Post-quantum public key algorithms for the Secure Shell (SSH) protocol
draft-kampanakis-curdle-pq-ssh-00

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Authors Panos Kampanakis  , Douglas Steblia  , Markus Friedl  , Torben Hansen  , Dimitrios Sikeridis 
Last updated 2020-10-21
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CURDLE                                                     P. Kampanakis
Internet-Draft                                             Cisco Systems
Intended status: Experimental                                 D. Stebila
Expires: 24 April 2021                            University of Waterloo
                                                               M. Friedl
                                                                 OpenSSH
                                                               T. Hansen
                                                                     AWS
                                                            D. Sikeridis
                                                University of New Mexico
                                                         21 October 2020

 Post-quantum public key algorithms for the Secure Shell (SSH) protocol
                   draft-kampanakis-curdle-pq-ssh-00

Abstract

   This document defines hybrid key exchange methods based on classical
   ECDH key exchange and post-quantum key encapsulation schemes.  These
   methods are defined for use in the SSH Transport Layer Protocol.  It
   also defines post-quantum public key authentication methods based on
   post-quantum signature schemes.  These methods are defined for use in
   the SSH Authentication Protocol.

Note

   EDNOTE: The goal of this draft is to start the standardization of PQ
   algorithms in SSH early to mitigate the potential record-and-harvest
   later with a quantum computer attacks.  This draft is not expected to
   be finalized before the NIST PQ Project has standardized PQ
   algorithms.  After NIST has standardized then this document will
   replace TBD1, TBD3 with the appropriate algorithms and parameters
   before proceeding to ratification.

   EDNOTE: Discussion of this work is encouraged to happen on the IETF
   WG Mailing List or in the GitHub repository which contains the draft:
   https://github.com/csosto-pk/pq-ssh/issues .

   *Change Log* [EDNOTE: Remove befor publicaton].

   draft-kampanakis-curdle-pq-ssh-00
      *  Initial draft

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Kampanakis, et al.        Expires 24 April 2021                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                   PQ SSH                     October 2020

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on 24 April 2021.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Hybrid Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.1.  Hybrid Key Exchange Method Abstraction  . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.2.  Key Derivation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.3.  HASH  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.4.  Hybrid Key Exchange Method Names  . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       2.4.1.  ecdh-nistp256-TBD1-sha256 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       2.4.2.  x25519-TBD1-sha256  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   3.  Key Authentication  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.1.  Public Key Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.2.  Signature Format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.3.  Signing and Verification  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   4.  Message Size  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   5.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
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