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Reaction of Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC) to Flash- Renumbering Events
draft-ietf-v6ops-slaac-renum-00

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This is an older version of an Internet-Draft that was ultimately published as RFC 8978.
Authors Fernando Gont , Jan Zorz , Richard Patterson
Last updated 2020-03-08
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draft-ietf-v6ops-slaac-renum-00
IPv6 Operations Working Group (v6ops)                            F. Gont
Internet-Draft                                              SI6 Networks
Intended status: Informational                                   J. Zorz
Expires: September 7, 2020                                 Go6 Institute
                                                            R. Patterson
                                                                  Sky UK
                                                           March 6, 2020

   Reaction of Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC) to Flash-
                           Renumbering Events
                    draft-ietf-v6ops-slaac-renum-00

Abstract

   In scenarios where network configuration information related to IPv6
   prefixes becomes invalid without any explicit signaling of that
   condition (such as when a CPE crashes and reboots without knowledge
   of the previously-employed prefixes), nodes on the local network will
   continue using stale prefixes for an unacceptably long period of
   time, thus resulting in connectivity problems.  This document
   documents this problem, and discusses operational workarounds that
   may help to improve network robustness.  Additionally, it highlights
   areas where further work may be needed.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 7, 2020.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Analysis of the Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.1.  Use of Dynamic Prefixes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.2.  Default Timer Values in IPv6 Stateless Address
           Autoconfiguration (SLAAC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.3.  Recovering from Stale Network Configuration Information .   6
     2.4.  Lack of Explicit Signaling about Stale Information  . . .   7
     2.5.  Interaction Between DHCPv6-PD and SLAAC . . . . . . . . .   7
   3.  Operational Mitigations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.1.  Stable Prefixes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.2.  SLAAC Parameter Tweaking  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   4.  Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   7.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12

1.  Introduction

   IPv6 largely assumes prefix stability, with network renumbering only
   taking place in a planned manner, with old/stale prefixes being
   phased-out via reduced prefix lifetimes, and new prefixes (with
   longer lifetimes) being introduced at the same time.  However, there
   are a number of scenarios that may lead to the so-called "flash-
   renumbering" events, where the prefix employed by a network suddenly
   becomes invalid and replaced by a new prefix.  In some of these
   scenarios, the local router producing the network renumbering event
   may try to deprecate the currently-employed prefixes (by explicitly
   signaling the network about the renumbering event), whereas in other
   scenarios it may be unable to do so.

   In scenarios where network configuration information related to IPv6
   prefixes becomes invalid without any explicit signaling of that

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   condition, nodes on the local network will continue using stale
   prefixes for an unacceptably long period of time, thus resulting in
   connectivity problems.

   Scenarios where this problem may arise include, but are not limited
   to, the following:

   o  The most common IPv6 deployment scenario for residential or small
      office networks is that in which a CPE router employs DHCPv6
      Prefix Delegation (DHCPv6-PD) [RFC8415] to request a prefix from
      an Internet Service Provider (ISP), and a sub-prefix of the leased
      prefix is advertised on the LAN-side of the CPE router via
      Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC) [RFC4862].  In
      scenarios where the CPE router crashes and reboots, the CPE may be
      leased (via DHCPv6-PD) a different prefix from the one previously
      leased, and therefore advertise (via SLAAC) the new prefix on the
      LAN side.  Hosts will normally configure addresses for the new
      prefix, but will normally retain and actively employ the addresses
      configured for the previously-advertised prefix, since their
      associated Preferred Lifetime and Valid Lifetime allow them to do
      so.

   o  A switch-port the host is connected to may be moved to another
      subnet (VLAN) as a result of manual switch-port reconfiguration or
      802.1x re-authentication.  In particular there has been evidence
      that some 802.1x supplicants do not reset network settings after
      successful 802.1x authentication.  So if a host had failed 802.1x
      authentication for some reason, was placed in a "quarantine" VLAN
      and then got successfully authenticated later on, it might end up
      having IPv6 addresses from both old ("quarantine") and new VLANs.

   o  During the planned network renumbering, a router may be configured
      to send an RA with the Preferred Lifetime for the "old" Prefix
      Information Option (PIO) set to zero and the new PIO having non-
      zero preferred lifetime.  However, due to unsolicited RAs being
      sent as all-hosts multicast and multicast being rather unreliable
      on busy wifi networks, the RA may not be received by a host (or
      set of hosts).

   o  Automated device config management system performs periodical
      config push to network devices.  If such a push results in
      changing the /64 subnet configured on a particular network, hosts
      attached to that network would not get notified about the subnet
      change and their addresses from the "old" prefix will not
      deprecated.  A related scenario is the incorrect network
      renumbering where a network administrator renumbers a network by
      simply removing the "old" prefix from the configuration and
      configuring a new prefix instead.

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   Lacking any explicit signaling to "deprecate" the previously-
   advertised prefixes, hosts may continue to employ the previously-
   configured addresses which will typically result in packets being
   blackholed -- whether because of egress-filtering by the CPE or ISP,
   or because responses to such packets be discarded or routed
   elsewhere.

   We note that the default values for the "Valid Lifetime" and
   "Preferred Lifetime" of PIOs, as specified in [RFC4861], are:

   o  Valid Lifetime (AdvValidLifetime): 2592000 seconds (30 days)

   o  Preferred Lifetime (AdvPreferredLifetime): 604800 seconds (7 days)

   This means that in the aforementioned scenarios, the stale addresses
   would be retained and also actively employed for new communications
   instances for unacceptably long period of time (one month, and one
   week, respectively), leading to interoperability problems, instead of
   hosts transitioning to the newly-advertised prefix(es) in a timelier
   manner.

   Some devices have implemented ad-hoc mechanisms to address this
   problem, such as sending RAs to invalidate apparently-stale prefixes
   when the device receives any packets employing a source address from
   a prefix not currently advertised for address configuration on the
   local network [FRITZ].  However, this may introduce other
   interoperability problems, particularly in multihomed/multiprefix
   scenarios.  This is clear indication that advice in this area is
   warranted.

   Unresponsiveness to these "flash-renumbering" events is caused by the
   inability of the network to deprecate stale information, as well as
   by the inability of hosts to react to network configuration changes
   in a timelier manner.  Clearly, it would be desirable that these
   flash-renumbering scenarios do not occur, and that, when they do
   occur, that hosts are explicitly notified of their occurrence.
   However, for robustness reasons it is also paramount for hosts to be
   able to recover from stale configuration information even when these
   flash-renumbering events occur and the network is unable to
   explicitly notify hosts about such condition.

   Section 2 analysis this problem in more detail.  Section 3 describes
   possible operational mitigations.  Section 4 describes possible
   future work to better mitigate the aforementioned problem.

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2.  Analysis of the Problem

   As noted in Section 1, the problem discussed in this document
   exacerbated by a number of different parameters and behaviours.  Each
   of the following sections analyze each of them in detail.

2.1.  Use of Dynamic Prefixes

   In the residential or small office scenario, the problem discussed in
   this document would be avoided if DHCPv6-PD would lease "stable"
   prefixes.  However, a recent survey [UK-NOF] indicates that 37% of
   the responding ISPs employ dynamic prefixes.  That is, dynamic IPv6
   prefixes are an operational reality.

   Deployment reality aside, there are a number of possible issues
   associated with stable prefixes:

   o  Provisioning systems may be unable to deliver stable IPv6
      prefixes.

   o  While there is a range of information that may be employed to
      correlate network activity [RFC7721], the use of stable prefixes
      clearly simplifies network activity correlation, and may
      essentially render features such as "temporary addresses"
      [RFC4941] irrelevant.

   o  There may be existing advice for ISPs to deliver dynamic IPv6
      prefixes *by default* (see e.g.  [GERMAN-DP]) over privacy
      concerns associated with stable prefixes.

   The authors of this document understand that, for a number of reasons
   (such as the ones stated above), IPv6 deployments may employ dynamic
   prefixes (even at the expense of the issues discussed in this
   document), and that there might be scenarios in which the dynamics of
   a network are such that the network exhibits the behaviour of dynamic
   prefixes.  Rather than try to preclude how operators may run their
   networks, this document aims at improving network robustness in the
   deployed Internet.

2.2.  Default Timer Values in IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration
      (SLAAC)

   Many protocols, from different layers, normally employ timers.  The
   general logic is as follows:

   o  A timer is set with a value such that, under normal conditions,
      the timer does *not* go off.

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   o  Whenever a fault condition arises, the timer goes off, and the
      protocol can perform fault recovery

   One common example for the use of timers is when implementing
   reliability mechanisms where a packet is transmitted, and unless a
   response is received, a retransmission timer will go off to trigger
   retransmission of the original packet.

   For obvious reasons, the whole point of using timers is that in
   problematic scenarios, they will go off, and trigger some recovery
   action.

   However, IPv6 SLAAC employs, for PIOs, these default values:

   o  Preferred Lifetime (AdvPreferredLifetime): 604800 seconds (7 days)

   o  Valid Lifetime (AdvValidLifetime): 2592000 seconds (30 days)

   Under normal network conditions, these timers will be reset/refreshed
   to the default values.  However, under problematic circumstances such
   as where the corresponding network information has become stale
   without any explicit signal from the network (as described in
   Section 1), it will take a host 7 days (one week) to un-prefer the
   corresponding addresses, and 30 days (one month) to eventually
   invalidate and remove any addresses configured for the stale prefix.

2.3.  Recovering from Stale Network Configuration Information

   SLAAC hosts are unable to recover from stale network configuration
   information for a number of reasons:

   o  Item "e)" of Section 5.5.3 of [RFC4862] specifies that an RA may
      never reduce the "RemainingLifetime" more than to two hours.  If
      the RemainingLifetime of an address is smaller than 2 hours, then
      a Valid Lifetime smaller than 2 hours will be ignored.  The
      Preferred Lifetime of an address can be reduced to any value to
      avoid the use of a stale prefix to be employed for new
      communications.

   o  In the absence of explicit signalling from SLAAC routers (such as
      sending PIOs with a "Preferred Lifetime" set to 0), SLAAC hosts
      fail to recover from stale configuration information in a timely
      manner.  However, when a network element is able to explicitly
      signal the renumbering event, it will only be able to "un-prefer"
      the stale prefix, but not to invalidate the prefix in question.
      Therefore, communication with the new "owners" of the stale prefix
      will not be possible, since the stale prefix will still be
      considered "on-link".

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2.4.  Lack of Explicit Signaling about Stale Information

   Whenever prefix information has changed, a SLAAC router should not
   only advertise the new information, but should also advertise the
   stale information with appropriate lifetime values (both "Preferred
   Lifetime" and "Valid Lifetime" set to 0), such that there is explicit
   signaling to SLAAC hosts to remove the stale information (including
   configured addresses and routes).  However, in scenarios such as when
   a CPE router crashes and reboots, the CPE router may have no
   knowledge about the previously-advertised prefixes, and thus may be
   unable to advertise them with appropriate lifetimes (in order to
   deprecate them).

   However, we note that, as discussed in Section 2.3, PIOs with small
   Valid Lifetimes will not lower the Valid Lifetime to any value
   shorter than two hours (as per [RFC4862]).  Therefore, even if a
   SLAAC router were to explicitly signal the network about the stale
   configuration information via RAs, such signaling would be mostly
   ignored.

2.5.  Interaction Between DHCPv6-PD and SLAAC

   While DHCPv6-PD is normally employed along with SLAAC, the
   interaction between the two protocols is largely unspecified.  Not
   unusually, the two protocols are implemented in two different
   software components with the interface between the two implemented by
   some sort of script that feeds the SLAAC implementation with values
   learned from DHCPv6-PD.

   At times, the prefix lease time is fed as a constant value to the
   SLAAC router implementation, meaning that, eventually, the prefix
   lifetime advertised on the LAN side will span *past* the DHCPv6-PD
   lease time.  This is clearly incorrect, since the SLAAC router
   implementation would be allowing the use of such prefixes for a
   longer time than it has been granted usage of those prefixes via
   DHCPv6-PD.

3.  Operational Mitigations

   The following subsections discuss possible operational workarounds
   for the aforementioned problem.

3.1.  Stable Prefixes

   As noted in Section 2.1, the use of stable prefixes would eliminate
   the issue in *some* of the scenarios discussed in Section 1 of this
   document, such as the typical home network deployment.  However, even

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   in such scenarios, there might be reasons for which an administrator
   may want or may need to employ dynamic prefixes

3.2.  SLAAC Parameter Tweaking

   An operator may wish to override some SLAAC parameters such that,
   under normal circumstances (including some packet loss), the timers
   will be refreshed/reset, but in the presence of network faults (such
   as network configuration information becoming stale without explicit
   signaling), the timers go off and trigger some fault recovering
   action (such as un-preferring the corresponding addresses and
   subsequently removing them).

   The following router configuration variables (corresponding to the
   "lifetime" parameters in PIOs) could be overridden as follows:

      AdvValidLifetime: 48 * AdvDefaultLifetime (86400 seconds)

      AdvPreferredLifetime: AdvDefaultLifetime (1800 seconds)

   NOTES:  A CPE router advertising a sub-prefix of a prefixed leased
      via DHCPv6-PD will periodically refresh the Preferred Lifetime and
      the Valid Lifetime of an advertised prefix to AdvPreferredLifetime
      and AdvValidLifetime, respectively, as long as the resulting
      lifetime of the corresponding prefixes does not extend past the
      DHCPv6-PD lease time.

   RATIONALE:

      *  In the context of [RFC8028], where it is clear that use of
         addresses configured for a given prefix is tied to using the
         next-hop router that advertised the prefix, it does not make
         sense for the "Preferred Lifetime" of a PIO to be larger than
         the "Router Lifetime" (AdvDefaultLifetime) of the corresponding
         Router Advertisement messages.  The "Valid Lifetime" is set to
         a much larger value to cope with transient network problems.

      *  Lacking RAs that refresh information, addresses configured for
         advertised prefixes become un-preferred in a timelier manner,
         and thus Rule 3 of [RFC6724] causes other configured addresses
         (if available) to be used instead.

      *  We note that lowering the default values for the "Valid
         Lifetime" helps reduce the amount of time a host may maintain
         stale information and the amount of time an advertising router
         would need to advertise stale prefixes to deprecate them, while
         reducing the default "Preferred Lifetime" would reduce the
         amount of time it takes for a host to prefer other working

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         prefixes (see Section 12 of [RFC4861]).  However, while the
         aforementioned values are an improvement over the default
         values specified in [RFC4861], they will not lead to a timely
         recovery from the problem discussed in this document.

4.  Future Work

   Improvement in Customer Edge Routers [RFC7084] such that they can
   signal the network about stale prefixes and deprecate them
   accordingly can help mitigate the problem discussed in this document
   for the "home network" scenario.  Such work is currently being
   pursued in [I-D.gont-v6ops-cpe-slaac-renum].

   Improvements in the SLAAC protocol [RFC4862] and other algorithms
   such as "Default Address Selection for IPv6" [RFC6724] would help
   improve network robustness.  Such work is currently being pursued in
   [I-D.gont-6man-slaac-renum].

   The aforementioned work is considered out of the scope of this
   present document, which only focuses on documenting the problem and
   discussing operational mitigations.

5.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no actions for IANA.

6.  Security Considerations

   This document discusses a problem that may arise in scenarios where
   flash-renumbering events occur, and proposes workarounds to mitigate
   the aforementioned problems.  This document does not introduce any
   new security issues.

7.  Acknowledgments

   The authors would lie to thank (in alphabetical order) Mikael
   Abrahamsson, Luis Balbinot, Brian Carpenter, Tassos Chatzithomaoglou,
   Uesley Correa, Owen DeLong, Gert Doering, Fernando Frediani, Steinar
   Haug, Nick Hilliard, Philip Homburg, Lee Howard, Christian Huitema,
   Albert Manfredi, Jordi Palet Martinez, Richard Patterson, Michael
   Richardson, Mark Smith, Tarko Tikan, and Ole Troan, for providing
   valuable comments on [I-D.gont-6man-slaac-renum], on which this
   document is based.

   Fernando would like to thank Alejandro D'Egidio and Sander Steffann
   for a discussion of these issues.  Fernando would also like to thank
   Brian Carpenter who, over the years, has answered many questions and

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   provided valuable comments that has benefited his protocol-related
   work.

   The problem discussed in this document has been previously documented
   by Jen Linkova in [I-D.linkova-6man-default-addr-selection-update],
   and also in [RIPE-690].  Section 1 borrows text from
   [I-D.linkova-6man-default-addr-selection-update], authored by Jen
   Linkova.

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [RFC4861]  Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman,
              "Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4861, September 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4861>.

   [RFC4862]  Thomson, S., Narten, T., and T. Jinmei, "IPv6 Stateless
              Address Autoconfiguration", RFC 4862,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4862, September 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4862>.

   [RFC4941]  Narten, T., Draves, R., and S. Krishnan, "Privacy
              Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in
              IPv6", RFC 4941, DOI 10.17487/RFC4941, September 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4941>.

   [RFC8028]  Baker, F. and B. Carpenter, "First-Hop Router Selection by
              Hosts in a Multi-Prefix Network", RFC 8028,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8028, November 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8028>.

   [RFC8415]  Mrugalski, T., Siodelski, M., Volz, B., Yourtchenko, A.,
              Richardson, M., Jiang, S., Lemon, T., and T. Winters,
              "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)",
              RFC 8415, DOI 10.17487/RFC8415, November 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8415>.

8.2.  Informative References

   [FRITZ]    Gont, F., "Quiz: Weird IPv6 Traffic on the Local Network
              (updated with solution)", SI6 Networks Blog, February
              2016, <http://blog.si6networks.com/2016/02/quiz-weird-
              ipv6-traffic-on-local-network.html>.

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   [GERMAN-DP]
              BFDI, "Einfuhrung von IPv6 Hinweise fur Provider im
              Privatkundengeschaft und Herstellere", Entschliessung der
              84. Konferenz der Datenschutzbeauftragten des Bundes und
              der Lander am 7./8. November 2012 in Frankfurt (Oder),
              November 2012,
              <http://www.bfdi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Publikationen/
              Entschliessungssammlung/DSBundLaender/84DSK_EinfuehrungIPv
              6.pdf?__blob=publicationFile>.

   [I-D.gont-6man-slaac-renum]
              Gont, F., Zorz, J., and R. Patterson, "Improving the
              Robustness of Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC)
              to Flash Renumbering Events", draft-gont-6man-slaac-
              renum-02 (work in progress), February 2020.

   [I-D.gont-v6ops-cpe-slaac-renum]
              Gont, F., Zorz, J., and R. Patterson, "Improving the
              Reaction of Customer Edge Routers to Renumbering Events",
              draft-gont-v6ops-cpe-slaac-renum-00 (work in progress),
              November 2019.

   [I-D.linkova-6man-default-addr-selection-update]
              Linkova, J., "Default Address Selection and Subnet
              Renumbering", draft-linkova-6man-default-addr-selection-
              update-00 (work in progress), March 2017.

   [RFC6724]  Thaler, D., Ed., Draves, R., Matsumoto, A., and T. Chown,
              "Default Address Selection for Internet Protocol Version 6
              (IPv6)", RFC 6724, DOI 10.17487/RFC6724, September 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6724>.

   [RFC7084]  Singh, H., Beebee, W., Donley, C., and B. Stark, "Basic
              Requirements for IPv6 Customer Edge Routers", RFC 7084,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7084, November 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7084>.

   [RFC7721]  Cooper, A., Gont, F., and D. Thaler, "Security and Privacy
              Considerations for IPv6 Address Generation Mechanisms",
              RFC 7721, DOI 10.17487/RFC7721, March 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7721>.

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   [RIPE-690]
              Zorz, J., Zorz, S., Drazumeric, P., Townsley, M., Alston,
              J., Doering, G., Palet, J., Linkova, J., Balbinot, L.,
              Meynell, K., and L. Howard, "Best Current Operational
              Practice for Operators: IPv6 prefix assignment for end-
              users - persistent vs non-persistent, and what size to
              choose", RIPE 690, October 2017,
              <https://www.ripe.net/publications/docs/ripe-690>.

   [UK-NOF]   Palet, J., "IPv6 Deployment Survey (Residential/Household
              Services) How IPv6 is being deployed?", UK NOF 39, January
              2018,
              <https://indico.uknof.org.uk/event/41/contributions/542/
              attachments/712/866/bcop-ipv6-prefix-v9.pdf>.

Authors' Addresses

   Fernando Gont
   SI6 Networks
   Segurola y Habana 4310, 7mo Piso
   Villa Devoto, Ciudad Autonoma de Buenos Aires
   Argentina

   Email: fgont@si6networks.com
   URI:   https://www.si6networks.com

   Jan Zorz
   Go6 Institute
   Frankovo naselje 165
   Skofja Loka  4220
   Slovenia

   Email: jan@go6.si
   URI:   https://www.go6.si

   Richard Patterson
   Sky UK

   Email: richard.patterson@sky.uk

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