Early Review of draft-ietf-bier-ping-08
review-ietf-bier-ping-08-secdir-early-mandelberg-2023-04-21-00
| Request | Review of | draft-ietf-bier-ping |
|---|---|---|
| Requested revision | No specific revision (document currently at 15) | |
| Type | Early Review | |
| Team | Security Area Directorate (secdir) | |
| Deadline | 2023-04-28 | |
| Requested | 2023-04-07 | |
| Requested by | Tony Przygienda | |
| Authors | Nagendra Kumar Nainar , Carlos Pignataro , Mach Chen , Greg Mirsky | |
| I-D last updated | 2024-11-08 (Latest revision 2024-11-08) | |
| Completed reviews |
Intdir Early review of -08
by Brian Haberman
(diff)
Secdir Early review of -08 by David Mandelberg (diff) Rtgdir Early review of -14 by Dhruv Dhody (diff) |
|
| Assignment | Reviewer | David Mandelberg |
| State | Completed | |
| Request | Early review on draft-ietf-bier-ping by Security Area Directorate Assigned | |
| Posted at | https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/secdir/xM-yWmnlUfoU__yfofbY-QRjGfU | |
| Reviewed revision | 08 (document currently at 15) | |
| Result | Has nits | |
| Completed | 2023-04-21 |
review-ietf-bier-ping-08-secdir-early-mandelberg-2023-04-21-00
This mostly looks good, I think. My only concern is about if/how this could be exploited to DDoS third parties. It looks like there are a few ways that the responses can be larger than the requests, either by responders adding additional TLVs, or by multiple responders responding to the same request. I'm not sure how much of a risk source address spoofing is in the request's outer header, but it looks like the Reply-To TLV can be used to send responses to another address anyway, regardless of the source address. So if this were on the open internet, I'd expect attackers to abuse it to send lots of data to their targets. But from the mentions of MPLS, I'm guessing that this is not meant to be used on the open internet? So it might not be an issue in the environments this is intended to be deployed in, or there might be some other mitigation.