Security Considerations for RFC5011 Publishers
draft-ietf-dnsop-rfc5011-security-considerations-01

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Last updated 2017-05-23
Replaces draft-hardaker-rfc5011-security-considerations
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dnsop                                                        W. Hardaker
Internet-Draft                                                   USC/ISI
Intended status: Standards Track                               W. Kumari
Expires: November 21, 2017                                        Google
                                                            May 20, 2017

             Security Considerations for RFC5011 Publishers
          draft-ietf-dnsop-rfc5011-security-considerations-01

Abstract

   This document describes the math behind the minimum time-length that
   a DNS zone publisher must wait before using a new DNSKEY to sign
   records when supporting the RFC5011 rollover strategies.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on November 21, 2017.

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Hardaker & Kumari       Expires November 21, 2017               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft       RFC5011 Security Considerations            May 2017

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Document History and Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.2.  Safely Rolling the Root Zone's KSK in 2017/2018 . . . . .   3
     1.3.  Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Background  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Timing Associated with RFC5011 Processing . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.1.  Timing Associated with Publication  . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.2.  Timing Associated with Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  Denial of Service Attack Considerations . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     5.1.  Enumerated Attack Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       5.1.1.  Attack Timing Breakdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  Minimum RFC5011 Timing Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   8.  Operational Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   9.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   10. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   11. Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Appendix A.  Real World Example: The 2017 Root KSK Key Roll . . .  10
   Appendix B.  Changes / Author Notes.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12

1.  Introduction

   [RFC5011] defines a mechanism by which DNSSEC validators can extend
   their list of trust anchors when they've seen a new key published in
   a zone.  However, RFC5011 [intentionally] provides no guidance to the
   publishers of DNSKEYs about how long they must wait before switching
   to a newly published key for signing records or how long they must
   wait before removing a revoked key from a zone.  Because of this lack
   of guidance, zone publishers may derive incorrect assumptions about
   safe usage of the RFC5011 DNSKEY advertising, rolling and revocation
   process.  This document describes the minimum security requirements
   from a publisher's point of view and is intended to compliment the
   guidance offered in RFC5011 (which is written to provide timing
   guidance solely to a Validating Resolver's point of view).

1.1.  Document History and Motivation

   To verify this lack of understanding is wide-spread, the authors
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