DNS privacy considerations
draft-ietf-dprive-problem-statement-05

The information below is for an old version of the document
Document Type Active Internet-Draft (dprive WG)
Author St├ęphane Bortzmeyer 
Last updated 2015-06-11 (latest revision 2015-05-23)
Replaces draft-bortzmeyer-dnsop-dns-privacy
Stream IETF
Intended RFC status Informational
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Stream WG state Submitted to IESG for Publication
Document shepherd Warren Kumari
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Send notices to "Warren Kumari" <warren@kumari.net>
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DNS PRIVate Exchange (dprive) Working Group                S. Bortzmeyer
Internet-Draft                                                     AFNIC
Intended status: Informational                              May 23, 2015
Expires: November 24, 2015

                       DNS privacy considerations
                 draft-ietf-dprive-problem-statement-05

Abstract

   This document describes the privacy issues associated with the use of
   the DNS by Internet users.  It is intended to be an analysis of the
   present situation and does not prescribe solutions.

Status of This Memo

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   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on November 24, 2015.

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   Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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Bortzmeyer              Expires November 24, 2015               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                 DNS privacy                      May 2015

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  The alleged public nature of DNS data . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.2.  Data in the DNS request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.3.  Cache snooping  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.4.  On the wire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.5.  In the servers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       2.5.1.  In the recursive resolvers  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       2.5.2.  In the authoritative name servers . . . . . . . . . .   9
       2.5.3.  Rogue servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     2.6.  Re-identification and other inferences  . . . . . . . . .  11
   3.  Actual "attacks"  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   4.  Legalities  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   5.  Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   6.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   7.  IANA considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     8.3.  URIs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17

1.  Introduction

   This document is an analysis of the DNS privacy issues, in the spirit
   of section 8 of [RFC6973].

   The Domain Name System is specified in [RFC1034] and [RFC1035] and
   many later RFCs, which have never been consolidated.  It is one of
   the most important infrastructure components of the Internet and
   often ignored or misunderstood by Internet users (and even by many
   professionals).  Almost every activity on the Internet starts with a
   DNS query (and often several).  Its use has many privacy implications
   and this is an attempt at a comprehensive and accurate list.

   Let us begin with a simplified reminder of how the DNS works.  (See
   also [I-D.ietf-dnsop-dns-terminology].)  A client, the stub resolver,
   issues a DNS query to a server, called the recursive resolver (also
   called caching resolver or full resolver or recursive name server).
   Let's use the query "What are the AAAA records for www.example.com?"
   as an example.  AAAA is the QTYPE (Query Type), and www.example.com
   is the QNAME (Query Name).  (The description which follows assume a
   cold cache, for instance because the server just started.)  The
   recursive resolver will first query the root nameservers.  In most
   cases, the root nameservers will send a referral.  In this example,
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