TLS Server Identity Pinning with Tickets
draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-11

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Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2019-06-12 (latest revision 2019-06-11)
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Intended RFC status Experimental
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Network Working Group                                         Y. Sheffer
Internet-Draft                                                    Intuit
Intended status: Experimental                                 D. Migault
Expires: December 13, 2019                                      Ericsson
                                                           June 11, 2019

                TLS Server Identity Pinning with Tickets
                  draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-11

Abstract

   Misissued public-key certificates can prevent TLS clients from
   appropriately authenticating the TLS server.  Several alternatives
   have been proposed to detect this situation and prevent a client from
   establishing a TLS session with a TLS end point authenticated with an
   illegitimate public-key certificate.  These mechanisms are either not
   widely deployed or limited to public web browsing.

   This document proposes experimental extensions to TLS with opaque
   pinning tickets as a way to pin the server's identity.  During an
   initial TLS session, the server provides an original encrypted
   pinning ticket.  In subsequent TLS session establishment, upon
   receipt of the pinning ticket, the server proves its ability to
   decrypt the pinning ticket and thus the ownership of the pinning
   protection key.  The client can now safely conclude that the TLS
   session is established with the same TLS server as the original TLS
   session.  One of the important properties of this proposal is that no
   manual management actions are required.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on December 13, 2019.

Sheffer & Migault       Expires December 13, 2019               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft               Pinning Tickets                   June 2019

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Conventions used in this document . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     1.2.  Scope of Experimentation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   2.  Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.1.  Initial Connection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.2.  Subsequent Connections  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     2.3.  Indexing the Pins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   3.  Message Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   4.  Cryptographic Operations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.1.  Pinning Secret  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.2.  Pinning Ticket  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.3.  Pinning Protection Key  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     4.4.  Pinning Proof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   5.  Operational Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     5.1.  Protection Key Synchronization  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     5.2.  Ticket Lifetime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     5.3.  Certificate Renewal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     5.4.  Certificate Revocation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     5.5.  Disabling Pinning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     5.6.  Server Compromise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     5.7.  Disaster Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   6.  Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     6.1.  Mint Fork . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       6.1.1.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       6.1.2.  Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       6.1.3.  Level of Maturity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
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