Security Considerations for Transient Numeric Identifiers Employed in Network Protocols
draft-gont-numeric-ids-sec-considerations-00
| The information below is for an old version of the document | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Document | Type | Expired Internet-Draft (individual) | |
| Last updated | 2016-12-21 (latest revision 2016-06-19) | ||
| Stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
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| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
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https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-gont-numeric-ids-sec-considerations-00.txt
Abstract
For more than 30 years, a large number of implementations of the TCP/ IP protocol suite have been subject to a variety of attacks, with effects ranging from Denial of Service (DoS) or data injection, to information leakage that could be exploited for pervasive monitoring. The root of these issues has been, in many cases, the poor selection of transient identifiers in such protocols, usually as a result of an insufficient or misleading specifications. This document formally updates RFC3552, such that RFCs are required to perform a security and privacy analysis of the transient numeric identifiers they specify.
Authors
Fernando Gont
(fgont@si6networks.com)
Ivan Arce
(stic@fundacionsadosky.org.ar)
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)