BGP Usage for SD-WAN Overlay Networks
draft-ietf-bess-bgp-sdwan-usage-23
Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (bess WG) | |
---|---|---|---|
Authors | Linda Dunbar , Ali Sajassi , John Drake , Basil Najem , Susan Hares | ||
Last updated | 2024-04-29 | ||
Replaces | draft-dunbar-bess-bgp-sdwan-usage | ||
RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
Intended RFC status | Informational | ||
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by Dan Romascanu
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Stream | WG state | WG Document | |
Document shepherd | Matthew Bocci | ||
Shepherd write-up | Show Last changed 2024-02-07 | ||
IESG | IESG state | I-D Exists | |
Consensus boilerplate | Yes | ||
Telechat date | (None) | ||
Responsible AD | Gunter Van de Velde | ||
Send notices to | matthew.bocci@nokia.com | ||
IANA | IANA review state | Version Changed - Review Needed |
draft-ietf-bess-bgp-sdwan-usage-23
Network Working Group L. Dunbar Internet Draft Futurewei Intended status: Informational A. Sajassi Expires: March 27, 2024 Cisco J. Drake Independet B. Najem Bell Canada S. Hares April 27, 2024 BGP Usage for SD-WAN Overlay Networks draft-ietf-bess-bgp-sdwan-usage-23 Abstract This document explores the complexities involved in managing large scale Software Defined WAN (SD-WAN) overlay networks, along with various SD-WAN scenarios. Its objective is to illustrate how the BGP-based control plane can effectively manage large-scale SD-WAN overlay networks with minimal manual intervention. Status of this Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. xxx, et al. [Page 1] Internet-Draft BGP Usage for SD-WAN April 27, 2024 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction...................................................3 2. Conventions used in this document..............................4 3. SD-WAN Scenarios and Their Requirements........................5 3.1. Requirements..............................................6 3.1.1. Supporting SD-WAN Segmentation.......................6 3.1.2. Client Service Requirement...........................6 3.1.3. SD-WAN Traffic Segmentation..........................7 3.1.4. Zero Touch Provisioning..............................8 3.1.5. Constrained Propagation of SD-WAN Edge Properties....8 3.2. Scenario #1: Homogeneous Encrypted SD-WAN.................9 3.3. Scenario #2: Differential Encrypted SD-WAN...............11 3.4. Scenario #3: Private VPN PE based SD-WAN.................12 4. Provisioning Model............................................13 4.1. Client Service Provisioning Model........................13 4.2. Policy Configuration.....................................14 4.3. IPsec Related Parameters Provisioning....................14 5. BGP Controlled SD-WAN.........................................14 5.1. Why BGP as Control Plane for SD-WAN?.....................14 5.2. BGP Walk Through for Homogeneous Encrypted SD-WAN........15 5.3. BGP Walk Through for Differential Encrypted SD-WAN.......18 5.4. BGP Walk Through for Application Flow-Based Segmentation.19 5.5. Benefit of Using Recursive Next Hop Resolution...........20 6. SD-WAN Forwarding Model.......................................20 6.1. Forwarding Model for Homogeneous Encrypted SD-WAN........21 6.1.1. Network and Service Startup Procedures..............21 6.1.2. Packet Walk-Through.................................21 6.2. Forwarding Model for Hybrid Underlay SD-WAN..............22 6.2.1. Network and Service Startup Procedures..............22 6.2.2. Packet Walk-Through.................................23 6.3. Forwarding Model for PE based SD-WAN.....................24 6.3.1. Network and Service Startup Procedures..............24 6.3.2. Packet Walk-Through.................................24 7. Manageability Considerations..................................25 8. Security Considerations.......................................25 Dunbar, et al. [Page 2] Internet-Draft BGP Usage for SD-WAN April 27, 2024 9. IANA Considerations...........................................27 10. References...................................................27 10.1. Normative References....................................27 10.2. Informative References..................................29 11. Acknowledgments..............................................29 1. Introduction Software Defined Wide Area Network (SD-WAN), as described in [MEF70.1] [MEF70.2], provides overlay connectivity services that optimize the transport of IP packets over one or more underlay connectivity services by recognizing applications and determining forwarding behavior by applying policies to them. Here are some of the main characteristics of "SD-WAN" networks: - Transport Augmentation, referring to utilizing paths over different underlay networks. There are often multiple parallel overlay paths between any two SD-WAN edges; some are private networks over which traffic can traverse with or without encryption; others require encryption, e.g., over untrusted public networks. - Instead of all traffic hauled to corporate headquarters for centralized policy control, direct Internet breakout from remote branch offices is allowed. - Some traffic can be steered onto specific overlay paths based on the packets matching a predefined condition instead of destination IP addresses [RFC9522]. The matching condition can be one or multiple fields of the IP header of the packets. More detailed attributes for steering traffic are described in the Table7 and Table 8 of [MEF70.1]. Using IPv6 [RFC8200] packets as an example, the Flow Label, the source address, a specific extension header field, or a combination of multiple IP header fields can be used to steer traffic. - The traffic forwarding can also be based on specific performance criteria (e.g., packet delay, packet loss, jitter) to provide better performance by choosing the underlay that meets or exceeds the specified policies. This document describes the SD-WAN use cases and explores the complexities of managing large-scale SD-WAN overlay networks, a component of [Net2Cloud-Problem]. It aims to illustrate how the Dunbar, et al. [Page 3] Internet-Draft BGP Usage for SD-WAN April 27, 2024 BGP-based control plane can effectively manage large-scale SD-WAN overlay networks with minimal manual intervention. It's important to distinguish the BGP instance as the control plane for SD-WAN overlay from the BGP instances governing the underlay networks. Additionally, it assumes the existence of a secure channel between the SD-WAN controller and the SD-WAN edges for BGP Control Plane communication. 2. Conventions used in this document Cloud DC: Third party data centers that host applications and workloads owned by different organizations or tenants. Controller: Used interchangeably with SD-WAN controller to manage SD-WAN overlay networks in this document. In the specific context of BGP-controlled SD-WAN, the controller functions as an integral component of the BGP Route Reflector. Client prefix: In this document, client prefix means IP prefix attached to a client port of an SD-WAN edge. CPE: Customer Premise Equipment C-PE: For SD-WAN network expanded from an existing VPN, the term C-PE refers to the PE (or CPE) of the existing VPN that has added WAN ports to other networks. Homogeneous Encrypted SD-WAN: An SD-WAN network in which all traffic to/from the SD-WAN edges are carried by IPsec tunnels regardless of underlay networks. I.e., the client traffic is carried by IPsec tunnel even over MPLS private networks. MP-NLRI: In this document, the term "MP-NLRI" serves as a concise reference for "MP_REACH_NLRI". NSP: Network Service Provider. PE: Provider Edge Dunbar, et al. [Page 4] Internet-Draft BGP Usage for SD-WAN April 27, 2024 SD-WAN Edge Node: An edge node, which can be physical or virtual, maps the attached clients' traffic to the wide area network (WAN) overlay tunnels. SD-WAN: An overlay connectivity service that optimizes the transport of IP packets over one or more Underlay connectivity services by recognizing applications and determining forwarding behavior by applying policies to them. [MEF-70.1]. SD-WAN IPsec SA: IPsec Security Association between two WAN ports of the SD-WAN edge nodes or between two SD-WAN edge nodes. SD-WAN over Hybrid Underlay Networks: SD-WAN over Hybrid Underlay Networks typically have edge nodes utilizing bandwidth resources from different types of underlay networks, some being private networks and others being public Internet. WAN Port: A Port or Interface facing a Network Service Provider (NSP), with an address allocated by the NSP. C-PE: SD-WAN Edge node, which can be Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) for customer-managed SD-WAN, or Provider Edge (PE) for provider-managed SD-WAN services. Private VPN: refers to a VPN that is supported wholly by a single network service provider without using any elements of the public Internet and without any traffic passing out of the immediate control of that service provider. ZTP: Zero Touch Provisioning 3. SD-WAN Scenarios and Their Requirements This section outlines the fundamental requirements for SD-WAN overlay networks and introduces various SD-WAN scenarios. These scenarios serve as examples that are further explored in Dunbar, et al. [Page 5] Internet-Draft BGP Usage for SD-WAN April 27, 2024 subsequent sections to demonstrate the application of the BGP control plane. 3.1. Requirements 3.1.1. Supporting SD-WAN Segmentation "SD-WAN Segmentation" is a frequently used term in SD-WAN deployment, referring to policy-driven network partitioning. An SD-WAN segment is a virtual private network (SD-WAN VPN) consisting of a set of edge nodes interconnected by tunnels, such as IPsec tunnels and MPLS VPN tunnels. This document assumes that SD-WAN VPN configuration on PE devices will, as with MPLS VPN [RFC4364] [RFC4659], make use of VRFs [RFC4364] [RFC4659]. It is important to highlight that a single SD-WAN VPN can be mapped to one or multiple virtual topologies governed by the SD-WAN controller's policies. When using BGP for SD-WAN, the Client Prefix UPDATE is the same as MPLS VPN. Route Target in the BGP Extended Community [RFC4360] can be used to differentiate the routes belonging to different SD-WAN VPNs. As SD-WAN is an overlay network arching over multiple types of networks, MPLS L2VPN[RFC4761] [RFC4762]/L3VPN[RFC4364] [RFC4659] or pure L2 underlay can continue using the VPN ID (Virtual Private Network Identifier), VN-ID (Virtual Network Identifier), or VLAN (Virtual LAN) in the data plane to differentiate packets belonging to different SD-WAN VPNs. To convey the SD-WAN VPN identifier within packets transported through an IPsec tunnel, an extra layer of encapsulation, like GRE [RFC2784] or VxLAN [RFC7348], is needed before inserting the packet into the IPsec ESP header. 3.1.2. Client Service Requirement The client service requirements describe the SD-WAN edge's ports, also known as SD-WAN client interfaces, which connect the client network to the SD-WAN service. The SD-WAN client interface should support IPv4 & IPv6 address prefixes and Ethernet (as described in [IEEE802.3] standard). It is worth noting that the "SD-WAN client interface" is called SD-WAN UNI (User Network Interface) in [MEF 70.1] with a set of attributes (described in Section 11 in MEF 70.1); these attributes (in MEF 70.1) describe the expected behavior and requirements to support the connectivity to the client network. Dunbar, et al. [Page 6] Internet-Draft BGP Usage for SD-WAN April 27, 2024 The client service should support the SD-WAN UNI service attributes at the SD-WAN edge as described in MEF 70.1, Section 11. 3.1.3. SD-WAN Traffic Segmentation SD-WAN Traffic Segmentation enables the separation of the traffic based on the business and the security needs of different user groups and/or application requirements. Each user group and/or application may need different isolated topologies and/or policies to fulfill the business and security requirements. For example, if a retail business requires the point-of-sales (PoS) application to be on a different topology from other applications, the PoS application is routed only to the payment processing entity at a hub site; other applications can be routed to all other sites. The traffic from the PoS application follows a tree topology (denoted as "----" in the figure below), whereas other traffic can follow a multipoint-to-multipoint topology (denoted as "==="). +--------+ Payment traffic |Payment | +------+----+-+gateway +------+----+-----+ / / | +----+---+ | \ \ / / | | | \ \ +-+--+ +-+--+ +-+--+ | +-+--+ +-+--+ +-+--+ |Site| |Site| |Site| | |Site| |Site| |Site| | 1 | | 2 | | 3 | | |4 | | 5 | | 6 | +--+-+ +--+-+ +--|-+ | +--|-+ +--|-+ +--|-+ | | | | | | | ==+=======+=======+====+======+=======+=======+=== Multi-point connection for non-payment traffic Another example is an enterprise that wants to isolate the traffic from different departments, with each department having its unique topology and policy. The HR department may need to access specific applications that are not accessible by the engineering department. Also, contractors may have limited access to the enterprise resources. Dunbar, et al. [Page 7] Internet-Draft BGP Usage for SD-WAN April 27, 2024 3.1.4. Zero Touch Provisioning SD-WAN Zero-Touch Provisioning (ZTP) allows devices to be configured and provisioned centrally without the need to dispatch a network engineer to the field to configure the remote devices. When an SD-WAN edge is installed at a remote location, ZTP automates follow-up steps, including updates to the OS, software version, and configuration, before client traffic is forwarded. The ZTP can bootstrap a remote SD-WAN edge and establish a secure connection to the local SD-WAN Controller, making it convenient to add or delete an SD-WAN edge node (virtual or physical). ZTP for a remote SD-WAN edge usually includes the following steps: - The SD-WAN edge's customer information and its device identifier, such as the device serial number, are added to the SD-WAN Central Controller. - Upon power-up, the SD-WAN edge can establish the transport layer secure connection [BCP195] to its controller, whose URL (or IP address) and credential for connection request can be preconfigured on the edge device by the manufacture, external USB drive or secure Email given to the installer. The external USB method involves providing the installer with a pre- configured USB flash drive containing the necessary configuration files and settings for the SD-WAN device. The secure Email approach entails sending a secure email containing the configuration details for the SD-WAN device. - The SD-WAN Controller authenticates the ZTP request from the remote SD-WAN edge with its configurations. Once the authentication is successful, it can designate a local network controller near the SD-WAN edge to pass down the initial configurations via the secure channel. The local network controller manages and monitors the communication policies for traffic to/from the edge node. 3.1.5. Constrained Propagation of SD-WAN Edge Properties For an SD-WAN Edge to establish an IPsec tunnel to another one and announce the attached client prefixes to each other, both edges need to know each other's network properties, such as the IP addresses of the WAN ports, the edges' loopback addresses, the attached client prefixes, the supported encryption methods, etc. Dunbar, et al. [Page 8] Internet-Draft BGP Usage for SD-WAN April 27, 2024 One SD-WAN edge node may only be authorized to communicate with a small number of other SD-WAN edge nodes. In this circumstance, the property of the SD-WAN edge node should not be propagated to other nodes that are not authorized to communicate. But a remote SD-WAN edge node, upon powering up, may not have the right policies to know which peers are authorized to communicate. Therefore, SD-WAN deployment needs to have a central point to distribute the properties of an SD-WAN edge node to its authorized peers. BGP is well suited for this purpose. Route-Reflector (RR) [RFC4456], as an integral part of the SD-WAN controller, has the policy governing communication among peers. The RR only propagates the BGP UPDATE from an edge to others within the same SD-WAN VPN. As the connection between an SD-WAN edge and its RR can be over an insecure network, an SD-WAN edge must establish a secure connection to its designated RR upon power-up. The BGP UPDATE messages must be sent over the secure channel to the RR. +---+ Authorized Peers G1 |RR | Authorized Peer G2 +======+====+=+ +======+====+=====+ / / | +---+ | \ \ / / | | \ \ +-+--+ +-+--+ +-+--+ +-+--+ +-+--+ +-+--+ |C-PE| |C-PE| |C-PE| |C-PE| |C-PE| |C-PE| | 1 | | 2 | | 3 | |4 | | 5 | | 6 | +----+ +----+ +----+ +----+ +----+ +----+ Tenant 1 Tenant 2 Figure 1: Authorized Peer Groups managed by RR Tenant separation is achieved by the SD-WAN VPN identifiers represented in the control plane and data plane, respectively. 3.2. Scenario #1: Homogeneous Encrypted SD-WAN Homogeneous Encrypted SD-WAN refers to an SD-WAN network with edge nodes encrypting all traffic over the WAN underlay to other edge nodes, regardless of whether the underlay is private or public, as Dunbar, et al. [Page 9] Internet-Draft BGP Usage for SD-WAN April 27, 2024 shown in Figure 2 below. For lack of better terminology, we call this Homogeneous Encrypted SD-WAN throughout this document. Here are some typical scenarios for using Homogeneous Encryption: - A small branch office connecting to its HQ offices via the Internet. All traffic to/from this small branch office must be encrypted, usually achieved by IPsec Tunnels [RFC6071]. - A store in a shopping mall may need to securely connect to its applications in one or more Cloud DCs via the Internet. A common way of achieving this is to establish IPsec SAs to the Cloud DC gateway to carry the sensitive data to/from the store. The granularity of the IPsec SAs for Homogeneous Encryption can be per site, per subnet, per tenant, or per address. Once the IPsec SA is established for a specific subnet/tenant/site, all traffic to/from the subnet/tenant/site is encrypted. +---+ +--------------|RR |------------+ / Untrusted +-+-+ \ / \ / \ +----+ +---------+ +------+ +----+ | CN3|--| P1-----+ -------------+------ P1 |--| CN3| +----+ | C-PE1 P2-----+ | | C-PE2| +----+ +----+ | P3-----+ Wide +------ P2 | +----+ | CN2|--| | | area +------ P3 |--| CN1| +-+--+ +---------+ | network | +------+ +-+--+ \ | | / \ +---------+ | all packets | +------+ / +--| P1-----+ encrypted +------ P1 |-+ | C-PE3 P2-----+ by | | C-PE4| +----+ | P3-----+ IPsec SAs +------ P2 | +----+ | CN1|--| P4-----+--------------+ | |--| CN2| +----+ +---------+ +------+ +----+ CN: Client Networks, which is same as Tenant Networks used by NVo3 Figure 2: Homogeneous Encrypted SD-WAN One of the properties of Homogeneous Encryption is that the SD-WAN Local Network Controller, e.g., RR in BGP-controlled SD-WAN, might be connected to C-PEs via an untrusted public network, therefore, requiring a secure connection between RR and C-PEs. Dunbar, et al. [Page 10] Internet-Draft BGP Usage for SD-WAN April 27, 2024 A Homogeneous Encrypted SD-WAN shares certain characteristics with the widely deployed IPsec VPN. However, while IPsec VPNs typically operate in a point-to-point manner among a limited number of nodes, SD-WAN networks can comprise a large number of edge nodes and a centralized controller responsible for managing configurations across these nodes. Existing private VPNs (e.g., MPLS based) can use Homogeneous Encrypted SD-WAN to extend over the public network to remote sites to which the VPN operator does not own or lease infrastructural connectivity. 3.3. Scenario #2: Differential Encrypted SD-WAN The Differential Encrypted SD-WAN refers to an SD-WAN network in which traffic over the existing VPN is forwarded natively without encryption, and the traffic over the Public Internet is encrypted. Differential Encrypted SD-WAN is over hybrid private VPN and public Internet underlays. Since IPsec requires additional processing power and the encrypted traffic over the Internet does not have the premium SLA (Service Lever Agreement) commonly offered by Private VPNs, especially over a long distance, current practice is for traffic over a private VPN to be forwarded without encryption. One C-PE might have the Internet-facing WAN ports managed by different NSPs with the WAN ports' addresses assigned by the corresponding NSPs. Clients might have policies to specify: 1) Some flows can only be forwarded over private VPNs. 2) Some flows can be forwarded over either private VPNs or the public Internet. The packets over the public Internet are encrypted. 3) Some flows, especially Internet-bound browsing ones, can be handed off to the Internet without further encryption. Suppose a flow traversing multiple segments, such as A<->B, B<->C, C<->D, has Policy 2) above. The flow can cross different underlays in different segments, such as over Private underlay between A<->B without encryption or over the public Internet between B<->C protected by an IPsec SA. As shown in the figure below, C-PE-1 has two different types of interfaces (A1 to Internet and A2 & A3 to VPN). The C-PE's loopback address and the attached client addresses may or may not be visible to the NSPs. The WAN ports' addresses can be allocated by the service providers or dynamically assigned (e.g., by DHCP). Dunbar, et al. [Page 11] Internet-Draft BGP Usage for SD-WAN April 27, 2024 +---+ +--------------|RR |----------+ / Untrusted +-+-+ \ / \ / \ +----+ +---------+ packets encrypted over +------+ +----+ | CN3|--| A1-----+ Untrusted +------ B1 |--| CN1| +----+ | C-PE1 A2-\ | C-PE2| +----+ +----+ | A3--+--+ +---+---B2 | +----+ | CN2|--| | |PE+--------------+PE |---B3 |--| CN3| +----+ +---------+ +--+ trusted +---+ +------+ +----+ | WAN | +----+ +---------+ +--+ packets +---+ +------+ +----+ | CN1|--| C1--|PE| go natively |PE |-- D1 |--| CN1| +----+ | C-PE3 C2--+--+ without encry+---+ | C-PE4| +----+ | | +--------------+ | | | | | | +----+ | | without encrypt over | | +----+ | CN2|--| C3--+---- Untrusted --+------D2 |--| CN2| +----+ +---------+ +------+ +----+ CN: Client Network Figure 3: SD-WAN with Hybrid Underlays Also, the connection between C-PEs and their Controller (RR) might be via the untrusted public network. It is necessary to have secure channel for communication between RR and C-PEs. There could be multiple SD-WAN edges (C-PEs) sharing common property, such as a geographic location. Some applications over SD-WAN may need to traverse specific geographic areas for various reasons, such as to comply with regulatory rules, to utilize specific value-added services, or others. Services may not be congruent, i.e., the packets from A-> B may traverse one underlay network, and the packets from B -> A may go over a different underlay. 3.4. Scenario #3: Private VPN PE based SD-WAN This scenario refers to an existing VPN (e.g., EVPN[RFC7432] or IPVPN) being expanded by adding extra ports facing the public Internet to accommodate any additional bandwidth requirement between two PEs. Dunbar, et al. [Page 12] Internet-Draft BGP Usage for SD-WAN April 27, 2024 Here are some differences from the Hybrid Underlay scenario (Section 3.3): - For MPLS-based VPN, PEs would have MPLS as payload encapsulated within the IPsec tunnel egressing the Internet WAN ports, MPLS-in-IP/GRE-in-IPsec. - The BGP RR is connected to PEs in the same way as the VPN, i.e., via a trusted network. PE-based SD-WAN can be used by VPN service providers to temporarily increase bandwidth between sites when not sure if the demand will sustain for an extended period or as a temporary solution prior to building or leasing a permanent infrastructure. +======>|PE2| // +---+ // ^ // || VPN // VPN v |PE1| <====> |RR| <=> |PE3| +-+-+ +--+ +-+-+ | | +--- Public Internet -- + Offload Figure 4: Additional Internet paths added to the VPN For Ethernet-based client traffic, Private VPN PE based SD-WAN should support VLAN-based service interfaces (EVPN Instances), VLAN bundle service interfaces, or VLAN-Aware bundling service interfaces. EVPN service requirement as described in Section 3.1 of [RFC8388] are applicable to the SD-WAN Ethernet-based Client services. For IP-based client interfaces, L3VPN service requirements are applicable. 4. Provisioning Model 4.1. Client Service Provisioning Model Client service provisioning can follow the same approach as MPLS VRFs (Virtual Routing and Forwarding) [RFC4364][RFC4659]. A client VPN can establish the communication policy by specifying the BGP Dunbar, et al. [Page 13] Internet-Draft BGP Usage for SD-WAN April 27, 2024 Route Targets to be imported and exported. Alternatively, conventional Match and Action ACLs (Access Control List) can identify the specific routes allowed or denied to or from the client VPN. When an SD-WAN edge node is dedicated to one client with a single virtual network, all prefixes attached to the client port(s) on the edge node can be considered to be inside a single VRF, and the RR can manage the policies for import/export policies for that VRF. 4.2. Policy Configuration One of the characteristics of an SD-WAN service is that packets can be forwarded over multiple types of underlays. Policies are needed to govern which underlay paths can carry a flow, as described by Section 8 of [MEF70.1]. A flow is a collection of packets between the same source and destination pair that are subject to the same forwarding and policy decisions at the ingress SD-WAN edge node, and are identified by the settings of one or more fields in the packet headers. For example, client-prefix-x can only be mapped to a MPLS topology. 4.3. IPsec Related Parameters Provisioning SD-WAN edge nodes must negotiate various cryptographic parameters to establish IPsec tunnels between them. Alternatively, the edges can retrieve the attribute values from their controller, thereby streamlining the configuration process. In the context of a BGP- controlled SD-WAN, BGP UPDATE messages can be extended to propagate the IPsec-related attribute values for each node, facilitating peer selection of mutually supported values-instead of the process facilitated by IPsec IKEv2 [RFC7296]. 5. BGP Controlled SD-WAN 5.1. Why BGP as Control Plane for SD-WAN? In the case of a modest-sized SD-WAN network with a limited number of nodes, the hub-and-spoke model, employing Next Hop Resolution Protocol (NHRP)[RFC2332] or a centralized hub managing edge nodes, including the mapping of local and public addresses along with tunnel identifiers, has proven effective. However, when dealing with a larger SD-WAN network, exceeding 100 nodes and encompassing Dunbar, et al. [Page 14] Internet-Draft BGP Usage for SD-WAN April 27, 2024 diverse underlays, the conventional approach becomes notably intricate, convoluted, and susceptible to errors. Here are some of the compelling reasons for using BGP: - Simplified peer authentication process: With a secure management channel established between an edge node and an RR, the RR can perform peer authentication on behalf of the edge node. The RR has policies on peer communication and the built-in capability to constrain the propagation of the UPDATE messages to the authorized edge nodes. - Scalable IPsec tunnel management When multiple IPsec tunnels are established between two edge nodes, BGP Tunnel Attribute Update can associate multiple IPsec tunnels with the client prefixes. In an IPsec VPN, separate IPsec Tunnels between two edge nodes are treated as parallel links requiring duplicated control plane messages exchanged on all those parallel tunnels if the client prefixes need be load shared among the IPsec tunnels. - Simplified IPsec tunnel traffic selection configurations The IPsec tunnel's traffic selector or admission control can be inherently realized by specifying importing/exporting the Route Targets representing the SD-WAN VPNs. 5.2. BGP Walk Through for Homogeneous Encrypted SD-WAN For the BGP-controlled Homogeneous Encrypted SD-WAN, a C-PE can advertise its attached client prefixes and the properties of the IPsec SA in one BGP UPDATE message. In the figure below, the BGP UPDATE message from C-PE2 to RR can have the client prefixes encoded in the MP-NLRI Path Attribute and the IPsec Tunnel associated information encoded in the Tunnel- Encapsulation [RFC9012] Attributes. Dunbar, et al. [Page 15] Internet-Draft BGP Usage for SD-WAN April 27, 2024 +---------|RR |----------+ / Untrusted+---+ \ / \ / \ +---------+ +---------+ --+ |-----------------------| |-192.0.2.4/30 | | | C-PE2 |- VLAN = 15 | C-PE1 | +-|192.0.2.2| --|192.0.2.1| | | |-192.0.2.8/30 +---------+ | +---------+ | | | +---------+ | --| |---------------------+ | | | C-PE3 | --|192.0.2.3| +---------+ Figure 5: Homogeneous Encrypted SD-WAN Alternatively, the C-PE2 can use two separate BGP UPDATE messages: - Update 1 for advertising the attached client prefixes. - Update 2 for advertising the underlay properties. This approach significantly reduces the size of BGP UPDATE messages, especially for IPsec tunnels terminated at edge nodes or WAN ports. IPsec SA tunnels have various attributes that may change at frequencies different from those of client prefix updates, such as periodic changes in IPsec SA nonce. Furthermore, multiple client prefixes can be transported over a single underlay IPsec SA tunnel. When using two separate BGP UPDATE messages, which is described by Section 4 and 8 of [RFC9012], UPDATE U1 has its Nexthop to the node loopback address and is recursively resolved to the IPsec SA tunnel type advertised by the UPDATE U2. Here are the details of the UPDATE messages: - Suppose that a given packet, denoted as "C", destined towards the client addresses attached to C-PE2 (e.g., prefix 192.0.2.4/30) can be carried by any IPsec tunnels terminated at C-PE2. Dunbar, et al. [Page 16] Internet-Draft BGP Usage for SD-WAN April 27, 2024 - The path along which "C" is to be forwarded is determined by BGP UPDATE U1. - UPDATE U1 does not have a Tunnel Encapsulation attribute. - UPDATE U1 can include the Encapsulation Extended Community with the option to have the Color Extended Community. - The address of the next-hop of UPDATE U1 is router C-PE2. - UPDATE U2 is for advertising the SD-WAN underlay path that has a Tunnel Encapsulation attribute to describe the IPsec SA detailed attributes. UPDATE U1 (client prefix advertisement): - MP-NLRI Path Attribute: 192.0.2.4/30 192.0.2.8/30 - Nexthop: 192.0.2.2 (C-PE2) - Encapsulation Extended Community: TYPE = SDWAN-Hybrid Note: The IPsec Tunnel Type specified in RFC5566 is obsolete. SDWAN-Hybrid tunnel type specified by [SDWAN-EDGE-DISCOVERY] is used to inform that the 192.0.2.4/30 and 192.0.2.8/30 are carried by the hybrid of IPsec underlay paths. UPDATE U2 (Underlay tunnel advertisement): - MP-NLRI Path Attribute: 192.0.2.2 (C-PE2) - Tunnel Encapsulation Path Attributes for IPsec SA detailed attributes, including the WAN address to be used as the IP address of the IPsec encrypted packets. If different client prefixes attached to C-PE2 need to be reached by separate underlay IPsec tunnels, the Color Extended Community [RFC9012] can be used to associate the prefixes with the tunnels. See Section 8 of [RFC9012]. Suppose C-PE2 does not have a policy on the authorized peers for the specific client prefixes. Then, the RR then needs to check the client prefixes' policies to constrain the BGP UPDATE message propagation only to the remote authorized edge nodes. Dunbar, et al. [Page 17] Internet-Draft BGP Usage for SD-WAN April 27, 2024 5.3. BGP Walk Through for Differential Encrypted SD-WAN In this scenario, some client prefixes can be forwarded over any one of the tunnels terminating at the edge node. Some client prefixes can only be forwarded over specific tunnels (such as only MPLS VPN). An edge node can use the Color Extended Community (Section 4 & 8 of [RFC9012]) in its BGP UPDATE message to associate the client prefixes with the specific tunnels. For example, in Figure 5 above, suppose that Route 192.0.2.4/30 can be carried by either MPLS or IPsec and Route 192.0.2.8/30 can only be carried by MPLS; C-PE2 can use the following UPDATE messages: UPDATE #1a for the client prefix 192.0.2.4/30: - MP-NLRI Path Attribute: 192.0.2.4/30 Nexthop: 192.0.2.2 (C-PE2) - Encapsulation Extended Community: TYPE = SDWAN-Hybrid - Color Extended Community: RED UPDATE #1b for the client prefix 192.0.2.8/30: - MP-NLRI Path Attribute: 192.0.2.8/30 Nexthop: 192.0.2.2 (C-PE2) - Encapsulation Extended Community: TYPE = MPLS [RFC8365] UPDATE #2: for the underlay IPsec tunnel terminated at the node: - MP-NLRI Path Attribute: 192.0.2.2 (C-PE2) - Tunnel Encapsulation Path Attributes: TYPE=SD-WAN-Hybrid Including the information about the WAN ports for receiving IPsec encrypted packets, the IPsec properties, etc. - Color Extended Community: RED Dunbar, et al. [Page 18] Internet-Draft BGP Usage for SD-WAN April 27, 2024 5.4. BGP Walk Through for Application Flow-Based Segmentation Suppose an application flow is identified by source or destination IP addresses. Application Flow-based Segmentation described in 3.1.2 can be realized by constraining the BGP UPDATE messages, such that only the nodes that meet the criteria of the application flow receive these updates. The following BGP Update messages can be advertised to ensure that the Payment Application only communicates with the Payment Gateway shown in Figure 6: BGP UPDATE #1a from C-PE2 to RR for the P2P topology that is only propagated to Payment GW node: - MP-NLRI Path Attribute: - 192.0.2.9/30 - Nexthop: 192.0.2.2 - Encapsulation extended community: TYPE = SDWAN-Hybrid - Color Extended Community: BLUE BGP UPDATE #1b from C-PE2 to RR is propagated to C-PE1 & C-PE3 for the prefixes to be reached by C-PE1 and C-PE3: - MP-NLRI Path Attribute: - 192.0.2.4/30 - 192.0.2.8/30 - Nexthop:192.0.2.2 - Encapsulation extended community: TYPE =SDWAN-Hybrid - Color Extended Community: RED BGP UPDATE #2a for the underlay IPsec Tunnel Path attributes terminated at C-PE2 192.0.2.2 that are propagated to C-PE1 & C- PE3. - MP-NLRI Path Attribute: 192.0.2.2 (C-PE2) - Tunnel Encapsulation Path Attributes: TYPE=IPsec (for all IPsec SAs) - Color Extended Community: RED UPDATE #2b for the IPsec SA to the Payment GW that is only propagated to Payment GW: - MP-NLRI Path Attribute: Dunbar, et al. [Page 19] Internet-Draft BGP Usage for SD-WAN April 27, 2024 192.0.2.2 (C-PE2) - Tunnel Encapsulation Path Attributes: TYPE=IPsec (for the IPsec SA to Payment GW). - Color Extended Community: Blue |Payment| +------->| GW |<----+ / +-------+ \ / Blue Tunnel \ /for Payment App:192.0.2.9/30\ / \ +------/--+ +----\----+ --|-----+ | | +---| 192.0.2.9/30 | | Red Tunnels | | --| C-PE1 |------------------------| |-192.0.2.4/30 |192.0.2.1| | C-PE2 | --| |------------------------|192.0.2.2|-192.0.2.8/30 | ------+ +| |- VLAN=25; / | |192.0.2.10/30 +---------+ / +---------+ --| |--------------------+ | C-PE3 | / |192.0.2.3| / --| |-----------------+ +---------+ Figure 6: Application Based SD-WAN Segmentation 5.5. Benefit of Using Recursive Next Hop Resolution Using the Recursive Next Hop Resolution described in Section 8 of [RFC9012], the clients' route UPDATE messages become very compact, and any attribute changes of the underlay network tunnels, such as IPsec key refreshing, can be advertised independently of the client prefixes update. This method is handy when the underlay paths are IPsec tunnels, which requires periodic message exchange for the pairwise re-keying process. 6. SD-WAN Forwarding Model This section describes how client traffic is forwarded in BGP Controlled SD-WAN for the use cases described in Section 3. Dunbar, et al. [Page 20] Internet-Draft BGP Usage for SD-WAN April 27, 2024 The procedures described in Section 6 of RFC8388 are applicable for the SD-WAN client traffic. Like the BGP-based VPN/EVPN client prefixes UPDATE message, Route Target can distinguish routes from different clients. 6.1. Forwarding Model for Homogeneous Encrypted SD-WAN 6.1.1. Network and Service Startup Procedures A single IPsec security association (SA) protects data in one direction. In the Homogeneous Encrypted SD-WAN Scenario, two SAs must be present to secure traffic in both directions between two C-PE nodes, two client ports, or two prefixes. Using Figure 2 of Section 3.2 as an example, for client CN2 attached to C-PE1, C- PE3, and C-PE4 to have a full-mesh connection, six one-directional IPsec SAs must be established: C-PE1 <-> C-PE3; C-PE1 <-> C-PE4; C-PE3 <-> C-PE4. SD-WAN services to clients can be IP-based or Ethernet-based. An SD-WAN edge can learn client prefixes from the client-facing ports via OSPF, RIP, BGP, or static configuration for its IP-based services. For Layer-2 SD-WAN services, the relevant EVPN parameters, such as the ESI (Ethernet Segment Identifier), EVI, and CE-VID (Customer Edge Virtual Instance Identifier) to EVI mapping, can be configured similarly to EVPN described in RFC8388. Instead of running IGP within each IPsec tunnel done by the IPsec VPN, BGP RR can propagate UPDATE messages of the client prefixes attached to an SD-WAN edge node to its authorized peers. The controller manages how clients' routes are associated with individual IPsec SA. Therefore, it is no longer necessary to manually configure the IPsec tunnel's endpoint addresses on each SD-WAN edge node and set up policies for the allowed client prefixes. 6.1.2. Packet Walk-Through For unicast packets forwarding: An IPsec SA terminated at a C-PE node can have multiple client prefixes multiplexed in the IPsec SA (or tunnel). Packets to/from the client prefixes are encapsulated in an inner tunnel, such as GRE or VxLAN. Different client traffic can be differentiated by a unique value in the inner encapsulation key or ID field. The GRE or VxLAN tunnel is encapsulated by an outer IP header whose destination & source addresses are the C-PE Dunbar, et al. [Page 21] Internet-Draft BGP Usage for SD-WAN April 27, 2024 nodes loopback addresses and most likely has the Protocol-code = ESP (50). C-PE Node-based IPsec tunnel is inherently protected when the C- PE has multiple WAN ports to different underlay paths. As shown in Figure 2, when one of the underlay paths fails, the IPsec traffic can be forwarded to or received from a different physical port. When a C-PE receives an IPsec encrypted packet from its WAN ports, it decrypts the packet and forwards the inner packet to the client port based on the inner packet's destination address. For multicast packets forwarding: IPsec was created to be a security protocol between two and only two devices, so multicast service using IPsec is problematic. An IPsec peer encrypts a packet so that only one other IPsec peer can successfully perform the de-encryption. A straightforward way to forward a multicast packet for the Homogeneous Encrypted SD-WAN is to encapsulate the multicast packet in separate unicast IPsec SA tunnels. More optimized forwarding multicast packets for the Homogeneous Encrypted SD-WAN is out of the scope of this document. 6.2. Forwarding Model for Hybrid Underlay SD-WAN In this scenario, as shown in Figure 3 of Section 3.3, traffic forwarded over the trusted VPN paths can be native (i.e., unencrypted). The traffic forwarded over untrusted networks need to be protected by IPsec SA. 6.2.1. Network and Service Startup Procedures Infrastructure setup: The proper MPLS infrastructure must be configured among the edge nodes, i.e., the C-PE1/C-PE2/C-PE3/C-PE4 of Figure 3. The IPsec SA between wAN ports or nodes must be set up as well. IPsec SA related attributes on edge nodes can be distributed by BGP UPDATE messages as described in Section 5. There could be policies governing how flows can be forwarded, as specified by [MEF70.1]. For example, "Private-only" indicates that the flows can only traverse the MPLS VPN underlay paths. Dunbar, et al. [Page 22] Internet-Draft BGP Usage for SD-WAN April 27, 2024 6.2.2. Packet Walk-Through For unicast packets forwarding: When the C-PE-a in Figure 7 receives a packet from a client port, if the packet belongs to a flow that can only be forwarded over the MPLS VPN, the forwarding processing is the same as the MPLS VPN. Otherwise, the C-PE node can make the local decision in choosing the least cost path, including the previously established MPLS paths and IPsec Tunnels, to forward the packet. Packets forwarded over the trusted MPLS VPN can be native without additional encryption, while the packets sent over the untrusted networks must be encrypted by IPsec SA. For a c-PE with multiple WAN ports provided by different NSPs, separate IPsec SAs can be established for the different WAN ports. In this case, the C-PE have multiple IPsec tunnels in addition to the MPLS path to choose from to forward the packets from the client ports. If the IPsec SA is chosen, the packet is encapsulated by the IPsec header and encrypted by the IPsec SA before forwarding it to the WAN. For packets received from an MPLS path, processing is the same as MPLS VPN. For IPsec SA encrypted packets received from the WAN ports, the packets are decrypted, and the inner payload is decapsulated and forwarded per the forwarding table of the C-PE. For all packets from the Internet-facing WAN ports, the additional anti-DDoS mechanism has to be enabled to prevent potential attacks from the Internet-facing ports. The anti-DDoS mechanism comprises numerous components, and their detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this document. Control Plane should not learn routes from the Internet-facing WAN ports. Dunbar, et al. [Page 23] Internet-Draft BGP Usage for SD-WAN April 27, 2024 +--------------|RR |----------+ / +-+-+ \ / \ / \ +----+ +---------+ packets encrypted over +---------+ +----+ | CN3|--| A1-----+ Untrusted +----- B1 |--| CN1| +----+ | C-PE-a A2-----+ +------B2 C-PE-b | +----+ |192.0.2.1| |192.0.2.2| +----+ | A3 |PE+--------------+PE |--B3 |--| CN3| +----+ +---------+ +--+ trusted +---+ +---------+ +----+ | VPN | +-----------+ Figure 7: Over hybrid SD-WAN For multicast packets forwarding: For multicast traffic, MPLS multicast [RFC6513, RFC6514, or RFC7988] can be used to forward multicast traffic. If IPsec tunnels are chosen for a multicast packet, the packet is encapsulated and encrypted by multiple separate IPsec tunnels to the desired destinations. 6.3. Forwarding Model for PE based SD-WAN 6.3.1. Network and Service Startup Procedures In this scenario, all PEs have secure interfaces facing the clients and facing the MPLS backbone, with some PEs having extra ports to the untrusted public Internet. The public Internet paths are for offloading low priority traffic when the MPLS paths get congested. The PEs are already connected to their RRs, and the configurations for the clients and policies are already established. 6.3.2. Packet Walk-Through For PEs to offload some MPLS packets to the Internet path, each MPLS packet is wrapped by an outer IP header as MPLS-in-IP or MPLS-in-GRE [RFC4023]. The outer IP address can be an interface address or the PE's loopback address. When IPsec Tunnel mode is used to protect an MPLS-in-IP packet, the entire MPLS-in-IP packet is placed after the IPsec tunnel header. When IPsec transport mode is used to protect the MPLS packet, the MPLS-in-IP packet's IP header becomes the outer IP header of the Dunbar, et al. [Page 24] Internet-Draft BGP Usage for SD-WAN April 27, 2024 IPsec packet, followed by an IPsec header, and then followed by the MPLS label stack. The IPsec header must set the payload type to MPLS by using the IP protocol number specified in section 3 of RFC4023. If IPsec transport mode is applied to an MPLS-in-GRE packet, the GRE header follows the IPsec header. The IPsec SA's endpoints should not be the client-facing interface addresses unless the traffic to/from those clients always goes through the IPsec SA even when the MPLS backbone has enough capacity to transport the traffic. When the PEs' Internet-facing ports are behind the NAT [RFC3715], an outer UDP field can be added outside the encrypted payload [RFC3948]. Three UDP ports must be open on the PEs: UDP port 4500 (used for NAT traversal), UDP port 500 (used for IKE), and IP protocol 50 (ESP). IPsec IKE (Internet Key Exchange) between the two PEs would be over the NAT [RFC3947] as well. Upon receiving a packet from a client port, the forwarding processing is the same as the MPLS VPN. If the MPLS backbone path to the destination is deemed congested, the IPsec tunnel towards the target Pes is used to encrypt the MPLS-in-IP packet. Upon receiving a packet from the Internet-facing WAN port, the packet is decrypted, and the inner MPLS payload is extracted to be sent to the MPLS VPN engine. Same as Scenario #2, the additional anti-DDoS mechanism must be enabled to prevent potential attacks from the Internet-facing port. Control Plane should not learn routes from the Internet- facing WAN ports. 7. Manageability Considerations BGP-controlled SD-WAN utilizes the BGP RR to facilitate the routes and underlay properties distribution among the authorized edge nodes. With RR having the preconfigured policies about the authorized peers, the peer-wise authentications of the IPsec IKE (Internet Key Exchange) are significantly simplified. 8. Security Considerations In a BGP-controlled SD-WAN network where the BGP RR serves as the SD-WAN controller, there are unique security advantages compared Dunbar, et al. [Page 25] Internet-Draft BGP Usage for SD-WAN April 27, 2024 to traditional peer-to-peer IPsec tunnel networks. Specifically, the centralized control model facilitated by the BGP RR allows for more streamlined security management. The RR's capability to enforce policies to ensure that BGP Update messages from each node are only distributed to authorized peers. This policy-driven approach reduces the potential attack surface compared to networks where peer nodes establish direct, decentralized tunnels that may lack uniform security oversight. This centralized policy enforcement can lead to a relaxation of certain security measures that are typically necessary in more distributed architectures. In the BGP-controlled setup, because the RR dictates and controls the routing information exchange, it inherently limits the opportunity for unauthorized access and routing leaks between nodes. Furthermore, secure channels between the RR and SD-WAN edge nodes, while critical, are safeguarded by fewer, more focused security protocols, concentrating the security efforts on securing the RR itself rather than on each individual tunnel. Additionally, the use of IPsec tunnels over the public Internet, while potentially exposing the network to risks associated with public network exposure, is mitigated by the RR's governance. The RR's role in managing these connections enhances overall security by ensuring consistent application of encryption and access policies across the network. This central governance model simplifies the security architecture, allowing for more efficient monitoring and quicker response to threats, thereby reducing the complexity and potentially the cost of network security management compared to a peer-to-peer model. However, adding an Internet-facing WAN port to a C-PE can introduce the following security risks: 1) Potential DDoS attacks from the Internet-facing ports. 2) Potential risk of malicious traffic being injected via the Internet-facing WAN ports. 3) For the Differential Encrypted SD-WAN deployment model, there is a risk of unauthorized traffic injected into the Internet- facing WAN ports being leaked to the L2/L3 VPN networks. Therefore, the additional anti-DDoS mechanism must be enabled on all Internet-facing ports to prevent potential attacks from those ports. Control Plane should not learn any routes from the Internet-facing WAN ports. Dunbar, et al. [Page 26] Internet-Draft BGP Usage for SD-WAN April 27, 2024 In SD-WAN deployments where no secure management channel exists between the SD-WAN controller and the SD-WAN edges, TLS or IPsec can be established to bridge the gap. BGP is a TCP-based protocol that can be easily aligned with TLS-based security. 9. IANA Considerations No Action is needed. 10. References 10.1. Normative References [BCP195] Consists of RFC8996 and RFC9325. [RFC2332] J. Luciani, et al, "NBMA Next Hop Resolution Protocol (NHRP)", RFC2332, April 1998. [RFC2784] D. Farinacci, et al, "Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE)" RFC2784, March 2000. [RFC3715] B. Aboba, W. Dixon, "IPsec-Network Address Translation (NAT) Compatibility Requirements", March 2004. [RFC3947] T. Kivinen, et al, "Negotiation of NAT Traversal in the IKE", Jan. 2005. [RFC3948] A. Huttunen, et al, "UDP Encapsulation of IPsec ESP Packets", Jan 2005. [RFC4023] T. Worster, Y. Rekhter, E. Rosen, "Encapsulating MPLS in IP or Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE)", March 2005. [RFC4360] S. Sangli, et al, "BGP Extended Communities Attribute", RFC4360, Feb. 2006. [RFC4364] E. Rosen, Y. Rekhter, "BGP/MPLS IP Virtual Private networks (VPNs)", Feb 2006. Dunbar, et al. [Page 27] Internet-Draft BGP Usage for SD-WAN April 27, 2024 [RFC4456] T. Bates, E. Chen, R. Chandra, "BGP Route Reflection: An Alternative to Full Mesh Internal BGP (IBGP)", April 2006. [RFC4659] J. De clercq, et al, "BGP-MPLS IP Virtual Private Network (VPN) Extension for IPv6 VPN", RFC4659, Sept 2006. [RFC4761] K. Kompella and Y. Rekhter, "Virtual Private LAN Service (VPLS) Using BGP for Auto-Discovery and Signaling", RFC4761, Jan. 2007. [RFC4762] M. Lasserre and V. Kompella, "Virtual Private LAN Service (VPLS) Using Label Distribution Protocol (LDP) Signaling", RFC4762, Jan. 2007. [RFC6071] S. Frankel, S. Krishan, "IP Security (IPsec) and Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Document Roadmap", Feb 2011. [RFC7296] C. Kaufman, et al, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)", Oct 2014. [RFC7348] M. Mahalingam, et al, "Virtual eXtensible Local Area Network (VXLAN): A Framework for Overlaying Virtualized Layer 2 Networks over Layer 3 Networks", RFC7348, Aug 2014. [RFC7432] A. Sajassi, et al, "BGP MPLS-Based Ethernet VPN", RFC7432, Feb 2015. [RFC8200] S. Deering and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification". July 2017. [RFC8365] A. Sajassi, et al, "A Network Virtualization Overlay Solution Using Ethernet VPN (EVPN)", March 2018. [RFC8388] J. Rabadan, et al, "Usage and Applicability of BGP MPLS- Based Ethernet VPN", RFC8388, May 2018. [RFC9012] K.Patel, et al "The BGP Tunnel Encapsulation Attribute", RFC9012, April 2021. Dunbar, et al. [Page 28] Internet-Draft BGP Usage for SD-WAN April 27, 2024 [RFC9522] A. Farrel, "Overview and Principles of Internet Traffic Engineering", RFC9522, Jan. 2024. 10.2. Informative References [Net2Cloud-Problem] L. Dunbar and A. Malis, "Dynamic Networks to Hybrid Cloud DCs: Problems and Mitigation Practices", draft-ietf-rtgwg-net2cloud-problem-statement-39, April. 2024. [SDWAN-EDGE-DISCOVERY] L, Dunbar, et, al, "BGP UPDATE for SD-WAN Edge Discovery", draft-ietf-idr-sdwan-edge-discovery-12, Oct, 2023 [IEEE802.3] "IEEE Standard for Ethernet" by The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.3. [MEF70.1] SD-WAN Service Attributes and Service Framework, https://www.mef.net/resources/mef-70-1-sd-wan-service- attributes-and-service-framework/. Nov 2021. [MEF70.2] "SD-WAN Service Attributes and Service Framework" by MEF, https://www.mef.net/resources/mef-70-2-sd-wan- service-attributes-and-service-framework/. Oct 2023. 11. Acknowledgments Acknowledgements to Andrew Alston, Adrian Farrel, Jim Guichard, Joel Halpern, John Scudder, Darren Dukes, Andy Malis, Donald Eastlake, Stephen Farrell, and Victo Sheng for their review and contributions. This document was prepared using 2-Word-v2.0.template.dot. Dunbar, et al. [Page 29] Internet-Draft BGP Usage for SD-WAN April 27, 2024 Authors' Addresses Linda Dunbar Futurewei Email: ldunbar@futurewei.com Ali Sajassi Cisco Email: sajassi@cisco.com John Drake Independent Email: je_drake@yahoo.com Basil Najem Bell Canada Email: basil.najem@bell.ca Sue Hares Email: shares@ndzh.com Contributor's Addresses David Carrel Graphiant Email: carrel@graphiant.com Ayan Banerjee Cisco Email: ayabaner@cisco.com Dunbar, et al. [Page 30]