Last Call Review of draft-ietf-pcp-third-party-id-option-03
review-ietf-pcp-third-party-id-option-03-secdir-lc-tsou-2015-11-12-00
Request | Review of | draft-ietf-pcp-third-party-id-option |
---|---|---|
Requested revision | No specific revision (document currently at 08) | |
Type | Last Call Review | |
Team | Security Area Directorate (secdir) | |
Deadline | 2015-11-02 | |
Requested | 2015-10-22 | |
Authors | Andreas Ripke , Rolf Winter , Thomas Dietz , Juergen Quittek , Rafael Lopez da Silva | |
I-D last updated | 2015-11-12 | |
Completed reviews |
Genart Last Call review of -03
by Suresh Krishnan
(diff)
Genart Telechat review of -04 by Suresh Krishnan (diff) Secdir Last Call review of -03 by Tina Tsou (Ting ZOU) (diff) Opsdir Last Call review of -03 by Tim Chown (diff) |
|
Assignment | Reviewer | Tina Tsou (Ting ZOU) |
State | Completed | |
Request | Last Call review on draft-ietf-pcp-third-party-id-option by Security Area Directorate Assigned | |
Reviewed revision | 03 (document currently at 08) | |
Result | Has issues | |
Completed | 2015-11-12 |
review-ietf-pcp-third-party-id-option-03-secdir-lc-tsou-2015-11-12-00
Dear all, I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other last call comments. ** Technical ** * Section 7, page 11: I think you should make comments regarding the (privacy) implications of employing identifiers such as MAC addresses when essentially any other value -- e.g. a long-enough random number would do. Besides, you should comment on how the ID can be somehow validated, and what could happen if a client were able to predict the ID employed by other clients. ** Editorial ** * Section 1, page 2: > The IETF has specified the Port Control Protocol (PCP) [RFC6887] to > control how packets are translated and forwarded by a PCP-controlled > device such as a network address translator (NAT) or firewall. Please replace "and" with "and/or", since a firewall will not translate packets. * Section 1, page 2: > This document focuses on the scenarios where the PCP client sends > requests that concern internal addresses other than the address of > the PCP client itself. s/the scenarios/scenarios/ (since at least at this point in the text you have not yet mentioned what those scenarios are about) * Section 1, page 2: > There is already an option defined for this purpose in the RFC 6887 > [RFC6887] called the THIRD_PARTY option. Please rephrase as: "There is already an option defined for this purpose in [RFC6887], called the THIRD_PARTY option." * Section 1, page 3: > CGN deployments Please expand the acronym on first usage. * Section 1, page 3: > This applies to some of the PCP deployment scenarios that are listed > in Section 2.1 of RFC 6887 [RFC6887], Just remove "RFC 6887" (the rfc number is already included by the ref). * Section 1, page 3: > in particular to a Layer-2 > aware NAT which is described in more detail in Section 3, or GI-DS- > Lite [RFC6674] and ds-extra-lite [RFC6619]. You refer to RFC6619 as "ds-extra-lite", but such RFC does not even include that term. Thoughts? * Section 3, page 4: > The scenarios serve as examples. This document does not restrict the > applicability of the THIRD_PARTY_ID to certain scenarios. Please replace "THIRD_PARTY_ID" with "THIRD_PARTY_ID option" (here, and in other places) * Section 3, page 4: > The THIRD_PARTY_ID > can also be used for the firewall control Please remove the "the". * Section 3.2, page 7: > tunnel ID of tunnel(BRAS, CGN) (two instances of this). Please rephrase as "ID of the tunnel (BRAS, CGN)". * Section 4, page 9: Why use "TBD" and "TBD-1" if there's a single value to be assigned? * Section 4, page 9: > are to be set As s/As/as/ Thank you, Tina