TLS Out-of-Band Public Key Validation
draft-ietf-tls-oob-pubkey-03

The information below is for an old version of the document
Document Type Active Internet-Draft (tls WG)
Last updated 2012-04-25
Replaces draft-wouters-tls-oob-pubkey
Stream IETF
Intended RFC status (None)
Formats plain text pdf html
Stream WG state WG Document
Document shepherd None
IESG IESG state I-D Exists
Telechat date
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)
TLS                                                           P. Wouters
Internet-Draft                                       No Hats Corporation
Intended status: Standards Track                              J. Gilmore
Expires: October 27, 2012
                                                               S. Weiler
                                                            SPARTA, Inc.
                                                              T. Kivinen
                                                               AuthenTec
                                                           H. Tschofenig
                                                  Nokia Siemens Networks
                                                          April 25, 2012

                 TLS Out-of-Band Public Key Validation
                    draft-ietf-tls-oob-pubkey-03.txt

Abstract

   This document specifies a new TLS certificate type for exchanging raw
   public keys in Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport
   Layer Security (DTLS) for use with out-of-band public key validation.
   Currently, TLS authentication can only occur via X.509-based Public
   Key Infrastructure (PKI) or OpenPGP certificates.  By specifying a
   minimum resource for raw public key exchange, implementations can use
   alternative public key validation methods.

   One such alternative public key valiation method is offered by the
   DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) together with DNS
   Security.  Another alternative is to utilize pre-configured keys, as
   is the case with sensors and other embedded devices.  The usage of
   raw public keys, instead of X.509-based certificates, leads to a
   smaller code footprint.

   The support for raw public keys is introduced into TLS via a new non-
   PKIX certificate type.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any

Wouters, et al.         Expires October 27, 2012                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft        TLS OOB Public Key Validation           April 2012

   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on October 27, 2012.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Wouters, et al.         Expires October 27, 2012                [Page 2]
Internet-Draft        TLS OOB Public Key Validation           April 2012

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
   3.  TLS Handshake Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
     3.1.  Client Hello  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
     3.2.  Server Hello  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
     3.3.  Certificate Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
     3.4.  Other Handshake Messages  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
     3.5.  Client authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
   6.  Contributors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
   7.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Wouters, et al.         Expires October 27, 2012                [Page 3]
Show full document text