Controlling Service Function Access to Network Service Header
draft-vu-sfc-sf-access-control-02

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Service Function Chaining                                      Vu Anh Vu
Internet-Draft                                              Younghan Kim
Intended status: Informational                             Kyoungjae Sun
Expires: January 4, 2018                                   Van-Ca Nguyen
                                                     Soongsil University
                                                          July 3, 2017

     Controlling Service Function Access to Network Service Header
                   draft-vu-sfc-sf-access-control-02

Abstract

   This document describes a mechanism to control Service Function
   access to the Network Service Header (NSH).  It addresses the Service
   Function trust issue and provide a method to enforce predefined
   access control lists to limit Service Function access to Service
   Function Chain information in the NSH in NSH-based Service Chaining.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 12, 2017.

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   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Vu Anh Vu, et al.      Expires January 1, 2018                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft        Controlling SF Access to NSH            July 2017

   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.2.  Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.3.  Definition Of Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  SF Access Control List  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Access Control Enforcing Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Consideration for NSH Concealment . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   8.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9

1.  Introduction

1.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

1.2.  Problem Statement

   SFC Architecture document [RFC7665] defines architectural concepts
   and core components, including Service Functions (SFs), Service
   Function Forwarder (SFF), Classifier (CF), SFC Proxy.  These
   terminologies will be used in this documents.

   It is argued that whether or not we should trust the SFs in SFC.  In
   SFC general use cases, SFs vary from virtual services hosted in
   general-purpose servers to legacy service functions with dedicated
   hardware.  Most of the time, these SFs are deployed and operated by
   their service provider.  Therefore they are highly trusted.  Despite
   being in private and relatively safe service provider networks, SFs
   are not invulnerable to all security threats.  Indeed, several
   reasons cause the misbehavior of SFs. For instance, they can still
   be manipulated by multiple types of malware.  Furthermore,
   malfunctioned and misconfigured SFs can have anomaly behaviors as
   well.

   Aside from their own SFs, service providers may use SFs from other
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