API Keys and Privacy
draft-ietf-httpapi-privacy-04

Building Blocks for HTTP APIs                                    R. Salz
Internet-Draft                                                 M. Bishop
Intended status: Best Current Practice               Akamai Technologies
Expires: 29 August 2026                                        M. Kleidl
                                                             Transloadit
                                                        25 February 2026

                          API Keys and Privacy
                     draft-ietf-httpapi-privacy-04

Abstract

   Redirecting HTTP requests to HTTPS, a common pattern for human-facing
   web resources, can be an anti-pattern for authenticated HTTP API
   traffic.  This document discusses the pitfalls and makes deployment
   recommendations for authenticated HTTP APIs.  It does not specify a
   protocol.

About This Document

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   The latest revision of this draft can be found at https://ietf-wg-
   httpapi.github.io/draft-ietf-httpapi-privacy/draft-ietf-httpapi-
   privacy.html.  Status information for this document may be found at
   https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-httpapi-privacy/.

   Discussion of this document takes place on the Building Blocks for
   HTTP APIs Working Group mailing list (mailto:httpapi@ietf.org), which
   is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/httpapi/.
   Subscribe at https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/httpapi/.

   Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
   https://github.com/ietf-wg-httpapi/httpapi-privacy.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 29 August 2026.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Server Recommendations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  Pre-Connection Redirects  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.2.  Connection Blocking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.3.  Credential Restriction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.4.  Disclosure Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       2.4.1.  Credential Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   3.  Client Recommendations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.1.  Implement Relevant Protocols  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.2.  Respect Credential Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.3.  Disallow Insecure by Default  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     6.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     6.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8

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1.  Introduction

   It is a common pattern for HTTP servers to prefer serving resources
   over HTTPS.  Because HTTPS uses TLS, clients receive authentication
   of the server and confidentiality of the resource bodies supplied by
   the server.

   In order to implement this preference, HTTP servers often listen for
   unencrypted requests and respond with a 3XX status code directing the
   client to the equivalent resource over an encrypted connection.  For
   unauthenticated web browsing, this is a reasonable user experience
   bridge.  Users often type bare hostnames (not URIs) into a user
   agent; if the user agent defaults to an unencrypted connection, the
   server can correct this default and require the use of encryption.
   This pattern is so well established that many HTTP server and
   intermediary implementations have a prominently displayed option to
   enable it automatically.

   When client authentication is used, more care must be taken.  The
   client's initial request may include a Bearer token or other
   credential (such as a Cookie); once the request has been sent on the
   network, any passive attacker who can see the traffic can acquire
   this credential and use it.

   If the server performs a redirect in this situation, it does not
   mitigate exposure of the credential.  Further, because the request
   will ultimately succeed if the client follows the redirect, an
   application developer or user who accidentally configures an
   unencrypted API endpoint will not necessarily notice the
   misconfiguration.

   This document describes actions API servers and clients should take
   in order to safeguard credentials.  These recommendations are not
   directed at resources where no authentication is used.

   Some have wondered if this document is really necessary.  After all,
   we have been telling people not to send passwords and such in the
   clear for decades.  Regrettably, this lesson seems to be largely
   forgotten by those developing Web-based APIs.  The blog post that
   motivated this document, [BLOG], did a spot-check in May, 2024, and
   found over two dozen websites that were vulnerable to the issues
   listed here.

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1.1.  Conventions and Definitions

   Although this document is not an IETF Standards Track publication, it
   adopts the conventions for normative language to provide clarity of
   instructions to the implementer.  The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT",
   "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT",
   "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119]
   [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown
   here.

2.  Server Recommendations

2.1.  Pre-Connection Redirects

   Various mechanisms exist to inform clients that unencrypted requests
   to a server are never appropriate:

   *  HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) [RFC6797] informs clients
      who make a successful connection over HTTPS that secure
      connections are a requirement in the future.

   *  HTTPS DNS records [RFC9460] inform clients at connection time to
      use only secure connections to the indicated server.

   Neither mechanism is foolproof.  An attacker with control of the
   network or the DNS server could block resolution of HTTPS records on
   a client connecting to a new server, while HSTS requires a successful
   prior connection to the server and relies on the client to implement
   persistent storage of the HSTS directive.

   Used together, however, both approaches make clients less likely to
   send any requests over an insecure channel.  HTTP API servers with
   authenticated endpoints SHOULD employ both mechanisms.

2.2.  Connection Blocking

   If an API request succeeds despite having an unencrypted endpoint
   configured, the developer or user is less likely to notice the
   misconfiguration.  Where possible, it is advantageous for such a
   misconfiguration to fail immediately so that the error can be noticed
   and corrected.

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   HTTP API servers MAY induce such an early failure by not accepting
   unencrypted connections, e.g. on port 80.  This makes it impossible
   for a client to send a credential over an insecure channel to the
   authentic server, as no such channel can be opened.  HTTP API servers
   MAY alternatively restrict connections on port 80 to network sources
   which are more trusted, such as a VPN or virtual network interface.

   However, this mitigation is limited against active network attackers,
   who can impersonate the HTTP API server and accept the client's
   insecure connection attempt.

2.3.  Credential Restriction

   Whenever possible, credentials should include an indicator to clients
   that the credential is restricted to secure contexts.  For example,
   Cookie-based authentication SHOULD include the Secure attribute
   described in Section 4.1.2.5 of [RFC6265].  Bearer tokens MAY use the
   format described in [RFC8959] to indicate the expected usage to the
   client.

2.4.  Disclosure Response

   Some deployments might not find it feasible to completely block
   unencrypted connections, whether because the hostname is shared with
   unauthenticated endpoints or for infrastructure reasons.  Therefore,
   HTTP API servers need a response for when a credential has been
   received over an insecure channel.

   HTTP status code 403 (Forbidden) indicates that "the server
   understood the request but refuses to fulfill it" [HTTP].  While this
   is generally understood to mean that "the server considers [the
   credentials] insufficient to grant access," it also states that "a
   request might be forbidden for reasons unrelated to the credentials."
   HTTP API servers SHOULD return status code 403 to all requests
   received over an insecure channel, regardless of the validity of the
   presented credentials.

   Because a difference in behavior would enable attackers to guess and
   check possible credentials, an HTTP API server MUST NOT return a
   different client response between a valid or invalid credential
   presented over an insecure connection.  Differences in behavior MUST
   only be visible on subsequent use of the credential over a secure
   channel.

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2.4.1.  Credential Revocation

   When a request is received over an unencrypted channel, the presented
   credential is potentially compromised.  HTTP API servers SHOULD
   revoke such credentials immediately.  When the credential is next
   used over a secure channel, the server MAY return an error that
   indicates why the credential was revoked.

   Credentials in a request can take on different forms.  API keys and
   tokens are simple modes for authentication, but can be abused by
   attackers to forge requests and hence should be revoked if
   compromised.  Requests can also be authenticated using derived
   values, where they only include digital signatures or message
   authentication codes (MACs) derived from credentials but not the
   credentials themselves.  Since an attacker cannot abuse the derived
   values to forge requests, the server MAY choose to not revoke the
   credentials in this case.

3.  Client Recommendations

   The following recommendations increase the success rate of the server
   recommendations above.

3.1.  Implement Relevant Protocols

   Clients SHOULD support and query for HTTPS records [RFC9460] when
   establishing a connection.  This gives HTTP API servers an
   opportunity to provide more complete information about capabilities,
   some of which are security-relevant.

   Clients SHOULD respect HSTS header fields [RFC6797] received from a
   server.  This includes implementing persistent storage of HSTS
   indications received from the server.

   Clients that do not follow either, or both, of these recommendations
   might not understand the requirements of the server and could have
   their traffic denied upon receipt, perhaps after having exposed
   authentication material in cleartext on the Internet.

3.2.  Respect Credential Restrictions

   [RFC6265] prohibits sending a Cookie with the Secure attribute over
   an insecure channel.

   Clients MUST NOT send any header field that contains a secret token
   over an insecure channel.  Such header fields include Authorization
   and Proxy-Authorization and are described in Sections 11.6.2 and
   11.7.2 of [RFC9110], respectively.

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3.3.  Disallow Insecure by Default

   When authentication is used, clients SHOULD require an explicit
   indication from the user or caller that an insecure context is
   expected which is distinct from the provided URI.  Depending on the
   interface, this might be a UI preference or an API flag.

   Absent such an indication, clients of HTTP APIs MUST implement and
   use HTTPS exclusively.

4.  Security Considerations

   This entire document is about security of HTTP API interactions.

   The behavior recommended in Section 2.4.1 creates the potential for a
   denial of service attack where an attacker guesses many possible
   credentials over an unencrypted connection in hopes of discovering
   and revoking a valid one.  HTTP API servers implementing this
   mitigation MUST also guard against such attacks, such as by limiting
   the number of requests before closing the connection and rate-
   limiting the establishment of insecure connections.

5.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no IANA actions.

6.  References

6.1.  Normative References

   [HTTP]     Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
              Ed., "HTTP Semantics", STD 97, RFC 9110,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9110, June 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9110>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

   [RFC6265]  Barth, A., "HTTP State Management Mechanism", RFC 6265,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6265, April 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6265>.

   [RFC6797]  Hodges, J., Jackson, C., and A. Barth, "HTTP Strict
              Transport Security (HSTS)", RFC 6797,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6797, November 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6797>.

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   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

   [RFC9110]  Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
              Ed., "HTTP Semantics", STD 97, RFC 9110,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9110, June 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9110>.

   [RFC9460]  Schwartz, B., Bishop, M., and E. Nygren, "Service Binding
              and Parameter Specification via the DNS (SVCB and HTTPS
              Resource Records)", RFC 9460, DOI 10.17487/RFC9460,
              November 2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9460>.

6.2.  Informative References

   [BLOG]     Viide, J., "Your API Shouldn't Redirect HTTP to HTTPS",
              May 2024, <https://jviide.iki.fi/http-redirects>.

   [RFC8959]  Nottingham, M., "The "secret-token" URI Scheme", RFC 8959,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8959, January 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8959>.

Acknowledgments

   We are grateful to Joachim Viide for his [BLOG] blog posting that
   brought up the issue.

Authors' Addresses

   Rich Salz
   Akamai Technologies
   Email: rsalz@akamai.com

   Mike Bishop
   Akamai Technologies
   Email: mbishop@evequefou.be

   Marius Kleidl
   Transloadit
   Email: marius@transloadit.com

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