HTTPS Token Binding with TLS Terminating Reverse Proxies
draft-ietf-tokbind-ttrp-06
Internet Engineering Task Force B. Campbell
Internet-Draft Ping Identity
Intended status: Standards Track July 27, 2018
Expires: January 28, 2019
HTTPS Token Binding with TLS Terminating Reverse Proxies
draft-ietf-tokbind-ttrp-06
Abstract
This document defines HTTP header fields that enable a TLS
terminating reverse proxy to convey information to a backend server
about the validated Token Binding Message received from a client,
which enables that backend server to bind, or verify the binding of,
cookies and other security tokens to the client's Token Binding key.
This facilitates the reverse proxy and backend server functioning
together as though they are a single logical server side deployment
of HTTPS Token Binding.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 28, 2019.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
Campbell Expires January 28, 2019 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Token Binding and TLS Termination July 2018
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements Notation and Conventions . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. HTTP Header Fields and Processing Rules . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.1. Token Binding ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.2. Token Binding Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Token Binding ID HTTP Header Fields . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3. Processing Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.4. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.4.1. Provided Token Binding ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.4.2. Provided and Referred Token Binding IDs . . . . . . . 7
2.4.3. Provided and Other Token Binding IDs . . . . . . . . 8
3. TLS Versions and Best Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.1. HTTP Message Header Field Names Registration . . . . . . 10
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Appendix B. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1. Introduction
Token Binding over HTTP [I-D.ietf-tokbind-https] provides a mechanism
that enables HTTP servers to cryptographically bind cookies and other
security tokens to a key generated by the client. When the use of
Token Binding is negotiated in the TLS [RFC5246] handshake
[I-D.ietf-tokbind-negotiation] the client sends an encoded Token
Binding Message [I-D.ietf-tokbind-protocol] as a header in each HTTP
request, which proves possession of one or more private keys held by
the client. The public portion of the keys are represented in the
Token Binding IDs of the Token Binding Message and for each one there
is a signature over some data, which includes the exported keying
material [RFC5705] of the TLS connection. An HTTP server issuing
cookies or other security tokens can associate them with the Token
Binding ID, which ensures those tokens cannot be used successfully
Show full document text