Last Call Review of draft-ietf-ecrit-trustworthy-location-08

Request Review of draft-ietf-ecrit-trustworthy-location
Requested rev. no specific revision (document currently at 14)
Type Last Call Review
Team General Area Review Team (Gen-ART) (genart)
Deadline 2014-02-28
Requested 2014-02-20
Authors Hannes Tschofenig, Henning Schulzrinne, Bernard Aboba
Draft last updated 2014-03-05
Completed reviews Genart Last Call review of -08 by Meral Shirazipour (diff)
Genart Telechat review of -09 by Meral Shirazipour (diff)
Secdir Last Call review of -08 by Brian Weis (diff)
Opsdir Last Call review of -08 by Bert Wijnen (diff)
Assignment Reviewer Meral Shirazipour 
State Completed
Review review-ietf-ecrit-trustworthy-location-08-genart-lc-shirazipour-2014-03-05
Reviewed rev. 08 (document currently at 14)
Review result Ready with Nits
Review completed: 2014-03-05


I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at



Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments you may receive.


Document: draft-ietf-ecrit-trustworthy-location-08

Reviewer: Meral Shirazipour

Review Date: 2013-02-28

IETF LC End Date:  2014-02-28

IESG Telechat date: NA




This draft is ready to be published as Informational RFC but I have a few comments.



Nits/editorial comments:

-[page 3] "an prank emergency"--a-->"a prank emergency"

-[page 3] "PSAP"---->"Public-safety answering point (PSAP)" (then remove Public safety answering point from next occurrence of PSAP in text) on the same page.

General comment:

AIP, PIDF, VSP, VESA, VPC and ERDB  please spell out at 'first use'

-[page 5] "one-off basis" ---->"on-off basis" ?

-[page 14] "attacker continue o learn"--typo-->"attacker continue to learn"

-[page 16] "on the Internet"-->"in the Internet"

-[page 19] 

" In some countries, regulators may not

   require the authenticated identity of the emergency caller, as is

   true for PSTN-based emergency calls placed from pay phones or SIM-

   less cell phones today.


I am not an expert but I doubt today only SIM-less cards can be tracked.


-[page 19]

"Location theft requires the attacker to be in proximity to the location to spoofed,.."

--->"...being spoofed"?


-Reference [TASMANIA] is no longer a valid link


-Although emergency prank calls are probably the most valid use case, can this method be applied to other use cases where location information needs to be

validated? If so it would be good to mention this in the draft, at least briefly.


Best Regards,



Meral Shirazipour

Ericsson Research