RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operation
draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-17

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Document Type Active Internet-Draft (sidr WG)
Last updated 2012-06-29
Replaces draft-ymbk-rpki-origin-ops
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Network Working Group                                            R. Bush
Internet-Draft                                 Internet Initiative Japan
Intended status: Best Current Practice                         June 2012
Expires: December 01, 2012

                 RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operation
                     draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-17

Abstract

   Deployment of RPKI-based BGP origin validation has many operational
   considerations.  This document attempts to collect and present the
   most critical.  It is expected to evolve as RPKI-based origin
   validation is deployed and the dynamics are better understood.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on December 01, 2012.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights

Bush                   Expires December 01, 2012                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft   RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operation        June 2012

   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text
   as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2
   2.  Suggested Reading  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2
   3.  RPKI Distribution and Maintenance  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   4.  Within a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   5.  Routing Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   6.  Notes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   7.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   8.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   9.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     10.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     10.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9

1.  Introduction

   RPKI-based origin validation relies on widespread deployment of the
   Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480].  How the RPKI is
   distributed and maintained globally is a serious concern from many
   aspects.

   The global RPKI is in very initial stages of deployment, there is no
   single root trust anchor, initial testing is being done by the IANA
   and the RIRs, and there are technical testbeds.  It is thought that
   origin validation based on the RPKI will be deployed incrementally
   over the next year to five years.  It is assumed that eventually
   there will be a single root trust anchor for the public address
   space.

   Origin validation needs to be done only by an AS's border routers and
   is designed so that it can be used to protect announcements which are
   originated by any network participating in Internet BGP routing:
   large providers, upstreams and down-streams, and by small stub/
   enterprise/edge routers.

   Origin validation has been designed to be deployed on current routers
   without significant hardware upgrade.  It should be used in border
   routers by operators from large backbones to small stub/entetprise/
   edge networks.

   RPKI-based origin validation has been designed so that, with prudent
   local routing policies, there is little risk that what is seen as
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