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IETF Last Call Review of draft-ietf-teas-actn-poi-applicability-20
review-ietf-teas-actn-poi-applicability-20-opsdir-lc-buraglio-2026-09-19-00

Request Review of draft-ietf-teas-actn-poi-applicability
Requested revision No specific revision (document currently at 21)
Type IETF Last Call Review
Team Ops Directorate (opsdir)
Deadline 2026-09-30
Requested 2026-09-09
Requested by Jim Guichard
Authors Fabio Peruzzini , Jean-Francois Bouquier , Italo Busi , Daniel King , Daniele Ceccarelli
I-D last updated 2026-11-03 (Latest revision 2026-10-30)
Completed reviews Rtgdir Early review of -18 by Acee Lindem (diff)
Genart IETF Last Call review of -20 by Ines Robles (diff)
Rtgdir IETF Last Call review of -20 by Zheng Zhang (diff)
Opsdir IETF Last Call review of -20 by Nick Buraglio (diff)
Secdir IETF Last Call review of -20 by Yaron Sheffer (diff)
Secdir Telechat review of -21 by Yaron Sheffer
Assignment Reviewer Nick Buraglio
State Completed
Request IETF Last Call review on draft-ietf-teas-actn-poi-applicability by Ops Directorate Assigned
Posted at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ops-dir/vgJARoujjp1YTF7YAJl0PqSxf3o
Reviewed revision 20 (document currently at 21)
Result Not ready
Completed 2026-09-19
review-ietf-teas-actn-poi-applicability-20-opsdir-lc-buraglio-2026-09-19-00
Hi,

I have been selected as the Operational Directorate (opsdir) reviewer for this
Internet-Draft.

The Operational Directorate reviews all operational and management-related
Internet-Drafts to ensure alignment with operational best practices and that
adequate operational considerations are covered.

A complete set of _"Guidelines for Considering Operations and Management in
IETF Specifications"_ can be found at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-opsawg-rfc5706bis/.

While these comments are primarily for the Operations and Management Area
Directors (Ops ADs), the authors should consider them alongside other feedback
received.

- Document: draft-ietf-teas-actn-poi-applicability-20

- Reviewer: Nick Buraglio

- Review Date: 2026-09-14

- Intended Status: Informational

---

## Summary

- Has Issues: I have some minor concerns about this document that I think
should be resolved before publication.

## General Operational Comments Alignment with RFC 5706bis

Provide an overview of the draft’s operational feasibility, readability, and
alignment with RFC5706bis guidelines.

The document describes how the ACTN architecture (RFC 8453) applies to Packet
Optical Integration (POI) deployments, specifically the coordination between
IP/MPLS Packet PNCs (P-PNCs) and Optical PNCs (O-PNCs) under a Multi-Domain
Service Coordinator (MDSC). The document analyzes topology discovery, service
setup, and multi-layer path coordination scenarios using YANG data models at
the MPI interface. This review was done on version 20. It is very detailed and
clearly authored, fairly easy to read with a well-structured gap analysis in
Section 6.

From an operational / engineering standpoint, however, the document has some
notable deficiencies. Section 8 (Operational Considerations) is thin relative
to the complexity of the architecture it describes, several operationally
significant failure modes are deferred or left unaddressed, and the security
section relies on fairly generic statements without guidance commensurate with
the sensitivity of cross-layer controller infrastructure. The concerns below
are raised in the spirit of making this document more useful to operators who
will actually attempt to deploy ACTN-based POI architectures, as it is fairly
complex in nature and would likely need significant operational resources for
design, ops, as especially troubleshooting in real-time. Having done some of
this work, the challenges are many and very complex. There are also some
significant holes in this document regarding the realities of operating such
networks that are left as out of scope, but nevertheless are  very common. I
almost feel like this is multiple documents pushed together into one monolithic
document that should be something like 3-4 discreet drafts (operational
guidance, security considerations, architectural overview). As it stands, with
an operators hat on I would be hard pressed to find this document useful from
an *operations* perspective.

## Major Issues

### Section 8 (Operational Considerations) is inadequate for the architecture's
complexity

Section 8 lists high-level categories (capacity planning, interoperability,
performance monitoring, fault management) but provides no actionable guidance
for any of them. For an architecture that coordinates multi-layer provisioning
across packet and optical domains from multiple vendors, the following
important operational realities are missing or left wanting:

**State synchronization and consistency.** The MDSC maintains a topology and
service database derived from PNC notifications (RFC 7923, RFC 8641, RFC 8650).
The document does not discuss what happens when the MDSC state diverges from
PNC state—due to PNC restart, notification loss, or partial failure. In
production environments, controller state divergence is a well-known
operational hazard in multi-vendor deployments. To start, I would expect some
guidance on the following, even it it is simply "consider this as a
probblem-space when implementing" either as an operator or a developer of a
controller: - How the MDSC detects and recovers from state inconsistency. -
What happens to in-flight provisioning operations during a PNC restart or MDSC
failover? the operational realities of this shouldn't be under-stated. This is
a very common issue with such services, and one that should be addressed.

**MDSC high availability.** The MDSC is the single coordination point for
multi-layer provisioning. Its failure or restart has direct impact on the
ability to provision, modify, or restore services. The document does not
address MDSC redundancy, failover behavior, or the operational impact of MDSC
unavailability on already-provisioned services. This is a fundamental
deployment concern. I don't know of a large network that would deploy a PCE
without redundancy, and I suspect this is a significant gap here as well.

**Brownfield migration.** Section 3.3 briefly mentions the PCEP brownfield
case, but the document otherwise assumes a greenfield ACTN deployment. Most
service provider networks that would benefit from POI are brownfield
environments with long existing optical management systems and IP EMS/NMS.
There is no discussion of how operators should migrate from siloed domain
management to ACTN-based coordination, what the incremental steps are, or more
practically, what co-existence constraints apply. At minimum, the document
should acknowledge this and note whether the architecture is compatible with
staged adoption.

**Operational skill gaps.** A key motivation stated in Section 1 is that packet
and optical operations are siloed due to different skill sets, I've seen this
personally. The proposed ACTN architecture does not eliminate this problem—it
shifts it to the MDSC operator who must now understand the behavior of both
layers, an issue that in reality may be very challenging to overcome. The
document should acknowledge that deploying ACTN POI requires new multi-layer
operational competencies and may require organizational changes, rather than
implying automation alone resolves the skill gap, i.e. not a technical problem,
but a potential organizational shift. This is pretty difficult to articulate in
an informational doc, but it is very much an operational/organizational reality.

**Timing and latency of provisioning workflows.** The multi-step provisioning
workflows in Sections 4 and 5 involve sequential interactions between the MDSC,
P-PNCs, and O-PNCs. For bandwidth-on-demand or maintenance-driven rerouting
scenarios, latency in the control loop definitely matters. The document
provides no guidance on expected or acceptable provisioning times, nor on
timeout and retry behavior at the MPI. Operators need to know whether these
workflows are suitable for near-real-time bandwidth adjustment or only for
pre-planned changes. I've also seen this in PCE deployments. Finding the
latency requirements for an HA system to properly syncronize is a hidden
requirement in many cases, and latency of provisioning goes hand in glove. Not
exactly the same, but adjacent and informative in practice.

### Scalability analysis is explicitly deferred with no resolution path

Section 4 states: _"Reporting the entire inventory and detailed topology
information of packet and optical networks to the MDSC may present scalability
issues... The analysis of the scalability of this approach and mechanisms to
address potential issues is outside the scope of this document."_

This is acceptable for a first analysis, but Version 20 of the document should
either: - Provide at least a qualitative characterization of the scalability
constraints (e.g., order-of-magnitude topology sizes where concerns arise), or
- Reference specific work in progress that addresses this, or - Explicitly
identify this as a gap requiring further work.

Simply deferring scalability without a forward reference or gap identification
is insufficient at this stage of the draft's lifecycle. Operators deploying at
scale—which is the explicit target audience—need at least a framework for
assessing whether a given deployment is within tractable bounds. There are some
adjacent references in some commercial optical planning systems, and it may be
useful to reference those in study. There are also limits within many optical
shelves that require zone-based deployments for topology isolation (i.e.
OSPF-TE areas to reduce the overhead for the shelves to process LSAs). This may
also inform some data points in that regard. Detailing out scaling is hard, but
operators need some guidance, even if it is simply "please verify with vendors".

The document should either:
- Reference the specific work that will close this gap and indicate its current
status, or - Expand the gap statement to clarify what a complete SR-TE
augmentation must cover (binding SID allocation, SID list configuration, path
reporting, revertive behavior), so that implementers and WG contributors
understand the scope of missing work.

The note in Section 5.3 about binding SID persistence across router or PNC
reboots is operationally important and deserves explicit treatment rather than
a parenthetical remark. Loss of binding SID mappings after a reboot would break
inter-domain SR-TE stitching. Operators need to understand whether this is a
device requirement, a PNC requirement, or both.

### Failure recovery workflows are described inadequately or relegated to
appendix

Appendix A.2 describes maintenance window and router port failure scenarios,
but the descriptions are informal and incomplete. The router port failure
scenario (A.2.2) explicitly states _"the scenario is not clear"_ in the non-LAG
case. A document at version 20 should not contain an acknowledged unresolved
scenario in a normative appendix without at least characterizing why it is
unresolved and what the open design questions are.

More broadly, the document's failure model needs more work:
- Multi-layer fault isolation (i.e. defining which layer caused the alarm?) is
explicitly deferred to draft-ietf-teas-actn-poi-assurance, which is itself
still undergoing changes / scoping. - The cascading failure scenario—where an
optical failure causes IP link failure, triggering FRR, with the MDSC
subsequently needing to restore the optical path—is described only at a high
level with no discussion of timing interactions between the optical
restoration, FRR convergence, and MDSC-driven re-optimization. - There is no
discussion of partial failure states: what happens if the MDSC successfully
reconfigures the P-PNC but the O-PNC operation fails, or vice versa?

Given that multi-layer resiliency is one of the primary motivations for POI
(explicitly stated in Section 1), the treatment of failure recovery is
surprisingly thin in the main body of the document.

---

## Minor Issues

Operational considerations that should probably be in Section 8.

### Coherent pluggables (ZR/ZR+) exclusion deserves more explicit treatment

Section 2 excludes scenarios with coherent optical interfaces on IP routers
("Scenarios using coherent optical interfaces on the IP routers are outside the
scope of this document"). This exclusion is noted without explanation. Coherent
pluggable optics (400ZR, OpenZR+, OpenROADM-compliant ZR) are a repidly growing
deployment model where the boundary between packet and optical domains changes
fundamentally—the router itself becomes a DWDM endpoint, collapsing the
cross-technology Ethernet link concept.

Given the operational relevance of this deployment model and the rate that it
has beenn increasing in the wild, the document should [briefly] address why
this scenario is out of scope, and ideally note whether this is expected to be
addressed in future work (which is very likely worth the time, IMO).

### Notification subscription management is not discussed

The document relies heavily on RFC 7923 / RFC 8641 / RFC 8650 subscriptions for
the MDSC to receive real-time topology and service change notifications from
PNCs. However, there is no discussion of: - How the MDSC manages subscription
lifecycle across PNC restarts - What happens if notification delivery fails or
lags behind network state - Whether periodic polling is expected as a fallback
- Subscription filter granularity (subscribing to everything from a large PNC
may be impractical at scale)

### A gap exists in  specificity appropriate to controller infrastructure

Section 7 correctly notes that TLS should be used for RESTCONF, NETCONF, and
PCEP, and that NACM/RBAC provide access control. However, it may be useful to
cite current bests practices rather than simply acknoledge the need for them.

- No minimum TLS version is specified. Given that the MDSC controls both packet
and optical path setup across an entire operator network, it represents a
*very* high-value target. At minimum, the document should recommend TLS 1.2 or
later (per BCP 195/RFC 9325) and discourage older versions. - The MDSC
compromise scenario is not discussed. If an attacker gains control of the MDSC
or a PNC, they can reroute all traffic in the network. The document should
acknowledge the privilege level represented by the MDSC and note that operators
should treat MDSC access with the same care as they would a device with routing
protocol adjacency to all routers. See draft-ietf-spring-srv6-security, which
may be of use for reference. - Mutual authentication at the MPI is mentioned
implicitly (TLS) but not required explicitly. The document should state whether
client certificate authentication is expected, or whether password-based
authentication is acceptable. - Audit logging of MDSC and PNC configuration
operations is not mentioned. For a system that can provision and modify paths
across both layers, audit trails are an operational and often a regulatory
requirement. - The supply chain and trust model for multi-vendor PNCs is not
discussed. When an O-PNC from one vendor interoperates with a P-PNC from
another, the MPI is a trust boundary. Again, migth be too specific but
definitely worth considering.

## Nits

- **Section 1**: Readability: I don't really see the need to point out that 5g
and fiber networks are high bandwidth, this may read easier if "such as
ultra-fast mobile broadband for 5G and fiber connectivity services. " was left
out. It feels like an unnecessary distinction that will age out as newer
technologies emerge.

- **Section 2**: The reference to [RFC7424] for LAG/ECMP seems out of place;
RFC 7424 is about LAG component link utilization optimization, not LAG
configuration in general. IEEE 802.1AX is already cited for LAG; the RFC 7424
reference should be reviewed for accuracy. Both Figure 2 and Figure 3 are
fairly busy and hard to follow. I picked up your intention, but they're
reasonably hard to digest. I don't really have a suggestion as to what I would
change, but even something as simple as expanding them somehow to make them
less congested might help?

- **Section 5.3**: "The MDSC also request" should be "The MDSC also requests."

- **Appendix A.2.2**: "the scenario is not clear" is an unusual phrase for a
standards-track-adjacent document. This should be reformulated as a gap
statement with a specific description of what is unclear and what additional
specification would be needed to resolve it.

- **Section 6**: The gap summary notes that "TE Tunnel model... needs
enhancement to support scenarios where multiple parallel TE paths are used in
load-balancing." This is described as "noted" but "not analyzed in this
document." Given that multiple parallel TE paths for load balancing is a
standard deployment practice in SP networks, this gap deserves at least a gap
identifier rather than a footnote-style observation.