Security Considerations for RFC5011 Publishers
draft-ietf-dnsop-rfc5011-security-considerations-02

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (dnsop WG)
Last updated 2017-06-27
Replaces draft-hardaker-rfc5011-security-considerations
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dnsop                                                        W. Hardaker
Internet-Draft                                                   USC/ISI
Intended status: Standards Track                               W. Kumari
Expires: December 29, 2017                                        Google
                                                           June 27, 2017

             Security Considerations for RFC5011 Publishers
          draft-ietf-dnsop-rfc5011-security-considerations-02

Abstract

   This document extends the RFC5011 rollover strategy with timing
   advice that must be followed in order to maintain security.
   Specifically, this document describes the math behind the minimum
   time-length that a DNS zone publisher must wait before signing with
   only recently added DNSKEYs.  This document also describes the
   minimum time-length that a DNS zone publisher must wait after
   publishing a revoked DNSKEY before assuming that all active RFC5011
   resolvers should have seen the revocation-marked key and removed it
   from their list of trust anchors.

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on December 29, 2017.

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Hardaker & Kumari       Expires December 29, 2017               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft       RFC5011 Security Considerations           June 2017

   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Document History and Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  Safely Rolling the Root Zone's KSK in 2017/2018 . . . . .   3
     1.3.  Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Background  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Timing Associated with RFC5011 Processing . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.1.  Timing Associated with Publication  . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.2.  Timing Associated with Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Denial of Service Attack Considerations . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     5.1.  Enumerated Attack Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       5.1.1.  Attack Timing Breakdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  Minimum RFC5011 Timing Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   8.  Operational Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   9.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   10. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   11. Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Appendix A.  Real World Example: The 2017 Root KSK Key Roll . . .  10
   Appendix B.  Changes / Author Notes.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12

1.  Introduction

   [RFC5011] defines a mechanism by which DNSSEC validators can extend
   their list of trust anchors when they've seen a new key published in
   a zone.  However, RFC5011 [intentionally] provides no guidance to the
   publishers of DNSKEYs about how long they must wait before switching
   to using only recently published keys for signing records, or how
   long they must wait before removing a revoked key from a zone.
   Because of this lack of guidance, zone publishers may derive
   incorrect assumptions about safe usage of the RFC5011 DNSKEY
   advertising, rolling and revocation process.  This document describes
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