Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Updates
draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-12
The information below is for an old version of the document.
| Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft that was ultimately published as RFC 9480.
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Hendrik Brockhaus , David von Oheimb | ||
| Last updated | 2021-07-09 (Latest revision 2021-06-30) | ||
| Replaces | draft-brockhaus-lamps-cmp-updates | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Reviews | |||
| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | WG Document | |
| Associated WG milestone |
|
||
| Document shepherd | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Became RFC 9480 (Proposed Standard) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-12
LAMPS Working Group H. Brockhaus
Internet-Draft D. von Oheimb
Updates: 4210, 5912, 6712 (if approved) Siemens
Intended status: Standards Track 9 July 2021
Expires: 10 January 2022
Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Updates
draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-12
Abstract
This document contains a set of updates to the syntax and transport
of Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) version 2. This document
updates RFC 4210 and RFC 6712.
The aspects of CMP updated in this document are using EnvelopedData
instead of EncryptedValue, clarifying the handling of p10cr messages,
improving the crypto agility, as well as adding new general message
types, extended key usages to identify certificates for use with CMP,
and '.well-known' HTTP path segments.
To properly differentiate the support of EnvelopedData instead of
EncryptedValue, the CMP version 3 is introduced in case a transaction
is supposed to use EnvelopedData.
CMP version 3 is introduced to enable signaling support of
EnvelopedData instead of EncryptedValue and signaling the use of an
explicit hash AlgorithmIdentifier in certConf messages, as far as
needed.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 10 January 2022.
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text
as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Convention and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Updates to RFC 4210 - Certificate Management Protocol
(CMP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 4210 . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. New Section 4.5 - Extended Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3. Update Section 5.1.1. - PKI Message Header . . . . . . . 7
2.4. New Section 5.1.1.3. - RootCaCert . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.5. New Section 5.1.1.4. - CertProfile . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.6. Update Section 5.1.3.1. - Shared Secret Information . . . 8
2.7. Replace Section 5.1.3.4 - Multiple Protection . . . . . . 8
2.8. Replace Section 5.2.2. - Encrypted Values . . . . . . . . 9
2.9. Update Section 5.3.4. - Certification Response . . . . . 11
2.10. Update Section 5.3.18. - Certificate Confirmation
Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.11. Update Section 5.3.19.2. - Signing Key Pair Types . . . . 12
2.12. Update Section 5.3.19.3. - Encryption/Key Agreement Key
Pair Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.13. Replace Section 5.3.19.9. - Revocation Passphrase . . . . 13
2.14. New Section 5.3.19.14 - CA Certificates . . . . . . . . . 13
2.15. New Section 5.3.19.15 - Root CA Certificate Update . . . 14
2.16. New Section 5.3.19.16 - Certificate Request Template . . 14
2.17. Update Section 5.3.22 - Polling Request and Response . . 16
2.18. Update Section 7 - Version Negotiation . . . . . . . . . 16
2.19. Update Section 7.1.1. - Clients Talking to RFC 2510
Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.20. Update Section 9 - IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . 17
2.21. Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase . . 19
2.22. Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral
Clarifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.23. Update Appendix D.1. - General Rules for Interpretation of
These Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
2.24. Update Appendix D.2. - Algorithm Use Profile . . . . . . 21
2.25. Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification
(Basic Authenticated Scheme) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3. Updates to RFC 6712 - HTTP Transfer for the Certificate
Management Protocol (CMP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.1. New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 6712 . . . . . . . . 21
3.2. Replace Section 3.6. - HTTP Request-URI . . . . . . . . . 22
3.3. Update Section 6. - IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . 22
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
A.1. 1988 ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
A.2. 2002 ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Appendix B. History of changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
1. Introduction
While using CMP [RFC4210] in industrial and IoT environments and
developing the Lightweight CMP Profile
[I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] some limitations were
identified in the original CMP specification. This document updates
RFC 4210 [RFC4210] and RFC 6712 [RFC6712] to overcome these
limitations.
Among others, this document improves the crypto agility of CMP, which
means to be flexible to react on future advances in cryptography.
This document also introduces new extended key usages to identify CMP
endpoints on registration and certification authorities.
1.1. Convention and Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Technical terminology is used in conformance with RFC 4210 [RFC4210],
RFC 4211 [RFC4211], and RFC 5280 [RFC5280]. The following key words
are used:
CA: Certification authority, which issues certificates.
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
RA: Registration authority, an optional system component to which a
CA delegates certificate management functions such as
authorization checks.
KGA: Key generation authority, which generates key pairs on behalf
of an EE. The KGA could be co-located with an RA or a CA.
EE: End entity, a user, device, or service that holds a PKI
certificate. An identifier for the EE is given as its subject
of the certificate.
2. Updates to RFC 4210 - Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)
2.1. New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 4210
The following subsection describes feature updates to RFC 4210
[RFC4210]. They are always related to the base specification. Hence
references to the original sections in RFC 4210 [RFC4210] are used
whenever possible.
Insert this section at the end of the current Section 1:
1.1. Changes since RFC 4210
The following updates are made in [thisRFC]:
* Add new extended key usages for various CMP server types, e.g.,
registration authority and certification authority, to express the
authorization of the entity identified in the certificate
containing the respective extended key usage extension to act as
the indicated PKI management entity.
* Extend the description of multiple protection to cover additional
use cases, e.g., batch processing of messages.
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
* Offering EnvelopedData as the preferred choice next to
EncryptedValue to better support crypto agility in CMP. Note that
according to RFC 4211 [RFC4211] section 2.1. point 9 the use of
the EncryptedValue structure has been deprecated in favor of the
EnvelopedData structure. RFC 4211 [RFC4211] offers the
EncryptedKey structure, a choice of EncryptedValue and
EnvelopedData for migration to EnvelopedData. For reasons of
completeness and consistency the type EncryptedValue has been
exchanged in all occurrences in RFC 4210 [RFC4210]. This includes
the protection of centrally generated private keys, encryption of
certificates, and protection of revocation passphrases. To
properly differentiate the support of EnvelopedData instead of
EncryptedValue, the CMP version 3 is introduced in case a
transaction is supposed to use EnvelopedData.
* Offering an optional hashAlg field in CertStatus supporting
confirmation of certificates signed with signature algorithms,
e.g., EdDSA, not directly indicating a specific hash algorithm to
use to compute the certHash.
* Adding new general message types to request CA certificates, a
root CA update, or a certificate request template.
* Extend the usage of polling to p10cr messages.
* Delete the mandatory algorithm profile in RFC 4210 Appendix D.2
[RFC4210] and refer to CMP Algorithms Section 7
[I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms].
2.2. New Section 4.5 - Extended Key Usage
The following subsection introduces a new extended key usage for CMP
servers authorized to centrally generate key pairs on behalf of end
entities.
Insert this section at the end of the current Section 4:
4.5. Extended Key Usage
The Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension indicates the purposes for
which the certified key pair may be used. It therefore restricts the
use of a certificate to specific applications.
A CA may want to delegate parts of its duties to other PKI management
entities. The mechanism to prove this delegation explained in this
section offers an automatic way of checking the authorization of such
delegation. Such delegation MAY also be expressed by other means,
e.g., explicit configuration.
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
To offer automatic validation for the delegation of a role by a CA to
another entity, the certificates used for CMP message protection or
signed data for central key generation MUST be issued by the
delegating CA and MUST contain the respective EKUs. This proves the
authorization of this entity by the delegating CA to act in the given
role as described below.
The OIDs to be used for these EKUs are:
id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) 27 }
id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) 28 }
id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) 32 }
Note: RFC 6402 section 2.10 [RFC6402] specifies OIDs for a CMC CA and
a CMC RA. As the functionality of a CA and RA is not specific to
using CMC or CMP as the certificate management protocol, these OIDs
MAY be re-used.
The meaning of the id-kp-cmKGA EKU is as follows:
CMP KGA: CMP Key Generation Authorities are identified by the id-kp-
cmKGA extended key usage. The CMP KGA knows the private
key it generated on behalf of the end entity. This is a
very sensitive service and therefore needs specific
authorization. This authorization is with the CA
certificate itself. Alternatively, the CA MAY delegate the
authorization by placing the id-kp-cmKGA extended key usage
in the certificate used to authenticate the origin of the
generated private key or the delegation MAY be determined
through local configuration of the end entity.
Note: In device PKIs, especially those issuing IDevID certificates
IEEE 802.1AR Section 8.5 [IEEE.802.1AR_2018], CA certificates may
have very long validity (including the GeneralizedTime value
99991231235959Z to indicate a not well-defined expiration date as
specified in IEEE 802.1AR Section 8.5 [IEEE.802.1AR_2018] and
RFC 5280 Section 4.1.2.5 [RFC5280]). Such validity periods SHOULD
NOT be used for protection of CMP messages and key generation.
Certificates containing one of the above EKUs SHOULD NOT use
indefinite expiration date.
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
2.3. Update Section 5.1.1. - PKI Message Header
Section 5.1.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the PKI message header.
This document introduces the new version 3 indicating support of
EnvelopedData as specified in Section 2.8.
Replace the ASN.1 Syntax of PKIHeader and the subsequent description
of pvno with the following text:
PKIHeader ::= SEQUENCE {
pvno INTEGER { cmp1999(1), cmp2000(2),
cmp2021(3) },
sender GeneralName,
recipient GeneralName,
messageTime [0] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
protectionAlg [1] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
senderKID [2] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL,
recipKID [3] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL,
transactionID [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
senderNonce [5] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
recipNonce [6] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
freeText [7] PKIFreeText OPTIONAL,
generalInfo [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
InfoTypeAndValue OPTIONAL
}
PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String
The usage of pvno values is described in Section 7.
2.4. New Section 5.1.1.3. - RootCaCert
Section 5.1.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] defines the PKIHeader and id-it
OIDs to be used in the generalInfo field. This section introduces
id-it-rootCaCert.
Insert this section after Section 5.1.1.2:
5.1.1.3. RootCaCert
This is used by the EE to indicate a specific root CA certificate,
e.g., when requesting a root CA certificate update, see
Section 5.3.19.15.
id-it-rootCaCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 20}
RootCaCertValue ::= CMPCertificate
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
2.5. New Section 5.1.1.4. - CertProfile
Section 5.1.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] defines the PKIHeader and id-it
OIDs to be used in the generalInfo field. This section introduces
id-it-certProfile.
Insert this section after Section 5.1.1.3:
5.1.1.4. CertProfile
This is used by the EE to indicate specific certificate profiles,
e.g., when requesting a new certificate or a certificate request
template, see Section 5.3.19.16.
id-it-certProfile OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 21}
CertProfileValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String
When used in a ir/cr/kur/genm, the value MUST NOT contain more
elements than the number of CertReqMsg or InfoTypeAndValue elements
and the certificate profile names refer to the elements in the given
order.
When used in a p10cr, the value MUST NOT contain multiple certificate
profile names.
2.6. Update Section 5.1.3.1. - Shared Secret Information
Section 5.1.3.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the MAC based
protection of a PKIMessage using the algorithm id-PasswordBasedMac.
Replace the first paragraph with the following text:
In this case, the sender and recipient share secret information with
sufficient entropy (established via out-of-band means or from a
previous PKI management operation). PKIProtection will contain a MAC
value and the protectionAlg MAY be one of the options described in
CMP Algorithms [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms]. The PasswordBasedMac
is specified as follows (see also [RFC4211] and [RFC9045]):
2.7. Replace Section 5.1.3.4 - Multiple Protection
Section 5.1.3.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the nested message.
This document enables using nested messages also for batch transport
of PKI messages between PKI management entities and with mixed body
types.
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
Replace the text of the section with the following text:
5.1.3.4. Multiple Protection
When receiving a protected PKI message, a PKI management entity such
as an RA MAY forward that message adding its own protection (which
MAY be a MAC or a signature, depending on the information and
certificates shared between the RA and the CA). Moreover, multiple
PKI messages MAY be aggregated. There are several use cases for such
messages.
* The RA confirms having validated and authorized a message and
forwards the original message unchanged.
* The RA modifies the message(s) in some way (e.g., adds or modifies
particular field values or add new extensions) before forwarding
them, then it MAY create its own desired PKIBody. If the changes
made by the RA to PKIMessage break the POP of a certificate
request, the RA MUST set the POP RAVerified. It MAY include the
original PKIMessage from the EE in the generalInfo field of
PKIHeader of a nested message (to accommodate, for example, cases
in which the CA wishes to check POP or other information on the
original EE message). The infoType to be used in this situation
is {id-it 15} (see Section 5.3.19 for the value of id-it) and the
infoValue is PKIMessages (contents MUST be in the same order as
the message in PKIBody).
* The RA collects several messages that are to be forwarded in the
same direction and forwards them in a batch. In communication to
the CA request messages and in communication from the CA response
or announcement messages will be collected. This can for instance
be used when bridging an off-line connection between two PKI
management entities.
These use cases are accomplished by nesting the messages within a new
PKI message. The structure used is as follows:
NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages
2.8. Replace Section 5.2.2. - Encrypted Values
Section 5.2.2 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the use of
EncryptedValue to transport encrypted data. This document extends
the encryption of data to preferably use EnvelopedData.
Replace the text of the section with the following text:
5.2.2. Encrypted Values
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
Where encrypted data (in this specification, private keys,
certificates, or revocation passphrase) are sent in PKI messages, the
EncryptedKey data structure is used.
EncryptedKey ::= CHOICE {
encryptedValue EncryptedValue, -- deprecated
envelopedData [0] EnvelopedData }
See CRMF [RFC4211] for EncryptedKey and EncryptedValue syntax and CMS
[RFC5652] for EnvelopedData syntax. Using the EncryptedKey data
structure offers the choice to either use EncryptedValue (for
backward compatibility only) or EnvelopedData. The use of the
EncryptedValue structure has been deprecated in favor of the
EnvelopedData structure. Therefore, it is recommended to use
EnvelopedData.
Note: The EncryptedKey structure defined in CRMF [RFC4211] is reused
here, which makes the update backward compatible. Using the new
syntax with the untagged default choice EncryptedValue is bits-on-
the-wire compatible with the old syntax.
To indicate support for EnvelopedData the pvno cmp2021 is introduced
by this document. Details on the usage of pvno values is described
in Section 7.
The EncryptedKey data structure is used in CMP to transport a private
key, certificate, or revocation passphrase in encrypted form.
EnvelopedData is used as follows:
* It contains only one RecipientInfo structure because the content
is encrypted only for one recipient.
* It may contain a private key in the AsymmetricKeyPackage structure
as defined in RFC 5958 [RFC5958] wrapped in a SignedData structure
as specified in CMS section 5 [RFC5652] signed by the Key
Generation Authority.
* It may contain a certificate or revocation passphrase directly in
the encryptedContent field.
The content of the EnvelopedData structure, as specified in CMS
section 6 [RFC5652], MUST be encrypted using a newly generated
symmetric content-encryption key. This content-encryption key MUST
be securely provided to the recipient using one of three key
management techniques.
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
The choice of the key management technique to be used by the sender
depends on the credential available at the recipient:
* Recipient's certificate that contains a key usage extension
asserting keyAgreement: The content-encryption key will be
protected using the key agreement key management technique, as
specified in CMS section 6.2.2 [RFC5652]. This is the preferred
technique.
* Recipient's certificate that contains a key usage extension
asserting keyEncipherment: The content-encryption key will be
protected using the key transport key management technique, as
specified in CMS section 6.2.1 [RFC5652].
* A password or shared secret: The content-encryption key will be
protected using the password-based key management technique, as
specified in CMS section 6.2.4 [RFC5652].
2.9. Update Section 5.3.4. - Certification Response
Section 5.3.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the Certification
Response. This document updates the syntax by using the parent
structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue as described in
Section 2.8 above. Moreover, it clarifies the certReqId to be used
in response to a p10cr message.
Replace the ASN.1 syntax of CertifiedKeyPair and CertOrEncCert with
the following text:
CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE {
certOrEncCert CertOrEncCert,
privateKey [0] EncryptedKey OPTIONAL,
-- see [CRMF] for comment on encoding
publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo OPTIONAL
}
CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE {
certificate [0] Certificate,
encryptedCert [1] EncryptedKey
}
Add the following as a new paragraph right after the ASN.1 syntax:
A p10cr message contains exactly one CertificationRequestInfo data
structure as specified in PKCS#10 [RFC2986] but no certReqId.
Therefore, the certReqId in the corresponding certification response
(cp) message MUST be set to 0.
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
Add the following as new paragraphs to the end of the section:
The use of EncryptedKey is described in Section 5.2.2.
Note: To indicate support for EnvelopedData the pvno cmp2021 is
introduced by this document. Details on the usage of different pvno
values are described in Section 7.
2.10. Update Section 5.3.18. - Certificate Confirmation Content
This section introduces an optional hashAlg field to the CertStatus
type used in certConf messages to explicitly specify the hash
algorithm for those certificates where no hash algorithm is specified
in the signatureAlgorithm field.
Replace the ASN.1 Syntax of CertStatus with the following text:
CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
certHash OCTET STRING,
certReqId INTEGER,
statusInfo PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL
}
The hashAlg field SHOULD be used only in exceptional cases where the
signatureAlgorithm of the certificate to be confirmed does not
specify a hash algorithm, neither in the OID nor in the parameters.
In such cases, e.g., for EdDSA, the hashAlg MUST be used to specify
the hash algorithm to be used for calculating the certHash value.
Otherwise, the certHash value SHALL be computed using the same hash
algorithm as used to create and verify the certificate signature. If
hashAlg is used, the CMP version indicated by the certConf message
header must be cmp2021(3).
2.11. Update Section 5.3.19.2. - Signing Key Pair Types
The following section clarifies the usage of the Signing Key Pair
Types on referencing EC curves.
Insert this note at the end of Section 5.3.19.2:
Note: In case several EC curves are supported, several id-ecPublicKey
elements need to be given, one per named curve.
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
2.12. Update Section 5.3.19.3. - Encryption/Key Agreement Key Pair
Types
The following section clarifies the use of the Encryption/Key
Agreement Key Pair Types on referencing EC curves.
Insert this note at the end of Section 5.3.19.3:
Note: In case several EC curves are supported, several id-ecPublicKey
elements need to be given, one per named curve.
2.13. Replace Section 5.3.19.9. - Revocation Passphrase
Section 5.3.19.9 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the provisioning of
a revocation passphrase for authenticating a later revocation
request. This document updates the handling by using the parent
structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue to transport this
information as described in Section 2.8 above.
Replace the text of the section with the following text:
5.3.19.9. Revocation Passphrase
This MAY be used by the EE to send a passphrase to a CA/RA for the
purpose of authenticating a later revocation request (in the case
that the appropriate signing private key is no longer available to
authenticate the request). See Appendix B for further details on the
use of this mechanism.
GenMsg: {id-it 12}, EncryptedKey
GenRep: {id-it 12}, < absent >
The use of EncryptedKey is described in Section 5.2.2.
2.14. New Section 5.3.19.14 - CA Certificates
The following subsection describes PKI general messages using id-it-
caCerts. The use is specified in Lightweight CMP Profile [I-D.ietf-
lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] Section 4.4.
Insert this section after Section 5.3.19.13:
2.3.19.14 CA Certificates
This MAY be used by the client to get the current CA intermediate and
issuing CA certificates.
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
GenMsg: {id-it 17}, < absent >
GenRep: {id-it 17}, SEQUENCE OF CMPCertificate | < absent >
2.15. New Section 5.3.19.15 - Root CA Certificate Update
The following subsection describes PKI general messages using id-it-
rootCaKeyUpdate. The use is specified in Lightweight CMP Profile [I-
D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] Section 4.4.
Insert this section after new Section 5.3.19.14:
5.3.19.15. Root CA Certificate Update
This MAY be used by the client to get an update of an existing root
CA Certificate, which MAY be indicated in the rootCaCert field, see
Section 5.1.1.3, of the PKIHeader of the request message. In
contrast to the ckuann message this approach follows the request/
response model.
GenMsg: {id-it 18}, < absent >
GenRep: {id-it 18}, RootCaKeyUpdateContent | < absent >
RootCaKeyUpdateValue ::= RootCaKeyUpdateContent
RootCaKeyUpdateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
newWithNew CMPCertificate,
newWithOld [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
oldWithNew [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL
}
Note: In contrast to CAKeyUpdAnnContent, this type offers omitting
newWithOld and oldWithNew in the GenRep message, depending on the
needs of the EE.
2.16. New Section 5.3.19.16 - Certificate Request Template
The following subsection introduces the PKI general message using id-
it-certReqTemplate. Details are specified in the Lightweight CMP
Profile [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] Section 4.4.
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
Insert this section after new Section 5.3.19.15:
5.3.19.16. Certificate Request Template
This MAY be used by the client to get a template containing
requirements for certificate request attributes and extensions. The
controls id-regCtrl-algId and id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen MAY contain
details on the types of subject public keys the CA is willing to
certify.
The id-regCtrl-algId control MAY be used to identify a cryptographic
algorithm, see RFC 5280 Section 4.1.2.7 [RFC5280], other than
rsaEncryption. The algorithm field SHALL identify a cryptographic
algorithm. The contents of the optional parameters field will vary
according to the algorithm identified. For example, when the
algorithm is set to id-ecPublicKey, the parameters identify the
elliptic curve to be used, see [RFC5480].
The id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen control SHALL be used for algorithm
rsaEncryption and SHALL contain the intended modulus bit length of
the RSA key.
GenMsg: {id-it 19}, < absent >
GenRep: {id-it 19}, CertReqTemplateContent | < absent >
CertReqTemplateValue ::= CertReqTemplateContent
CertReqTemplateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
certTemplate CertTemplate,
keySpec Controls OPTIONAL
}
Controls ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue
id-regCtrl-algId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) pkip(5) regCtrl(1) 11 }
AlgIdCtrl ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}}
id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) pkip(5) regCtrl(1) 12 }
RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER
The CertReqTemplateValue contains the prefilled certTemplate to be
used for a future certificate request. The publicKey field in the
certTemplate MUST NOT be used. In case the PKI management entity
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
wishes to specify supported public-key algorithms, the keySpec field
MUST be used. One AttributeTypeAndValue per supported algorithm or
RSA key length MUST be used.
Note: The Controls ASN.1 type is defined in CRMF Section 6 [RFC4211]
2.17. Update Section 5.3.22 - Polling Request and Response
Section 5.3.22 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes when and how polling
messages are used. This document adds the polling mechanism also for
outstanding responses to a p10cr.
Replace in the first paragraph the word 'cr' by 'cr, p10cr' and add
just before the state machine diagram the following text:
A p10cr message contains exactly one CertificationRequestInfo data
structure as specified in PKCS#10 [RFC2986] but no certificate
request identifier. Therefore, the certReqId MUST be set to 0 in all
subsequent messages of this transaction.
2.18. Update Section 7 - Version Negotiation
Section 7 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the use of CMP protocol
versions. This document describes the handling of the additional CMP
version cmp2021 introduced to indicate support of EnvelopedData and
hashAlg.
Replace the text of the first two paragraphs with the following text:
This section defines the version negotiation between client and
server used to choose among cmp1999 (specified in RFC 2510
[RFC2510]), cmp2000 (specified in RFC 4210 [RFC4210]), and cmp2021
(specified in this document). The only difference between protocol
versions cmp2021 and cmp2000 is that EnvelopedData replaces
EncryptedValue and the optional hashAlg field is added to CertStatus.
If a client does not support cmp2021 it chooses the versions for a
request as follows:
* If the client knows the protocol version(s) supported by the
server (e.g., from a previous PKIMessage exchange or via some out-
of-band means), then it MUST send a PKIMessage with the highest
version supported by both itself and the server.
* If the client does not know what version(s) the server supports,
then it MUST send a PKIMessage using the highest version it
supports.
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 16]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
If a client supports cmp2021 and encrypted values are supposed to be
transferred in the PKI management operation the client MUST choose
the version for a request as follows:
* If the client supports EnvelopedData, but not EncryptedValue, then
it MUST send a PKIMessage using cmp2021.
* If the client does not support EnvelopedData, but EncryptedValue,
then it MUST send a PKIMessage using cmp2000.
* If the client supports both EnvelopedData and EncryptedValue:
- If the client knows the protocol version(s) supported by the
server (e.g., from a previous PKIMessage exchange or via some
out-of-band means), then it MUST send a PKIMessage with the
highest version supported the server.
- If the client does not know what version(s) the server
supports, then it MUST send a PKIMessage using cmp2021.
If a client is supposed to send a certConf message containing the
hashAlg field the client MUST choose the version for a request as
follows:
* If the client supports cmp2021 it MUST use cmp2021 in the certConf
message.
* If the client does not support cmp2021 it MUST reject the
certificate.
2.19. Update Section 7.1.1. - Clients Talking to RFC 2510 Servers
Section 7.1.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the behavior of a
client sending a cmp2000 message talking to a cmp1999 server. This
document extends the section to clients with any higher version than
cmp1999.
Replace the first sentence of Section 7.1.1 with the following text:
If, after sending a message with a protocol version number higher
than cmp1999, a client receives an ErrorMsgContent with a version of
cmp1999, then it MUST abort the current transaction.
2.20. Update Section 9 - IANA Considerations
Section 9 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] contains the IANA Considerations of
that document. As this document defines a new Extended Key Usage,
the IANA Considerations need to be updated accordingly.
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 17]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
Add the following paragraphs after the third paragraph of the
section:
In the SMI-numbers registry "SMI Security for PKIX Extended Key
Purpose Identifiers (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3)" (see
https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-
numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3) as defined in RFC 7299 [RFC7299] one
addition has been performed.
One new entry has been added:
+=========+=============+============+
| Decimal | Description | References |
+=========+=============+============+
| 32 | id-kp-cmKGA | [thisRFC] |
+---------+-------------+------------+
Table 1: Addition to the PKIX
Extended Key Purpose Identifiers
registry
In the SMI-numbers registry "SMI Security for PKIX CMP Information
Types (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.4)" (see https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-
numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.4) as defined in
RFC 7299 [RFC7299] fife additions have been performed.
Fife new entries have been added:
+=========+=======================+============+
| Decimal | Description | References |
+=========+=======================+============+
| 17 | id-it-caCerts | [thisRFC] |
+---------+-----------------------+------------+
| 18 | id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate | [thisRFC] |
+---------+-----------------------+------------+
| 19 | id-it-certReqTemplate | [thisRFC] |
+---------+-----------------------+------------+
| 20 | id-it-rootCaCert | [thisRFC] |
+---------+-----------------------+------------+
| 21 | id-it-certProfile | [thisRFC] |
+---------+-----------------------+------------+
Table 2: Addition to the PKIX CMP
Information Types registry
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 18]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
In the SMI-numbers registry " SMI Security for PKIX CRMF Registration
Controls (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.5.1)" (see https://www.iana.org/assignments/
smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.5.1) as
defined in RFC 7299 [RFC7299] two additions have been performed.
Two new entries have been added:
+=========+======================+============+
| Decimal | Description | References |
+=========+======================+============+
| 11 | id-regCtrl-algId | [thisRFC] |
+---------+----------------------+------------+
| 12 | id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen | [thisRFC] |
+---------+----------------------+------------+
Table 3: Addition to the PKIX CRMF
Registration Controls registry
2.21. Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase
Appendix B of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the use of the revocation
passphrase. As this document updates RFC 4210 [RFC4210] to utilize
the parent structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue as
described in Section 2.8 above, the description is updated
accordingly.
Replace the first bullet point of this section with the following
text:
* The OID and value specified in Section 5.3.19.9 MAY be sent in a
GenMsg message at any time, or MAY be sent in the generalInfo
field of the PKIHeader of any PKIMessage at any time. (In
particular, the EncryptedKey structure as described in section
5.2.2 may be sent in the header of the certConf message that
confirms acceptance of certificates requested in an initialization
request or certificate request message.) This conveys a
revocation passphrase chosen by the entity to the relevant CA/RA.
For use of EnvelopedData this is in the decrypted bytes of
encryptedContent field and for use of EncryptedValue this is in
the decrypted bytes of the encValue field. Furthermore, the
transfer is accomplished with appropriate confidentiality
characteristics.
Replace the third bullet point of this section with the following
text:
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 19]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
* When using EnvelopedData the localKeyId attribute as specified in
RFC 2985 [RFC2985] and when using EncryptedValue the valueHint
field MAY contain a key identifier (chosen by the entity, along
with the passphrase itself) to assist in later retrieval of the
correct passphrase (e.g., when the revocation request is
constructed by the entity and received by the CA/RA).
2.22. Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral Clarifications
Appendix C of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides clarifications to the
request message behavior. As this document updates RFC 4210
[RFC4210] to utilize the parent structure EncryptedKey instead of
EncryptedValue as described in Section 2.8 above, the description is
updated accordingly.
Replace the comment within the ASN.1 syntax coming after the
definition of POPOPrivKey with the following text:
-- **********
-- * the type of "thisMessage" is given as BIT STRING in RFC 4211
-- * [RFC4211]; it should be "EncryptedKey" (in accordance with
-- * Section 5.2.2 of this specification). Therefore, this
-- * document makes the behavioral clarification of specifying
-- * that the contents of "thisMessage" MUST be encoded either as
-- * "EnvelopedData" or "EncryptedValue" (only for backward
-- * compatibility) and then wrapped in a BIT STRING. This
-- * allows the necessary conveyance and protection of the
-- * private key while maintaining bits-on-the-wire compatibility
-- * with RFC 4211 [RFC4211].
-- **********
2.23. Update Appendix D.1. - General Rules for Interpretation of These
Profiles
Appendix D.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides general rules for
interpretation of the PKI management messages profiles specified in
Appendix D and Appendix E of RFC 4210 [RFC4210]. This document
updates a sentence regarding the new protocol version cmp2021.
Replace the last sentence of the first paragraph of the section with
the following text:
Mandatory fields are not mentioned if they have an obvious value
(e.g., in this version of these profiles, pvno is always cmp2000).
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 20]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
2.24. Update Appendix D.2. - Algorithm Use Profile
Appendix D.2 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides a list of algorithms that
implementations must support when claiming conformance with PKI
Management Message Profiles as specified in CMP Appendix D.2
[RFC4210]. This document redirects to the new algorithm profile as
specified in Appendix A.1 of CMP Algorithms
[I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms].
Replace the text of the section with the following text:
D.2. Algorithm Use Profile
For specifications of algorithm identifiers and respective
conventions for conforming implementations, please refer to CMP
Algorithms Appendix A.1 [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms].
2.25. Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification (Basic
Authenticated Scheme)
Appendix D.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides the initial registration/
certification scheme. This scheme shall continue using
EncryptedValue for backward compatibility reasons.
Replace the comment after the privateKey field of
crc[1].certifiedKeyPair in the syntax of the Initialization Response
message with the following text:
-- see Appendix C, Request Message Behavioral Clarifications
-- for backward compatibility reasons, use EncryptedValue
3. Updates to RFC 6712 - HTTP Transfer for the Certificate Management
Protocol (CMP)
3.1. New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 6712
The following subsection describes feature updates to RFC 6712
[RFC6712]. They are related to the base specification. Hence
references to the original sections in RFC 6712 [RFC6712] are used
whenever possible.
Insert this section at the end of the current Section 1:
1.1 Changes since RFC 6712
The following updates are made in [thisRFC]:
* Introduce the HTTP path '/.well-known/cmp'.
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 21]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
* Extend the URI structure.
3.2. Replace Section 3.6. - HTTP Request-URI
Section 3.6 of RFC 6712 [RFC6712] specifies the used HTTP URIs. This
document introduces the HTTP path '/.well-known/cmp' and extends the
URIs.
Replace the text of the section with the following text:
3.6. HTTP Request-URI
Each CMP server on a PKI management entity supporting HTTP or HTTPS
transport MUST support the use of the path prefix '/.well-known/' as
defined in RFC 8615 [RFC8615] and the registered name 'cmp' to ease
interworking in a multi-vendor environment.
The CMP client needs to be configured with sufficient information to
form the CMP server URI. This is at least the authority portion of
the URI, e.g., 'www.example.com:80', or the full operation path
segment of the PKI management entity. Additionally, OPTIONAL path
segments MAY be added after the registered application name as part
of the full operation path to provide further distinction. A path
segment could for example support the differentiation of specific
CAs, certificate profiles, or PKI management operations. A valid
full operation path segment can look like this:
http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp
http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/operationLabel
http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/profileLabel
http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/profileLabel/operationLabel
3.3. Update Section 6. - IANA Considerations
Section 6 of RFC 6712 [RFC6712] contains the IANA Considerations of
that document. As this document defines a new '.well-known' URI
prefix, the IANA Considerations need to be updated accordingly.
Add the following text between the first and second paragraph of the
section:
In the registry of well-known URIs (see
https://www.iana.org/assignments/well-known-uris/well-known-
uris.xhtml#well-known-uris-1) as defined in RFC 8615 [RFC8615] the
following change has been performed.
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 22]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
One new name entry has been added:
+============+===================+============+
| URI suffix | Change controller | References |
+============+===================+============+
| cmp | IETF | [thisRFC] |
+------------+-------------------+------------+
Table 4
4. IANA Considerations
This document contains an update to the IANA Consideration sections
to be added to [RFC4210] and [RFC6712].
This document updates the ASN.1 modules of RFC 4210 Appendix F
[RFC4210] and RFC 5912 Section 9 [RFC5912]. The OIDs 99 (id-mod-
cmp2021-88) and 100 (id-mod-cmp2021-02) were registered in the SMI
Security for PKIX Module Identifier registry to identify the updated
ASN.1 modules.
< TBD: The temporary registration of cmp URI suffix expires
2022-05-20. The registration must be extended in time or update from
provisional to permanent. >
5. Security Considerations
No changes are made to the existing security considerations of
RFC 4210 [RFC4210] and RFC 6712 [RFC6712].
6. Acknowledgements
Special thank goes to Jim Schaad for his guidance and the inspiration
on structuring and writing this document we got from [RFC6402] which
updates CMC. Special thank also goes also to Russ Housley and Tomas
Gustavsson for reviewing and providing valuable suggestions on
improving this document.
We also thank all reviewers of this document for their valuable
feedback.
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms]
Brockhaus, H., Aschauer, H., Ounsworth, M., and J. Gray,
"Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Algorithms", Work
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 23]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-
algorithms-05, 7 May 2021,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lamps-
cmp-algorithms-05>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2510] Adams, C. and S. Farrell, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocols",
RFC 2510, DOI 10.17487/RFC2510, March 1999,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2510>.
[RFC2985] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object
Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2985, November 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2985>.
[RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2986, November 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2986>.
[RFC4210] Adams, C., Farrell, S., Kause, T., and T. Mononen,
"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
Management Protocol (CMP)", RFC 4210,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4210, September 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4210>.
[RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4211, September 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4211>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC5480] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk,
"Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
Information", RFC 5480, DOI 10.17487/RFC5480, March 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5480>.
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 24]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.
[RFC5912] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the
Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912>.
[RFC5958] Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", RFC 5958,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5958, August 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5958>.
[RFC6402] Schaad, J., "Certificate Management over CMS (CMC)
Updates", RFC 6402, DOI 10.17487/RFC6402, November 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6402>.
[RFC6712] Kause, T. and M. Peylo, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure -- HTTP Transfer for the Certificate
Management Protocol (CMP)", RFC 6712,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6712, September 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6712>.
[RFC7299] Housley, R., "Object Identifier Registry for the PKIX
Working Group", RFC 7299, DOI 10.17487/RFC7299, July 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7299>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8615] Nottingham, M., "Well-Known Uniform Resource Identifiers
(URIs)", RFC 8615, DOI 10.17487/RFC8615, May 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8615>.
[RFC9045] Housley, R., "Algorithm Requirements Update to the
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 9045,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9045, June 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9045>.
7.2. Informative References
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 25]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
[I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile]
Brockhaus, H., Fries, S., and D. V. Oheimb, "Lightweight
Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Profile", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-lightweight-
cmp-profile-05, 22 February 2021,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lamps-
lightweight-cmp-profile-05>.
[IEEE.802.1AR_2018]
IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area
networks - Secure Device Identity", IEEE 802.1AR-2018,
DOI 10.1109/IEEESTD.2018.8423794, 2 August 2018,
<https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8423794>.
Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules
A.1. 1988 ASN.1 Module
This section contains the updated ASN.1 module for [RFC4210]. This
module replaces the module in Appendix F of that document. Although
a 2002 ASN.1 module is provided, this 1988 ASN.1 module remains the
normative module as per the policy of the PKIX working group.
PKIXCMP {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-mod-cmp2021-88(99)}
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL --
IMPORTS
Certificate, CertificateList, Extensions, Name,
AlgorithmIdentifier, UTF8String,
id-kp -- if required; otherwise, comment out
FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit-88(18)}
-- The import of Name is added to define CertificationRequest
-- instead of importing it from PKCS#10 [RFC2986]
GeneralName, KeyIdentifier
FROM PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit-88(19)}
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 26]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
CertTemplate, PKIPublicationInfo, EncryptedKey, CertId,
CertReqMessages, Controls, id-regCtrl
FROM PKIXCRMF-2005 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-mod-crmf2005(36)}
-- The import of EncryptedKey is added due to the updates made
-- in CMP Updates [thisRFC]]. EncryptedValue does not need to
-- be imported anymore and is therefore removed here.
-- see also the behavioral clarifications to CRMF codified in
-- Appendix C of this specification
EnvelopedData, SignedData, Attribute
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004 { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) cms-2004(24) }
-- The import of EnvelopedData and SignedData is added due to
-- the updates made in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
-- The import of Attribute is added to define
-- CertificationRequest instead of importing it from
-- PKCS#10 [RFC2986]
;
-- the rest of the module contains locally-defined OIDs and
-- constructs
CMPCertificate ::= CHOICE {
x509v3PKCert Certificate
}
-- This syntax, while bits-on-the-wire compatible with the
-- standard X.509 definition of "Certificate", allows the
-- possibility of future certificate types (such as X.509
-- attribute certificates, WAP WTLS certificates, or other kinds
-- of certificates) within this certificate management protocol,
-- should a need ever arise to support such generality. Those
-- implementations that do not foresee a need to ever support
-- other certificate types MAY, if they wish, comment out the
-- above structure and "un-comment" the following one prior to
-- compiling this ASN.1 module. (Note that interoperability
-- with implementations that don't do this will be unaffected by
-- this change.)
-- CMPCertificate ::= Certificate
PKIMessage ::= SEQUENCE {
header PKIHeader,
body PKIBody,
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 27]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
protection [0] PKIProtection OPTIONAL,
extraCerts [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate
OPTIONAL
}
PKIMessages ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIMessage
PKIHeader ::= SEQUENCE {
pvno INTEGER { cmp1999(1), cmp2000(2),
cmp2021(3) },
sender GeneralName,
-- identifies the sender
recipient GeneralName,
-- identifies the intended recipient
messageTime [0] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
-- time of production of this message (used when sender
-- believes that the transport will be "suitable"; i.e.,
-- that the time will still be meaningful upon receipt)
protectionAlg [1] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
-- algorithm used for calculation of protection bits
senderKID [2] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL,
recipKID [3] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL,
-- to identify specific keys used for protection
transactionID [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
-- identifies the transaction; i.e., this will be the same in
-- corresponding request, response, certConf, and PKIConf
-- messages
senderNonce [5] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
recipNonce [6] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
-- nonces used to provide replay protection, senderNonce
-- is inserted by the creator of this message; recipNonce
-- is a nonce previously inserted in a related message by
-- the intended recipient of this message
freeText [7] PKIFreeText OPTIONAL,
-- this may be used to indicate context-specific instructions
-- (this field is intended for human consumption)
generalInfo [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
InfoTypeAndValue OPTIONAL
-- this may be used to convey context-specific information
-- (this field not primarily intended for human consumption)
}
PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String
-- text encoded as UTF-8 String [RFC3629] (note: each
-- UTF8String MAY include an [RFC3066] language tag
-- to indicate the language of the contained text
-- see [RFC2482] for details)
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 28]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
PKIBody ::= CHOICE { -- message-specific body elements
ir [0] CertReqMessages, --Initialization Request
ip [1] CertRepMessage, --Initialization Response
cr [2] CertReqMessages, --Certification Request
cp [3] CertRepMessage, --Certification Response
p10cr [4] CertificationRequest, --imported from [PKCS10]
popdecc [5] POPODecKeyChallContent, --pop Challenge
popdecr [6] POPODecKeyRespContent, --pop Response
kur [7] CertReqMessages, --Key Update Request
kup [8] CertRepMessage, --Key Update Response
krr [9] CertReqMessages, --Key Recovery Request
krp [10] KeyRecRepContent, --Key Recovery Response
rr [11] RevReqContent, --Revocation Request
rp [12] RevRepContent, --Revocation Response
ccr [13] CertReqMessages, --Cross-Cert. Request
ccp [14] CertRepMessage, --Cross-Cert. Response
ckuann [15] CAKeyUpdAnnContent, --CA Key Update Ann.
cann [16] CertAnnContent, --Certificate Ann.
rann [17] RevAnnContent, --Revocation Ann.
crlann [18] CRLAnnContent, --CRL Announcement
pkiconf [19] PKIConfirmContent, --Confirmation
nested [20] NestedMessageContent, --Nested Message
genm [21] GenMsgContent, --General Message
genp [22] GenRepContent, --General Response
error [23] ErrorMsgContent, --Error Message
certConf [24] CertConfirmContent, --Certificate confirm
pollReq [25] PollReqContent, --Polling request
pollRep [26] PollRepContent --Polling response
}
PKIProtection ::= BIT STRING
ProtectedPart ::= SEQUENCE {
header PKIHeader,
body PKIBody
}
id-PasswordBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {1 2 840 113533 7 66 13}
PBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
salt OCTET STRING,
-- note: implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes
-- of this string to values appropriate for their environment
-- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks
owf AlgorithmIdentifier,
-- AlgId for a One-Way Function (SHA-1 recommended)
iterationCount INTEGER,
-- number of times the OWF is applied
-- note: implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 29]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
-- of this integer to values appropriate for their environment
-- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks
mac AlgorithmIdentifier
-- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11],
} -- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202])
id-DHBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {1 2 840 113533 7 66 30}
DHBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
owf AlgorithmIdentifier,
-- AlgId for a One-Way Function (SHA-1 recommended)
mac AlgorithmIdentifier
-- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11],
} -- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202])
NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages
PKIStatus ::= INTEGER {
accepted (0),
-- you got exactly what you asked for
grantedWithMods (1),
-- you got something like what you asked for; the
-- requester is responsible for ascertaining the differences
rejection (2),
-- you don't get it, more information elsewhere in the message
waiting (3),
-- the request body part has not yet been processed; expect to
-- hear more later (note: proper handling of this status
-- response MAY use the polling req/rep PKIMessages specified
-- in Section 5.3.22; alternatively, polling in the underlying
-- transport layer MAY have some utility in this regard)
revocationWarning (4),
-- this message contains a warning that a revocation is
-- imminent
revocationNotification (5),
-- notification that a revocation has occurred
keyUpdateWarning (6)
-- update already done for the oldCertId specified in
-- CertReqMsg
}
PKIFailureInfo ::= BIT STRING {
-- since we can fail in more than one way!
-- More codes may be added in the future if/when required.
badAlg (0),
-- unrecognized or unsupported Algorithm Identifier
badMessageCheck (1),
-- integrity check failed (e.g., signature did not verify)
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 30]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
badRequest (2),
-- transaction not permitted or supported
badTime (3),
-- messageTime was not sufficiently close to the system time,
-- as defined by local policy
badCertId (4),
-- no certificate could be found matching the provided criteria
badDataFormat (5),
-- the data submitted has the wrong format
wrongAuthority (6),
-- the authority indicated in the request is different from the
-- one creating the response token
incorrectData (7),
-- the requester's data is incorrect (for notary services)
missingTimeStamp (8),
-- when the timestamp is missing but should be there
-- (by policy)
badPOP (9),
-- the proof-of-possession failed
certRevoked (10),
-- the certificate has already been revoked
certConfirmed (11),
-- the certificate has already been confirmed
wrongIntegrity (12),
-- invalid integrity, password based instead of signature or
-- vice versa
badRecipientNonce (13),
-- invalid recipient nonce, either missing or wrong value
timeNotAvailable (14),
-- the TSA's time source is not available
unacceptedPolicy (15),
-- the requested TSA policy is not supported by the TSA.
unacceptedExtension (16),
-- the requested extension is not supported by the TSA.
addInfoNotAvailable (17),
-- the additional information requested could not be
-- understood or is not available
badSenderNonce (18),
-- invalid sender nonce, either missing or wrong size
badCertTemplate (19),
-- invalid cert. template or missing mandatory information
signerNotTrusted (20),
-- signer of the message unknown or not trusted
transactionIdInUse (21),
-- the transaction identifier is already in use
unsupportedVersion (22),
-- the version of the message is not supported
notAuthorized (23),
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 31]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
-- the sender was not authorized to make the preceding
-- request or perform the preceding action
systemUnavail (24),
-- the request cannot be handled due to system unavailability
systemFailure (25),
-- the request cannot be handled due to system failure
duplicateCertReq (26)
-- certificate cannot be issued because a duplicate
-- certificate already exists
}
PKIStatusInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
status PKIStatus,
statusString PKIFreeText OPTIONAL,
failInfo PKIFailureInfo OPTIONAL
}
OOBCert ::= CMPCertificate
OOBCertHash ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
certId [1] CertId OPTIONAL,
hashVal BIT STRING
-- hashVal is calculated over the DER encoding of the
-- self-signed certificate with the identifier certID.
}
POPODecKeyChallContent ::= SEQUENCE OF Challenge
-- One Challenge per encryption key certification request (in the
-- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages).
Challenge ::= SEQUENCE {
owf AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
-- MUST be present in the first Challenge; MAY be omitted in
-- any subsequent Challenge in POPODecKeyChallContent (if
-- omitted, then the owf used in the immediately preceding
-- Challenge is to be used).
witness OCTET STRING,
-- the result of applying the one-way function (owf) to a
-- randomly-generated INTEGER, A. [Note that a different
-- INTEGER MUST be used for each Challenge.]
challenge OCTET STRING
-- the encryption (under the public key for which the cert.
-- request is being made) of Rand.
}
-- Added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 32]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
Rand ::= SEQUENCE {
-- Rand is encrypted under the public key to form the challenge
-- in POPODecKeyChallContent
int INTEGER,
-- the randomly-generated INTEGER A (above)
sender GeneralName
-- the sender's name (as included in PKIHeader)
}
POPODecKeyRespContent ::= SEQUENCE OF INTEGER
-- One INTEGER per encryption key certification request (in the
-- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages). The
-- retrieved INTEGER A (above) is returned to the sender of the
-- corresponding Challenge.
CertRepMessage ::= SEQUENCE {
caPubs [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate
OPTIONAL,
response SEQUENCE OF CertResponse
}
CertificationRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
certificationRequestInfo SEQUENCE {
version INTEGER,
subject Name,
subjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE {
algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
subjectPublicKey BIT STRING },
attributes [0] IMPLICIT SET OF Attribute },
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
signature BIT STRING
}
CertResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER,
-- to match this response with corresponding request (a value
-- of 0 is to be used if certReqId is not specified in the
-- corresponding request, which can only be a p10cr)
status PKIStatusInfo,
certifiedKeyPair CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL,
rspInfo OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
-- analogous to the id-regInfo-utf8Pairs string defined
-- for regInfo in CertReqMsg [CRMF]
}
CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE {
certOrEncCert CertOrEncCert,
privateKey [0] EncryptedKey OPTIONAL,
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 33]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
-- see [CRMF] for comment on encoding
-- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE of
-- EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes made in
-- CMP Updates [thisRFC]
-- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the
-- syntax without this change
publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo OPTIONAL
}
CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE {
certificate [0] CMPCertificate,
encryptedCert [1] EncryptedKey
-- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE of
-- EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes made in
-- CMP Updates [thisRFC]
-- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the
-- syntax without this change
}
KeyRecRepContent ::= SEQUENCE {
status PKIStatusInfo,
newSigCert [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
caCerts [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
keyPairHist [2] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL
}
RevReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF RevDetails
RevDetails ::= SEQUENCE {
certDetails CertTemplate,
-- allows requester to specify as much as they can about
-- the cert. for which revocation is requested
-- (e.g., for cases in which serialNumber is not available)
crlEntryDetails Extensions OPTIONAL
-- requested crlEntryExtensions
}
RevRepContent ::= SEQUENCE {
status SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIStatusInfo,
-- in same order as was sent in RevReqContent
revCerts [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertId
OPTIONAL,
-- IDs for which revocation was requested
-- (same order as status)
crls [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertificateList
OPTIONAL
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 34]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
-- the resulting CRLs (there may be more than one)
}
CAKeyUpdAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE {
oldWithNew CMPCertificate, -- old pub signed with new priv
newWithOld CMPCertificate, -- new pub signed with old priv
newWithNew CMPCertificate -- new pub signed with new priv
}
CertAnnContent ::= CMPCertificate
RevAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE {
status PKIStatus,
certId CertId,
willBeRevokedAt GeneralizedTime,
badSinceDate GeneralizedTime,
crlDetails Extensions OPTIONAL
-- extra CRL details (e.g., crl number, reason, location, etc.)
}
CRLAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertificateList
CertConfirmContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertStatus
CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
-- the hash algorithm to use for calculating certHash
-- SHOULD NOT be used in all cases where the AlgorithmIdentifier
-- of the certificate signature specifies a hash algorithm
certHash OCTET STRING,
-- the hash of the certificate, using the same hash algorithm
-- as is used to create and verify the certificate signature
certReqId INTEGER,
-- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep
statusInfo PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL
}
PKIConfirmContent ::= NULL
-- Added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
RootCaKeyUpdateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
newWithNew CMPCertificate,
-- new root CA certificate
newWithOld [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
-- X.509 certificate containing the new public root CA key
-- signed with the old private root CA key
oldWithNew [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 35]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
-- X.509 certificate containing the old public root CA key
-- signed with the new private root CA key
}
-- Added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
CertReqTemplateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
certTemplate CertTemplate,
-- prefilled certTemplate structure elements
-- The SubjectPublicKeyInfo field in the certTemplate MUST NOT
-- be used.
keySpec Controls OPTIONAL
-- MAY be used to specify supported algorithms.
-- Controls ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue
-- as specified in CRMF (RFC4211)
}
id-regCtrl-algId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 11 }
AlgIdCtrl ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
-- SHALL be used to specify suported algorithms other than RSA
id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 12 }
RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER
-- SHALL be used to specify suported RSA key lengths
InfoTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
infoType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
infoValue ANY DEFINED BY infoType OPTIONAL
}
-- Example InfoTypeAndValue contents include, but are not limited
-- to, the following (un-comment in this ASN.1 module and use as
-- appropriate for a given environment):
--
-- id-it-caProtEncCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 1}
-- CAProtEncCertValue ::= CMPCertificate
-- id-it-signKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 2}
-- SignKeyPairTypesValue ::= SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier
-- id-it-encKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 3}
-- EncKeyPairTypesValue ::= SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier
-- id-it-preferredSymmAlg OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 4}
-- PreferredSymmAlgValue ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
-- id-it-caKeyUpdateInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 5}
-- CAKeyUpdateInfoValue ::= CAKeyUpdAnnContent
-- id-it-currentCRL OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 6}
-- CurrentCRLValue ::= CertificateList
-- id-it-unsupportedOIDs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 7}
-- UnsupportedOIDsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER
-- id-it-keyPairParamReq OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 10}
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 36]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
-- KeyPairParamReqValue ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
-- id-it-keyPairParamRep OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 11}
-- KeyPairParamRepValue ::= AlgorithmIdentifer
-- id-it-revPassphrase OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 12}
-- RevPassphraseValue ::= EncryptedKey
-- - Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE
-- - of EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes
-- - made in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
-- - Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the
-- - syntax without this change
-- id-it-implicitConfirm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 13}
-- ImplicitConfirmValue ::= NULL
-- id-it-confirmWaitTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 14}
-- ConfirmWaitTimeValue ::= GeneralizedTime
-- id-it-origPKIMessage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 15}
-- OrigPKIMessageValue ::= PKIMessages
-- id-it-suppLangTags OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 16}
-- SuppLangTagsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF UTF8String
-- id-it-caCerts OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 17}
-- CaCertsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF CMPCertificate
-- - id-it-caCerts added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
-- id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 18}
-- RootCaKeyUpdateValue ::= RootCaKeyUpdateContent
-- - id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
-- id-it-certReqTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 19}
-- CertReqTemplateValue ::= CertReqTemplateContent
-- - id-it-certReqTemplate added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
-- id-it-rootCaCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 20}
-- RootCaCertValue ::= CMPCertificate
-- - id-it-rootCaCert added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
-- id-it-certProfile OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 21}
-- CertProfileValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String
-- - id-it-certProfile added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
--
-- where
--
-- id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
-- iso(1) identified-organization(3)
-- dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)}
-- and
-- id-it OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 4}
--
--
-- This construct MAY also be used to define new PKIX Certificate
-- Management Protocol request and response messages, or general-
-- purpose (e.g., announcement) messages for future needs or for
-- specific environments.
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 37]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
GenMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue
-- May be sent by EE, RA, or CA (depending on message content).
-- The OPTIONAL infoValue parameter of InfoTypeAndValue will
-- typically be omitted for some of the examples given above.
-- The receiver is free to ignore any contained OBJ. IDs that it
-- does not recognize. If sent from EE to CA, the empty set
-- indicates that the CA may send
-- any/all information that it wishes.
GenRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue
-- Receiver MAY ignore any contained OIDs that it does not
-- recognize.
ErrorMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE {
pKIStatusInfo PKIStatusInfo,
errorCode INTEGER OPTIONAL,
-- implementation-specific error codes
errorDetails PKIFreeText OPTIONAL
-- implementation-specific error details
}
PollReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER
}
PollRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER,
checkAfter INTEGER, -- time in seconds
reason PKIFreeText OPTIONAL
}
--
-- Extended Key Usage extension for PKI entities used in CMP
-- operations, added due to the changes made in
-- CMP Updates [thisRFC]
-- The EKUs for the CA and RA are reused from CMC as defined in
-- [RFC6402]
--
-- id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 27 }
-- id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 }
id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 32 }
-- There is no 1988 ASN.1 module of PKCS#9 available to import the
-- syntax of the localKeyId attribute type and value from. Therefore,
-- the syntax is added here as needed for the updates made in
-- CMP Updates [thisRFC]
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 38]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
pkcs-9 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 9}
pkcs-9-at-localKeyId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-9 21}
LocalKeyIdValue ::= OCTET STRING
END -- of CMP module
A.2. 2002 ASN.1 Module
This section contains the updated 2002 ASN.1 module for [RFC5912].
This module replaces the module in Section 9 of that document. The
module contains those changes to the normative ASN.1 module from
RFC4210 Appendix F [RFC4210] that were to update to 2002 ASN.1
standard done in [RFC5912] as well as changes made in this document.
PKIXCMP-2021
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-cmp2021-02(100) }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
AttributeSet{}, Extensions{}, EXTENSION, ATTRIBUTE
FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57)}
AlgorithmIdentifier{}, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, ALGORITHM,
DIGEST-ALGORITHM, MAC-ALGORITHM
FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58)}
Certificate, CertificateList, id-kp
FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51)}
GeneralName, KeyIdentifier
FROM PKIX1Implicit-2009
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59)}
CertTemplate, PKIPublicationInfo, EncryptedKey, CertId,
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 39]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
CertReqMessages, Controls, id-regCtrl
FROM PKIXCRMF-2009
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-crmf2005-02(55) }
-- The import of EncryptedKey is added due to the updates made
-- in CMP Updates [thisRFC]. EncryptedValue does not need to
-- be imported anymore and is therefore removed here.
-- see also the behavioral clarifications to CRMF codified in
-- Appendix C of this specification
CertificationRequest
FROM PKCS-10
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkcs10-2009(69)}
-- (specified in RFC 2986 with 1993 ASN.1 syntax and IMPLICIT
-- tags). Alternatively, implementers may directly include
-- the [PKCS10] syntax in this module
localKeyId
FROM PKCS-9
{iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
modules(0) pkcs-9(1)}
-- The import of localKeyId is added due to the updates made in
-- CMP Updates [thisRFC]
EnvelopedData, SignedData
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2009
{iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2004-02(41)}
-- The import of EnvelopedData and SignedData is added due to
-- the updates made in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
;
-- the rest of the module contains locally defined OIDs and
-- constructs
CMPCertificate ::= CHOICE { x509v3PKCert Certificate, ... }
-- This syntax, while bits-on-the-wire compatible with the
-- standard X.509 definition of "Certificate", allows the
-- possibility of future certificate types (such as X.509
-- attribute certificates, WAP WTLS certificates, or other kinds
-- of certificates) within this certificate management protocol,
-- should a need ever arise to support such generality. Those
-- implementations that do not foresee a need to ever support
-- other certificate types MAY, if they wish, comment out the
-- above structure and "uncomment" the following one prior to
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 40]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
-- compiling this ASN.1 module. (Note that interoperability
-- with implementations that don't do this will be unaffected by
-- this change.)
-- CMPCertificate ::= Certificate
PKIMessage ::= SEQUENCE {
header PKIHeader,
body PKIBody,
protection [0] PKIProtection OPTIONAL,
extraCerts [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate
OPTIONAL }
PKIMessages ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIMessage
PKIHeader ::= SEQUENCE {
pvno INTEGER { cmp1999(1), cmp2000(2),
cmp2012(3) },
sender GeneralName,
-- identifies the sender
recipient GeneralName,
-- identifies the intended recipient
messageTime [0] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
-- time of production of this message (used when sender
-- believes that the transport will be "suitable"; i.e.,
-- that the time will still be meaningful upon receipt)
protectionAlg [1] AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}}
OPTIONAL,
-- algorithm used for calculation of protection bits
senderKID [2] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL,
recipKID [3] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL,
-- to identify specific keys used for protection
transactionID [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
-- identifies the transaction; i.e., this will be the same in
-- corresponding request, response, certConf, and PKIConf
-- messages
senderNonce [5] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
recipNonce [6] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
-- nonces used to provide replay protection, senderNonce
-- is inserted by the creator of this message; recipNonce
-- is a nonce previously inserted in a related message by
-- the intended recipient of this message
freeText [7] PKIFreeText OPTIONAL,
-- this may be used to indicate context-specific instructions
-- (this field is intended for human consumption)
generalInfo [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
InfoTypeAndValue OPTIONAL
-- this may be used to convey context-specific information
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 41]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
-- (this field not primarily intended for human consumption)
}
PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String
-- text encoded as UTF-8 String [RFC3629] (note: each
-- UTF8String MAY include an [RFC3066] language tag
-- to indicate the language of the contained text;
-- see [RFC2482] for details)
PKIBody ::= CHOICE { -- message-specific body elements
ir [0] CertReqMessages, --Initialization Request
ip [1] CertRepMessage, --Initialization Response
cr [2] CertReqMessages, --Certification Request
cp [3] CertRepMessage, --Certification Response
p10cr [4] CertificationRequest, --imported from [PKCS10]
popdecc [5] POPODecKeyChallContent, --pop Challenge
popdecr [6] POPODecKeyRespContent, --pop Response
kur [7] CertReqMessages, --Key Update Request
kup [8] CertRepMessage, --Key Update Response
krr [9] CertReqMessages, --Key Recovery Request
krp [10] KeyRecRepContent, --Key Recovery Response
rr [11] RevReqContent, --Revocation Request
rp [12] RevRepContent, --Revocation Response
ccr [13] CertReqMessages, --Cross-Cert. Request
ccp [14] CertRepMessage, --Cross-Cert. Response
ckuann [15] CAKeyUpdAnnContent, --CA Key Update Ann.
cann [16] CertAnnContent, --Certificate Ann.
rann [17] RevAnnContent, --Revocation Ann.
crlann [18] CRLAnnContent, --CRL Announcement
pkiconf [19] PKIConfirmContent, --Confirmation
nested [20] NestedMessageContent, --Nested Message
genm [21] GenMsgContent, --General Message
genp [22] GenRepContent, --General Response
error [23] ErrorMsgContent, --Error Message
certConf [24] CertConfirmContent, --Certificate confirm
pollReq [25] PollReqContent, --Polling request
pollRep [26] PollRepContent --Polling response
}
PKIProtection ::= BIT STRING
ProtectedPart ::= SEQUENCE {
header PKIHeader,
body PKIBody }
id-PasswordBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
usa(840) nt(113533) nsn(7) algorithms(66) 13 }
PBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 42]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
salt OCTET STRING,
-- note: implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes
-- of this string to values appropriate for their environment
-- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks
owf AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}},
-- AlgId for a One-Way Function (SHA-1 recommended)
iterationCount INTEGER,
-- number of times the OWF is applied
-- note: implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes
-- of this integer to values appropriate for their environment
-- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks
mac AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {...}}
-- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11],
-- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202])
}
id-DHBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
usa(840) nt(113533) nsn(7) algorithms(66) 30 }
DHBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
owf AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}},
-- AlgId for a One-Way Function (SHA-1 recommended)
mac AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {...}}
-- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11],
-- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202])
}
PKIStatus ::= INTEGER {
accepted (0),
-- you got exactly what you asked for
grantedWithMods (1),
-- you got something like what you asked for; the
-- requester is responsible for ascertaining the differences
rejection (2),
-- you don't get it, more information elsewhere in the message
waiting (3),
-- the request body part has not yet been processed; expect to
-- hear more later (note: proper handling of this status
-- response MAY use the polling req/rep PKIMessages specified
-- in Section 5.3.22; alternatively, polling in the underlying
-- transport layer MAY have some utility in this regard)
revocationWarning (4),
-- this message contains a warning that a revocation is
-- imminent
revocationNotification (5),
-- notification that a revocation has occurred
keyUpdateWarning (6)
-- update already done for the oldCertId specified in
-- CertReqMsg
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 43]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
}
PKIFailureInfo ::= BIT STRING {
-- since we can fail in more than one way!
-- More codes may be added in the future if/when required.
badAlg (0),
-- unrecognized or unsupported Algorithm Identifier
badMessageCheck (1),
-- integrity check failed (e.g., signature did not verify)
badRequest (2),
-- transaction not permitted or supported
badTime (3),
-- messageTime was not sufficiently close to the system time,
-- as defined by local policy
badCertId (4),
-- no certificate could be found matching the provided criteria
badDataFormat (5),
-- the data submitted has the wrong format
wrongAuthority (6),
-- the authority indicated in the request is different from the
-- one creating the response token
incorrectData (7),
-- the requester's data is incorrect (for notary services)
missingTimeStamp (8),
-- when the timestamp is missing but should be there
-- (by policy)
badPOP (9),
-- the proof-of-possession failed
certRevoked (10),
-- the certificate has already been revoked
certConfirmed (11),
-- the certificate has already been confirmed
wrongIntegrity (12),
-- invalid integrity, password based instead of signature or
-- vice versa
badRecipientNonce (13),
-- invalid recipient nonce, either missing or wrong value
timeNotAvailable (14),
-- the TSA's time source is not available
unacceptedPolicy (15),
-- the requested TSA policy is not supported by the TSA
unacceptedExtension (16),
-- the requested extension is not supported by the TSA
addInfoNotAvailable (17),
-- the additional information requested could not be
-- understood or is not available
badSenderNonce (18),
-- invalid sender nonce, either missing or wrong size
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 44]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
badCertTemplate (19),
-- invalid cert. template or missing mandatory information
signerNotTrusted (20),
-- signer of the message unknown or not trusted
transactionIdInUse (21),
-- the transaction identifier is already in use
unsupportedVersion (22),
-- the version of the message is not supported
notAuthorized (23),
-- the sender was not authorized to make the preceding
-- request or perform the preceding action
systemUnavail (24),
-- the request cannot be handled due to system unavailability
systemFailure (25),
-- the request cannot be handled due to system failure
duplicateCertReq (26)
-- certificate cannot be issued because a duplicate
-- certificate already exists
}
PKIStatusInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
status PKIStatus,
statusString PKIFreeText OPTIONAL,
failInfo PKIFailureInfo OPTIONAL }
OOBCert ::= CMPCertificate
OOBCertHash ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}}
OPTIONAL,
certId [1] CertId OPTIONAL,
hashVal BIT STRING
-- hashVal is calculated over the DER encoding of the
-- self-signed certificate with the identifier certID.
}
POPODecKeyChallContent ::= SEQUENCE OF Challenge
-- One Challenge per encryption key certification request (in the
-- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages).
Challenge ::= SEQUENCE {
owf AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}}
OPTIONAL,
-- MUST be present in the first Challenge; MAY be omitted in
-- any subsequent Challenge in POPODecKeyChallContent (if
-- omitted, then the owf used in the immediately preceding
-- Challenge is to be used).
witness OCTET STRING,
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 45]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
-- the result of applying the one-way function (owf) to a
-- randomly-generated INTEGER, A. [Note that a different
-- INTEGER MUST be used for each Challenge.]
challenge OCTET STRING
-- the encryption (under the public key for which the cert.
-- request is being made) of Rand.
}
-- Added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
Rand ::= SEQUENCE {
-- Rand is encrypted under the public key to form the challenge
-- in POPODecKeyChallContent
int INTEGER,
-- the randomly-generated INTEGER A (above)
sender GeneralName
-- the sender's name (as included in PKIHeader)
}
POPODecKeyRespContent ::= SEQUENCE OF INTEGER
-- One INTEGER per encryption key certification request (in the
-- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages). The
-- retrieved INTEGER A (above) is returned to the sender of the
-- corresponding Challenge.
CertRepMessage ::= SEQUENCE {
caPubs [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate
OPTIONAL,
response SEQUENCE OF CertResponse }
CertResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER,
-- to match this response with the corresponding request (a value
-- of 0 is to be used if certReqId is not specified in the
-- corresponding request, which can only be a p10cr)
status PKIStatusInfo,
certifiedKeyPair CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL,
rspInfo OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
-- analogous to the id-regInfo-utf8Pairs string defined
-- for regInfo in CertReqMsg [RFC4211]
}
CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE {
certOrEncCert CertOrEncCert,
privateKey [0] EncryptedKey OPTIONAL,
-- see [RFC4211] for comment on encoding
-- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE of
-- EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes made in
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 46]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
-- CMP Updates [thisRFC]
-- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the
-- syntax without this change
publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo OPTIONAL }
CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE {
certificate [0] CMPCertificate,
encryptedCert [1] EncryptedKey
-- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE of
-- EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes made in
-- CMP Updates [thisRFC]
-- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the
-- syntax without this change
}
KeyRecRepContent ::= SEQUENCE {
status PKIStatusInfo,
newSigCert [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
caCerts [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
keyPairHist [2] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL }
RevReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF RevDetails
RevDetails ::= SEQUENCE {
certDetails CertTemplate,
-- allows requester to specify as much as they can about
-- the cert. for which revocation is requested
-- (e.g., for cases in which serialNumber is not available)
crlEntryDetails Extensions{{...}} OPTIONAL
-- requested crlEntryExtensions
}
RevRepContent ::= SEQUENCE {
status SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIStatusInfo,
-- in same order as was sent in RevReqContent
revCerts [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertId OPTIONAL,
-- IDs for which revocation was requested
-- (same order as status)
crls [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertificateList OPTIONAL
-- the resulting CRLs (there may be more than one)
}
CAKeyUpdAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE {
oldWithNew CMPCertificate, -- old pub signed with new priv
newWithOld CMPCertificate, -- new pub signed with old priv
newWithNew CMPCertificate -- new pub signed with new priv
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 47]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
}
CertAnnContent ::= CMPCertificate
RevAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE {
status PKIStatus,
certId CertId,
willBeRevokedAt GeneralizedTime,
badSinceDate GeneralizedTime,
crlDetails Extensions{{...}} OPTIONAL
-- extra CRL details (e.g., crl number, reason, location, etc.)
}
CRLAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertificateList
PKIConfirmContent ::= NULL
NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages
-- Added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
RootCaKeyUpdateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
newWithNew CMPCertificate,
-- new root CA certificate
newWithOld [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
-- X.509 certificate containing the new public root CA key
-- signed with the old private root CA key
oldWithNew [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL
-- X.509 certificate containing the old public root CA key
-- signed with the new private root CA key
}
-- Added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
CertReqTemplateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
certTemplate CertTemplate,
-- prefilled certTemplate structure elements
-- The SubjectPublicKeyInfo field in the certTemplate MUST NOT
-- be used.
keySpec Controls OPTIONAL
-- MAY be used to specify supported algorithms.
-- Controls ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue
-- as specified in CRMF (RFC4211)
}
id-regCtrl-algId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 11 }
AlgIdCtrl ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}}
-- SHALL be used to specify suported algorithms other than RSA
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 48]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 12 }
RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER
-- SHALL be used to specify suported RSA key lengths
INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER
InfoTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
infoType INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE.
&id({SupportedInfoSet}),
infoValue INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE.
&Type({SupportedInfoSet}{@infoType}) }
SupportedInfoSet INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE ::= { ... }
-- Example InfoTypeAndValue contents include, but are not limited
-- to, the following (uncomment in this ASN.1 module and use as
-- appropriate for a given environment):
--
-- id-it-caProtEncCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 1}
-- CAProtEncCertValue ::= CMPCertificate
-- id-it-signKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 2}
-- SignKeyPairTypesValue ::= SEQUENCE OF
-- AlgorithmIdentifier{{...}}
-- id-it-encKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 3}
-- EncKeyPairTypesValue ::= SEQUENCE OF
-- AlgorithmIdentifier{{...}}
-- id-it-preferredSymmAlg OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 4}
-- PreferredSymmAlgValue ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{{...}}
-- id-it-caKeyUpdateInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 5}
-- CAKeyUpdateInfoValue ::= CAKeyUpdAnnContent
-- id-it-currentCRL OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 6}
-- CurrentCRLValue ::= CertificateList
-- id-it-unsupportedOIDs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 7}
-- UnsupportedOIDsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER
-- id-it-keyPairParamReq OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 10}
-- KeyPairParamReqValue ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
-- id-it-keyPairParamRep OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 11}
-- KeyPairParamRepValue ::= AlgorithmIdentifer
-- id-it-revPassphrase OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 12}
-- RevPassphraseValue ::= EncryptedKey
-- - Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE
-- - of EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes
-- - made in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
-- - Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to
-- - the syntax without this change
-- id-it-implicitConfirm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 13}
-- ImplicitConfirmValue ::= NULL
-- id-it-confirmWaitTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 14}
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 49]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
-- ConfirmWaitTimeValue ::= GeneralizedTime
-- id-it-origPKIMessage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 15}
-- OrigPKIMessageValue ::= PKIMessages
-- id-it-suppLangTags OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 16}
-- SuppLangTagsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF UTF8String
-- id-it-caCerts OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 17}
-- CaCertsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF CMPCertificate
-- - id-it-caCerts added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
-- id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 18}
-- RootCaKeyUpdateValue ::= RootCaKeyUpdateContent
-- - id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
-- id-it-certReqTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 19}
-- CertReqTemplateValue ::= CertReqTemplateContent
-- - id-it-certReqTemplate added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
-- id-it-rootCaCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 20}
-- RootCaCertValue ::= CMPCertificate
-- - id-it-rootCaCert added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
-- id-it-certProfile OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 21}
-- CertProfileValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String
-- - id-it-certProfile added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
--
-- where
--
-- id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
-- iso(1) identified-organization(3)
-- dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)}
-- and
-- id-it OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 4}
--
--
-- This construct MAY also be used to define new PKIX Certificate
-- Management Protocol request and response messages, or general-
-- purpose (e.g., announcement) messages for future needs or for
-- specific environments.
GenMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue
-- May be sent by EE, RA, or CA (depending on message content).
-- The OPTIONAL infoValue parameter of InfoTypeAndValue will
-- typically be omitted for some of the examples given above.
-- The receiver is free to ignore any contained OBJECT IDs that it
-- does not recognize. If sent from EE to CA, the empty set
-- indicates that the CA may send
-- any/all information that it wishes.
GenRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue
-- Receiver MAY ignore any contained OIDs that it does not
-- recognize.
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 50]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
ErrorMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE {
pKIStatusInfo PKIStatusInfo,
errorCode INTEGER OPTIONAL,
-- implementation-specific error codes
errorDetails PKIFreeText OPTIONAL
-- implementation-specific error details
}
CertConfirmContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertStatus
CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
-- the hash algorithm to use for calculating certHash
-- SHOULD NOT be used in all cases where the AlgorithmIdentifier
-- of the certificate signature specifies a hash algorithm
certHash OCTET STRING,
-- the hash of the certificate, using the same hash algorithm
-- as is used to create and verify the certificate signature
certReqId INTEGER,
-- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep
statusInfo PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL }
PollReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER }
PollRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER,
checkAfter INTEGER, -- time in seconds
reason PKIFreeText OPTIONAL }
--
-- Extended Key Usage extension for PKI entities used in CMP
-- operations, added due to the changes made in
-- CMP Updates [thisRFC]
-- The EKUs for the CA and RA are reused from CMC as defined in
-- [RFC6402]
--
-- id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 27 }
-- id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 }
id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 32 }
END
Appendix B. History of changes
Note: This appendix will be deleted in the final version of the
document.
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 51]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
From version 11 -> 12:
* Extended Section 2.5 and the ASN.1 modules in Appendix A to allow
a sequence of certificate profiles in CertProfileValue (see thread
"id-it-CertProfile in draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates")
From version 10 -> 11:
* Add Section 2.10 to add an additional hashAlg field to the
CertStatus type to support certificates signed with a signature
algorithm not explicitly indicating a hash algorithm in the
AlgorithmIdentifier (see thread "Hash algorithm to us for
calculating certHash")
* Added newly registered OIDs and temporarily registered URI suffix
* Exchanged the import of CertificationRequest from RFC 2986 to the
definition from RFC 6402 Appendix A.1 (see thread "CMP Update of
CertificationRequest")
* Corrected the definition of LocalKeyIdValue in Appendix A.1
* Updated new RFC numbers for I-D.ietf-lamps-crmf-update-algs
From version 9 -> 10:
* Added 1988 ASN.1 syntax for localKeyId attribute to Appendix A.1
From version 08 -> 09:
* Deleted specific definition of CMP CA and CMP RA in Section 2.2
and only reference RFC 6402 for definition of id-kp-cmcCA and id-
kp-cmcRA to resolve the ToDo below based on feedback of Tomas
Gustavesson
* Added Section 2.4. and 2.5 to define id-it-rootCaCert and id-it-
certProfile to be used in Section 2.14 and 2.15
* Added reference to CMP Algorithms in Section 2.8
* Extended Section 2.14 to explicitly indicate the root CA an update
is requested for by using id-it-rootCaCert and changing the ASN.1
syntax to require providing the newWithOld certificate in the
response message
* Extended Section 2.15 to explicitly indicate the certificate
request template by using id-it-certProfile and on further details
of the newly introduced controls
* Deleted the table on id-kp-cmcCA and id-kp-cmcRA and adding id-it-
rootCaCert and id-it-certProfile in Section 2.19
* Adding the definition of id-it-rootCaCert and id-it-certProfile in
both ASN.1 modules in Appendix A
* Minor editorial changes reflecting the above changes
From version 07 -> 08:
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 52]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
* Added a ToDo to Section 2.2 to reflect a current discussion on the
need of an additional CMP-CA role and EKU and differentiation from
CMP-RA
* Added ToDos to Section 2.12 and 2.13
From version 06 -> 07:
* Added David von Oheimb as co-author
* Changed to XML V3
* Added Section 2.3 to enable a CMP protocol version number 3 in the
PKIHeader for cases where EnvelopedData is to be used (see thread
"Mail regarding draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates").
* Added Section 2.4 to refer to [I-D.ietf-lamps-crmf-update-algs]
for the update of id-PasswordBasedMac for PKI message protection
using passwords or shared secrets.
* Updated Section 2.6 to introduce the protocol version number 3 to
properly indicate support of EnvelopedData instead of
EncryptedValue in case a transaction requires use of EnvelopedData
(see thread "Mail regarding draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates").
* Update Section 2.14 to make the minimal changes to the respective
section in CMP more explicit.
* Added Sections 2.15 and 2.16 to address the new cmp2021 protocol
version in Section 7 Version Negotiation.
* Updated Section 2.17 to add new OIDs for id-regCtrl-algId and id-
regCtrl-rsaKeyLen for registration at IANA.
* Added Section 2.20 to update the general rules of interpretation
in Appendix D.1 regarding the new cmp2021 version.
* Added Section 2.21 to update the Algorithm Use Profile in
Appendix D.2 with the reference to the new CMP Algorithms document
as decided at IETF 108.
* Updates Section 3.1 to delete the description of a discovery
mechanism as decided at IETF 108.
* Various changes and corrections in wording.
From version 05 -> 06:
* Added the update of Appendix D.2 with the reference to the new CMP
Algorithms document as decided in IETF 108
* Updated the IANA considerations to register new OIDs for id-
regCtrl-algId and d-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen.
* Minor changes and corrections
From version 04 -> 05:
* Added Section 2.11 and Section 2.12 to clarify the usage of these
general messages types with EC curves (see thread
"AlgorithmIdentifier parameters NULL value - Re: InfoTypeAndValue
in CMP headers")
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 53]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
* Split former section 2.7 on adding 'CA Certificates', 'Root CA
Certificates Update', and 'Certificate Request Template' in three
separate sections for easier readability
* Changed in Section 2.15 the ASN.1 syntax of CertReqTemplateValue
from using reaKeyLen to usage of controls as specified in CRMF
Section 6 [RFC4211] (see thread "dtaft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and
rsaKeyLen")
* Updated the IANA considerations in Section 2.20 to introduce new
OID for id-regCtrl-algId and id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen (see thread
"dtaft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and rsaKeyLen")
* Updated the IANA Considerations in and the Appendixes to introduce
new OID for the updates ASN.1 modules (see thread "I-D Action:
draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-04.txt")
* Removed EncryptedValue from and added Controls to the list of
types imported from CRMF [RFC4211] in ASN.1 modules (see thread
"draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and the ASN.1 modules")
* Moved declaration of Rand out of the comment in ASN.1 modules (see
thread "draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and the ASN.1 modules")
* Minor changes and corrections
From version 03 -> 04:
* Added Section 2.7 to introduce three new id-it IDs for uses in
general messages as discussed (see thread "draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-
updates add section to introduce id-it-caCerts, id-it-
rootCaKeyUpdate, and id-it-certReqTemplate")
* Added the new id-it IDs and the /.well-known/cmp to the IANA
Considerations of [RFC4210] in Section 2.9
* Updated the IANA Considerations of [RFC4210] in Section 2.21
* Some changes in wording on Section 3 due to review comments from
Martin Peylo
From version 02 -> 03:
* Added a ToDo on aligning with the CMP Algorithms draft that will
be set up as decided in IETF 108
* Updated section on Encrypted Values in Section 2.8 to add the
AsymmetricKey Package structure to transport a newly generated
private key as decided in IETF 108
* Updated the IANA Considerations of [RFC4210] in Section 2.21
* Added the pre-registered OID in Section 2.21 and the ASN.1 module
* Added Section 3 to document the changes to RFC 6712 [RFC6712]
regarding URI discovery and using the path-prefix of '/.well-
known/' as discussed in IETF 108
* Updated the IANA Considerations section
* Added a complete updated ASN.1 module in 1988 syntax to update
Appendix F of [RFC4210] and a complete updated ASN.1 module in
2002 syntax to update Section 9 of [RFC5912]
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 54]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
* Minor changes in wording
From version 01 -> 02:
* Updated section on EKU OIDs in Section 2.2 as decided in IETF 107
* Changed from symmetric key-encryption to password-based key
management technique in Section 2.8 as discussed with Russ and Jim
on the mailing list
* Defined the attribute containing the key identifier for the
revocation passphrase in Section 2.21
* Moved the change history to the Appendix
From version 00 -> 01:
* Minor changes in wording
From draft-brockhaus-lamps-cmp-updates-03 -> draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-
updates-00:
* Changes required to reflect WG adoption
From version 02 -> 03:
* Added some clarification in Section 2.1
From version 01 -> 02:
* Added clarification to section on multiple protection
* Added clarification on new EKUs after some exchange with Tomas
Gustavsson
* Reused OIDs from RFC 6402 [RFC6402] as suggested by Sean Turner at
IETF 106
* Added clarification on the field containing the key identifier for
a revocation passphrase
* Minor changes in wording
From version 00 -> 01:
* Added a section describing the new extended key usages
* Completed the section on changes to the specification of encrypted
values
* Added a section on clarification to Appendix D.4
* Minor generalization in RFC 4210 [RFC4210] Sections 5.1.3.4 and
5.3.22
* Minor changes in wording
Authors' Addresses
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 55]
Internet-Draft CMP Updates July 2021
Hendrik Brockhaus
Siemens AG
Email: hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com
David von Oheimb
Siemens AG
Email: david.von.oheimb@siemens.com
Brockhaus & von Oheimb Expires 10 January 2022 [Page 56]