules . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.1. Token Binding ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.2. Token Binding Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Token Binding ID HTTP Header Fields . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3. Processing Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.4. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.4.1. Provided Token Binding ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.4.2. Provided and Referred Token Binding IDs . . . . . . . 7
2.4.3. Provided and Other Token Binding IDs . . . . . . . . 8
3. TLS Versions and Best Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1. HTTP Message Header Field Names Registration . . . . . . 10
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Appendix B. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1. Introduction
Token Binding over HTTP [RFC8473] provides a mechanism that enables
HTTP servers to cryptographically bind cookies and other security
tokens to a key generated by the client. When the use of Token
Binding is negotiated in the TLS [RFC5246] handshake [RFC8472] the
client sends an encoded Token Binding Message [RFC8471] as a header
in each HTTP request, which proves possession of one or more private
keys held by the client. The public portion of the keys are
represented in the Token Binding IDs of the Token Binding Message and
for each one there is a signature over some data, which includes the
exported keying material [RFC5705] of the TLS connection. An HTTP
server issuing cookies or other security tokens can associate them
with the Token Binding ID, which ensures those tokens cannot be used
successfully over a different TLS connection or by a different client
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