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Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Data Channel
draft-reddy-dots-data-channel-01

The information below is for an old version of the document.
Document Type
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Replaced".
Authors Tirumaleswar Reddy.K , Dan Wing , Mohamed Boucadair , Kaname Nishizuka , Liang Xia
Last updated 2016-10-27
Replaced by draft-ietf-dots-data-channel, draft-ietf-dots-data-channel, RFC 8783
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draft-reddy-dots-data-channel-01
DOTS                                                            T. Reddy
Internet-Draft                                                   D. Wing
Intended status: Standards Track                                   Cisco
Expires: April 30, 2017                                     M. Boucadair
                                                                  Orange
                                                            K. Nishizuka
                                                      NTT Communications
                                                                  L. Xia
                                                                  Huawei
                                                        October 27, 2016

Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Data Channel
                    draft-reddy-dots-data-channel-01

Abstract

   The document specifies a Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
   Signaling (DOTS) data channel used for bulk exchange of data not
   easily or appropriately communicated through the DOTS signal channel
   under attack conditions.  This is a companion document to the DOTS
   signal channel specification.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 30, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of

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   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Notational Conventions and Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  DOTS Data Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  DOTS Provisioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       3.1.1.  Create Identifiers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       3.1.2.  Delete Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       3.1.3.  Retrieving Installed Identifiers  . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.2.  Filtering Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       3.2.1.  Install Filtering Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       3.2.2.  Remove Filtering Rules  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       3.2.3.  Retrieving Installed Filtering Rules  . . . . . . . .  13
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   6.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17

1.  Introduction

   A distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack is an attempt to make
   machines or network resources unavailable to their intended users.
   In most cases, sufficient scale can be achieved by compromising
   enough end-hosts and using those infected hosts to perpetrate and
   amplify the attack.  The victim in this attack can be an application
   server, a client, a router, a firewall, or an entire network.

   DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) defines two channels: signal and
   data channels [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture] (Figure 1).  The DOTS
   signal channel used to convey that a network is under a DDOS attack
   to an upstream DOTS server so that appropriate mitigation actions are
   undertaken on the suspect traffic is further elaborated in
   [I-D.reddy-dots-signal-channel].  The DOTS data channel is used for
   infrequent bulk data exchange between DOTS agents in the aim to
   significantly augment attack response coordination.

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     +---------------+                                 +---------------+
     |               | <------- Signal Channel ------> |               |
     |  DOTS Client  |                                 |  DOTS Server  |
     |               | <=======  Data Channel  ======> |               |
     +---------------+                                 +---------------+

                          Figure 1: DOTS Channels

   Section 2 of [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture] identifies that the DOTS
   data channel is used to perform the tasks listed below:

   o  Filter management, which enables a DOTS client to install or
      remove traffic filters dropping or rate-limiting unwanted traffic
      and permitting white-listed traffic.  Sample use cases for
      populating black- or white-list filtering rules are detailed
      hereafter:

      A.  If a network resource (DOTS client) detects a potential DDoS
          attack from a set of IP addresses, the DOTS client informs its
          servicing router (DOTS gateway) of all suspect IP addresses
          that need to be blocked or black-listed for further
          investigation.  The DOTS client could also specify a list of
          protocols and ports in the black-list rule.  That DOTS gateway
          in-turn propagates the black-listed IP addresses to the DOTS
          server which will undertake appropriate action so that traffic
          from these IP addresses to the target network (specified by
          the DOTS client) is blocked.

      B.  An enterprise network has partner sites from which only
          legitimate traffic arrives and the enterprise network wants to
          ensure that the traffic from these sites is not penalized
          during DDOS attacks.  The DOTS client uses DOTS data channel
          to convey the white-listed IP addresses or prefixes of the
          partner sites to its DOTS server.  The DOTS server uses this
          information to white-list flows from such IP addresses or
          prefixes reaching the enterprise network.

   o  Creating identifiers, such as names or aliases, for resources for
      which mitigation may be requested:

      A.  The DOTS client may submit to the DOTS server a collection of
          prefixes it wants to refer to by alias when requesting
          mitigation, to which the server would respond with a success
          status and the new prefix group alias, or an error status and
          message in the event the DOTS client's data channel request
          failed (see requirement OP-006 in [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements]
          and Section 2 in [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture]).

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2.  Notational Conventions and Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

   The reader should be familiar with the terms defined in
   [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture].

3.  DOTS Data Channel

   The DOTS data channel is intended to be used for bulk data exchanges
   between DOTS agents.  Unlike the signal channel, which must operate
   nominally even when confronted with despite signal degradation due to
   packet loss, the data channel is not expected to be constructed to
   deal with attack conditions.

   As the primary function of the data channel is data exchange, a
   reliable transport is required in order for DOTS agents to detect
   data delivery success or failure.  Constrained Application Protocol
   (CoAP) [RFC7252] over TLS [RFC5246] over TCP is used for DOTS data
   channel (Figure 2).  COAP was designed according to the REST
   architecture, and thus exhibits functionality similar to that of
   HTTP, it is quite straightforward to map from CoAP to HTTP and from
   HTTP to CoAP.

                                  +--------------+
                                  |     DOTS     |
                                  +--------------+
                                  |     CoAP     |
                                  +--------------+
                                  |     TLS      |
                                  +--------------+
                                  |     TCP      |
                                  +--------------+
                                  |     IP       |
                                  +--------------+

    Figure 2: Abstract Layering of DOTS data channel over CoAP over TLS

   JSON [RFC7159] payloads is used to convey DOTS signal channel session
   configuration, filtering rules as well as data channel specific
   payload messages that convey request parameters and response
   information such as errors.  All data channel URIs defined in this
   document, and in subsequent documents, MUST NOT have a URI containing
   "/DOTS-signal".

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   A single DOTS data channel between DOTS agents can be used to
   exchange multiple requests and multiple responses.  To reduce DOTS
   client and DOTS server workload, DOTS client SHOULD re-use the TLS
   session.

3.1.  DOTS Provisioning

   A DOTS client registers itself to its DOTS server(s) in order to set
   up DOTS related configuration and policy information exchange between
   the two DOTS agents.

3.1.1.  Create Identifiers

   A POST request is used to create identifiers, such as names or
   aliases, for resources for which a mitigation may be requested.  Such
   identifiers may then be used in subsequent DOTS signal channel
   exchanges to refer more efficiently to the resources under attack
   (Figure 3).

     Header: POST (Code=0.02)
     Uri-Host: "host"
     Uri-Path: ".well-known"
     Uri-Path: "version"
     Uri-Path: "DOTS-data-channel"
     Uri-Path: "identifier"
     Content-Format: "application/json"
     {
        "policy-id": "integer",
        "id": { "alias-name" : [
                                  "traffic-protocol": "string",
                                  "destination-protocol-port": "string",
                                  "destination-ip": "string",
                                ],
                "alias-name" :  [
                                  "FQDN": "string",
                                ],
                "alias-name" :  [
                                   "URI": "string",
                                ],
               }
                "alias-name" :  [
                                   "E.164": "string",
                                ]
               }
      }

                   Figure 3: POST to create identifiers

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   The header fields are described below:

   policy-id:  Identifier of the policy represented using an integer.
      This identifier MUST be unique for each policy bound to the DOTS
      client, i.e., the policy-id needs to be unique relative to the
      active policies with the DOTS server.  This identifier MUST be
      generated by the client.  This document does not make any
      assumption about how this identifier is generated.  This is a
      mandatory attribute.

   alias-name:  Name of the alias.  This is a mandatory attribute.

   traffic-protocol:   Valid protocol values include tcp, udp, sctp, and
      dccp.  Protocol values are separated by commas (e.g., "tcp, udp").
      This is an optional attribute.

   destination-protocol-port:   The destination port number.  Ports are
      separated by commas and port number range (using "-").  For TCP,
      UDP, SCTP, or DCCP: the destination range of ports (e.g.,
      80-8080).  This information is useful to avoid disturbing a group
      of customers when address sharing is in use [RFC6269].  This is an
      optional attribute.

   destination-ip:   The destination IP address or prefix.  IP addresses
      and prefixes are separated by commas.  Prefixes are represented
      using CIDR [RFC4632] notation.  This is an optional attribute.

   FQDN:   Fully Qualified Domain Name, is the full name of a system,
      rather than just its hostname.  For example, "venera" is a
      hostname, and "venera.isi.edu" is an FQDN.  This is an optional
      attribute.

   URI:   Uniform Resource Identifier (URI).  This is an optional
      attribute.

   E.164:   E.164 number.  This is an optional attribute.

   In the POST request at least one of the attributes traffic-protocol
   or destination-protocol-port or destination-ip or FQDN or URI or
   E.164 MUST be present.

   Figure 4 shows a POST request to create alias called "https1" for
   HTTPS servers with IP addresses 2002:db8:6401::1 and 2002:db8:6401::2
   listening on port 443.

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     Header: POST (Code=0.02)
     Uri-Host: "www.example.com"
     Uri-Path: ".well-known"
     Uri-Path: "v1"
     Uri-Path: "DOTS-data-channel"
     Uri-Path: "identifier"
     Content-Format: "application/json"
     {
      "policy-id": 123321333242,
      "id": { "Server1" : [
                          "traffic-protocol": "tcp",
                          "destination-protocol-port": "443",
                          "destination-ip": "2002:db8:6401::1,
                                             2002:db8:6401::2",
                          ]
             }
      }

                   Figure 4: POST to create identifiers

   The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the POST request
   using CoAP response codes.  CoAP 2.xx codes are success, CoAP 4.xx
   codes are some sort of invalid requests and 5.xx codes are returned
   if the DOTS server has erred or it is incapable of accepting the
   alias.  Response code 2.01 (Created) will be returned in the response
   if the DOTS server has accepted the alias.  If the request is missing
   one or more mandatory attributes, then 4.00 (Bad Request) will be
   returned in the response or if the request contains invalid or
   unknown parameters then 4.02 (Invalid query) will be returned in the
   response.  The CoAP response will include the JSON body received in
   the request.

3.1.2.  Delete Identifier

   A DELETE request is used to delete an identifier maintained by a DOTS
   server (Figure 5).

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     Header: DELETE (Code=0.04)
     Uri-Host: "host"
     Uri-Path: ".well-known"
     Uri-Path: "version"
     Uri-Path: "DOTS-data-channel"
     Uri-Path: "identifier"
     Content-Format: "application/json"
      {
        "policy-id": "number"
      }

                        Figure 5: DELETE identifier

   If the DOTS server does not find the policy number conveyed in the
   DELETE request in its policy state data, then it responds with a 4.04
   (Not Found) error response code.  The DOTS server successfully
   acknowledges a DOTS client's request to remove the identifier using
   2.02 (Deleted) response code.

3.1.3.  Retrieving Installed Identifiers

   A GET request is used to retrieve the set of installed identifiers
   from a DOTS server.

   Figure 6 shows how to retrieve all the identifiers that were
   instantiated by the DOTS client while Figure 7 shows how to retrieve
   a specific identifier.

     Header: GET (Code=0.01)
     Uri-Host: "host"
     Uri-Path: ".well-known"
     Uri-Path: "version"
     Uri-Path: "DOTS-data-channel"
     Uri-Path: "identifier"

          Figure 6: GET to retrieve all the installed identifiers

     Header: GET (Code=0.01)
     Uri-Host: "host"
     Uri-Path: ".well-known"
     Uri-Path: "version"
     Uri-Path: "DOTS-data-channel"
     Uri-Path: "identifier"
     Uri-Path: "policy-id value"

             Figure 7: GET to retrieve the specific identifier

   Figure 8 shows response for all identifiers on the DOTS server.

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   {
     "policy-data":[
       {
         "policy-id": 1234534333242
         "id": { "Server1" : [
                              "traffic-protocol": "tcp",
                              "destination-protocol-port": "443",
                              "destination-ip": "2002:db8:6401::1,
                                                 2002:db8:6401::2",
                             ]
                }
       },
       {
         "policy-id": 1233213344443
         "id": { "Server2" : [
                               "traffic-protocol": "tcp",
                               "destination-protocol-port": "80",
                               "destination-ip": "2002:db8:6401::10,
                                                  2002:db8:6401::20",
                           ]
               }
       }
     ]
   }

                          Figure 8: Response body

   If the DOTS server does not find the policy number conveyed in the
   GET request in its policy state data, then it responds with a 4.04
   (Not Found) error response code.

3.2.  Filtering Rules

   One of the possible arrangements for a DOTS client to signal
   filtering rules to a DOTS server via the DOTS gateway is discussed
   below:

   The DOTS data channel conveys the filtering rules to the DOTS
   gateway.  The DOTS gateway validates if the DOTS client is authorized
   to signal the filtering rules and if the client is authorized
   propagates the rules to the DOTS server.  Likewise, the DOTS server
   validates if the DOTS gateway is authorized to signal the filtering
   rules.  To create or purge filters, the DOTS client sends CoAP
   requests to the DOTS gateway.  The DOTS gateway validates the rules
   and proxies the requests containing the filtering rules to a DOTS
   server.  When the DOTS gateway receives the associated CoAP response
   from the DOTS server, it propagates the response back to the DOTS
   client.

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   The following APIs define means for a DOTS client to configure
   filtering rules on a DOTS server.

3.2.1.  Install Filtering Rules

   A POST request is used to push filtering rules to a DOTS server
   (Figure 9).

     Header: POST (Code=0.02)
     Uri-Host: "host"
     Uri-Path: ".well-known"
     Uri-Path: "version"
     Uri-Path: "DOTS-data-channel"
     Uri-Path: "filter"
     Content-Format: "application/json"
     {
        "policy-id": "integer",
        "traffic-protocol": "string",
        "source-protocol-port": "string",
        "destination-protocol-port": "string",
        "destination-ip": "string",
        "source-ip": "string",
        "lifetime": "number",
        "dscp": "string",
        "traffic-rate" : "number"
      }

                 Figure 9: POST to install filtering rules

   The header fields are described below:

   policy-id:  An identifier of the policy represented as an integer.
      This identifier MUST be unique for each policy bound to the DOTS
      client, i.e., the policy-id needs to be unique relative to the
      active policies with the DOTS server.  This identifier MUST be
      generated by the client.  This document does not make any
      assumption about how this identifier is generated.  This is a
      mandatory attribute.

   traffic-protocol:   Valid protocol values include tcp, udp, sctp, and
      dccp.  Protocol values are separated by commas (e.g., "tcp, udp").
      This is an optional attribute.

   source-protocol-port:   The source port number.  Ports are separated
      by commas and port number range (using "-").  For TCP, UDP, SCTP,
      or DCCP: the source range of ports (e.g., 1024-65535).  This is an
      optional attribute.

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   destination-protocol-port:   The destination port number.  Ports are
      separated by commas and port number range (using "-").  For TCP,
      UDP, SCTP, or DCCP: the destination range of ports (e.g.,
      443-443).  This information is useful to avoid disturbing a group
      of customers when address sharing is in use [RFC6269].  This is an
      optional attribute.

   destination-ip:   The destination IP address or prefix.  IP addresses
      and prefixes are separated by commas.  Prefixes are represented
      using CIDR notation.  This is an optional attribute.

   source-ip:   The source IP addresses or prefix.  IP addresses and
      prefixes are separated by commas.  Prefixes are represented using
      CIDR notation.  This is an optional attribute.

   lifetime:   Lifetime of the rule in seconds.  Upon the expiry of this
      lifetime, and if the request is not refreshed, this particular
      rule is removed.  The rule can be refreshed by sending the same
      message again.  The default lifetime of the rule is 60 minutes --
      this value was chosen to be long enough so that refreshing is not
      typically a burden on the DOTS client, while expiring the rule
      where the client has unexpectedly quit in a timely manner.  A
      lifetime of zero indicates indefinite lifetime for the rule.  The
      server MUST always indicate the actual lifetime in the response.
      This is an optional attribute.

   dscp:   Differentiated services code point (DSCP) value in the IP
      header of a packet.  This is an optional attribute.

   traffic-rate:   This is the allowed traffic rate in bytes per second
      indicated in IEEE floating point [IEEE.754.1985] format.  The
      value 0 indicates all traffic for the particular flow to be
      discarded.  This is a mandatory attribute.

   In the POST request at least one of the attributes traffic-protocol
   or source-protocol-port or destination-protocol-port or destination-
   ip or source-ip MUST be present.  The relative order of two rules is
   determined by comparing their respective policy identifiers.  The
   rule with higher numeric policy identifier value has higher
   precedence (and thus will match before) than the rule with lower
   numeric policy identifier value.

   Figure 10 shows a POST request to block traffic from an attacker
   using 2001:db8:abcd:3f01::/64 IPv6 prefix to a network resource
   reachable at IP address 2002:db8:6401::1 to operate a server on TCP
   port 443.

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     Header: POST (Code=0.02)
     Uri-Host: "www.example.com"
     Uri-Path: ".well-known"
     Uri-Path: "v1"
     Uri-Path: "DOTS-data-channel"

     Content-Format: "application/json"
      {
        "policy-id": 123321333242,
        "traffic-protocol": "tcp",
        "source-protocol-port": "0-65535",
        "destination-protocol-port": "443",
        "destination-ip": "2001:db8:abcd:3f01::/64",
        "source-ip": "2002:db8:6401::1",
        "lifetime": 1800,
        "traffic-rate": 0
      }

                 Figure 10: POST to Install filterng rules

   The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the POST request
   using CoAP response codes.  CoAP 2.xx codes are success, CoAP 4.xx
   codes are some sort of invalid request and 5.xx codes are returned if
   the DOTS server has erred or is incapable of configuring the
   filtering rules.  Response code 2.01 (Created) will be returned in
   the response if the DOTS server has accepted the filtering rules.  If
   the request is missing one or more mandatory attributes then 4.00
   (Bad Request) will be returned in the response or if the request
   contains invalid or unknown parameters then 4.02 (Invalid query) will
   be returned in the response.  The CoAP response will include the JSON
   body received in the request.

3.2.2.  Remove Filtering Rules

   A DELETE request is used to delete filtering rules from a DOTS server
   (Figure 11).

     Header: DELETE (Code=0.04)
     Uri-Host: "host"
     Uri-Path: ".well-known"
     Uri-Path: "version"
     Uri-Path: "DOTS-data-channel"
     Content-Format: "application/json"
      {
        "policy-id": "number"
      }

              Figure 11: DELETE to remove the filtering rules

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   If the DOTS server does not find the policy number conveyed in the
   DELETE request in its policy state data, then it responds with a 4.04
   (Not Found) error response code.  The DOTS server successfully
   acknowledges a DOTS client's request to withdraw the filtering rules
   using 2.02 (Deleted) response code, and removes the filtering rules
   as soon as possible.

3.2.3.  Retrieving Installed Filtering Rules

   The DOTS client periodically queries the DOTS server to check the
   counters for installed filtering rules.  A GET request is used to
   retrieve filtering rules from a DOTS server.

   Figure 12 shows how to retrieve all the filtering rules programmed by
   the DOTS client while Figure 13 shows how to retrieve specific
   filtering rules programmed by the DOTS client.

     Header: GET (Code=0.01)
     Uri-Host: "host"
     Uri-Path: ".well-known"
     Uri-Path: "version"
     Uri-Path: "DOTS-data-channel"
     Uri-Path: "list"

            Figure 12: GET to retrieve the filtering rules (1)

     Header: GET (Code=0.01)
     Uri-Host: "host"
     Uri-Path: ".well-known"
     Uri-Path: "version"
     Uri-Path: "DOTS-data-channel"
     Uri-Path: "policy-id value"

            Figure 13: GET to retrieve the filtering rules (2)

   Figure 14 shows response for all active policies on the DOTS server.

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   {
     "policy-data":[
       {
         "policy-id":123321333242,
         "traffic-protocol": "tcp",
         "source-protocol-port": "0-65535",
         "destination-protocol-port": "443",
         "destination-ip": "2001:db8:abcd:3f01::/64",
         "source-ip": "2002:db8:6401::1",
         "lifetime": 1800,
         "traffic-rate": 0,
         "match-count": 689324,
       },
       {
         "policy-id":123321333242,
         "traffic-protocol": "udp",
         "source-protocol-port": "0-65535",
         "destination-protocol-port": "53",
         "destination-ip": "2001:db8:abcd:3f01::/64",
         "source-ip": "2002:db8:6401::2",
         "lifetime": 1800,
         "traffic-rate": 0,
         "match-count": 6666,
       }
     ]
   }

                         Figure 14: Response body

   If the DOTS server does not find the policy number conveyed in the
   GET request in its policy state data, then it responds with a 4.04
   (Not Found) error response code.

4.  IANA Considerations

   TODO

   [TBD: DOTS WG will probably have to do something similar to
   https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7519#section-10, create JSON DOTS
   claim registry and register the JSON attributes defined in this
   specification].

5.  Security Considerations

   Authenticated encryption MUST be used for data confidentiality and
   message integrity.  TLS based on client certificate MUST be used for
   mutual authentication.  The interaction between the DOTS agents
   requires Transport Layer Security (TLS) with a cipher suite offering

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   confidentiality protection and the guidance given in [RFC7525] MUST
   be followed to avoid attacks on TLS.

   An attacker may be able to inject RST packets, bogus application
   segments, etc., regardless of whether TLS authentication is used.
   Because the application data is TLS protected, this will not result
   in the application receiving bogus data, but it will constitute a DoS
   on the connection.  This attack can be countered by using TCP-AO
   [RFC5925].  If TCP-AO is used, then any bogus packets injected by an
   attacker will be rejected by the TCP-AO integrity check and therefore
   will never reach the TLS layer.

   Special care should be taken in order to ensure that the activation
   of the proposed mechanism won't have an impact on the stability of
   the network (including connectivity and services delivered over that
   network).

   Involved functional elements in the cooperation system must establish
   exchange instructions and notification over a secure and
   authenticated channel.  Adequate filters can be enforced to avoid
   that nodes outside a trusted domain can inject request such as
   deleting filtering rules.  Nevertheless, attacks can be initiated
   from within the trusted domain if an entity has been corrupted.
   Adequate means to monitor trusted nodes should also be enabled.

6.  Acknowledgements

   Thanks to Christian Jacquenet, Roland Dobbins, Andrew Mortensen,
   Roman Danyliw, and Gilbert Clark for the discussion and comments.

7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture]
              Mortensen, A., Andreasen, F., Reddy, T.,
              christopher_gray3@cable.comcast.com, c., Compton, R., and
              N. Teague, "Distributed-Denial-of-Service Open Threat
              Signaling (DOTS) Architecture", draft-ietf-dots-
              architecture-00 (work in progress), July 2016.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

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   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.

   [RFC5925]  Touch, J., Mankin, A., and R. Bonica, "The TCP
              Authentication Option", RFC 5925, DOI 10.17487/RFC5925,
              June 2010, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5925>.

   [RFC7252]  Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
              Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252>.

   [RFC7525]  Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
              "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
              Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
              (DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May
              2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>.

7.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements]
              Mortensen, A., Moskowitz, R., and T. Reddy, "Distributed
              Denial of Service (DDoS) Open Threat Signaling
              Requirements", draft-ietf-dots-requirements-02 (work in
              progress), July 2016.

   [I-D.reddy-dots-signal-channel]
              Reddy, T., Boucadair, M., Wing, D., and P. Patil,
              "Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling
              (DOTS) Signal Channel", draft-reddy-dots-signal-channel-01
              (work in progress), September 2016.

   [IEEE.754.1985]
              Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers,
              "Standard for Binary Floating-Point Arithmetic", August
              1985.

   [RFC4632]  Fuller, V. and T. Li, "Classless Inter-domain Routing
              (CIDR): The Internet Address Assignment and Aggregation
              Plan", BCP 122, RFC 4632, DOI 10.17487/RFC4632, August
              2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4632>.

   [RFC6269]  Ford, M., Ed., Boucadair, M., Durand, A., Levis, P., and
              P. Roberts, "Issues with IP Address Sharing", RFC 6269,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6269, June 2011,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6269>.

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   [RFC7159]  Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
              Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March
              2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>.

Authors' Addresses

   Tirumaleswar Reddy
   Cisco Systems, Inc.
   Cessna Business Park, Varthur Hobli
   Sarjapur Marathalli Outer Ring Road
   Bangalore, Karnataka  560103
   India

   Email: tireddy@cisco.com

   Dan Wing
   Cisco Systems, Inc.
   170 West Tasman Drive
   San Jose, California  95134
   USA

   Email: dwing@cisco.com

   Mohamed Boucadair
   Orange
   Rennes  35000
   France

   Email: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com

   Kaname Nishizuka
   NTT Communications
   GranPark 16F 3-4-1 Shibaura, Minato-ku
   Tokyo  108-8118
   Japan

   Email: kaname@nttv6.jp

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   Liang Xia
   Huawei
   101 Software Avenue, Yuhuatai District
   Nanjing, Jiangsu  210012
   China

   Email: frank.xialiang@huawei.com

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