DNSSEC Validator Requirements
draft-mglt-dnsop-dnssec-validator-requirements-07

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Last updated 2018-11-28
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dnsop                                                         D. Migault
Internet-Draft                                                  Ericsson
Intended status: Informational                                  E. Lewis
Expires: June 1, 2019                                              ICANN
                                                                 D. York
                                                                    ISOC
                                                       November 28, 2018

                     DNSSEC Validator Requirements
           draft-mglt-dnsop-dnssec-validator-requirements-07

Abstract

   The DNS Security Extensions define a process for validating received
   data and assert them authentic and complete as opposed to forged.

   This document describes what is needed in implementations to make the
   validation process manageable Considerations for accurate time as
   well as management of the trust anchor store.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on June 1, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect

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   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Requirements Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  DNSSEC Validator Description  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  Time deviation and absence of Real Time Clock . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  Trust Anchor  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     6.1.  Trust Anchor Bootstrapping  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       6.1.1.  The IANA managed root zone KSK  . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     6.2.  Trust Anchor Data Store . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     6.3.  Interactions with the cached RRsets . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   7.  ZSK / KSK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     7.1.  KSK/ZSK Data Store  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     7.2.  KSK ZSK Data Store and Trust Anchor Data Store  . . . . .  12
     7.3.  Interactions with cached RRsets . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   8.  Cryptography Deprecation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   9.  Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   12. Acknowledgment  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   13. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     13.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     13.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17

1.  Requirements Notation

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described BCP 14
   [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals,
   as shown here.

2.  Introduction

   The act of DNSSEC validation [RFC4033][RFC4035] can be broken into
   two part:

   o  Signature Validation: which consists in checking the cryptographic
      signature of a Resource Record Set (RRset).  The signature
      validation involves among other parameters a DNSKEY Resource
      Record (RR) and RRSIG RR and the RRset itself.  The signature

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