Security Considerations for RFC5011 Publishers
draft-ietf-dnsop-rfc5011-security-considerations-12

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (dnsop WG)
Last updated 2018-04-18 (latest revision 2018-03-23)
Replaces draft-hardaker-rfc5011-security-considerations
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Document shepherd Tim Wicinski
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Send notices to Tim Wicinski <tjw.ietf@gmail.com>
dnsop                                                        W. Hardaker
Internet-Draft                                                   USC/ISI
Updates: 7583 (if approved)                                    W. Kumari
Intended status: Standards Track                                  Google
Expires: September 24, 2018                               March 23, 2018

             Security Considerations for RFC5011 Publishers
          draft-ietf-dnsop-rfc5011-security-considerations-12

Abstract

   This document extends the RFC5011 rollover strategy with timing
   advice that must be followed by the publisher in order to maintain
   security.  Specifically, this document describes the math behind the
   minimum time-length that a DNS zone publisher must wait before
   signing exclusively with recently added DNSKEYs.  This document also
   describes the minimum time-length that a DNS zone publisher must wait
   after publishing a revoked DNSKEY before assuming that all active
   RFC5011 resolvers should have seen the revocation-marked key and
   removed it from their list of trust anchors.

   This document contains much math and complicated equations, but the
   summary is that the key rollover / revocation time is much longer
   than intuition would suggest.  If you are not both publishing a
   DNSSEC DNSKEY, and using RFC5011 to advertise this DNSKEY as a new
   Secure Entry Point key for use as a trust anchor, you probably don't
   need to read this document.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 24, 2018.

Hardaker & Kumari      Expires September 24, 2018               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft       RFC5011 Security Considerations          March 2018

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   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Document History and Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  Safely Rolling the Root Zone's KSK in 2017/2018 . . . . .   4
     1.3.  Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Background  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Timing Associated with RFC5011 Processing . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.1.  Timing Associated with Publication  . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.2.  Timing Associated with Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Denial of Service Attack Walkthrough  . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     5.1.  Enumerated Attack Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       5.1.1.  Attack Timing Breakdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  Minimum RFC5011 Timing Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     6.1.  Equation Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       6.1.1.  addHoldDownTime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       6.1.2.  lastSigExpirationTime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       6.1.3.  sigExpirationTime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       6.1.4.  sigExpirationTimeRemaining  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       6.1.5.  activeRefresh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       6.1.6.  timingSafetyMargin  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       6.1.7.  retrySafetyMargin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     6.2.  Timing Requirements For Adding a New KSK  . . . . . . . .  13
       6.2.1.  Wait Timer Based Calculation  . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       6.2.2.  Wall-Clock Based Calculation  . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       6.2.3.  Timing Constraint Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       6.2.4.  Additional Considerations for RFC7583 . . . . . . . .  15
       6.2.5.  Example Scenario Calculations . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
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