Security Implications of IPv6 Fragmentation with IPv6 Neighbor Discovery
draft-ietf-6man-nd-extension-headers-01
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IPv6 maintenance Working Group (6man) F. Gont
Internet-Draft SI6 Networks / UTN-FRH
Updates: 3971, 4861 (if approved) November 5, 2012
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: May 9, 2013
Security Implications of IPv6 Fragmentation with IPv6 Neighbor Discovery
draft-ietf-6man-nd-extension-headers-01
Abstract
This document analyzes the security implications of using IPv6
Extension Headers with Neighbor Discovery (ND) messages. It updates
RFC 4861 such that use of the IPv6 Fragmentation Header is forbidden
in all Neighbor Discovery messages, thus allowing for simple and
effective counter-measures for Neighbor Discovery attacks. Finally,
it discusses the security implications of using IPv6 fragmentation
with SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND), and formally updates RFC 3971
to provide advice regarding how the aforementioned security
implications can be prevented.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on May 9, 2013.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
Gont Expires May 9, 2013 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft ND and IPv6 Fragmentation November 2012
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Traditional Neighbor Discovery and IPv6 Fragmentation . . . . 5
3. SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) and IPv6 Fragmentation . . . 6
4. Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Gont Expires May 9, 2013 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft ND and IPv6 Fragmentation November 2012
1. Introduction
The Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP) is specified in RFC 4861
[RFC4861] and RFC 4862 [RFC4862]. It is used by both hosts and
routers. Its functions include Neighbor Discovery (ND), Router
Discovery (RD), Address Autoconfiguration, Address Resolution,
Neighbor Unreachability Detection (NUD), Duplicate Address Detection
(DAD), and Redirection.
Many of the possible attacks against the Neighbor Discovery Protocol
are discussed in detail in [RFC3756]. In order to mitigate the
aforementioned possible attacks, the SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)
was standardized. SEND employs a number of mechanisms to certify the
origin of Neighbor Discovery packets and the authority of routers,
and to protect Neighbor Discovery packets from being the subject of
modification or replay attacks.
However, a number of factors, such as the use of trust anchors and
the unavailability of SEND implementations for many widely-deployed
operating systems, make SEND hard to deploy [Gont-DEEPSEC2011].
Thus, in many general scenarios it may be necessary and/or convenient
to use other mitigation techniques for NDP-based attacks. The
following mitigations are currently available for NDP attacks:
o Layer-2 filtering of Neighbor Discovery packets (such as RA-Guard
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