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A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)
RFC 9582

Document Type RFC - Proposed Standard (May 2024)
Obsoletes RFC 6482
Authors Job Snijders , Ben Maddison , Matt Lepinski , Derrick Kong , Stephen Kent
Last updated 2024-05-23
RFC stream Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
Additional resources Mailing list discussion
IESG Responsible AD Warren "Ace" Kumari
Send notices to (None)
RFC 9582

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                       J. Snijders
Request for Comments: 9582                                        Fastly
Obsoletes: 6482                                              B. Maddison
Category: Standards Track                                     Workonline
ISSN: 2070-1721                                              M. Lepinski
                                                        Carleton College
                                                                 D. Kong
                                                                 S. Kent
                                                                May 2024

            A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)


   This document defines a standard profile for Route Origin
   Authorizations (ROAs).  A ROA is a digitally signed object that
   provides a means of verifying that an IP address block holder has
   authorized an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes to one or
   more prefixes within the address block.  This document obsoletes RFC

Status of This Memo

   This is an Internet Standards Track document.

   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
   received public review and has been approved for publication by the
   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
   Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   ( in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the
   Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described
   in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction
     1.1.  Requirements Language
     1.2.  Changes from RFC 6482
   2.  Related Work
   3.  The ROA Content Type
   4.  The ROA eContent
     4.1.  The version Element
     4.2.  The asID Element
     4.3.  The ipAddrBlocks Element
       4.3.1.  Type ROAIPAddressFamily
       4.3.2.  Type ROAIPAddress
       4.3.3.  Canonical Form for ipAddrBlocks
   5.  ROA Validation
   6.  Security Considerations
   7.  IANA Considerations
     7.1.  SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type
     7.2.  RPKI Signed Objects Registry
     7.3.  File Extension
     7.4.  SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier
     7.5.  Media Type
   8.  References
     8.1.  Normative References
     8.2.  Informative References
   Appendix A.  Example ROA eContent Payload
   Authors' Addresses

1.  Introduction

   The primary purpose of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
   is to improve routing security.  (See [RFC6480] for more
   information.)  As part of this system, a mechanism is needed to allow
   entities to verify that an Autonomous System (AS) has been given
   permission by an IP address block holder to advertise routes to one
   or more prefixes within that block.  A Route Origin Authorization
   (ROA) provides this function.

   The ROA makes use of the template for RPKI digitally signed objects
   [RFC6488], which defines a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) wrapper
   [RFC5652] for the ROA content as well as a generic validation
   procedure for RPKI signed objects.  Therefore, to complete the
   specification of the ROA (see Section 4 of [RFC6488]), this document

   *  The OID that identifies the signed object as being a ROA.  (This
      OID appears within the eContentType in the encapContentInfo object
      as well as the content-type signed attribute in the signerInfo

   *  The ASN.1 syntax for the ROA eContent.  (This is the payload that
      specifies the AS being authorized to originate routes as well as
      the prefixes to which the AS may originate routes.)  The ROA
      eContent is ASN.1 encoded using the Distinguished Encoding Rules
      (DER) [X.690].

   *  Additional steps required to validate ROAs (in addition to the
      validation steps specified in [RFC6488]).

1.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

1.2.  Changes from RFC 6482

   This section summarizes the significant changes between [RFC6482] and
   the profile described in this document.

   *  Clarified the requirements for the IP address and AS identifier
      X.509 certificate extensions.

   *  Strengthened the ASN.1 formal notation and definitions.

   *  Incorporated errata for RFC 6482.

   *  Added an example ROA eContent payload, and a complete ROA
      (Appendix A).

   *  Specified a canonicalization procedure for the content of

2.  Related Work

   It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts
   described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
   and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC5280] and "X.509
   Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779].

   Additionally, this document makes use of the RPKI signed object
   profile [RFC6488]; thus, familiarity with that document is assumed.
   Note that the RPKI signed object profile makes use of certificates
   adhering to the RPKI resource certificate profile [RFC6487]; thus,
   familiarity with that profile is also assumed.

3.  The ROA Content Type

   The content-type for a ROA is defined as id-ct-routeOriginAuthz and
   has the numerical value 1.2.840.113549.

   This OID MUST appear within both the eContentType in the
   encapContentInfo object and the content-type signed attribute in the
   signerInfo object (see [RFC6488]).

4.  The ROA eContent

   The content of a ROA identifies a single AS that has been authorized
   by the address space holder to originate routes and a list of one or
   more IP address prefixes that will be advertised.  If the address
   space holder needs to authorize multiple ASes to advertise the same
   set of address prefixes, the holder issues multiple ROAs, one per AS
   number.  A ROA is formally defined as:

     { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
     pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) mod(0)
     id-mod-rpkiROA-2023(75) }


     FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010 -- in [RFC6268]
       { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
         pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58) } ;

   ct-routeOriginAttestation CONTENT-TYPE ::=
     { TYPE RouteOriginAttestation
       IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-routeOriginAuthz }

   id-ct-routeOriginAuthz OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
     { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
       pkcs-9(9) id-smime(16) id-ct(1) routeOriginAuthz(24) }

   RouteOriginAttestation ::= SEQUENCE {
     version [0]   INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
     asID          ASID,
     ipAddrBlocks  SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..2)) OF ROAIPAddressFamily }

   ASID ::= INTEGER (0..4294967295)

   ROAIPAddressFamily ::= SEQUENCE {
     addressFamily ADDRESS-FAMILY.&afi ({AddressFamilySet}),
     addresses     ADDRESS-FAMILY.&Addresses
                                  ({AddressFamilySet}{@addressFamily}) }

     &afi          OCTET STRING (SIZE(2)) UNIQUE,
   } WITH SYNTAX { AFI &afi ADDRESSES &Addresses }

   AddressFamilySet ADDRESS-FAMILY ::=
     { addressFamilyIPv4 | addressFamilyIPv6 }

   addressFamilyIPv4 ADDRESS-FAMILY ::=
     { AFI afi-IPv4 ADDRESSES ROAAddressesIPv4 }
   addressFamilyIPv6 ADDRESS-FAMILY ::=
     { AFI afi-IPv6 ADDRESSES ROAAddressesIPv6 }

   afi-IPv4 OCTET STRING ::= '0001'H
   afi-IPv6 OCTET STRING ::= '0002'H

   ROAAddressesIPv4 ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ROAIPAddress{ub-IPv4}
   ROAAddressesIPv6 ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ROAIPAddress{ub-IPv6}

   ub-IPv4 INTEGER ::= 32
   ub-IPv6 INTEGER ::= 128

   ROAIPAddress {INTEGER: ub} ::= SEQUENCE {
     address       BIT STRING (SIZE(0..ub)),
     maxLength     INTEGER (0..ub) OPTIONAL }


4.1.  The version Element

   The version number of the RouteOriginAttestation entry MUST be 0.

4.2.  The asID Element

   The asID element contains the AS number that is authorized to
   originate routes to the given IP address prefixes.

4.3.  The ipAddrBlocks Element

   The ipAddrBlocks element encodes the set of IP address prefixes to
   which the AS is authorized to originate routes.  Note that the syntax
   here is more restrictive than that used in the IP address delegation
   extension defined in [RFC3779].  That extension can represent
   arbitrary address ranges, whereas ROAs need to represent only IP

4.3.1.  Type ROAIPAddressFamily

   Within the ROAIPAddressFamily structure, the addressFamily element
   contains the Address Family Identifier (AFI) of an IP address family.
   This specification only supports IPv4 and IPv6; therefore,
   addressFamily MUST be either 0001 or 0002.  IPv4 prefixes MUST NOT
   appear as IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (Section of [RFC4291]).

   There MUST be only one instance of ROAIPAddressFamily per unique AFI
   in the ROA.  Thus, the ROAIPAddressFamily structure MUST NOT appear
   more than twice.

   The addresses field contains IP prefixes as a sequence of type

4.3.2.  Type ROAIPAddress

   A ROAIPAddress structure is a sequence containing an address element
   of type BIT STRING and an optional maxLength element of type INTEGER.  The address Element

   The address element is of type BIT STRING and represents a single IP
   address prefix.  This field uses the same representation of an IP
   address prefix as a BIT STRING as the IPAddress type defined in
   Section of [RFC3779].  The maxLength Element

   When present, the maxLength element specifies the maximum length of
   the IP address prefix that the AS is authorized to advertise.  The
   maxLength element SHOULD NOT be encoded if the maximum length is
   equal to the prefix length.  Certification Authorities SHOULD
   anticipate that future Relying Parties will become increasingly
   stringent in considering the presence of superfluous maxLength
   elements an encoding error.

   If present, the maxLength element MUST be:

   *  an integer greater than or equal to the length of the accompanying
      prefix, and

   *  less than or equal to the maximum length (in bits) of an IP
      address in the applicable address family: 32 in the case of IPv4
      and 128 in the case of IPv6.

   For example, if the IP address prefix is and maxLength
   is 26, the AS is authorized to advertise any more-specific prefix
   with a maximum length of 26.  In this example, the AS would be
   authorized to advertise,, or, but not  See [RFC9319] for more
   information on the use of maxLength.

   When the maxLength element is not present, the AS is only authorized
   to advertise the exact prefix specified in the ROAIPAddress
   structure's address element.  Note on Overlapping or Superfluous Information Encoding

   Note that a valid ROA may contain an IP address prefix (within a
   ROAIPAddress element) that is encompassed by another IP address
   prefix (within a separate ROAIPAddress element).  For example, a ROA
   may contain the prefix with maxLength 26, as well as
   the prefix with maxLength 28.  This ROA would
   authorize the indicated AS to advertise any prefix beginning with
   203.0.113 with a minimum length of 24 and a maximum length of 26, as
   well as the specific prefix

   Additionally, a ROA MAY contain two ROAIPAddress elements, where the
   IP address prefix is identical in both cases.  However, this is NOT
   RECOMMENDED, because in such a case, the ROAIPAddress element with
   the shorter maxLength grants no additional privileges to the
   indicated AS and thus can be omitted without changing the meaning of
   the ROA.

4.3.3.  Canonical Form for ipAddrBlocks

   As the data structure described by the ROA ASN.1 module allows for
   many different ways to represent the same set of IP address
   information, a canonical form is defined such that every set of IP
   address information has a unique representation.  In order to produce
   and verify this canonical form, the process described in this section
   SHOULD be used to ensure that information elements are unique with
   respect to one another and sorted in ascending order.  Certification
   Authorities SHOULD anticipate that future Relying Parties will impose
   a strict requirement for the ipAddrBlocks field to be in this
   canonical form.  This canonicalization procedure builds upon the
   canonicalization procedure specified in Section of [RFC3779].

   In order to semantically compare, sort, and deduplicate the contents
   of the ipAddrBlocks field, each ROAIPAddress element is mapped to an
   abstract data element composed of four integer values:

   afi  The AFI value appearing in the addressFamily field of the
      containing ROAIPAddressFamily as an integer.

   addr  The first IP address of the IP prefix appearing in the
      ROAIPAddress address field, as a 32-bit (IPv4) or 128-bit (IPv6)
      integer value.

   plen  The length of the IP prefix appearing in the ROAIPAddress
      address field as an integer value.

   mlen  The value appearing in the maxLength field of the ROAIPAddress
      element, if present; otherwise, the above prefix length value.

   Thus, the equality or relative order of two ROAIPAddress elements can
   be tested by comparing their abstract representations.  Comparator

   The set of ipAddrBlocks is totally ordered.  The order of two
   ipAddrBlocks is determined by the first non-equal comparison in the
   following list.

   1.  Data elements with a lower afi value precede data elements with a
       higher afi value.

   2.  Data elements with a lower addr value precede data elements with
       a higher addr value.

   3.  Data elements with a lower plen value precede data elements with
       a higher plen value.

   4.  Data elements with a lower mlen value precede data elements with
       a higher mlen value.

   Data elements for which all four values compare equal are duplicates
   of one another.  Example Implementations

   *  A sorting implementation [roasort-c] in ISO/IEC 9899:1999
      ("ANSI C99").

   *  A sorting implementation [roasort-rs] in the Rust 2021 Edition.

5.  ROA Validation

   Before a Relying Party can use a ROA to validate a routing
   announcement, the Relying Party MUST first validate the ROA.  To
   validate a ROA, the Relying Party MUST perform all the validation
   checks specified in [RFC6488] as well as the following additional
   ROA-specific validation steps:

   *  The IP address delegation extension [RFC3779] is present in the
      end-entity (EE) certificate (contained within the ROA), and every
      IP address prefix in the ROA payload is contained within the set
      of IP addresses specified by the EE certificate's IP address
      delegation extension.

   *  The EE certificate's IP address delegation extension MUST NOT
      contain "inherit" elements as described in [RFC3779].

   *  The Autonomous System identifier delegation extension described in
      [RFC3779] is not used in ROAs and MUST NOT be present in the EE

   *  The ROA content fully conforms with all requirements specified in
      Sections 3 and 4.

   If any of the above checks fail, the ROA in its entirety MUST be
   considered invalid and an error SHOULD be logged.

6.  Security Considerations

   There is no assumption of confidentiality for the data in a ROA; it
   is anticipated that ROAs will be stored in repositories that are
   accessible to all ISPs, and perhaps to all Internet users.  There is
   no explicit authentication associated with a ROA, since the PKI used
   for ROA validation provides authorization but not authentication.
   Although the ROA is a signed, application-layer object, there is no
   intent to convey non-repudiation via a ROA.

   The purpose of a ROA is to convey authorization for an AS to
   originate a route to the prefix or prefixes in the ROA.  Thus, the
   integrity of a ROA MUST be established.  This ROA specification makes
   use of the RPKI signed object format; thus, all security
   considerations discussed in [RFC6488] also apply to ROAs.
   Additionally, the signed object profile uses the CMS signed message
   format for integrity; thus, ROAs inherit all security considerations
   associated with that data structure.

   The right of the ROA signer to authorize the target AS to originate
   routes to the prefix or prefixes is established through the use of
   the address space and AS number PKI as described in [RFC6480].
   Specifically, one MUST verify the signature on the ROA using an X.509
   certificate issued under this PKI and check that the prefix or
   prefixes in the ROA are contained within those in the certificate's
   IP address delegation extension.

7.  IANA Considerations

7.1.  SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type (1.2.840.113549.

   IANA has updated the id-ct-routeOriginAuthz entry in the "SMI
   Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type (1.2.840.113549."
   registry as follows:

             | Decimal | Description            | References |
             | 24      | id-ct-routeOriginAuthz | RFC 9582   |

                                  Table 1

7.2.  RPKI Signed Objects Registry

   IANA has updated the Route Origination Authorization entry in the
   "RPKI Signed Objects" registry created by [RFC6488] as follows:

      | Name              | OID                        | Reference |
      | Route Origination | 1.2.840.113549. | RFC 9582  |
      | Authorization     |                            |           |

                                 Table 2

7.3.  File Extension

   IANA has updated the entry for the ROA file extension in the "RPKI
   Repository Name Schemes" registry created by [RFC6481] as follows:

   | Filename Extension | RPKI Object                     | Reference |
   | .roa               | Route Origination Authorization | RFC 9582  |

                                 Table 3

7.4.  SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier

   IANA has allocated the following entry in the "SMI Security for
   S/MIME Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549." registry:

              | Decimal | Description         | References |
              | 75      | id-mod-rpkiROA-2023 | RFC 9582   |

                                 Table 4

7.5.  Media Type

   IANA has updated the media type application/rpki-roa in the "Media
   Types" registry as follows:

   Type name:  application

   Subtype name:  rpki-roa

   Required parameters:  N/A

   Optional parameters:  N/A

   Encoding considerations:  binary

   Security considerations:  Carries an RPKI ROA (RFC 9582).  This media
      type contains no active content.  See Section 6 of RFC 9582 for
      further information.

   Interoperability considerations:  None

   Published specification:  RFC 9582

   Applications that use this media type:  RPKI operators

   Additional information:

      Content:  This media type is a signed object, as defined in
         [RFC6488], which contains a payload of a list of prefixes and
         an AS identifier as defined in RFC 9582.
      Magic number(s):  None
      File extension(s):  .roa
      Macintosh file type code(s):  None

   Person & email address to contact for further information:
      Job Snijders <>

   Intended usage:  COMMON

   Restrictions on usage:  None

   Change controller:  IETF

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,

   [RFC3779]  Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
              Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004,

   [RFC4291]  Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing
              Architecture", RFC 4291, DOI 10.17487/RFC4291, February
              2006, <>.

   [RFC5652]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
              RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,

   [RFC6268]  Schaad, J. and S. Turner, "Additional New ASN.1 Modules
              for the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and the Public
              Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 6268,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6268, July 2011,

   [RFC6481]  Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
              Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6481, February 2012,

   [RFC6482]  Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
              Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012,

   [RFC6487]  Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
              X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012,

   [RFC6488]  Lepinski, M., Chi, A., and S. Kent, "Signed Object
              Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
              (RPKI)", RFC 6488, DOI 10.17487/RFC6488, February 2012,

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <>.

   [X.690]    ITU-T, "Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
              Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
              Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
              (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, February 2021.

8.2.  Informative References

   [RFC4648]  Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
              Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,

   [RFC6480]  Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
              Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
              February 2012, <>.

   [RFC9319]  Gilad, Y., Goldberg, S., Sriram, K., Snijders, J., and B.
              Maddison, "The Use of maxLength in the Resource Public Key
              Infrastructure (RPKI)", BCP 185, RFC 9319,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9319, October 2022,

              Snijders, J., "ROA sorter in C", commit 68969ea, July
              2023, <>.

              Maddison, B., "ROA sorter in Rust", commit 023e756, August
              2023, <>.

Appendix A.  Example ROA eContent Payload

   An example of a DER-encoded ROA eContent is provided below, with
   annotation following the "#" character.

   $ echo 16i 301802030100003011300F040200023009300703050020010DB8 P \
     | dc | openssl asn1parse -inform DER -i -dump
    0:d=0  hl=2 l=  24 cons: SEQUENCE           # RouteOriginAttestation
    2:d=1  hl=2 l=   3 prim:  INTEGER  :010000  #  asID 65536
    7:d=1  hl=2 l=  17 cons:  SEQUENCE          #  ipAddrBlocks
    9:d=2  hl=2 l=  15 cons:   SEQUENCE         #   ROAIPAddressFamily
   11:d=3  hl=2 l=   2 prim:    OCTET STRING    #    addressFamily
      0000 - 00 02                              #     IPv6
   15:d=3  hl=2 l=   9 cons:    SEQUENCE        #    addresses
   17:d=4  hl=2 l=   7 cons:     SEQUENCE       #     ROAIPAddress
   19:d=5  hl=2 l=   5 prim:      BIT STRING    #      2001:db8::/32
       0000 - 00 20 01 0d b8

   Below is a complete RPKI ROA signed object, Base64 encoded per


   The object in this appendix has the following properties:

   Object size: 1668 octets
   Object SHA256 message digest:

   CMS signing time: Wed 01 May 2024 00:34:13 +0000

   X.509 end-entity certificate
   Subject key id: DE145B193FB320B25A744355298C8BF7C2523D22
   Authority key id: D67208EA470E9D6DD6654022F553ADC1389AB434
   Issuer: CN=86525cd5-44d7-4df9-8079-4a9dcdf26944
   Serial: 3
   Not before: Wed 01 May 2024 00:34:13 +0000
   Not after: Thu 01 May 2025 00:34:13 +0000
   IP address delegation: 2001:db8::/32

   ROA eContent
   asID: 65536
   addresses: 2001:db8::/32


   The authors wish to thank Theo Buehler, Ties de Kock, Martin
   Hoffmann, Charles Gardiner, Russ Housley, Jeffrey Haas, Bob Beck, and
   Tom Harrison for their help and contributions.  Additionally, the
   authors thank Jim Fenton, Vijay Gurbani, Haoyu Song, Rob Austein,
   Roque Gagliano, Danny McPherson, Sam Weiler, Jasdip Singh, and Murray
   S. Kucherawy for their careful reviews and helpful comments.

Authors' Addresses

   Job Snijders
   The Netherlands

   Ben Maddison
   Cape Town
   South Africa

   Matthew Lepinski
   Carleton College

   Derrick Kong

   Stephen Kent