SEND-based Source-Address Validation Implementation
draft-ietf-savi-send-07

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Document Type Active Internet-Draft (savi WG)
Last updated 2012-03-28
Replaces draft-bagnulo-savi-send
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SAVI Working Group                                            M. Bagnulo
Internet-Draft                                        A. Garcia-Martinez
Intended status: Standards Track                                    UC3M
Expires: September 29, 2012                               March 28, 2012

          SEND-based Source-Address Validation Implementation
                        draft-ietf-savi-send-07

Abstract

   This memo describes SEND SAVI, a mechanism to provide source address
   validation using the SEND protocol.  The proposed mechanism is
   intended to complement ingress filtering techniques to provide a
   finer granularity on the control of the source addresses used.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 29, 2012.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Bagnulo & Garcia-Martinez  Expires September 29, 2012           [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                  SEND SAVI                     March 2012

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Background to SEND SAVI  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.1.  Address Validation Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.2.  Binding Creation for SEND SAVI . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.3.  SEND SAVI Protection Perimeter . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     2.4.  Special cases  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   3.  SEND SAVI Specification  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     3.1.  SEND SAVI Data Structures  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     3.2.  SEND SAVI Device Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     3.3.  Traffic Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
       3.3.1.  Transit Traffic Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
       3.3.2.  Local Traffic Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     3.4.  SEND SAVI Port Configuration Guidelines  . . . . . . . . . 24
     3.5.  VLAN Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
     3.6.  Protocol Constants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
   4.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
     4.1.  Protection Against Replay Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
     4.2.  Protection Against Denial of Service Attacks . . . . . . . 28
     4.3.  Residual threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
     4.4.  Privacy considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
   5.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
   6.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
   7.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
     7.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
     7.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Bagnulo & Garcia-Martinez  Expires September 29, 2012           [Page 2]
Internet-Draft                  SEND SAVI                     March 2012

1.  Introduction

   This memo describes SEND SAVI (SEcure Neighbor Discovery Source-
   Address Validation Implementation), a mechanism to provide source
   address validation for IPv6 networks using the SEND protocol
   [RFC3971].  The proposed mechanism is intended to complement ingress
   filtering techniques to provide a finer granularity on the control of
   the source addresses used.

   SEND SAVI uses the DAD_NSOL (Duplicate Address Detection Neighbor
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