HTTPS Token Binding with TLS Terminating Reverse Proxies
draft-ietf-tokbind-ttrp-01
Internet Engineering Task Force B. Campbell
Internet-Draft Ping Identity
Intended status: Standards Track August 2, 2017
Expires: February 3, 2018
HTTPS Token Binding with TLS Terminating Reverse Proxies
draft-ietf-tokbind-ttrp-01
Abstract
This document defines common HTTP header fields that enable a TLS
terminating reverse proxy to convey information about the validated
Token Binding Message sent by the client to a backend server, which
enables that backend server to bind, or verify the binding of,
cookies and other security tokens to the client's Token Binding key.
Status of This Memo
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Campbell Expires February 3, 2018 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Token Binding and TLS Termination August 2017
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements Notation and Conventions . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. HTTP Header Fields and Processing Rules . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Token Binding ID HTTP Header Fields . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. Processing Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3.1. Provided Token Binding ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3.2. Provided and Referred Token Binding IDs . . . . . . . 6
3. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1. HTTP Message Header Field Names Registration . . . . . . 7
5. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Appendix B. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1. Introduction
Token Binding over HTTP [I-D.ietf-tokbind-https] provides a mechanism
that enables HTTP servers to cryptographically bind cookies and other
security tokens to a key held by the browser or other HTTP client,
possession of which is proven on the TLS [RFC5246] connections over
which the tokens are used. When Token Binding is negotiated in the
TLS handshake [I-D.ietf-tokbind-negotiation] the client sends an
encoded Token Binding Message [I-D.ietf-tokbind-protocol] as a header
in each HTTP request, which proves possession of one or more private
keys held by the client. The public portion of the keys are
represented in the Token Binding IDs of the Token Binding Message and
for each one there is a signature over some data, which includes the
exported keying material [RFC5705] of the TLS connection. An HTTP
server issuing cookies or other security tokens can associate them
with the Token Binding ID, which ensures those tokens cannot be used
successfully over a different TLS connection or by a different client
than the one to which they were issued.
A fairly common deployment architecture for HTTPS applications is to
have the backend HTTP application servers sit behind a reverse proxy
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