IPsec Key Exchange using a Controller
draft-carrel-ipsecme-controller-ike-01
| Document | Type | Expired Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | David Carrel , Brian Weis | ||
| Last updated | 2019-09-11 (Latest revision 2019-03-10) | ||
| Stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats |
Expired & archived
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| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of
the expired Internet-Draft can be found at:
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-carrel-ipsecme-controller-ike-01.txt
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-carrel-ipsecme-controller-ike-01.txt
Abstract
This document presents a key exchange method allowing devices managed by a controller (e.g., an SDN management station) to create private pair-wise IPsec SAs without IKEv2 or any other direct peer-to-peer session establishment messages. The method can be used when a full mesh of IKEv2 sessions between IPsec devices is not appropriate.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)