Security Considerations for RFC5011 Publishers
draft-ietf-dnsop-rfc5011-security-considerations-07

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (dnsop WG)
Last updated 2017-10-18
Replaces draft-hardaker-rfc5011-security-considerations
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dnsop                                                        W. Hardaker
Internet-Draft                                                   USC/ISI
Updates: 7583 (if approved)                                    W. Kumari
Intended status: Standards Track                                  Google
Expires: April 21, 2018                                 October 18, 2017

             Security Considerations for RFC5011 Publishers
          draft-ietf-dnsop-rfc5011-security-considerations-07

Abstract

   This document extends the RFC5011 rollover strategy with timing
   advice that must be followed in order to maintain security.
   Specifically, this document describes the math behind the minimum
   time-length that a DNS zone publisher must wait before signing
   exclusively with recently added DNSKEYs.  It contains much math and
   complicated equations, but the summary is that the key rollover /
   revocation time is much longer than intuition would suggest.  If you
   are not both publishing a DNSSEC trust anchor, and using RFC5011 to
   update that trust anchor, you probably don't need to read this
   document.

   This document also describes the minimum time-length that a DNS zone
   publisher must wait after publishing a revoked DNSKEY before assuming
   that all active RFC5011 resolvers should have seen the revocation-
   marked key and removed it from their list of trust anchors.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 21, 2018.

Hardaker & Kumari        Expires April 21, 2018                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft       RFC5011 Security Considerations        October 2017

Copyright Notice

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   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Document History and Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  Safely Rolling the Root Zone's KSK in 2017/2018 . . . . .   3
     1.3.  Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Background  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Timing Associated with RFC5011 Processing . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.1.  Timing Associated with Publication  . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.2.  Timing Associated with Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Denial of Service Attack Considerations . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     5.1.  Enumerated Attack Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       5.1.1.  Attack Timing Breakdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  Minimum RFC5011 Timing Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     6.1.  Timing Requirements For Adding a New KSK  . . . . . . . .   8
       6.1.1.  addHoldDownTime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       6.1.2.  sigExpirationTime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       6.1.3.  activeRefresh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       6.1.4.  activeRefreshOffset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       6.1.5.  safetyMargin  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       6.1.6.  Fully expanded equation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       6.1.7.  Timing Constraint Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       6.1.8.  Additional Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     6.2.  Timing Requirements For Revoking an Old KSK . . . . . . .  11
       6.2.1.  Example Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   8.  Operational Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
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