Security Considerations for Transient Numeric Identifiers Employed in Network Protocols
draft-gont-numeric-ids-sec-considerations-02

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Last updated 2018-09-01 (latest revision 2018-02-28)
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-gont-numeric-ids-sec-considerations-02.txt

Abstract

For more than 30 years, a large number of implementations of the TCP/ IP protocol suite have been subject to a variety of attacks, with effects ranging from Denial of Service (DoS) or data injection, to information leakage that could be exploited for pervasive monitoring. The root of these issues has been, in many cases, the poor selection of transient identifiers in such protocols, usually as a result of an insufficient or misleading specifications. This document formally updates RFC3552, such that RFCs are required to perform a security and privacy analysis of the transient numeric identifiers they specify.

Authors

Fernando Gont (fgont@si6networks.com)
Ivan Arce (iarce@quarkslab.com)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)