Last Call Review of draft-ietf-isis-pcr-03
review-ietf-isis-pcr-03-secdir-lc-salz-2016-01-14-00

Request Review of draft-ietf-isis-pcr
Requested rev. no specific revision (document currently at 05)
Type Last Call Review
Team Security Area Directorate (secdir)
Deadline 2016-01-05
Requested 2015-12-10
Authors János Farkas, Nigel Bragg, Paul Unbehagen, Glenn Parsons, Peter Ashwood-Smith, Chris Bowers
Draft last updated 2016-01-14
Completed reviews Genart Last Call review of -04 by Suresh Krishnan (diff)
Secdir Last Call review of -03 by Rich Salz (diff)
Opsdir Last Call review of -03 by Linda Dunbar (diff)
Assignment Reviewer Rich Salz
State Completed
Review review-ietf-isis-pcr-03-secdir-lc-salz-2016-01-14
Reviewed rev. 03 (document currently at 05)
Review result Has Issues
Review completed: 2016-01-14

Review
review-ietf-isis-pcr-03-secdir-lc-salz-2016-01-14

I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.  These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other last call comments.

My view: Ready with issues, about the security considerations section.

I know very little about IS-IS, or even the overall routing discipline.

One nit is that this document cannot easily be read stand-alone.  That is probably okay, but a pointer to background RFC's are a definition of terms (e.g., sub-TLV) would be helpful.

I do not understand how "reserving capacity" or "specifying capacity" cannot be used as a denial of service attack.  Perhaps that is related to the above paragraph?  Is there authentication (perhaps out of band) between IS-IS systems?  Message integrity that prevents spoofing or modification?

Thanks.