BGP operations and security
draft-ietf-opsec-bgp-security-00

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Document Type Active Internet-Draft (opsec WG)
Last updated 2013-01-18
Replaces draft-jdurand-bgp-security
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Internet Engineering Task Force                                J. Durand
Internet-Draft                                       CISCO Systems, Inc.
Intended status: BCP                                        I. Pepelnjak
Expires: July 22, 2013                                               NIL
                                                              G. Doering
                                                                SpaceNet
                                                        January 18, 2013

                      BGP operations and security
                  draft-ietf-opsec-bgp-security-00.txt

Abstract

   BGP (Border Gateway Protocol) is the protocol almost exclusively used
   in the Internet to exchange routing information between network
   domains.  Due to this central nature, it's important to understand
   the security measures that can and should be deployed to prevent
   accidental or intentional routing disturbances.

   This document describes measures to protect the BGP sessions itself
   (like TTL, MD5, control plane filtering) and to better control the
   flow of routing information, using prefix filtering and
   automatization of prefix filters, max-prefix filtering, AS path
   filtering, route flap dampening and BGP community scrubbing.

Foreword

   A placeholder to list general observations about this document.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [1].

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any

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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on July 22, 2013.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.  Definitions and Accronyms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.  Protection of the BGP router . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   4.  Protection of BGP sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     4.1.  Protection of TCP sessions used by BGP . . . . . . . . . .  4
     4.2.  BGP TTL security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   5.  Prefix filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     5.1.  Definition of prefix filters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
       5.1.1.  Prefixes that MUST not be routed by definition . . . .  6
       5.1.2.  Prefixes not allocated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       5.1.3.  Prefixes too specific  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       5.1.4.  Filtering prefixes belonging to the local AS . . . . .  9
       5.1.5.  IXP LAN prefixes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
       5.1.6.  The default route  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     5.2.  Prefix filtering recommendations in full routing
           networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
       5.2.1.  Filters with internet peers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
       5.2.2.  Filters with customers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
       5.2.3.  Filters with upstream providers  . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     5.3.  Prefix filtering recommendations for leaf networks . . . . 14
       5.3.1.  Inbound filtering  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
       5.3.2.  Outbound filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   6.  BGP route flap dampening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
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