TLS 1.3 Option for Negotiation of Visibility in the Datacenter
draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility-00

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Last updated 2017-10-02
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Network Working Group                                         R. Housley
Internet-Draft                                            Vigil Security
Intended status: Standards Track                                R. Droms
Expires: April 2, 2018                              Interisle Consulting
                                                      September 29, 2017

     TLS 1.3 Option for Negotiation of Visibility in the Datacenter
                   draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility-00

Abstract

   Current drafts of TLS 1.3 do not include the use of the RSA
   handshake.  While (EC) Diffie-Hellman is in nearly all ways an
   improvement over the TLS RSA handshake, the use of (EC)DH has impacts
   certain enterprise network operational requirements.  The TLS
   Visibility Extension addresses one of the impacts of (EC)DH through
   an opt-in mechanism that allows a TLS client and server to explicitly
   grant access to the TLS session plaintext.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 2, 2018.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must

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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

1.  Introduction

   Unlike earlier versions of TLS, current drafts of TLS 1.3
   [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13] do not provide support for the RSA handshake --
   and have instead adopted ephemeral-mode Diffie-Hellman (DHE) and
   elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDHE) as the primary cryptographic
   key exchange mechanism used in TLS.

   While ephemeral (EC) Diffie-Hellman is in nearly all ways an
   improvement over the TLS RSA handshake, the use of these mechanisms
   has impacts on certain enterprise operational requirements.
   Specifically, the use of ephemeral ciphersuites prevents the use of
   current enterprise network monitoring tools such as Intrusion
   Detection Systems (IDS) and application monitoring systems, which
   leverage the current TLS RSA handshake to passively decrypt and
   monitor intranet TLS connections made between endpoints under the
   enterprise's control.  This traffic includes TLS connections made
   from enterprise network security devices (firewalls) and load
   balancers at the edge of the enterprise network to internal
   enterprise TLS servers.  It does not include TLS connections
   traveling over the external Internet.

   Such monitoring of the enterprise network is ubiquitous and
   indispensable in some industries, and is required for effective and
   safe operation of their enterprise networks.  Loss of this capability
   may slow adoption of TLS 1.3 or force enterprises to continue to use
   outdated and potentially vulnerable technology.

   The TLS Visibility Extension provides an option to enable visibility
   into a TLS 1.3 session by an authorized third party.  Use of the
   extension requires opt-in by the TLS client when it initiates a TLS
   1.3 session.  The TLS server then opts-in by including keying
   material that will enable decryption in the TLS Visibility Extension.
   The presence of the TLS Visibility Extension provides a clear
   indication that other parties have been granted access to the TLS
   session plaintext.  The keying material in the TLS Visibility
   Extension is encrypted and can only be decrypted by authorized
   parties that have been given the private key from a managed Diffie-
   Hellman key pair.

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