Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance (DMARC)
draft-kucherawy-dmarc-base-00

The information below is for an old version of the document
Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2013-03-31
Stream (None)
Intended RFC status (None)
Formats plain text pdf html bibtex
IETF conflict review conflict-review-kucherawy-dmarc-base
Stream Stream state (No stream defined)
Consensus Boilerplate Unknown
RFC Editor Note (None)
IESG IESG state I-D Exists
Telechat date
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)
Network Working Group                                  M. Kucherawy, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                            March 31, 2013
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: October 2, 2013

 Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance (DMARC)
                     draft-kucherawy-dmarc-base-00

Abstract

   The email ecosystem currently lacks a cohesive mechanism through
   which email senders and receivers can make use of multiple
   authentication protocols in an attempt to establish reliable domain
   identifiers.  This lack of cohesion prevents receivers from providing
   domain-specific feedback to senders regarding the accuracy of
   authentication deployments.  Inaccurate authentication deployments
   preclude receivers from safely taking deterministic action against
   email that fails authentication checks.  Finally, email senders do
   not have the ability to publish policies specifying actions that
   should be taken against email that fails multiple authentication
   checks.

   This memo presents a proposal for a scalable mechanism by which an
   organization can express, using the Domain Name System, domain-level
   policies and preferences for message validation, disposition, and
   reporting with predictable and accurate results.

   The enclosed proposal is not intended to introduce mechanisms that
   provide elevated delivery privilege of authenticated email.  The
   proposal presents a mechanism for policy distribution that enables a
   continuum of increasingly strict handling of messages that fail
   multiple authentication checks, from no action, through silent
   reporting, up to message rejection.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference

Kucherawy                Expires October 2, 2013                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                    DMARC                       March 2013

   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on October 2, 2013.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Kucherawy                Expires October 2, 2013                [Page 2]
Internet-Draft                    DMARC                       March 2013

Table of Contents

   1.  License  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   2.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     2.1.   Scalability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     2.2.   Anti-Phishing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     2.3.   Towards An Authenticated Future . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     2.4.   Experiment Team . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   3.  Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     3.1.   High-Level Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     3.2.   Security Dependencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     3.3.   DMARC Discovery Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     3.4.   Detailed Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     3.5.   Out Of Scope  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   4.  Terminology and Definitions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     4.1.   Authentication Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     4.2.   Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     4.3.   Identifier Alignment  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
       4.3.1.   DKIM-authenticated Identifiers  . . . . . . . . . . . 17
       4.3.2.   SPF-authenticated Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
       4.3.3.   Alignment and Extension Technologies  . . . . . . . . 18
Show full document text