Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC)
draft-selander-ace-cose-ecdhe-07
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ACE Working Group G. Selander
Internet-Draft J. Mattsson
Intended status: Standards Track F. Palombini
Expires: January 4, 2018 Ericsson AB
July 03, 2017
Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC)
draft-selander-ace-cose-ecdhe-07
Abstract
This document specifies Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC), a
compact, and lightweight authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange
with ephemeral keys that can be used over any layer. EDHOC messages
are encoded with CBOR and COSE, allowing reuse of existing libraries.
Status of This Memo
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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described in the Simplified BSD License.
Selander, et al. Expires January 4, 2018 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC) July 2017
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. EDHOC Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Formatting of the Ephemeral Public Keys . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. Key Derivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. EDHOC Authenticated with Asymmetric Keys . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2. EDHOC Message 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.3. EDHOC Message 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.4. EDHOC Message 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5. EDHOC Authenticated with Symmetric Keys . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.2. EDHOC Message 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.3. EDHOC Message 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.4. EDHOC Message 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6. Error Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
6.1. Error Message Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
7.1. Media Types Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Appendix A. Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Appendix B. PSK Chaining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Appendix C. EDHOC with CoAP and OSCOAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
C.1. Transferring EDHOC in CoAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
C.2. Deriving an OSCOAP context from EDHOC . . . . . . . . . . 29
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1. Introduction
Security at the application layer provides an attractive option for
protecting Internet of Things (IoT) deployments, for example where
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