IPsec Key Exchange using a Controller
draft-carrel-ipsecme-controller-ike-01

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2019-03-10
Stream (None)
Intended RFC status (None)
Formats plain text pdf html bibtex
Stream Stream state (No stream defined)
Consensus Boilerplate Unknown
RFC Editor Note (None)
IESG IESG state I-D Exists
Telechat date
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)
Network Working Group                                          D. Carrel
Internet-Draft                                             Cisco Systems
Intended status: Standards Track                                 B. Weis
Expires: September 12, 2019                                  Independent
                                                          March 11, 2019

                 IPsec Key Exchange using a Controller
                 draft-carrel-ipsecme-controller-ike-01

Abstract

   This document presents a key exchange method allowing devices managed
   by a controller (e.g., an SDN management station) to create private
   pair-wise IPsec SAs without IKEv2 or any other direct peer-to-peer
   session establishment messages.  The method can be used when a full
   mesh of IKEv2 sessions between IPsec devices is not appropriate.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 12, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of

Carrel & Weis          Expires September 12, 2019               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft               Controller-IKE                   March 2019

   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Generating Initial IPsec SAs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Rekey of IPsec SAs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.1.  Single IPsec Device Rekey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.2.  Simultaneous Rekey of IPsec Devices . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   5.  IPsec Database Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     5.1.  The Security Policy Database (SPD)  . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     5.2.  Security Association Database (SAD) . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       5.2.1.  Generating Keying Material for IPsec SAs  . . . . . .  13
     5.3.  Peer Authorization Database (PAD) . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   6.  Policy distributed through the Controller . . . . . . . . . .  16
     6.1.  IPsec policy negotiation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   9.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   Appendix A.  Example Controller protocols . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     A.1.  Example: I2NSF  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     A.2.  Example: Network Controller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     A.3.  Additional controller protocol considerations . . . . . .  22
       A.3.1.  Peer-to-peer distribution of IPsec policy . . . . . .  22
       A.3.2.  Ordering of messages distributed to a controller  . .  23
   Appendix B.  Choosing whether to use IKEv2 or Controller IKE  . .  23
   Appendix C.  Implementation Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . .  25
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25

1.  Introduction

   Network architectures typically have included network devices
   directly communicating using network control protocols such as
   routing and signaling protocols.  Additionally, secured
   communications between these network devices are usually accomplished
   with a key agreement protocol such as IKEv2 [RFC7296], in which the
   network devices directly authenticate each other and agree upon
   security policy and keying material to protect communications between
Show full document text