XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures
draftirtfcfrgxmsshashbasedsignatures01
The information below is for an old version of the document.
Document  Type 
This is an older version of an InternetDraft that was ultimately published as RFC 8391.



Authors  Andreas Huelsing , Denis Butin , StefanLukas Gazdag , Aziz Mohaisen  
Last updated  20150703  
Replaces  drafthuelsingcfrghashsigxmss  
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IETF conflict review  conflictreviewirtfcfrgxmsshashbasedsignatures, conflictreviewirtfcfrgxmsshashbasedsignatures, conflictreviewirtfcfrgxmsshashbasedsignatures, conflictreviewirtfcfrgxmsshashbasedsignatures, conflictreviewirtfcfrgxmsshashbasedsignatures, conflictreviewirtfcfrgxmsshashbasedsignatures  
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draftirtfcfrgxmsshashbasedsignatures01
Crypto Forum Research Group A. Huelsing InternetDraft TU Eindhoven Intended status: Informational D. Butin Expires: January 4, 2016 TU Darmstadt S. Gazdag genua GmbH A. Mohaisen Verisign Labs July 3, 2015 XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures draftirtfcfrgxmsshashbasedsignatures01 Abstract This note describes the eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme (XMSS), a hashbased digital signature system. It follows existing descriptions in scientific literature. The note specifies the WOTS+ onetime signature scheme, a singletree (XMSS) and a multitree variant (XMSS^MT) of XMSS. Both variants use WOTS+ as a main building block. XMSS provides cryptographic digital signatures without relying on the conjectured hardness of mathematical problems. Instead, it is proven that it only relies on the properties of cryptographic hash functions. XMSS provides strong security guarantees and, besides some special instantiations, is even secure when the collision resistance of the underlying hash function is broken. It is suitable for compact implementations, relatively simple to implement, and naturally resists sidechannel attacks. Unlike most other signature systems, hashbased signatures withstand attacks using quantum computers. Status of This Memo This InternetDraft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. InternetDrafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as InternetDrafts. The list of current Internet Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. InternetDrafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use InternetDrafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This InternetDraft will expire on January 4, 2016. Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 1] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/licenseinfo) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Conventions Used In This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2. Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.1. Data Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.2. Operators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.3. Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.4. Integer to Byte Conversion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.5. Hash Function Address Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.6. Strings of Base w Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.7. Member Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3. Primitives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.1. WOTS+ OneTime Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.1.1. WOTS+ Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.1.1.1. WOTS+ Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 3.1.2. WOTS+ Chaining Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 3.1.3. WOTS+ Private Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 3.1.4. WOTS+ Public Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 3.1.5. WOTS+ Signature Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 3.1.6. WOTS+ Signature Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 3.1.7. Pseudorandom Key Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 4. Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 4.1. XMSS: eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme . . . . . . . . . 17 4.1.1. XMSS Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 4.1.2. XMSS Hash Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 4.1.3. XMSS Private Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4.1.4. Randomized Tree Hashing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4.1.5. LTrees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4.1.6. TreeHash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 4.1.7. XMSS Public Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 4.1.8. XMSS Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 4.1.9. XMSS Signature Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 2] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 4.1.10. XMSS Signature Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 4.1.11. Pseudorandom Key Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 4.1.12. Free Index Handling and Partial Secret Keys . . . . . 26 4.2. XMSS^MT: MultiTree XMSS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 4.2.1. XMSS^MT Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 4.2.2. XMSS Algorithms Without Message Hash . . . . . . . . 27 4.2.3. XMSS^MT Private Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 4.2.4. XMSS^MT Public Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 4.2.5. XMSS^MT Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 4.2.6. XMSS^MT Signature Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 4.2.7. XMSS^MT Signature Verification . . . . . . . . . . . 31 4.2.8. Pseudorandom Key Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 4.2.9. Free Index Handling and Partial Secret Keys . . . . . 32 5. Parameter Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 5.1. WOTS+ Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 5.2. XMSS Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 5.3. XMSS^MT Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 6. Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 8.1. Security Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 8.2. Security Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 8.3. PostQuantum Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Appendix A. WOTS+ XDR Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Appendix B. XMSS XDR Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Appendix C. XMSS^MT XDR Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 Appendix D. Changed since draftirtfcfrgxmsshashbased signatures00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 1. Introduction A (cryptographic) digital signature scheme provides asymmetric message authentication. The key generation algorithm produces a key pair consisting of a private and a public key. A message is signed using a private key to produce a signature. A message/signature pair can be verified using a public key. A OneTime Signature (OTS) scheme allows using a key pair to sign exactly one message securely. A manytime signature system can be used to sign multiple messages. OneTime Signature schemes, and ManyTime Signature (MTS) schemes composed of them, were proposed by Merkle in 1979 [Merkle79]. They were wellstudied in the 1990s and have regained interest from 2006 onwards because of their resistance against quantumcomputeraided Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 3] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 attacks. These kinds of signature schemes are called hashbased signature schemes as they are built out of a cryptographic hash function. Hashbased signature schemes generally feature small private and public keys as well as fast signature generation and verification but large signatures and relatively slow key generation. In addition, they are suitable for compact implementations that benefit various applications and are naturally resistant to most kinds of sidechannel attacks. Some progress has already been made toward standardizing and introducing hashbased signatures. McGrew and Curcio have published an InternetDraft [DC14] specifying the "textbook" LamportDiffie WinternitzMerkle (LDWM) scheme based on early publications. Independently, Buchmann, Dahmen and Huelsing have proposed XMSS [BDH11], the eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme, offering better efficiency and a modern security proof. Very recently, the stateless hashbased signature scheme SPHINCS was introduced [BHH15], with the intent of being easier to deploy in current applications. A reasonable next step toward introducing hashbased signatures would be to complete the specifications of the basic algorithms  LDWM, XMSS, SPHINCS and/or variants [Kaliski15]. The eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme (XMSS) [BDH11] is the latest stateful hashbased signature scheme. It has the smallest signatures out of such schemes and comes with a multitree variant that solves the problem of slow key generation. Moreover, it can be shown that XMSS is secure, making only mild assumptions on the underlying hash function. Especially, it is not required that the cryptographic hash function is collisionresistant for the security of XMSS. This document describes a singletree and a multitree variant of XMSS. It also describes WOTS+, a variant of the Winternitz OTS scheme introduced in [Huelsing13] that is used by XMSS. The schemes are described with enough specificity to ensure interoperability between implementations. This document is structured as follows. Notation is introduced in Section 2. Section 3 describes the WOTS+ signature system. MTS schemes are defined in Section 4: the eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme (XMSS) in Section 4.1, and its MultiTree variant (XMSS^MT) in Section 4.2. Parameter sets are described in Section 5. Section 6 describes the rationale behind choices in this note. The IANA registry for these signature systems is described in Section 7. Finally, security considerations are presented in Section 8. Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 4] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 1.1. Conventions Used In This Document The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. 2. Notation 2.1. Data Types Bytes and byte strings are the fundamental data types. A byte is a sequence of eight bits. A single byte is denoted as a pair of hexadecimal digits with a leading "0x". A byte string is an ordered sequence of zero or more bytes and is denoted as an ordered sequence of hexadecimal characters with a leading "0x". For example, 0xe534f0 is a byte string of length 3. An array of byte strings is an ordered, indexed set starting with index 0 in which all byte strings have identical length. If not stated or handled otherwise, we assume bigendian representation of data types. 2.2. Operators When a and b are integers, mathematical operators are defined as follows: ^ : a ^ b denotes the result of a raised to the power of b. * : a * b denotes the product of a and b. This operator is sometimes used implicitly in the absence of ambiguity, as in usual mathematical notation. / : a / b denotes the quotient of a by b. % : a % b denotes the nonnegative remainder of the integer division of a by b. + : a + b denotes the sum of a and b.  : a  b denotes the difference of a and b. The standard order of operations is used when evaluating arithmetic expressions. Arrays are used in the common way, where the i^th element of an array A is denoted A[i]. Byte strings are treated as arrays of bytes where necessary: If X is a byte string, then X[i] denotes its i^th byte, where X[0] is the leftmost byte. Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 5] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 If A and B are byte strings of equal length, then: A AND B denotes the bitwise logical conjunction operation. A XOR B denotes the bitwise logical exclusive disjunction operation. When B is a byte and i is an integer, then B >> i denotes the logical rightshift operation. Similarly, B << i denotes the logical left shift operation. If X is a xbyte string and Y a ybyte string, then X  Y denotes the concatenation of X and Y, with X  Y = X[0] ... X[x1] Y[0] ... Y[y1]. 2.3. Functions If x is a nonnegative real number, then we define the following functions: ceil(x) : returns the smallest integer greater or equal than x. floor(x) : returns the largest integer less or equal than x. lg(x) : returns the logarithm to base 2 of x. 2.4. Integer to Byte Conversion If x and y are nonnegative integers, we define Z = toByte(x,y) the ybyte representation of x as the ybyte string that contains the binary representation of x padded with zeros in the most significant bit positions in little endian byteorder. 2.5. Hash Function Address Scheme The schemes described in this document randomize each hash function call. This means that aside of the initial message digest, for each hash function call a different key and different bitmask is used. These values are pseudorandomly generated using a pseudorandom generator that takes a seed S and a 16byte address A. The latter is used to select the Ath nbyte block from the PRG output where n is the security parameter. Here we explain the structure of address A. We explain the construction of the addresses in the following sections where they are used. The schemes in the next two sections use two kinds of hash functions parameterized by security parameter n. For the hash tree constructions a hash function that maps 2nbyte inputs and an nbyte Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 6] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 key to nbyte outputs is used. To randomize this function, 3n bytes are needed  n bytes for the key and 2n bytes for a bitmask. For the onetime signature scheme constructions a hash function that maps nbyte inputs and nbyte keys to nbyte outputs is used. To randomize this function, 2n bytes are needed  n bytes for the key and n bytes for a bitmask. Consequently, three addresses are needed for the first function and two addresses for the second one. There are three different address formats for the different use cases. One format for the hashes used in onetime signature schemes, one for hashes used within the main Merkletree construction, and one for hashes used in the Ltrees. The latter being used to compress onetime public keys. All these formats share as much format as possible. In the following we describe these formats in detail. An address is structured as follows. It always starts with 46 zero bits in the most significant bits. These are followed by a layer address of 8 bits, and a tree address of 24 bits. The next bit decides whether it is an OTS construction or a hash tree address. This OTS bit is set to zero for a tree hash address and it is set to one for an OTS hash address. We first describe the OTS address case as the hash tree case again splits into two cases. In this case, the OTS bit is followed by a 24bit OTS address that encodes the index of the OTS key pair within a tree. The next 16 bits encode the chain address followed by 8 bits that encode the address of the hash function call within a chain. The key bit is used to generate two different addresses for one hash function call. The bit is set to one to generate the key. To generate the nbyte bitmask, the key bit is set to zero. Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 7] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 Index i for OTS hash ++  Padding = 0 (46 bit) ++  layer address (8 bit) ++  tree address (24 bit) ++  OTS bit = 1 (1 bit) ++  OTS address (24 bit) ++  chain address (16 bit) ++  hash address (8 bit) ++  key bit (1 bit) ++ Now we describe the hash tree address case. This case again splits into two. The OTS bit is followed by an Ltree bit. This bit is set to zero in case of an Ltree and set to one for main tree nodes. We first discuss the Ltree case. In this case the Ltree bit is followed by a 24 bit Ltree address, encoding the index of the leaf computed with this Ltree. The next 6 bits encode the height of the node inside the Ltree and the following 16 bit encode the index of the node at that height, inside the Ltree. The last two bits are used to generate three different addresses for one node. The first of these bits is set to one to generate the key. In that case the last bit is always zero. To generate the 2nbyte bitmask, the key bit is set to zero. The most significant n bytes are generated using the address with the last bit zero. The least significant bytes are generated using the address with the last bit set to one. Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 8] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 An Ltree address ++  Padding = 0 (46 bit) ++  layer address (8 bit) ++  tree address (24 bit) ++  OTS bit = 0 (1 bit) ++  Ltree bit = 1 (1 bit) ++  Ltree address (24 bit) ++  tree height (6 bit) ++  tree index (16 bit) ++  key bit (1 bit) ++  block bit (1 bit) ++ We now describe the remaining format for the main tree hash addresses. In this case the Ltree bit is set to zero and followed by 14 zero bits padding as there are less hash tree addresses required. The next 8 bits encode the height of the tree node to be computed within the tree, followed by 24 bits that encode the index of this node at that height. The last two bits are used to generate three different addresses for one node as described for the Ltree case. The first of these bits is set to one to generate the key. In that case the last bit is always zero. To generate the 2nbyte bitmask, the key bit is set to zero. The most significant n bytes are generated using the address with the last bit zero. The least significant bytes are generated using the address with the last bit set to one. Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 9] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 A hash tree address ++  Padding = 0 (46 bit) ++  layer address (8 bit) ++  tree address (24 bit) ++  OTS bit = 0 (1 bit) ++  Ltree bit = 0 (1 bit) ++  Padding = 0 (14 bit) ++  tree height (8 bit) ++  tree index (24 bit) ++  key bit (1 bit) ++  block bit (1 bit) ++ All fields within these addresses encode unsigned integers. When describing the generation of addresses we use settermethods that take positive integers and set the bits of a field to the binary representation of that integer of the length of the field. We also assume that setting the Ltree bit to zero, does also set the (second) padding block to zero. 2.6. Strings of Base w Numbers A byte string can be considered as a string of base w numbers, i.e. integers in the set {0, ... , w  1}. The correspondence is defined by the function base_w(X, w) as follows. If X is an mbyte string, w is a member of the set {4, 16}, then base_w(X, w) outputs a length 8 * m / lg(w) array of integers between 0 and w  1. Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 10] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 Algorithm 1: base_w(X, w) int in = 0; int out = 0; unsigned int total = 0; int bits = 0; int consumed; for ( consumed = 0; consumed < 8 * m; consumed += lg(w) ) { if ( bits == 0 ) { total = X[m  1  in]; in++; bits += 8; } bits = lg(w); basew[out] = (total >> bits) AND (w  1); out++; } return basew; For example, if X is the (big endian) byte string 0x1234, then base_w(X, 4) returns the array a = {0, 3, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 2}. X (represented as bits) +++++++++++++++++  0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 +++++++++++++++++ X[0]  X[1] X (represented as base 4 numbers) +++++++++  0  1  0  2  0  3  1  0  +++++++++ base_w(X, 4) +++++++++  0  3  1  0  0  1  0  2  +++++++++ a[0] a[1] a[2] a[3] a[4] a[5] a[6] a[7] 2.7. Member Functions To simplify algorithm descriptions, we assume the existence of member functions. If a complex data structure like a public key PK contains a value X then getX(PK) returns the value of X for this public key. Accordingly, setX(PK, X, Y) sets value X in PK to the value hold by Y. Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 11] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 3. Primitives 3.1. WOTS+ OneTime Signatures This section describes the WOTS+ onetime signature system, in a version similar to [Huelsing13]. WOTS+ is a onetime signature scheme; while a private key can be used to sign any message, each private key MUST be used only once to sign a single message. In particular, if a secret key is used to sign two different messages, the scheme becomes insecure. The section starts with an explanation of parameters. Afterwards, the socalled chaining function, which forms the main building block of the WOTS+ scheme, is explained. It follows a description of the algorithms for key generation, signing and verification. Finally, pseudorandom key generation is discussed. 3.1.1. WOTS+ Parameters WOTS+ uses the parameters m, n, and w; they all take positive integer values. These parameters are summarized as follows: m : the message length in bytes n : the length, in bytes, of a secret key, public key, or signature element w : the Winternitz parameter; it is a member of the set {4, 16} The parameters are used to compute values len, len_1 and len_2: len : the number of nbyte string elements in a WOTS+ secret key, public key, and signature. It is computed as len = len_1 + len_2, with len_1 = ceil(8m/lg(w)) and len_2 = floor(lg(len_1*(w1))/lg(w)) + 1 The value of n is determined by the cryptographic hash function used for WOTS+. The hash function is chosen to ensure an appropriate level of security. The value of m is the input length that can be processed by the signing algorithm. It is often the length of a message digest. The parameter w can be chosen from the set {4, 16}. A larger value of w results in shorter signatures but slower overall signing operations; it has little effect on security. Choices of w are limited to the values 4 and 16 since these values yield optimal tradeoffs and easy implementation. Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 12] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 3.1.1.1. WOTS+ Functions The WOTS+ algorithm uses a keyed cryptographic hash function F. F accepts and returns byte strings of length n using keys of length n. Security requirements on F are discussed in Section 8. In addition, WOTS+ uses a pseudorandom generator G. G takes as input an nbyte key and a 16byte index and generates pseudorandom outputs of length n. Security requirements on G are discussed in Section 8. 3.1.2. WOTS+ Chaining Function The chaining function (Algorithm 2) computes an iteration of F on an nbyte input using outputs of G. It takes a hash function address as input. This address will have the first 119 bits set to encode the address of this chain. In each iteration, one output of G is used as key for F and a second output is XORed to the intermediate result before it is processed by F. In the following, ADRS is a 16byte hash function address as specified in Section 2.5 and SEED is an nbyte string, both used to generate the outputs of G. The chaining function takes as input an nbyte string X, a start index i, a number of steps s, as well as ADRS and SEED. The chaining function returns as output the value obtained by iterating F for s times on input X, using the outputs of G. Algorithm 2: Chaining Function if ( s is equal to 0 ) { return X; } if ( (i+s) > w1 ) { return NULL; } byte[n] tmp = chain(X, i, s1, SEED, ADRS); ADRS.setHashAddress(i+s1); ADRS.setKeyBit(0); BM = G(SEED, ADRS); ADRS.setKeyBit(1); KEY = G(SEED, ADRS); tmp = F(KEY, tmp XOR BM); return tmp; 3.1.3. WOTS+ Private Key The private key in WOTS+, denoted by sk, is a length len array of nbyte strings. This private key MUST be only used to sign exactly one message. Each nbyte string MUST either be selected randomly from the uniform distribution or using a cryptographically secure pseudorandom procedure. In the latter case, the security of the used Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 13] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 procedure MUST at least match that of the WOTS+ parameters used. For a further discussion on pseudorandom key generation see the end of this section. The following pseudocode (Algorithm 3) describes an algorithm for generating sk. Algorithm 3: Generating a WOTS+ Private Key for ( i = 0; i < len; i = i + 1 ) { set sk[i] to a uniformly random nbyte string; } return sk; 3.1.4. WOTS+ Public Key A WOTS+ key pair defines a virtual structure that consists of len hash chains of length w. The len nbyte strings in the secret key each define the start node for one hash chain. The public key consists of the end nodes of these hash chains. Therefore, like the secret key, the public key is also a length len array of nbyte strings. To compute the hash chain, the chaining function (Algorithm 2) is used. A hash function address ADRS and a seed SEED has to be provided by the calling algorithm. This address will encode the address of the WOTS+ key pair within a greater structure. Hence, a WOTS+ algorithm MUST NOT manipulate any other fields of ADRS than chain address, hash address and key bit. Please note that the SEED used here is public information also available to a verifier. The following pseudocode (Algorithm 4) describes an algorithm for generating the public key pk, where sk is the private key. Algorithm 4 (WOTS_genPK): Generating a WOTS+ Public Key From a Private Key for ( i = 0; i < len; i = i + 1 ) { ADRS.setChainAddress(i); pk[i] = chain(sk[i], 0, w1, SEED, ADRS); } return pk; 3.1.5. WOTS+ Signature Generation A WOTS+ signature is a length len array of nbyte strings. The WOTS+ signature is generated by mapping a message to len integers between 0 and w  1. To this end, the message is transformed into base w numbers using the base_w function defined in Section 2.6. Next, a checksum is computed and appended to the transformed message as len_2 base w numbers using the base_w function. Each of the base w integers is used to select a node from a different hash chain. The signature is formed by concatenating the selected nodes. The Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 14] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 pseudocode for signature generation is shown below (Algorithm 5), where M is the message and sig is the resulting signature. Algorithm 5 (WOTS_sign): Generating a signature from a private key and a message csum = 0; // convert message to base w msg = base_w(M,w); // compute checksum for ( i = 0; i < len_1; i = i + 1 ) { csum = csum + w  1  msg[i]; } // Convert csum to base w csum = csum << ( 8  ( len_2 % 8 )); len_2_bytes = ceil( len_2 / 8 ); msg = msg  base_w(toByte(csum, len_2_bytes), w); for ( i = 0; i < len; i = i + 1 ) { ADRS.setChainAddress(i); sig[i] = chain(sk[i], 0, msg[i], SEED, ADRS); } return sig; The data format for a signature is given below. WOTS+ Signature ++  algorithm OID  ++    sig_ots[0]  n bytes   ++   ~ .... ~   ++    sig_ots[len1]  n bytes   ++ Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 15] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 3.1.6. WOTS+ Signature Verification In order to verify a signature sig on a message M, the verifier computes a WOTS+ public key value from the signature. This can be done by "completing" the chain computations starting from the signature values, using the base w values of the message hash and its checksum. This step, called WOTS_pkFromSig, is described below in Algorithm 6. The result of WOTS_pkFromSig is then compared to the given public key. If the values are equal, the signature is accepted. Otherwise, the signature is rejected. Algorithm 6 (WOTS_pkFromSig): Computing a WOTS+ public key from a message and its signature csum = 0; // convert message to base w msg = base_w(M,w); // compute checksum for ( i = 0; i < len_1; i = i + 1 ) { csum = csum + w  1  msg[i]; } // Convert csum to base w csum = csum << ( 8  ( len_2 % 8 )); len_2_bytes = ceil( len_2 / 8 ); msg = msg  base_w(toByte(csum, len_2_bytes), w); for ( i = 0; i < len; i = i + 1 ) { ADRS.setChainAddress(i); tmp_pk[i] = chain(sig[i], msg[i], w1msg[i], SEED, ADRS); } return tmp_pk; Note: XMSS uses WOTS_pkFromSig to compute a public key value and delays the comparison to a later point. 3.1.7. Pseudorandom Key Generation An implementation MAY use a cryptographically secure pseudorandom method to generate the secret key from a single nbyte value. For example, the method suggested in [BDH11] and explained below MAY be used. Other methods MAY be used. The choice of a pseudorandom method does not affect interoperability, but the cryptographic strength MUST match that of the used WOTS+ parameters. The advantage of generating the secret key elements from a random nbyte string is that only this nbyte string needs to be stored Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 16] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 instead of the full secret key. The key can be regenerated when needed. The suggested method from [BDH11] can be described using G. During key generation a uniformly random nbyte string S is sampled from a secure source of randomness. This string S is stored as secret key. The secret key elements are computed as sk[i] = G'(S, toByte(i,16)) whenever needed. Please note that this seed S MUST be different from the seed SEED used to randomize the hash function calls. Also, this seed S MUST be kept secret. 4. Schemes In this section, the eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme (XMSS) is described using WOTS+. XMSS comes in two flavors: First, a single tree variant (XMSS) and second a multitree variant (XMSS^MT). Both allow combining a large number of WOTS+ key pairs under a single small public key. The main ingredient added is a binary hash tree construction. XMSS uses a single hash tree while XMSS^MT uses a tree of XMSS key pairs. 4.1. XMSS: eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme XMSS is a method for signing a potentially large but fixed number of messages. It is based on the Merkle signature scheme. XMSS uses five cryptographic components: WOTS+ as OTS method, two additional cryptographic hash functions H and H_m, a pseudorandom function PRF_m, and a pseudorandom generator G. One of the main advantages of XMSS with WOTS+ is that it does not rely on the collision resistance of the used hash functions but on weaker properties. Each XMSS public/private key pair is associated with a perfect binary tree, every node of which contains an nbyte value. Each tree leaf contains a special tree hash of a WOTS+ public key value. Each non leaf tree node is computed by first concatenating the values of its child nodes, computing the XOR with a bitmask, and applying the keyed hash function H to the result. The bitmasks and the keys for the hash function H are generated from a (public) seed that is part of the public key using the pseudorandom generator G. The value corresponding to the root of the XMSS tree forms the XMSS public key together with the seed. To generate a key pair that can be used to sign 2^h messages, a tree of height h is used. XMSS is a stateful signature scheme, meaning that the secret key changes after every signature. To prevent one time secret keys from being used twice, the WOTS+ key pairs are numbered from 0 to (2^h)1 according to the related leaf, starting from index 0 for the leftmost leaf. The secret key contains an index that is updated after every signature, such that it contains the index of the next unused WOTS+ key pair. Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 17] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 A signature consists of the index of the used WOTS+ key pair, the WOTS+ signature on the message and the socalled authentication path. The latter is a vector of tree nodes that allow a verifier to compute a value for the root of the tree starting from a WOTS+ signature. A verifier computes the root value and compares it to the respective value in the XMSS public key. If they match, the signature is valid. The XMSS secret key consists of all WOTS+ secret keys and the actual index. To reduce storage, a pseudorandom key generation procedure, as described in [BDH11], MAY be used. The security of the used method MUST at least match the security of the XMSS instance. 4.1.1. XMSS Parameters XMSS has the following parameters: h : the height (number of levels  1) of the tree n : the length in bytes of each node m : the length of the message digest w : the Winternitz parameter as defined for WOTS+ in Section 3.1 There are N = 2^h leaves in the tree. For XMSS and XMSS^MT, secret and public keys are denoted by SK and PK. For WOTS+, secret and public keys are denoted by sk and pk, respectively. XMSS and XMSS^MT signatures are denoted by Sig. WOTS+ signatures are denoted by sig. 4.1.2. XMSS Hash Functions Besides the cryptographic hash function F required by WOTS+, XMSS uses four more functions: A cryptographic hash function H. H accepts nbyte keys and byte strings of length (2 * n) and returns an nbyte string. A cryptographic hash function H_m. H_m accepts mbyte keys and byte strings of arbitrary length and returns an mbyte string. A pseudorandom function PRF_m. PRF_m accepts byte strings of arbitrary length and an mbyte key and returns an mbyte string. A pseudorandom generator G. G takes as input an nbyte key and a 16byte index and generates pseudorandom outputs of length n. Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 18] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 4.1.3. XMSS Private Key An XMSS private key contains N = 2^h WOTS+ private keys, the leaf index idx of the next WOTS+ private key that has not yet been used and SK_PRF, an mbyte key for the PRF. The leaf index idx is initialized to zero when the XMSS private key is created. The PRF key SK_PRF MUST be sampled from a secure source of randomness that follows the uniform distribution. The WOTS+ secret keys MUST be generated as described in Section 3.1. To reduce the secret key size, a cryptographic pseudorandom method MAY be used as discussed at the end of this section. For the following algorithm descriptions, the existence of a method getWOTS_SK(SK,i) is assumed. This method takes as inputs an XMSS secret key SK and an integer i and outputs the i^th WOTS+ secret key of SK. 4.1.4. Randomized Tree Hashing To improve readability we introduce a function RAND_HASH(LEFT, RIGHT, SEED, ADRS) that does the randomized hashing. It takes as input two nbyte values LEFT and RIGHT that represent the left and the right half of the hash function input, the seed SEED for G and the address ADRS of this hash function call. RAND_HASH first uses G with SEED and ADRS to generate a key KEY and nbyte bitmasks BM_0, BM_1. Then it returns the randomized hash H(KEY, (LEFT XOR BM_0)(RIGHT XOR BM_1)). Algorithm 7: RAND_HASH ADRS.setKeyBit(0); ADRS.setBlockBit(0); BM_0 = G(SEED, ADRS); ADRS.setBlockBit(1); BM_1 = G(SEED, ADRS); ADRS.setKeyBit(1); ADRS.setBlockBit(0); KEY = G(SEED, ADRS); return H(KEY, (LEFT XOR BM_0)  (RIGHT XOR BM_1)); 4.1.5. LTrees To compute the leaves of the binary hash tree, a socalled Ltree is used. An Ltree is an unbalanced binary hash tree, distinct but similar to the main XMSS binary hash tree. The algorithm ltree (Algorithm 8) takes as input a WOTS+ public key pk and compresses it to a single nbyte value pk[0]. Towards this end it also takes an address ADRS as input that encodes the address of the Ltree. The algorithm uses G and the seed SEED generated during public key generation. Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 19] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 Algorithm 8: ltree unsigned int len' = len; unsigned int j = 0; ADRS.setTreeHeight(0); while ( len' > 1 ) { for ( i = 0; i < floor(len' / 2); i = i + 1 ) { ADRS.setTreeIndex(i); pk[i] = RAND_HASH(pk[2i], pk[2i + 1], SEED, ADRS); } if ( len' % 2 == 1 ) { pk[floor(len' / 2) + 1] = pk[len']; } len' = ceil(len' / 2); ADRS.setTreeHeight(ADRS.getTreeHeight() + 1); } return pk[0]; 4.1.6. TreeHash For the computation of the internal nbyte nodes of a Merkle tree, the subroutine treeHash (Algorithm 9) accepts an XMSS secret key SK, an unsigned integer s (the start index), an unsigned integer t (the target node height), a seed SEED, and an address ADRS that encodes the address of the containing tree. For the height of a node within a tree counting starts with the leaves at height zero. The treeHash algorithm returns the root node of a tree of height t with the leftmost leaf being the hash of the WOTS+ pk with index s. It is REQUIRED that s % 2^t = 0, i.e. that the leaf at index s is a left most leaf of a subtree of height t. Otherwise the hashaddressing scheme fails. The treeHash algorithm uses a stack holding up to (t1) nbyte strings, with the usual stack functions push() and pop(). Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 20] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 Algorithm 9: treeHash if( s % (1 << t) != 0 ) return 1; for ( i = 0; i < 2^t; i = i + 1 ) { ADRS.setOTSBit(1); ADRS.setOTSAddress(s+i); pk = WOTS_genPK (getWOTS_SK(SK, s+i), SEED, ADRS); ADRS.setOTSBit(0); ADRS.setLTreeBit(1); ADRS.setLTreeAddress(s+i); node = ltree(pk, SEED, ADRS); ADRS.setLTreeBit(0); ADRS.setTreeHeight(0); ADRS.setTreeIndex(i+s); while ( Top node on Stack has same height t' as node ) { ADRS.setTreeIndex((ADRS.getTreeIndex()  1) / 2); node = RAND_HASH(Stack.pop(), node, SEED, ADRS); ADRS.setTreeHeight(ADRS.getTreeHeight() + 1); } Stack.push(node); } return Stack.pop(); 4.1.7. XMSS Public Key The XMSS public key is computed as described in XMSS_genPK (Algorithm 10). The algorithm takes the XMSS secret key SK, and the tree height h. The XMSS public key PK consists of the root of the binary hash tree and the seed SEED. SEED is generated as a uniformly random nbyte string. Although SEED is public, it is important that it is generated using a good entropy source. The root is computed using treeHash. For XMSS, there is only a single main tree. Hence, the used address is set to the allzerostring. Algorithm 10: XMSS_genPK  Generate an XMSS public key from an XMSS private key set SEED to a uniformly random nbyte string; ADRS = toByte(0,16); root = treeHash(SK, 0, h, SEED, ADRS); PK = root  SEED; return PK; Public and private key generation MAY be interleaved to save space. Especially, when a pseudorandom method is used to generate the secret key, generation MAY be done when the respective WOTS+ key pair is needed by treeHash. Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 21] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 The format of an XMSS public key is given below. XMSS Public Key ++  algorithm OID  ++    root node  n bytes   ++    SEED  n bytes   ++ 4.1.8. XMSS Signature An XMSS signature is a (4 + m + (len + h) * n)byte string consisting of the index idx_sig of the used WOTS+ key pair (4 bytes), a byte string r used for randomized message hashing (m bytes), a WOTS+ signature sig_ots (len * n bytes), the socalled authentication path 'auth' for the leaf associated with the used WOTS+ key pair (h * n bytes). The authentication path is an array of h nbyte strings. It contains the siblings of the nodes on the path from the used leaf to the root. It does not contain the nodes on the path itself. These nodes are needed by a verifier to compute a root node for the tree from the WOTS+ public key. A node Node is addressed by its position in the tree. Node(x,y) denotes the x^th node on level y with x = 0 being the leftmost node on a level. The leaves are on level 0, the root is on level h. An authentication path contains exactly one node on every layer 0 <= x <= h1. For the i^th WOTS+ key pair, counting from zero, the j^th authentication path node is Node(j, floor(i / (2^j)) XOR 1) Given an XMSS secret key SK and seed SEED, all nodes in a tree are determined. Their value is defined in terms of treeHash(Algorithm 9). Hence, one can compute the authentication path: Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 22] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 ADRS = toByte(0, 16); for (j = 0; j < h; j++) { k = floor(i / (2^j)) XOR 1; auth[j] = treeHash(SK, k * 2^j, j, SEED, ADRS); } The data format for a signature is given below. XMSS Signature ++    index idx_sig  4 bytes   ++    randomness r  m bytes   ++    WOTS+ signature sig_ots  len * n bytes   ++    auth[0]  n bytes   ++   ~ .... ~   ++    auth[h1]  n bytes   ++ 4.1.9. XMSS Signature Generation To compute the XMSS signature of a message M with an XMSS private key, the signer first computes a randomized message digest. Then a WOTS+ signature of the message is computed using the next unused WOTS+ private key. Next, the authentication path is computed. Finally, the secret key is updated, i.e. idx is incremented. An implementation MUST NOT output the signature before the updated private key. The node values of the authentication path MAY be computed in any way. This computation is assumed to be performed by the subroutine Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 23] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 buildAuth for the function XMSS_sign, as below. The fastest alternative is to store all tree nodes and set the array in the signature by copying them, respectively. The least storageintensive alternative is to recompute all nodes for each signature online. There exist several algorithms in between, with different time/ storage tradeoffs. For an overview see [BDS09]. Note that the details of this procedure are not relevant to interoperability; it is not necessary to know any of these details in order to perform the signature verification operation. As a consequence, buildAuth is not specified here. The algorithm XMSS_sign (Algorithm 11) described below calculates an updated secret key SK and a signature on a message M. XMSS_sign takes as inputs a message M of an arbitrary length, an XMSS secret key SK and seed SEED. It returns the byte string containing the concatenation of the updated secret key SK and the signature Sig. Algorithm 11: XMSS_sign  Generate an XMSS signature and update the XMSS secret key idx_sig = getIdx(SK); ADRS = toByte(0,16); auth = buildAuth(SK, idx_sig, SEED, ADRS); byte[m] r = PRF_m(getSK_PRF(SK), M); byte[m] M' = H_m(r, M); ADRS.setOTSBit(0); ADRS.setOTSAddress(idx_sig); sig_ots = WOTS_sign(getWOTS_SK(SK, idx_sig), M', SEED, ADRS); Sig = (idx_sig  r  sig_ots  auth); setIdx(SK, idx_sig + 1); return (SK  Sig); 4.1.10. XMSS Signature Verification An XMSS signature is verified by first computing the message digest using randomness r and a message M. Then the used WOTS+ public key pk_ots is computed from the WOTS+ signature using WOTS_pkFromSig. The WOTS+ public key in turn is used to compute the corresponding leaf using an Ltree. The leaf, together with index idx_sig and authentication path auth is used to compute an alternative root value for the tree. These first steps are done by XMSS_rootFromSig (Algorithm 12). The verification succeeds if and only if the computed root value matches the one in the XMSS public key. In any other case it MUST return fail. The main part of XMSS signature verification is done by the function XMSS_rootFromSig (Algorithm 12) described below. XMSS_rootFromSig takes as inputs an XMSS signature Sig, a message M, and seed SEED. Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 24] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 XMSS_rootFromSig returns an nbyte string holding the value of the root of a tree defined by the input data. Algorithm 12: XMSS_rootFromSig  Compute a root node using an XMSS signature, a message, and seed SEED byte[m] M' = H_m(r, M); ADRS = toByte(0,16); ADRS.setOTSBit(1); ADRS.setOTSAddress(idx_sig); pk_ots = WOTS_pkFromSig(sig_ots, M', SEED, ADRS); ADRS.setOTSBit(0); ADRS.setLTreeBit(1); ADRS.setLTreeAddress(idx_sig); byte[n][2] node; node[0] = ltree(pk_ots, SEED, ADRS); ADRS.setLTreeBit(0); ADRS.setTreeIndex(idx_sig); for ( k = 0; k < h; k = k + 1 ) { ADRS.setTreeHeight(k); if ( floor(idx_sig / (2^k)) % 2 is equal to 0 ) { ADRS.setTreeIndex(ADRS.getTreeIndex() / 2); node[1] = RAND_HASH(node[0], auth[k], SEED, ADRS); } else { ADRS.setTreeIndex(ADRS.getTreeIndex()  1 / 2); node[1] = RAND_HASH(auth[k], node[0], SEED, ADRS); } node[0] = node[1]; } return node[0]; The full XMSS signature verification is depicted below. XMSS^MT uses only XMSS_rootFromSig and delegates the comparison to a later comparison of data depending on its output. Algorithm 13: XMSS_verify  Verify an XMSS signature using an XMSS signature, the corresponding XMSS public key and a message byte[n] node = XMSS_rootFromSig(Sig, M, getSEED(PK)); if ( node is equal to root in PK ) { return true; } else { return false; } Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 25] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 4.1.11. Pseudorandom Key Generation An implementation MAY use a cryptographically secure pseudorandom method to generate the XMSS secret key from a single nbyte value. For example, the method suggested in [BDH11] and explained below MAY be used. Other methods MAY be used. The choice of a pseudorandom method does not affect interoperability, but the cryptographic strength MUST match that of the used XMSS parameters. For XMSS a similar method than the one used for WOTS+ can be used. The suggested method from [BDH11] can be described using G. During key generation a uniformly random nbyte string S is sampled from a secure source of randomness. This seed S MUST NOT be confused with the public seed SEED. The seed S MUST be independent of SEED and as it is the main secret, it MUST be kept secret. This seed S is used to generate an nbyte value S_ots for each WOTS+ key pair. The nbyte value S_ots can then be used to compute the respective WOTS+ secret key using the method described in Section 3.1.7. The seeds for the WOTS+ key pairs are computed as S_ots[i] = G(S,i). The second parameter of G is the index i of the WOTS+ key pair, represented as 16byte string in the common way. An advantage of this method is that a WOTS+ key can be computed using only len + 1 evaluations of G when S is given. 4.1.12. Free Index Handling and Partial Secret Keys Some applications might require to work with partial secret keys or copies of secret keys. Examples include delegation of signing rights / proxy signatures, and load balancing. Such applications MAY use their own key format and MAY use a signing algorithm different from the one described above. The index in partial secret keys or copies of a secret key MAY be manipulated as required by the applications. However, applications MUST establish means that guarantee that each index and thereby each WOTS+ key pair is used to sign only a single message. 4.2. XMSS^MT: MultiTree XMSS XMSS^MT is a method for signing a large but fixed number of messages. It was first described in [HRB13]. It builds on XMSS. XMSS^MT uses a tree of several layers of XMSS trees. The trees on top and intermediate layers are used to sign the root nodes of the trees on the respective layer below. Trees on the lowest layer are used to sign the actual messages. All XMSS trees have equal height. Consider an XMSS^MT tree of total height h that has d layers of XMSS trees of height h / d. Then layer d  1 contains one XMSS tree, Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 26] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 layer d  2 contains 2^(h / d) XMSS trees, and so on. Finally, layer 0 contains 2^(h  h / d) XMSS trees. 4.2.1. XMSS^MT Parameters In addition to all XMSS parameters, an XMSS^MT system requires the number of tree layers d, specified as an integer value that divides h without remainder. The same tree height h / d and the same Winternitz parameter w are used for all tree layers. All the trees on higher layers sign root nodes of other trees which are nbyte strings. Hence, no message compression is needed and WOTS+ is used to sign the root nodes themselves instead of their hash values. Hence the WOTS+ message length for these layers is n not m. Accordingly, the values of len_1, len_2 and len change for these layers. The parameters len_1_n, len_2_n, and len_n denote the respective values computed using n as message length for WOTS+. 4.2.2. XMSS Algorithms Without Message Hash As all XMSS trees besides those on layer 0 are used to sign short fixed length messages, the initial message hash can be omitted. In the description below XMSS_sign_wo_hash and XMSS_rootFromSig_wo_hash are versions of XMSS_sign and XMSS_rootFromSig, respectively, that omit the initial message hash. They are obtained by setting M' = M in the above algorithms. Accordingly, the evaluations of H_m and PRF_m MUST be omitted. This also means that no randomization element r for the message hash is required. XMSS signatures generated by XMSS_sign_wo_hash and verified by XMSS_rootFromSig_wo_hash MUST NOT contain a value r. 4.2.3. XMSS^MT Private Key An XMSS^MT private key SK_MT consists of one reduced XMSS private key for each XMSS tree. These reduced XMSS private keys contain no pseudorandom function key and no index. Instead, SK_MT contains a single mbyte pseudorandom function key SK_PRF and a single (ceil(h / 8))byte index idx_MT. The index is a global index over all WOTS+ key pairs of all XMSS trees on layer 0. It is initialized with 0. It stores the index of the last used WOTS+ key pair on the bottom layer, i.e. a number between 0 and 2^h  1. The algorithm descriptions below uses a function getXMSS_SK(SK, x, y) that outputs the reduced secret key of the x^th XMSS tree on the y^th layer. Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 27] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 4.2.4. XMSS^MT Public Key The XMSS^MT public key PK_MT contains the root of the single XMSS tree on layer d1 and the seed SEED. The pseudorandom generator G is used with SEED to generate the bitmasks and keys for all XMSS trees. Algorithm 14 shows pseudocode to generate PK_MT. First, the nbyte SEED is chosen uniformly at random. The nbyte root node of the top layer tree is computed using treeHash. The algorithm XMSSMT_genPK takes the XMSS^MT secret key SK_MT as an input and outputs an XMSS^MT public key PK_MT. Algorithm 14: XMSSMT_genPK  Generate an XMSS^MT public key from an XMSS^MT private key set SEED to a uniformly random nbyte string; ADRS = toByte(0,16); ADRS.setLayerAddress(d1); root = treeHash(getXMSS_SK(SK_MT, 0, d  1), 0, h / d, SEED, ADRS); PK_MT = root  SEED; return PK_MT; The format of an XMSS^MT public key is given below. XMSS^MT Public Key ++  algorithm OID  ++    root node  n bytes   ++    SEED  n bytes   ++ 4.2.5. XMSS^MT Signature An XMSS^MT signature Sig_MT is a byte string of length (ceil(h / 8) + m + (h + len + (d  1) * len_n) * n). It consists of the index idx_sig of the used WOTS+ key pair on the bottom layer (ceil(h / 8) bytes), a byte string r used for randomized message hashing (m bytes), one reduced XMSS signature ((h + len) * n bytes), Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 28] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 d1 reduced XMSS signatures with message length n ((h + len_n) * n bytes). The reduced XMSS signatures contain no index idx and no byte string r. They only contain a WOTS+ signature sig_ots and an authentication path auth. The first reduced XMSS signature contains a WOTS+ signature that consists of len nbyte elements. The remaining reduced XMSS signatures contain a WOTS+ signature on an nbyte message that consists of len_n nbyte elements. The data format for a signature is given below. XMSS^MT signature ++    index idx_sig  ceil(h / 8) bytes   ++    randomness r  m bytes   ++    (reduced) XMSS signature Sig  (h + len) * n bytes  (bottom layer 0)    ++    (reduced) XMSS signature Sig  (h + len_n) * n bytes  (layer 1)    ++   ~ .... ~   ++    (reduced) XMSS signature Sig  (h + len_n) * n bytes  (layer d1)    ++ 4.2.6. XMSS^MT Signature Generation To compute the XMSS^MT signature Sig_MT of a message M using an XMSS^MT private key SK_MT and seed SEED, XMSSMT_sign (Algorithm 15) described below uses XMSS_sign and XMSS_sign_wo_hash as defined in Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 29] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 Section 4.2.2. First, the signature index is set to idx. Next, PRF_m is used to compute a pseudorandom mbyte string r. This mbyte string is then used to compute a randomized message digest of length m. The message digest is signed using the WOTS+ key pair on the bottom layer with absolute index idx. The authentication path for the WOTS+ key pair is computed as well as the root of the containing XMSS tree. The root is signed by the parent XMSS tree. This is repeated until the top tree is reached. Algorithm 15: XMSSMT_sign  Generate an XMSS^MT signature and update the XMSS^MT secret key ADRS = toByte(0,16); SK_PRF = getSK_PRF(SK_MT); idx_sig = getIdx(SK_MT); setIdx(SK_MT, idx_sig + 1); Sig_MT = idx_sig; unsigned int idx_tree = (h  h / d) most significant bits of idx_sig; unsigned int idx_leaf = (h / d) least significant bits of idx_sig; SK = idx_leaf  SK_PRF  getXMSS_SK(SK_MT, idx_tree, 0); ADRS.setLayerAddress(0); ADRS.setTreeAddress(idx_tree); Sig_tmp = XMSS_sign(M, SK, SEED, ADRS); Sig_tmp = Sig_tmp without idx; Sig_MT = Sig_MT  Sig_tmp; for ( j = 1; j < d; j = j + 1 ) { root = treeHash(SK, 0, h / d, SEED, ADRS); idx_leaf = (h / d) least significant bits of idx_tree; idx_tree = (h  j * (h / d)) most significant bits of idx_tree; SK = idx_leaf  SK_PRF  getXMSS_SK(SK_MT, idx_tree, j); ADRS.setLayerAddress(j); ADRS.setTreeAddress(idx_tree); Sig_tmp = XMSS_sign_wo_hash(root, SK, SEED, ADRS) with idx removed; Sig_MT = Sig_MT  Sig_tmp; } return SK_MT  Sig_MT; Algorithm 15 is only one method to compute XMSS^MT signatures. Especially, there exist timememory tradeoffs that allow to reduce the signing time to less than the signing time of an XMSS scheme with tree height h / d. These tradeoffs prevent certain values from being recomputed several times by keeping a state and distribute all computations over all signature generations. Details can be found in [Huelsing13a]. Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 30] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 4.2.7. XMSS^MT Signature Verification XMSS^MT signature verification (Algorithm 16) can be summarized as d XMSS signature verifications with small changes. First, only the message is hashed. The remaining XMSS signatures are on the root nodes of trees which have a fixed length. Second, instead of comparing the computed root node to a given value, a signature on the root is verified. Only the root node of the top tree is compared to the value in the XMSS^MT public key. XMSSMT_verify uses XMSS_rootFromSig and XMSS_rootFromSig_wo_hash. XMSSMT_verify takes as inputs an XMSS^MT signature Sig^MT, a message M and a public key PK_MT. It outputs a boolean. Algorithm 16: XMSSMT_verify  Verify an XMSS^MT signature Sig_MT on a message M using an XMSS^MT public key PK_MT idx = getIdx(Sig_MT); SEED = getSEED(PK_MT); ADRS = toByte(0,16); unsigned int idx_leaf = (h / d) least significant bits of idx; unsigned int idx_tree = (h  h / d) most significant bits of idx; Sig' = leaf  setR(Sig_MT)  getXMSSSignature(Sig, 0); ADRS.setLayerAddress(0); ADRS.setTreeAddress(idx_tree); byte[n] node = XMSS_rootFromSig(Sig', M, SEED, ADRS); for ( j = 1; j < d; j = j + 1 ) { idx_leaf = (h / d) least significant bytes of idx_tree; idx_tree = (h  j * h / d) most significant bytes of idx_tree; Sig' = idx_leaf  getXMSSSignature(Sig, j); ADRS.setLayerAddress(j); ADRS.setTreeAddress(idx_tree); node = XMSS_rootFromSig_wo_hash(Sig', node, SEED, ADRS); } if ( node is equal to getRoot(PK_MT) ) { return true; } else { return false; } 4.2.8. Pseudorandom Key Generation Like for XMSS, an implementation MAY use a cryptographically secure pseudorandom method to generate the XMSS^MT secret key from a single nbyte value. For example, the method explained below MAY be used. Other methods MAY be used, too. The choice of a pseudorandom method does not affect interoperability, but the cryptographic strength MUST match that of the used XMSS parameters. Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 31] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 For XMSS^MT a method similar to that for XMSS and WOTS+ can be used. The method uses a G as pseudorandom generator. During key generation a uniformly random nbyte string S_MT is sampled from a secure source of randomness. This seed S_MT is used to generate one nbyte value S for each XMSS key pair. This nbyte value can be used to compute the respective XMSS secret key using the method described in Section 4.1.11. Let S[x][y] be the seed for the x^th XMSS secret key on layer y. The seeds are computed as S[x][y] = G(G(S, y), x). The second parameter of G is the index x (resp. level y), represented as 16byte string in the common way. 4.2.9. Free Index Handling and Partial Secret Keys The content of Section 4.1.12 also applies to XMSS^MT. 5. Parameter Sets This note provides a first basic set of parameter sets which are assumed to cover most relevant applicants. Parameter sets for two classical security levels are defined: 256 and 512 bits. Function output sizes are n = m = 32 and 64 bytes. Considering quantum computeraided attacks, these output sizes yield postquantum security of 128 and 256 bits, respectively. For the n = m = 32 and n = m = 64 settings, we give parameters that use SHA2256 and SHA2512 as defined in [FIPS180], respectively, and ChaCha20 as defined in [RFC7539]. SHA2 does not provide a keyedmode itself. To implement a keyed hashfunction, SHA2256(toByte(0,32)  KEY  M) and SHA2512(toByte(0,64)  KEY  M) are used. This construction is used for the functions F, H, and H_m. To implement PRF_m, HMACSHA2256 and HMACSHA2512 are used, respectively. The pseudorandom generator G for n=32 is implemented as ChaCha20 using SEED as key, the most significant 12 bytes of the address input as nonce and the least significant 4 bytes as counter. The output consists of the first 32 bytes of the key stream. The pseudorandom generator G for n=64 is implemented as HMACSHA2512. 5.1. WOTS+ Parameters To fully describe a WOTS+ signature method, the parameters m, n, and w, as well as the functions F and G MUST be specified. This section defines several WOTS+ signature systems, each of which is identified by a name. Values for len are provided for convenience. Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 32] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 ++++++++  Name  F  G  m  n  w  len  ++++++++  WOTSP_SHA2256_M32_W16  SHA2  ChaCha20  32  32  16  67           WOTSP_SHA2512_M64_W16  SHA2  SHA2  64  64  16  131  ++++++++ Table 1 The implementation of the single functions is done as described above. XDR formats for WOTS+ are listed in Appendix A. 5.2. XMSS Parameters To fully describe an XMSS signature method, the parameters m, n, w, and h, as well as the functions F, H, H_m, PRF_m, and G MUST be specified. This section defines different XMSS signature systems, each of which is identified by a name. We define parameter sets that implement the functions using SHA2 and ChaCha20 for n = 32 and only SHA2 for n=64 as described above. +++++++  Name  m  n  w  len  h  +++++++  XMSS_SHA2256_M32_W16_H10  32  32  16  67  10          XMSS_SHA2256_M32_W16_H16  32  32  16  67  16          XMSS_SHA2256_M32_W16_H20  32  32  16  67  20          XMSS_SHA2512_M64_W16_H10  64  64  16  131  10          XMSS_SHA2512_M64_W16_H16  64  64  16  131  16          XMSS_SHA2512_M64_W16_H20  64  64  16  131  20  +++++++ Table 2 The XDR formats for XMSS are listed in Appendix B. 5.3. XMSS^MT Parameters To fully describe an XMSS^MT signature method, the parameters m, n, w, h, and d, as well as the functions F, H, H_m, PRF_m, and G MUST be specified. This section defines several XMSS^MT signature systems, each of which is identified by a name. We define parameter sets that Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 33] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 implement the functions using SHA2 and ChaCha20 for n = 32 and only SHA2 for n=64 as described above. ++++++++  Name  m  n  w  len  h  d  ++++++++  XMSSMT_SHA2256_M32_W16_H20_D2  32  32  16  67  20  2           XMSSMT_SHA2256_M32_W16_H20_D4  32  32  16  67  20  4           XMSSMT_SHA2256_M32_W16_H40_D2  32  32  16  67  40  2           XMSSMT_SHA2256_M32_W16_H40_D4  32  32  16  67  40  4           XMSSMT_SHA2256_M32_W16_H40_D8  32  32  16  67  40  8           XMSSMT_SHA2256_M32_W16_H60_D3  32  32  16  67  60  3           XMSSMT_SHA2256_M32_W16_H60_D6  32  32  16  67  60  6           XMSSMT_SHA2256_M32_W16_H60_D12  32  32  16  67  60  12           XMSSMT_SHA2512_M64_W16_H20_D2  64  64  16  131  20  2           XMSSMT_SHA2512_M64_W16_H20_D4  64  64  16  131  20  4           XMSSMT_SHA2512_M64_W16_H40_D2  64  64  16  131  40  2           XMSSMT_SHA2512_M64_W16_H40_D4  64  64  16  131  40  4           XMSSMT_SHA2512_M64_W16_H40_D8  64  64  16  131  40  8           XMSSMT_SHA2512_M64_W16_H60_D3  64  64  16  131  60  3           XMSSMT_SHA2512_M64_W16_H60_D6  64  64  16  131  60  6           XMSSMT_SHA2512_M64_W16_H60_D12  64  64  16  131  60  12  ++++++++ Table 3 XDR formats for XMSS^MT are listed in Appendix C. 6. Rationale The goal of this note is to describe the WOTS+, XMSS and XMSS^MT algorithms following the scientific literature. Other signature methods are out of scope and may be an interesting followon work. Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 34] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 The description is done in a modular way that allows to base a description of stateless hashbased signature algorithms like SPHINCS [BHH15] on it. The draft slightly deviates from the scientific literature using a tweak that prevents multitarget attacks against the underlying hash function. The security assumptions for this tweak are discussed in Section 8. The main difference to literature is that security now relies either on the random oracle model or some other seemingly natural heuristic assumptions. We suggest the value w = 16 for the Winternitz parameter. No bigger values are included since the decrease in signature size then becomes less significant. Furthermore, the value w = 16 considerably simplifies the implementations of some of the algorithms. Please note that we do allow w = 4, but limit the specified parameter sets to w = 16 for efficiency reasons. The signature and public key formats are designed so that they are easy to parse. Each format starts with a 32bit enumeration value that indicates all of the details of the signature algorithm and hence defines all of the information that is needed in order to parse the format. The enumeration values used in this note are palindromes, which have the same byte representation in either host order or network order. This fact allows an implementation to omit the conversion between byte order for those enumerations. Note however that the idx field used in XMSS and XMSS^MT signatures and secret keys must be properly converted to and from network byte order; this is the only field that requires such conversion. There are 2^32 XDR enumeration values, 2^16 of which are palindromes, which is adequate for the foreseeable future. If there is a need for more assignments, nonpalindromes can be assigned. 7. IANA Considerations The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) is requested to create three registries: one for WOTS+ signatures as defined in Section 3, one for XMSS signatures and one for XMSS^MT signatures; the latter two being defined in Section 4. For the sake of clarity and convenience, the first sets of WOTS+, XMSS, and XMSS^MT parameter sets are defined in Section 5. Additions to these registries require that a specification be documented in an RFC or another permanent and readily available reference in sufficient details to make interoperability between independent implementations possible. Each entry in the registry contains the following elements: Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 35] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 a short name, such as "XMSS_SHA2512_M64_W16_H20", a positive number, and a reference to a specification that completely defines the signature method test cases that can be used to verify the correctness of an implementation. Requests to add an entry to the registry MUST include the name and the reference. The number is assigned by IANA. These number assignments SHOULD use the smallest available palindromic number. Submitters SHOULD have their requests reviewed by the IRTF Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG) at cfrg@ietf.org. Interested applicants that are unfamiliar with IANA processes should visit http://www.iana.org. The numbers between 0xDDDDDDDD (decimal 3,722,304,989) and 0xFFFFFFFF (decimal 4,294,967,295) inclusive, will not be assigned by IANA, and are reserved for private use; no attempt will be made to prevent multiple sites from using the same value in different (and incompatible) ways [RFC2434]. The WOTS+ registry is as follows. ++++  Name  Reference  Numeric Identifier  ++++  WOTSP_SHA2256_M32_W16  Section 5.1  0x01000001       WOTSP_SHA2512_M64_W16  Section 5.1  0x02000002  ++++ Table 4 The XMSS registry is as follows. Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 36] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 ++++  Name  Reference  Numeric Identifier  ++++  XMSS_SHA2256_M32_W16_H10  Section 5.2  0x01000001       XMSS_SHA2256_M32_W16_H16  Section 5.2  0x02000002       XMSS_SHA2256_M32_W16_H20  Section 5.2  0x03000003       XMSS_SHA2512_M64_W16_H10  Section 5.2  0x04000004       XMSS_SHA2512_M64_W16_H16  Section 5.2  0x05000005       XMSS_SHA2512_M64_W16_H20  Section 5.2  0x06000006  ++++ Table 5 The XMSS^MT registry is as follows. Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 37] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 ++++  Name  Reference  Numeric     Identifier  ++++  XMSSMT_SHA2256_M32_W16_H20_D2  Section 5.3  0x01000001       XMSSMT_SHA2256_M32_W16_H20_D4  Section 5.3  0x02000002       XMSSMT_SHA2256_M32_W16_H40_D2  Section 5.3  0x03000003       XMSSMT_SHA2256_M32_W16_H40_D4  Section 5.3  0x04000004       XMSSMT_SHA2256_M32_W16_H40_D8  Section 5.3  0x05000005       XMSSMT_SHA2256_M32_W16_H60_D3  Section 5.3  0x06000006       XMSSMT_SHA2256_M32_W16_H60_D6  Section 5.3  0x07000007       XMSSMT_SHA2256_M32_W16_H60_D12  Section 5.3  0x08000008       XMSSMT_SHA2512_M64_W16_H20_D2  Section 5.3  0x09000009       XMSSMT_SHA2512_M64_W16_H20_D4  Section 5.3  0x0a00000a       XMSSMT_SHA2512_M64_W16_H40_D2  Section 5.3  0x0b00000b       XMSSMT_SHA2512_M64_W16_H40_D4  Section 5.3  0x0c00000c       XMSSMT_SHA2512_M64_W16_H40_D8  Section 5.3  0x0d00000d       XMSSMT_SHA2512_M64_W16_H60_D3  Section 5.3  0x0e00000e       XMSSMT_SHA2512_M64_W16_H60_D6  Section 5.3  0x0f00000f       XMSSMT_SHA2512_M64_W16_H60_D12  Section 5.3  0x01010101  ++++ Table 6 An IANA registration of a signature system does not constitute an endorsement of that system or its security. 8. Security Considerations A signature system is considered secure if it prevents an attacker from forging a valid signature. More specifically, consider a setting in which an attacker gets a public key and can learn signatures on arbitrary messages of his choice. A signature system Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 38] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 is secure if, even in this setting, the attacker can not produce a message signature pair of his choosing such that the verification algorithm accepts. Preventing an attacker from mounting an attack means that the attack is computationally too expensive to be carried out. There exist various estimates when a computation is too expensive to be done. For that reason, this note only describes how expensive it is for an attacker to generate a forgery. Parameters are accompanied by a bit security value. The meaning of bit security is as follows. A parameter set grants b bits of security if the best attack takes at least 2^(b1) bit operations to achieve a success probability of 1/2. Hence, to mount a successful attack, an attacker needs to perform 2^b bit operations on average. How the given values for bit security were estimated is described below. 8.1. Security Proofs There exist formal security proofs for schemes very similar to those described here in the literature [Huelsing13a]. These proofs show that an attacker has to break at least one out of certain security properties of the used hash functions and PRFs to forge a signature. The proofs in [Huelsing13a] do not consider the initial message compression and the extended randomized hashing used here. For the original schemes, these proofs show that an attacker has to break certain minimal security properties. In particular, it is not sufficient to break the collision resistance of the hash functions to generate a forgery. It is folklore that one can securely combine a secure signature scheme for fixed length messages with an initial message digest. It is easy to prove that an attacker either must break the security of the fixedinputlength signature scheme or the collision resistance of the used hash function. The descriptions of XMSS and XMSS^MT in this note use a known trick to prevent the applicability of collision attacks. Namely, the schemes use a randomized message hash. For technical reasons, it is not possible to formally prove in the standard model that the resulting scheme is secure if the hash function is not collisionresistant but fulfills some weaker security properties. However, in the random oracle model such a proof is trivial. While the basic randomized hashing used in the original descriptions of the schemes allows to prove that it is not enough for an adversary to break the collision resistance of the underlying hash function. However, it turns out that an attacker could launch a multitarget secondpreimage attack. The (simplified) reason is that the adversary learns in the order of 2^h hash function inputoutput pairs Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 39] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 and it suffices to find a secondpreimage for one out of those. Hence, an attacker can do a brute force search until he finds an input that matches one of the given outputs. The extended randomized hashing used here makes the hash function calls position dependent. Hence, the above attack does not work anymore because each hash function evaluation during an attack can only target one output value. This can also be shown formally. The given bit security values were estimated based on the complexity of the best known generic attacks against the required security properties of the used hash functions and PRFs. 8.2. Security Assumptions The security assumptions made to argue for the security of the described schemes are minimal. Any signature algorithm that allows arbitrary size messages relies on the security of a cryptographic hash function. For the schemes described here this is already sufficient to be secure. In contrast, common signature schemes like RSA, DSA, and ECDSA additionally rely on the conjectured hardness of certain mathematical problems. 8.3. PostQuantum Security A postquantum cryptosystem is a system that is secure against attackers with access to a reasonably sized quantum computer. At the time of writing this note, whether or not it is feasible to build such machine is an open conjecture. However, significant progress was made over the last few years in this regard. In contrast to RSA, DSA, and ECDSA, the described signature systems are postquantumsecure if they are used with an appropriate cryptographic hash function. In particular, for postquantum security, the size of m and n must be twice the size required for classical security. This is in order to protect against quantum square root attacks due to Grover's algorithm. It has been shown that Grover's algorithm is optimal for finding preimages and collisions. 9. Acknowledgements We would like to thank Scott Fluhrer, Burt Kaliski, Adam Langley, David McGrew, and Sean Parkinson for their help and comments. Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 40] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 10. References 10.1. Normative References [FIPS180] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure Hash Standard (SHS)", FIPS 1804, 2012. [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. [RFC2434] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434, October 1998. [RFC4506] Eisler, M., "XDR: External Data Representation Standard", STD 67, RFC 4506, May 2006. [RFC7539] Nir, Y. and A. Langley, "ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IETF Protocols", RFC 7539, May 2015. 10.2. Informative References [BDH11] Buchmann, J., Dahmen, E., and A. Huelsing, "XMSS  A Practical Forward Secure Signature Scheme Based on Minimal Security Assumptions", Lecture Notes in Computer Science volume 7071. PostQuantum Cryptography, 2011. [BDS09] Buchmann, J., Dahmen, E., and M. Szydlo, "Hashbased Digital Signature Schemes", Book chapter PostQuantum Cryptography, Springer, 2009. [BHH15] Bernstein, D., Hopwood, D., Huelsing, A., Lange, T., Niederhagen, R., Papachristodoulou, L., Schneider, M., Schwabe, P., and Z. WilcoxO'Hearn, "SPHINCS: Practical Stateless HashBased Signatures", Lecture Notes in Computer Science volume 9056. Advances in Cryptology  EUROCRYPT, 2015. [DC14] McGrew, D. and M. Curcio, "Hashbased signatures", draft mcgrewhashsigs02 (work in progress), July 2014. [HRB13] Huelsing, A., Rausch, L., and J. Buchmann, "Optimal Parameters for XMSS^MT", Lecture Notes in Computer Science volume 8128. CDARES, 2013. Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 41] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 [Huelsing13] Huelsing, A., "WOTS+  Shorter Signatures for HashBased Signature Schemes", Lecture Notes in Computer Science volume 7918. Progress in Cryptology  AFRICACRYPT, 2013. [Huelsing13a] Huelsing, A., "Practical Forward Secure Signatures using Minimal Security Assumptions", PhD thesis TU Darmstadt, 2013. [Kaliski15] Kaliski, B., "Panel: Shoring up the Infrastructure: A Strategy for Standardizing Hash Signatures", NIST Workshop on Cybersecurity in a PostQuantum World, 2015. [Merkle79] Merkle, R., "Secrecy, Authentication, and Public Key Systems", Stanford University Information Systems Laboratory Technical Report 19791, 1979. Appendix A. WOTS+ XDR Formats The WOTS+ signature and public key formats are formally defined using XDR [RFC4506] in order to provide an unambiguous, machine readable definition. Though XDR is used, these formats are simple and easy to parse without any special tools. To avoid the need to convert to and from network / host byte order, the enumeration values are all palindromes. WOTS+ parameter sets are defined using XDR syntax as follows: /* ots_algorithm_type identifies a particular signature algorithm */ enum ots_algorithm_type { wotsp_reserved = 0x00000000, wotsp_sha2256_m32_w16 = 0x01000001, wotsp_sha2512_m64_w16 = 0x02000002, }; Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 42] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 WOTS+ signatures are defined using XDR syntax as follows: /* Byte strings */ typedef opaque bytestring32[32]; typedef opaque bytestring64[64]; union ots_signature switch (ots_algorithm_type type) { case wotsp_sha2256_m32_w16: bytestring32 ots_sig_m32_len67[67]; case wotsp_sha2512_m64_w16: bytestring64 ots_sig_m64_len18[131]; default: void; /* error condition */ }; WOTS+ public keys are defined using XDR syntax as follows: union ots_pubkey switch (ots_algorithm_type type) { case wotsp_sha2256_m32_w16: bytestring32 ots_pubk_m32_len67[67]; case wotsp_sha2512_m64_w16: bytestring64 ots_pubk_m64_len18[131]; default: void; /* error condition */ }; Appendix B. XMSS XDR Formats Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 43] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 XMSS parameter sets are defined using XDR syntax as follows: /* Byte strings */ typedef opaque bytestring4[4]; /* Definition of parameter sets */ enum xmss_algorithm_type { xmss_reserved = 0x00000000, /* 256 bit classical security, 128 bit postquantum security */ xmss_sha2256_m32_w16_h10 = 0x01000001, xmss_sha2256_m32_w16_h16 = 0x02000002, xmss_sha2256_m32_w16_h20 = 0x03000003, /* 512 bit classical security, 256 bit postquantum security */ xmss_sha2512_m64_w16_h10 = 0x04000004, xmss_sha2512_m64_w16_h16 = 0x05000005, xmss_sha2512_m64_w16_h20 = 0x06000006, }; XMSS signatures are defined using XDR syntax as follows: /* Authentication path types */ union xmss_path switch (xmss_algorithm_type type) { case xmss_sha2256_m32_w16_h10: bytestring32 path_n32_t10[10]; case xmss_sha2256_m32_w16_h16: bytestring32 path_n32_t16[16]; case xmss_sha2256_m32_w16_h20: bytestring32 path_n32_t20[20]; case xmss_sha2512_m64_w16_h10: bytestring64 path_n64_t10[10]; case xmss_sha2512_m64_w16_h16: bytestring64 path_n64_t16[16]; case xmss_sha2512_m64_w16_h20: Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 44] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 bytestring64 path_n64_t20[20]; default: void; /* error condition */ }; /* Types for XMSS random strings */ union random_string_xmss switch (xmss_algorithm_type type) { case xmss_sha2256_m32_w16_h10: case xmss_sha2256_m32_w16_h16: case xmss_sha2256_m32_w16_h20: bytestring32 rand_m32; case xmss_sha2512_m64_w16_h10: case xmss_sha2512_m64_w16_h16: case xmss_sha2512_m64_w16_h20: bytestring64 rand_m64; default: void; /* error condition */ }; /* Corresponding WOTS+ type for given XMSS type */ union xmss_ots_signature switch (xmss_algorithm_type type) { case xmss_sha2256_m32_w16_h10: case xmss_sha2256_m32_w16_h16: case xmss_sha2256_m32_w16_h20: wotsp_sha2256_m32_w16; case xmss_sha2512_m64_w16_h10: case xmss_sha2512_m64_w16_h16: case xmss_sha2512_m64_w16_h20: wotsp_sha2512_m64_w16; default: void; /* error condition */ }; /* XMSS signature structure */ struct xmss_signature { /* WOTS+ key pair index */ bytestring4 idx_sig; /* Random string for randomized hashing */ random_string_xmss rand_string; /* WOTS+ signature */ Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 45] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 xmss_ots_signature sig_ots; /* authentication path */ xmss_path nodes; }; Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 46] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 XMSS public keys are defined using XDR syntax as follows: /* Types for bitmask seed */ union seed switch (xmss_algorithm_type type) { case xmss_sha2256_m32_w16_h10: case xmss_sha2256_m32_w16_h16: case xmss_sha2256_m32_w16_h20: bytestring32 seed_n32; case xmss_sha2512_m64_w16_h10: case xmss_sha2512_m64_w16_h16: case xmss_sha2512_m64_w16_h20: bytestring64 seed_n64; default: void; /* error condition */ }; /* Types for XMSS root node */ union xmss_root switch (xmss_algorithm_type type) { case xmss_sha2256_m32_w16_h10: case xmss_sha2256_m32_w16_h16: case xmss_sha2256_m32_w16_h20: bytestring32 root_n32; case xmss_sha2512_m64_w16_h10: case xmss_sha2512_m64_w16_h16: case xmss_sha2512_m64_w16_h20: bytestring64 root_n64; default: void; /* error condition */ }; /* XMSS public key structure */ struct xmss_public_key { xmss_root root; /* Root node */ seed SEED; /* Seed for bitmasks */ }; Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 47] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 Appendix C. XMSS^MT XDR Formats XMSS^MT parameter sets are defined using XDR syntax as follows: /* Byte strings */ typedef opaque bytestring3[3]; typedef opaque bytestring5[5]; typedef opaque bytestring8[8]; /* Definition of parameter sets */ enum xmssmt_algorithm_type { xmssmt_reserved = 0x00000000, /* 256 bit classical security, 128 bit postquantum security */ xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h20_d2 = 0x01000001, xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h20_d4 = 0x02000002, xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h40_d2 = 0x03000003, xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h40_d4 = 0x04000004, xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h40_d8 = 0x05000005, xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h60_d3 = 0x06000006, xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h60_d6 = 0x07000007, xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h60_d12 = 0x08000008, /* 512 bit classical security, 256 bit postquantum security */ xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h20_d2 = 0x09000009, xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h20_d4 = 0x0a00000a, xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h40_d2 = 0x0b00000b, xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h40_d4 = 0x0c00000c, xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h40_d8 = 0x0d00000d, xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h60_d3 = 0x0e00000e, xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h60_d6 = 0x0f00000f, xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h60_d12 = 0x01010101, }; XMSS^MT signatures are defined using XDR syntax as follows: /* Type for XMSS^MT key pair index */ /* Depends solely on h */ union idx_sig_xmssmt switch (xmss_algorithm_type type) { case xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h20_d2: Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 48] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 case xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h20_d4: case xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h20_d2: case xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h20_d4: bytestring3 idx3; case xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h40_d2: case xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h40_d4: case xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h40_d8: case xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h40_d2: case xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h40_d4: case xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h40_d8: bytestring5 idx5; case xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h60_d3: case xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h60_d6: case xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h60_d12: case xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h60_d3: case xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h60_d6: case xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h60_d12: bytestring8 idx8; default: void; /* error condition */ }; union random_string_xmssmt switch (xmssmt_algorithm_type type) { case xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h20_d2: case xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h20_d4: case xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h40_d2: case xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h40_d4: case xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h40_d8: case xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h60_d3: case xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h60_d6: case xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h60_d12: bytestring32 rand_m32; case xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h20_d2: case xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h20_d4: case xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h40_d2: case xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h40_d4: case xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h40_d8: case xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h60_d3: case xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h60_d6: case xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h60_d12: bytestring64 rand_m64; default: void; /* error condition */ Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 49] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 }; struct xmss_reduced_bottom { xmss_ots_signature sig_ots; /* WOTS+ signature */ xmss_path nodes; /* authentication path */ }; /* Type for individual reduced XMSS signatures on higher layers */ union xmss_reduced_others (xmss_algorithm_type type) { case xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h20_d2: case xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h20_d4: bytestring32 xmss_reduced_n32_t87[87]; case xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h40_d2: case xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h40_d4: case xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h40_d8: bytestring32 xmss_reduced_n32_t107[107]; case xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h60_d3: case xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h60_d6: case xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h60_d12: bytestring32 xmss_reduced_n32_t127[127]; case xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h20_d2: case xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h20_d4: bytestring64 xmss_reduced_n64_t151[151]; case xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h40_d2: case xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h40_d4: case xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h40_d8: bytestring64 xmss_reduced_n64_t171[171]; case xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h60_d3: case xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h60_d6: case xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h60_d12: bytestring64 xmss_reduced_n64_t191[191]; default: void; /* error condition */ }; /* xmss_reduced_array depends on d */ union xmss_reduced_array (xmss_algorithm_type type) { case xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h20_d2: case xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h20_d2: case xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h40_d2: Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 50] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 case xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h40_d2: xmss_reduced_others xmss_red_arr_d2[1]; case xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h60_d3: case xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h60_d3: xmss_reduced_others xmss_red_arr_d3[2]; case xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h20_d4: case xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h20_d4: case xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h40_d4: case xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h40_d4: xmss_reduced_others xmss_red_arr_d4[3]; case xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h60_d6: case xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h60_d6: xmss_reduced_others xmss_red_arr_d6[5]; case xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h40_d8: case xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h40_d8: xmss_reduced_others xmss_red_arr_d8[7]; case xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h60_d12: case xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h60_d12: xmss_reduced_others xmss_red_arr_d12[11]; default: void; /* error condition */ }; /* XMSS^MT signature structure */ struct xmssmt_signature { /* WOTS+ key pair index */ idx_sig_xmssmt idx_sig; /* Random string for randomized hashing */ random_string_xmssmt randomness; /* Reduced bottom layer XMSS signature */ xmss_reduced_bottom; /* Array of reduced XMSS signatures with message length n */ xmss_reduced_array; }; XMSS^MT public keys are defined using XDR syntax as follows: /* Types for bitmask seed */ Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 51] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 union seed switch (xmssmt_algorithm_type type) { case xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h20_d2: case xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h40_d4: case xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h60_d6: case xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h20_d4: case xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h40_d8: case xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h60_d12: case xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h40_d2: case xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h60_d3: bytestring32 seed_n32; case xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h20_d2: case xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h40_d4: case xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h60_d6: case xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h20_d4: case xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h40_d8: case xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h60_d12: case xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h40_d2: case xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h60_d3: bytestring64 seed_n64; default: void; /* error condition */ }; /* Types for XMSS^MT root node */ union xmssmt_root switch (xmssmt_algorithm_type type) { case xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h20_d2: case xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h20_d4: case xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h40_d2: case xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h40_d4: case xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h40_d8: case xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h60_d3: case xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h60_d6: case xmssmt_sha2256_m32_w16_h60_d12: bytestring32 root_n32; case xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h20_d2: case xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h20_d4: case xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h40_d2: case xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h40_d4: case xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h40_d8: case xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h60_d3: case xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h60_d6: case xmssmt_sha2512_m64_w16_h60_d12: bytestring64 root_n64; Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 52] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 default: void; /* error condition */ }; /* XMSS^MT public key structure */ struct xmssmt_public_key { xmssmt_root root; /* Root node */ seed SEED; /* Seed for bitmasks */ }; Appendix D. Changed since draftirtfcfrgxmsshashbasedsignatures00 Added keying of hash functions with pseudorandomly generated keys for all hashes but the message hash. A Hash Function Address Scheme is introduced that for. For further information please take a look at sections Section 2.5 and Section 8. Replaced bitmasks by pseudorandomly generated values. Removed zero bitmasks, as we now only store a small seed (n bytes) for bitmask generation, which is pretty small compared to the bitmask solution before. Removed w = 8 to reduce huge number of parameter sets. Simplified algorithms (like base_w) as we don't need to support the w = 8 case now. Removed w = 4 from the suggested parameter sets. Changed 'l' to 'len, 'l_1' to 'len_1' and 'l_2' to 'len_2' to avoid confusion between the characters 'l' and '1'. Changed appearances of "is equal" or "mod" to % operator for better readability. Removed the OID in the XMSS and XMSS^MT signatures. This was redundant, since the OID is already part of the public key in both cases. Replaced SHA3 by SHA2 in light of more widespread usage and faster implementations for SHA2. Fixed the log notation in the Schemes section. Removed AESbased parameter sets. Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 53] InternetDraft XMSS: Extended HashBased Signatures July 2015 Adapted XDR according to the changes. Removed definitions like max() from notation, when no longer needed in this document. Authors' Addresses Andreas Huelsing TU Eindhoven P.O. Box 513 Eindhoven 5600 MB The Netherlands Email: a.t.huelsing@tue.nl Denis Butin TU Darmstadt Hochschulstrasse 10 Darmstadt 64289 Germany Email: dbutin@cdc.informatik.tudarmstadt.de StefanLukas Gazdag genua GmbH Domagkstrasse 7 Kirchheim bei Muenchen 85551 Germany Email: stefanlukas_gazdag@genua.eu Aziz Mohaisen Verisign Labs 12061 Bluemont Way Reston, VA 20190 Phone: +1 703 9483200 Email: amohaisen@verisign.com Huelsing, et al. Expires January 4, 2016 [Page 54]