Last Call Review of draft-ietf-opsec-probe-attribution-06
review-ietf-opsec-probe-attribution-06-secdir-lc-reddyk-2023-06-22-00
Request | Review of | draft-ietf-opsec-probe-attribution |
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Requested revision | No specific revision (document currently at 09) | |
Type | Last Call Review | |
Team | Security Area Directorate (secdir) | |
Deadline | 2023-06-08 | |
Requested | 2023-05-25 | |
Authors | Éric Vyncke , Benoit Donnet , Justin Iurman | |
I-D last updated | 2023-06-22 | |
Completed reviews |
Genart Last Call review of -05
by Peter E. Yee
(diff)
Secdir Last Call review of -06 by Tirumaleswar Reddy.K (diff) Tsvart Last Call review of -05 by Magnus Westerlund (diff) Opsdir Last Call review of -05 by Linda Dunbar (diff) Opsdir Telechat review of -08 by Linda Dunbar (diff) |
|
Assignment | Reviewer | Tirumaleswar Reddy.K |
State | Completed | |
Request | Last Call review on draft-ietf-opsec-probe-attribution by Security Area Directorate Assigned | |
Posted at | https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/secdir/BuRl0qGJiFge1qG7eK7PFeomgvw | |
Reviewed revision | 06 (document currently at 09) | |
Result | Has issues | |
Completed | 2023-06-20 |
review-ietf-opsec-probe-attribution-06-secdir-lc-reddyk-2023-06-22-00
Reviewer: Tirumaleswar Reddy Review result: Ready with issues I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other last call comments. The summary of the review is Ready with issues. [1] else (or in addition), the Probe Description URI is "https://[2001:db8::dead]/.well-known/probing.txt". In this case, there might be a certificate verification issue. Comment> It is possible to get a certificate with IP address from a public CA (see https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8738). [2] You may want to consider referring to https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-6man-hbh-processing/, It discusses HBH option processing by intermediate nodes and recommendations to process new HBH options. [3] I suggest discussing the privacy implications that an eavesdropper will be able to view the PII data in the Probe. [4] As a consequence, the recipient of this information cannot trust it without confirmation. If a recipient cannot confirm the information or does not wish to do so, it should treat the flows as if there were no probe attribution. Comment> How can the recipient of the probe information validate it is authentic for confirmation ? Cheers, -Tiru