Skip to main content

ACE use cases

The information below is for an old version of the document.
Document Type
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Replaced".
Authors Ludwig Seitz , Stefanie Gerdes , Göran Selander
Last updated 2014-02-11
Replaced by draft-ietf-ace-usecases, draft-ietf-ace-usecases, RFC 7744
RFC stream (None)
Stream Stream state (No stream defined)
Consensus boilerplate Unknown
RFC Editor Note (None)
IESG IESG state I-D Exists
Telechat date (None)
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)
ACE Working Group                                               L. Seitz
Internet-Draft                                       SICS Swedish ICT AB
Intended status: Informational                                 S. Gerdes
Expires: August 14, 2014                         Universitaet Bremen TZI
                                                             G. Selander
                                                       February 10, 2014

                             ACE use cases


   This document presents use cases for authentication and access
   control in scenarios involving constrained RESTful devices.  Where
   specific details are relevant, it is assumed that the devices use
   CoAP as communication protocol, however most conclusions apply

   A number of security requirements are derived from the use cases,
   which are intended as a guideline for developing a comprehensive
   authentication and access control approach for this class of

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 14, 2014.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal

Seitz, et al.            Expires August 14, 2014                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                ACE use cases                February 2014

   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   ( in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.1.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Use Cases  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.1.  Container monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
       2.1.1.  Bananas for Munich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
       2.1.2.  Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     2.2.  Home Automation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
       2.2.1.  Remotely letting in a visitor  . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
       2.2.2.  Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     2.3.  Personal Health Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       2.3.1.  John and the heart rate monitor  . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       2.3.2.  Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     2.4.  Building Automation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
       2.4.1.  Fire Alarm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
       2.4.2.  Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     2.5.  Industrial Control Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
       2.5.1.  Water treatment plant  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
       2.5.2.  Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   3.  Requirements From The Use Cases  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     3.1.  General Security Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     3.2.  Authentication Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     3.3.  Access Control Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   4.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   5.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   6.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   7.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Seitz, et al.            Expires August 14, 2014                [Page 2]
Internet-Draft                ACE use cases                February 2014

1.  Introduction

   This document presents use cases in an attempt to analyze the
   authentication and access control requirements in an Internet of
   Things setting.  This setting features constrained devices
   [I-D.ietf-lwig-terminology] communicating over the Internet.  Some of
   these devices may have very low capacity in terms of memory and
   processing power, and may additionally be limited by the fact that
   they run on battery power.

   These devices offer resources such as sensor data and actuators,
   which are accessed by clients, that may be users or other devices.
   In some situations the communication will happen through
   intermediaries (e.g. gateways, proxies).

   Where specific detail is necessary it is assumed that the devices
   communicate using the CoAP protocol [I-D.ietf-core-coap], although
   most conclusions are generic.  Currently CoAP proposes to use DTLS
   [RFC6347] for authentication, and access control lists on the
   devices, that specify which clients may initiate a DTLS connection.
   One goal of this document is to point out use cases where this
   approach is not satisfactory.

1.1.  Terminology

   Resource Server (RS): The constrained device which hosts resources
   the Client wants to access.

   Client (C): A device which wants to access a resource on the Resource
   This could also be a constrained device.

   Resource Owner (RO): The subject who owns the resource and controls
   its access permissions.

Seitz, et al.            Expires August 14, 2014                [Page 3]
Internet-Draft                ACE use cases                February 2014

2.  Use Cases

   This section lists use cases involving constrained devices with
   security requirements.  Each use case first presents a general
   description of the application area, then one or more specific use
   cases, and finally the resulting requirements.  We assume that basic
   security requirements such as e.g. communication security and mutual
   authentication, apply for all of these scenarios.

2.1.  Container monitoring

   The ability of sensors to communicate environmental data wirelessly
   opens up new application areas.  The use of such sensor systems makes
   it possible to transmit specific characteristics such as temperature,
   humidity and gas content during transportation and storage of goods.

   The proper handling of the sensors in this scenario is not easy to
   accomplish.  They have to be associated to the appropriate pallet of
   the respective container.  Moreover, the goods and the corresponding
   sensors belong to specific customers.

   During the shipment to their destination the goods often pass stops
   where they are transloaded to other means of transportation, e.g.
   from ship transport to road transport.

2.1.1.  Bananas for Munich

   A Munich supermarket chain buys bananas from a Costa Rican fruit
   vendor.  It instructs a transport company to deliver the goods via
   ship to Rotterdam where they are picked up by their own company

   The supermarket's quality management wants to assure the quality of
   their products and thus uses the fruit vendor's service of equipping
   the bananas with sensors.  The state of the goods is monitored
   consistently during the shipment and abnormal sensor values are
   recorded.  Additionally, the sensor values are used to control the
   climate within the cargo containers.

   The personnel of the transport company and the supermarket's delivery
   service has to be able to locate the proper goods and match them to
   the corresponding customer.  The state of the cargo must not be
   disclosed to them, however.

   When the goods arrive at the supermarket in Munich, their state is
   If no anomalies occurred during the transport, the bananas are
   admitted for sale.

Seitz, et al.            Expires August 14, 2014                [Page 4]
Internet-Draft                ACE use cases                February 2014

2.1.2.  Requirements

   o  U1.1 The supermarket chain must be able to allow the transport
      company and the delivery service to access the position data on
      the monitoring devices.  Other state information must not be

   o  U1.2 The climate regulation system in the containers must be able
      to access the monitoring devices' state information to regulate
      the climate accordingly, without manual intervention of the
      resource owner.

   o  U1.3 The supermarket chain must be able to allow the supermarket's
      quality management to access the recorded state information on the
      monitoring devices.

   o  U1.4 The supermarket chain does not want other companies to be
      able to read sensor information so there should be some access
      control for the monitoring devices' state information.

2.2.  Home Automation

   Automation of the home, housework or household activity is propagated
   as a future market for the Internet of Things.  A home automation
   system integrates electrical devices in a house with each other, such
   as heating, ventilation, lighting, home entertainment and home

   Such a system needs to accommodate a number of regular users
   (inhabitants, close friends, cleaning personnel) as well as a
   heterogeneous group of dynamically varying users (visitors,
   repairmen, delivery men).

   The security required by the systems integrated in a automated home
   varies, however it is clear that the security system controlling e.g.
   the doors, alarms, and other critical systems needs to be at least as
   secure as for a comparable unautomated home.

   As the users are not typically trained in security (or even computer
   use), the configuration must use secure default settings, and the
   interface must be well adapted to novice users.

2.2.1.  Remotely letting in a visitor

   Jane is the owner of an automated home, that allows her to remotely
   control all electrical devices through a web interface or mobile
   application.  To allow for centralized management of all devices, new
   devices need to be able to communicate with both the web interface

Seitz, et al.            Expires August 14, 2014                [Page 5]
Internet-Draft                ACE use cases                February 2014

   and the mobile application using a standardized, secure protocol.

   Jane has invited over her acquaintance Jeffrey for dinner, but is
   stuck in traffic and can not arrive in time, while Jeffrey who uses
   the subway arrives punctually.  Jane calls Jeffrey and offers him to
   let him in remotely, so he can make himself comfortable and use
   Jane's home entertainment system.

   Jeffrey downloads an application that lets him communicate with
   Jane's home, and Jane set permissions for Jeffery that let's him open
   the door, and shut down the alarm using that application.  She also
   gives Jeffrey access to lighting and HVAC and limited access to the
   home entertainment system, allowing Jeffrey to all services except
   those that are pay-per-use or those that Jane has marked as private.

2.2.2.  Requirements

   o  U2.1 Jane needs to be able to spontaneously provision
      authentication means to Jeffrey

   o  U2.2 Jane must be able to spontaneously change the access control

   o  U2.3 Jane needs to be able to apply different rights for different
      devices and users

   o  U2.4 Jane must be able to apply local conditions (presence, time)
      to authorizations, and the device (e.g. the door) needs to be able
      to verify these conditions

   o  U2.5 The security mechanisms of the different devices in Jane's
      home need to be able to communicate with different control devices
      (e.g.  Jeffrey's mobile phone)

   o  U2.6 The access control configuration of Jane's home needs to be
      secure by default

   o  U2.7 It must be easy for Jane to edit the access control policies
      for her home, even remotely

2.3.  Personal Health Monitoring

   The use of wearable health monitoring technology is expected to grow
   strongly, as a multitude of novel devices are developed and marketed.
   These devices are typically battery driven, and located physically on
   the user.  They monitor some bodily function, such as e.g.
   temperature, blood pressure, or pulse.  They are connected to the
   Internet through an intermediary base-station, using wireless

Seitz, et al.            Expires August 14, 2014                [Page 6]
Internet-Draft                ACE use cases                February 2014

   technologies.  Through this connection they report the monitored data
   to some entity, which may either be the user herself, or some medical
   personnel in charge of the user.

   Medical data has always been considered as very sensitive, and
   therefore requires good protection against unauthorized disclosure.
   A frequent, conflicting requirement is the capability for medical
   personnel to gain emergency access, even if no specific access rights
   exist.  As a result, the importance of secure audit logs increases in
   such scenarios.

   Since the users are not typically trained in security (or even
   computer use), the configuration must use secure default settings,
   and the interface must be well adapted to novice users.  Also the
   system must require very little maintenance, so e.g. frequent changes
   of battery are unacceptable.

2.3.1.  John and the heart rate monitor

   John has a heart condition, that can result in sudden cardiac
   arrests.  He therefore uses a device called HeartGuard that monitors
   his heart rate and his position.  In case of a cardiac arrest it
   automatically sends an alarm to an emergency service, transmitting
   John's current location.  The device also functions as a implanted
   cardioverter defibrilator, i.e. it can deliver a shock in order to
   try and normalize Johns heart rate.

   The device includes some smart logic, with which it identifies its
   owner John and allows him to configure the device's settings,
   including access control.
   This prevents situation where someone else wearing that device can
   act as the owner and mess up the access control and security

   John can configure additional persons that get notified in an
   emergency, for example his daughter Jill.  Furthermore the device
   stores data on John's heart rate, which can later be accessed by a
   physician to assess the condition of John's heart.

   However John is a rather private person, and is worried that Jill
   might use HeartGuard to monitor his location while there is no
   emergency.  Furthermore he doesn't want his health insurance to get
   access to the HeartGuard data, since they might refuse to renew his
   insurance if they decided he was too big a risk for them.

Seitz, et al.            Expires August 14, 2014                [Page 7]
Internet-Draft                ACE use cases                February 2014

2.3.2.  Requirements

   o  U3.1 John must be able to selectively allow different persons or
      groups to access the position data on condition that there is an

   o  U3.2 John must be able to selectively allow different persons or
      groups to access the heart rate data.

   o  U3.3 John must be able to block access to specific persons or
      groups, if he mistrusts them.

   o  U3.4 The security measures must not affect the device's battery
      lifetime significantly

   o  U3.5 The device must have secure access control settings by

   o  U3.6 The device's access control settings must be easy to

   o  U3.7 The device's authentication and access control mechanisms
      must not open new avenues for denial of service attacks

2.4.  Building Automation

   Buildings for commercial use such as shopping malls or office
   buildings nowadays are equipped increasingly with semi-automatic
   components to enhance the overall living quality and save energy
   where possible.  This includes for example heating, ventilation and
   air condition (HVAC) as well as illumination and fire alarm systems.

   These buildings are often used by more than one company who share
   some parts of the building while other areas are used by each of them
   exclusively.  Accordingly, a company must be able to control the
   light and HVAC system of its own part of the building and must not
   have access to rooms that belong to other companies.

   Some parts of the building automation system such as entrance
   illumination and fire alarm systems are controlled either by all
   parties together or by a service company.

2.4.1.  Fire Alarm

   The Companies A and B share an office building which is equipped with
   a fire alarm system.  It is triggered by several smoke detectors
   which are spread out across the building.

Seitz, et al.            Expires August 14, 2014                [Page 8]
Internet-Draft                ACE use cases                February 2014

   It is a really hot day and James who works for company A turns on the
   air condition in his office.  Lucy who works for company B wants to
   make tea using an electric kettle.  After she turned it on she goes
   outside to talk to a colleague until the water is boiling.
   Unfortunately, her kettle has a malfunction which causes overheating
   and results in a smoldering fire of the kettle's plastic case.

   Due to the smoke coming from the kettle the fire alarm is triggered.
   Alarm sirens throughout the building are notified and alert the staff
   of both companies.  Additionally, the ventilation system of the whole
   building is closed off to prevent the smoke from spreading and to
   withdraw oxygen from the fire.  The smoke cannot get into James'
   office although he turned on his air condition because the fire alarm
   overrides the manual setting.

   The fire department is notified of the fire automatically and arrives
   within a short time.  After inspecting the damage and extinguishing
   the smoldering fire a fire fighter resets the fire alarm because only
   the fire department is authorized to do that.

2.4.2.  Requirements

   o  U4.1 Different subsystems of the building must be able
      interoperate with each other, e.g. the ventilation with the fire
      alarm.  The affected devices might be produced by different
      vendors and might be operated by different service providers.

   o  U4.2 Only the smoke detectors must be able to trigger an alarm.

   o  U4.3 Only the fire department must be able to reset the fire

   o  U4.4 James must be able to control the air conditioning in his

   o  U4.5 The emergency system must be able to automatically close off
      the ventilation system, without manual intervention of the
      resource owner.

   o  U4.6 During fire alarm, the personnel must not be allowed to
      regulate the climate control.

   o  U4.7 Since physically accessing the devices in the building is
      very work intensive and thus expensive (there are many devices,
      and some are in places that are hard to access), the security
      measures should not affect battery lifetime significantly and not
      require direct physical interaction with individual devices.

Seitz, et al.            Expires August 14, 2014                [Page 9]
Internet-Draft                ACE use cases                February 2014

2.5.  Industrial Control Systems

   Industrial control systems (ICS) and especially supervisory control
   and data acquisition systems (SCADA) use a multitude of sensors and
   actuators in order to monitor and control industrial processes in the
   physical world.  Example processes include manufacturing, power
   generation, and refining of raw materials.

   Since the advent of the Stuxnet worm it has become obvious to the
   general public how vulnerable this kind of systems are, especially
   when connected to the Internet.  The severity of these
   vulnerabilities are exacerbated by the fact that many ICS are used to
   control critical public infrastructure, such as power, water
   treatment of traffic control.
   Nevertheless the economical advantages of connecting such systems to
   the Internet can be significant if appropriate security measures are
   put in place.

2.5.1.  Water treatment plant

   The communal water treatment plant of a mid-sized city is controlled
   by a networked ICS.  Spread across the city are numerous nodes,
   sensors (e.g. pollution meters, pressure indicators) and actuators
   (e.g. valves, pumps) communicating via a wireless network.  Since the
   range of the network is limited, many nodes communicate through
   intermediary proxies that relay communications to the administration
   clients of the ICS.

   Jenny is a technician whose job it is to monitor the plant and take
   appropriate measure, if abnormal conditions are detected (e.g. if
   water pollution is detected, or the pressure in a pump reaches
   critical levels).
   Jenny uses an observation mechanism on certain critical resources
   that sends her automatic notifications in case of some unexpected
   state change.

   If Jenny needs to go on sick-leave spontaneously, the service company
   sends a replacement worker from a pool of available, qualified
   persons.  The security administrators give the replacement
   appropriate access rights to the system, without sharing Jenny's
   credentials (e.g. her password, access card, or private key) with
   him, furthermore this delegation does not require updates of the
   access control information on the devices.

   Joshuah is a young, computer savvy kid with too much time at his
   hands.  He spends time wardriving and stumbles upon the wireless
   network, used by the plant's sensors and actuators.  Joshuah tries to
   interact with the devices on this network and manages to stall a

Seitz, et al.            Expires August 14, 2014               [Page 10]
Internet-Draft                ACE use cases                February 2014

   valve controlling water flow to a part of the city, by overloading
   its controller with fake requests for secure connections.  Jenny
   quickly discovers the attack and is able to take appropriate measures
   to prevent damage to the value and restore normal service conditions.

2.5.2.  Requirements

   o  U5.1 The authentication and access control measures must cope with
      the presence of intermediary proxies between the Resource Server
      and the Client.

   o  U5.2 Since most of the processing capacity of the nodes and the
      network load capacity must go towards production tasks, the
      security measures must use minimal resources, both on the network
      and on the nodes.

   o  U5.3 Since replacement workers can spontaneously jump in for
      Jenny, the system needs to be able to handle authentication and
      access control updates without re-provisioning each node

   o  U5.4 After a replacement worker has finished taking care of the
      system, the corresponding access control and authentication means
      need to be revoked, without re-provisioning each node

   o  U5.5 The authentication and access control mechanisms must not
      introduce additional avenues for denial of service attacks.

Seitz, et al.            Expires August 14, 2014               [Page 11]
Internet-Draft                ACE use cases                February 2014

3.  Requirements From The Use Cases

   This section lists requirements derived from the use cases above.
   Note that not every single requirement applies to every Resource
   Server, however protocols should allow for all of these requirements
   to be fulfilled.

3.1.  General Security Requirements

   The following requirements refer to general security measures that
   are affected by the design of authentication and access control

   o  Protect the Resource Server against denial of service (U3.7, U5.5)

      *  Minimize the number of protocol steps that an attacker can
         induce a Resource Server to perform without proper
         authentication and access control.

      *  Note well that for constrained devices this includes attacks
         that aim to drain the battery of the target.

   o  Authentication and access control measures must work when traffic
      from the Client to the Resource Server goes through intermediary
      nodes.  (U5.1)

      Rationale: In many deployments, there will be gateways, proxies,
      firewalls etc. between a Client and a Resource Server.  This means
      that e.g.  DTLS client authentication can not be used to
      authenticate the Client.

   o  Minimize resource usage for authentication and access control on
      the constrained device(s) (U3.4, U4.7, U5.2)

      *  Minimize battery usage

         +  Minimize message exchanges required by security measures

         +  Minimize the size of authentication and access control data
            that is transmitted

         +  Minimize the size of required software libraries

         +  Minimize memory and stack usage on the devices

   o  Require secure default settings (U1.4, U2.6, U3.5)

      Rationale: Many attacks exploit insecure default settings, and

Seitz, et al.            Expires August 14, 2014               [Page 12]
Internet-Draft                ACE use cases                February 2014

      experience shows that default settings are frequently left
      unchanged by the end users.  Therefore the security protocols for
      constrained devices should require secure modes of use by default.

   o  Interoperability (U1.1, U2.5, U4.1)

      Rationale: Resource Owners may interact with Clients from various
      manufacturers and vice-versa.  In order to function correctly the
      authentication and access control mechanisms need to work
      This is best achieved by standardization.

   o  Usability (U2.7, U3.6)

      *  Keep response times reasonable

      *  Make authentication and access control transparent for human
         users where possible

      *  Make the administration of authentication and access control as
         simple as possible

3.2.  Authentication Requirements

   o  Standardized provisioning of authentication means to Clients and
      Resource Servers (U2.1, U5.3)

      *  Allow for remote provisioning as an option

   o  Enable remote revocation of authentication means (U5.4)

3.3.  Access Control Requirements

   o  Enforce the access control policies of the Resource Owner (all use

      *  Provision access control policies set by the Resource Owner to
         the Policy Decision Point [RFC2904] (which may be on the
         Resource Server or on another trusted entity).

      *  Apply the access control policies to incoming requests (this
         may be done by the Resource Server or by another trusted

   o  Apply different rights for different requesting entities (U1.1,
      U1.2, U2.3, U3.1, U3.2, U3.3, U4.2, U4.3, U4.4, U4.5)

      Rationale: In some cases different types of users require

Seitz, et al.            Expires August 14, 2014               [Page 13]
Internet-Draft                ACE use cases                February 2014

      different access rights, as opposed to all-or-nothing access

   o  Allow for fine-grained access control (U1.1, U1.2, U3.1, U3.2,
      U4.2, U4.3, U4.4, U4.5) Resource Servers can host several
      resources, and a resource (e.g. an actuator) can have different
      settings.  In some cases access rights need to be different at
      this level of granularity.

   o  Enable checking of local conditions (U2.4, U3.1, U4.6) Access may
      depend on local conditions e.g. access to health data in an
      emergency.  The Policy Decision Point must be able to take such
      conditions into account.

   o  Enable policy updates without re-provisioning individual devices
      (U2.2, U4.7, U5.3, U5.4)

      Rationale: Clients can change rapidly and re-provisioning might be
      prohibitively expensive.

   o  Do not require manual intervention of the Resource Owner in the
      access control process (U1.2, U3.1, U4.5).

      Rationale: Manually approving access requests, while being a
      common solution in web access control, does not scale well in an
      M2M scenario.

Seitz, et al.            Expires August 14, 2014               [Page 14]
Internet-Draft                ACE use cases                February 2014

4.  Security Considerations

   This document lists security requirements for constrained devices,
   motivated by specific use cases.  Therefore the whole document deals
   with security considerations.

Seitz, et al.            Expires August 14, 2014               [Page 15]
Internet-Draft                ACE use cases                February 2014

5.  Acknowledgments

   The authors would like to thank Olaf Bergmann, Sumit Singhal, John
   Mattson, and Mohit Sethi for reviewing and contributing to the
   document.  Also, thanks to Markus Becker for his input on the
   container monitoring use case.

Seitz, et al.            Expires August 14, 2014               [Page 16]
Internet-Draft                ACE use cases                February 2014

6.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no IANA actions.

Seitz, et al.            Expires August 14, 2014               [Page 17]
Internet-Draft                ACE use cases                February 2014

7.  Informative References

              Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "Constrained
              Application Protocol (CoAP)", draft-ietf-core-coap-18
              (work in progress), June 2013.

              Bormann, C., Ersue, M., and A. Keranen, "Terminology for
              Constrained Node Networks", draft-ietf-lwig-terminology-06
              (work in progress), December 2013.

   [RFC2904]  Vollbrecht, J., Calhoun, P., Farrell, S., Gommans, L.,
              Gross, G., de Bruijn, B., de Laat, C., Holdrege, M., and
              D. Spence, "AAA Authorization Framework", RFC 2904,
              August 2000.

   [RFC6347]  Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
              Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, January 2012.

Seitz, et al.            Expires August 14, 2014               [Page 18]
Internet-Draft                ACE use cases                February 2014

Authors' Addresses

   Ludwig Seitz
   SICS Swedish ICT AB
   Scheelevaegen 17
   Lund  22370


   Stefanie Gerdes
   Universitaet Bremen TZI
   Postfach 330440
   Bremen  D-28359

   Phone: +49-421-218-63906

   Goeran Selander
   Faroegatan 6
   Kista  16480


Seitz, et al.            Expires August 14, 2014               [Page 19]