Require BGP implementers to advertise no routes
draft-mauch-bgp-reject-00

Internet Engineering Task Force                                 J. Mauch
Internet-Draft                                               J. Snijders
Intended status: Standards Track                                     NTT
Expires: January 21, 2016                                  July 20, 2015

            Require BGP implementers to advertise no routes
                     draft-mauch-bgp-reject-00.txt

Abstract

   This document describes a solution to a common routing security
   problem inherent in vendors with their security practices.

Foreword

   A placeholder to list general observations about this document.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [1].

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 21, 2016.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents

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   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Definitions and Accronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Solution Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   6.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     6.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     6.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4

1.  Introduction

   BGP speaking devices have many default settings which need to be
   revisited as part of improving the routing ecosystem.  There is a
   need to provide guidace to BGP implementors for the default behaviors
   of a well functioning internet ecosystem.  Routing leaks [3] are part
   of the problem, but software defects and operator misconfigurations
   are just a few of the attacks on internet stability we aim to
   address.

   Usually BGP speaking devices accept all routes from a configured peer
   or neighbor.  This practice dates back to the early days of internet
   protocols in being very permissive in offering routing information to
   allow all networks to reach each other.  With the core of the
   internet becoming more densely interconnected the risk of a
   misbehaving edge device or BGP speaking customer poses signficiant
   risks to the reachability of critical services.

   This proposal intends to solve this situation with the requiring the
   explicity configuration of BGP policy for any non-iBGP speaking
   session such as customers, peers or confederation boundaries.  When
   this solution is implemented, devices will no longer pass routes
   without explicit policy.

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2.  Definitions and Accronyms

   o  BGP: Border Gateway Protocol [2]

3.  Solution Requirements

   The following requirements apply to the solution described in this
   document:

   o  Software MUST NOT accept routes from an eBGP peer without an
      operator configuring a policy

   o  Software MUST NOT require a configuration directive to operate in
      this mode.

   o  Software MUST NOT send routes to an eBGP peer without an operator
      configuring a policy

   o  Software MUST provide protection from internal failures preventing
      the advertisement and acceptance of routes

   o  Software MAY provide a configuration option to disable this
      security capability.

4.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank the following people for their
   comments and support: [TBD].

5.  Security Considerations

   This document addresses the basic security posture of a BGP speaking
   device within a network.  Operators have a need for implementors to
   address the problem through a behavior change to mitigate against
   possible attacks from a permissive security posture.  Attacks and
   inadvertent advertisements cause business impact necessitating this
   default behavior.

6.  References

6.1.  Normative References

   [1]        Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [2]        Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway
              Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.

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6.2.  Informative References

   [3]        "Methods for Detection and Mitigation of BGP Route Leaks",
              <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sriram-idr-route-leak-
              detection-mitigation>.

Authors' Addresses

   Jared Mauch
   NTT Communications, Inc.
   8285 Reese Lane
   Ann Arbor  Michigan 48103
   US

   Email: jmauch@us.ntt.net

   Job Snijders
   NTT Communications, Inc.
   Amsterdam
   NL

   Email: job@ntt.net

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