Last Call Review of draft-ietf-opsec-probe-attribution-06
review-ietf-opsec-probe-attribution-06-secdir-lc-reddyk-2023-06-22-00
| Request | Review of | draft-ietf-opsec-probe-attribution |
|---|---|---|
| Requested revision | No specific revision (document currently at 09) | |
| Type | IETF Last Call Review | |
| Team | Security Area Directorate (secdir) | |
| Deadline | 2023-06-08 | |
| Requested | 2023-05-25 | |
| Authors | Éric Vyncke , Benoit Donnet , Justin Iurman | |
| I-D last updated | 2023-11-28 (Latest revision 2023-07-23) | |
| Completed reviews |
Genart IETF Last Call review of -05
by Peter E. Yee
(diff)
Secdir IETF Last Call review of -06 by Tirumaleswar Reddy.K (diff) Tsvart IETF Last Call review of -05 by Magnus Westerlund (diff) Opsdir IETF Last Call review of -05 by Linda Dunbar (diff) Opsdir Telechat review of -08 by Linda Dunbar (diff) |
|
| Assignment | Reviewer | Tirumaleswar Reddy.K |
| State | Completed | |
| Request | IETF Last Call review on draft-ietf-opsec-probe-attribution by Security Area Directorate Assigned | |
| Posted at | https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/secdir/BuRl0qGJiFge1qG7eK7PFeomgvw | |
| Reviewed revision | 06 (document currently at 09) | |
| Result | Has issues | |
| Completed | 2023-06-20 |
review-ietf-opsec-probe-attribution-06-secdir-lc-reddyk-2023-06-22-00
Reviewer: Tirumaleswar Reddy
Review result: Ready with issues
I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's
ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the
IESG. These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the
security area directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat
these comments just like any other last call comments.
The summary of the review is Ready with issues.
[1]
else (or in addition), the Probe Description URI is
"https://[2001:db8::dead]/.well-known/probing.txt". In this case,
there might be a certificate verification issue.
Comment> It is possible to get a certificate with IP address from a public
CA
(see https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8738).
[2]
You may want to consider referring to
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-6man-hbh-processing/,
It discusses HBH option processing by intermediate nodes and
recommendations to process new HBH options.
[3]
I suggest discussing the privacy implications that an eavesdropper will be
able to view the PII data in the Probe.
[4]
As a consequence, the recipient of this information cannot trust it
without confirmation. If a recipient cannot confirm the information
or does not wish to do so, it should treat the flows as if there were
no probe attribution.
Comment> How can the recipient of the probe information validate it is
authentic for confirmation ?
Cheers,
-Tiru