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Last Call Review of draft-ietf-lisp-sec-13
review-ietf-lisp-sec-13-secdir-lc-takahashi-2017-10-10-00

Request Review of draft-ietf-lisp-sec
Requested revision No specific revision (document currently at 29)
Type Last Call Review
Team Security Area Directorate (secdir)
Deadline 2017-10-04
Requested 2017-09-20
Authors Fabio Maino , Vina Ermagan , Albert Cabellos-Aparicio , Damien Saucez
I-D last updated 2017-10-10
Completed reviews Rtgdir Last Call review of -12 by Manav Bhatia (diff)
Secdir Last Call review of -13 by Takeshi Takahashi (diff)
Opsdir Last Call review of -13 by Mehmet Ersue (diff)
Genart Last Call review of -26 by Matt Joras (diff)
Secdir Last Call review of -26 by Alexey Melnikov (diff)
Assignment Reviewer Takeshi Takahashi
State Completed
Request Last Call review on draft-ietf-lisp-sec by Security Area Directorate Assigned
Reviewed revision 13 (document currently at 29)
Result Ready
Completed 2017-10-10
review-ietf-lisp-sec-13-secdir-lc-takahashi-2017-10-10-00
I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing
effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. These comments
were written primarily for the benefit of the security area directors. Document
editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other last call
comments.

I would say this document is ready with nits, but the nits are very minor.

[comments that require chages to the current draft]
1. I guess the authors mix up "reply" and "replay" in Section 6.6. "Reply
attacks" could be "Replay attacks".

[comments that does not necessarily require changes to the current draft]
2. The security aspect of LISP is addressed not only in this draft but also in
RFC6830 and in RFC7835. If I understood correctly, LISP-SEC addressed a part of
the threats mentioned in RFC7835. Then, it would be nice if the authors could
clarify what types of further threats that are not mentioned in LISP-SEC still
exist by referring to RFC6830 and RFC7835.

3. DOS/DDoS was mentioned in the introduction section, but it was not discussed
in the later sections. It would be nice if the authors could address DoS/DDoS
issues as well.