A Profile for Autonomous System Provider Authorization
draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-09
The information below is for an old version of the document.
| Document | Type |
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|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Alexander Azimov , Eugene Uskov , Randy Bush , Job Snijders , Russ Housley , Ben Maddison | ||
| Last updated | 2022-07-29 | ||
| Replaces | draft-azimov-sidrops-aspa-profile | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
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draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-09
Network Working Group A. Azimov
Internet-Draft Yandex
Intended status: Standards Track E. Uskov
Expires: 30 January 2023 JetLend
R. Bush
Internet Initiative Japan
J. Snijders
Fastly
R. Housley
Vigil Security
B. Maddison
Workonline
29 July 2022
A Profile for Autonomous System Provider Authorization
draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-09
Abstract
This document defines a standard profile for Autonomous System
Provider Authorization in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure. An
Autonomous System Provider Authorization is a digitally signed object
that provides a means of validating that a Customer Autonomous System
holder has authorized members of Provider set to be its upstream
providers or provide route server service at internet exchange point.
For the Providers it means that they are legal to send prefixes
received from the Customer Autonomous System in all directions
including providers and peers.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 30 January 2023.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. The ASPA Content Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. The ASPA eContent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. customerASID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3. providers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3.1. ProviderAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3.1.1. providerASID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3.1.2. afiLimit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. ASPA Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Implementation status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
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1. Introduction
The primary purpose of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
is to improve routing security. (See [RFC6480] for more
information.) As part of this infrastructure, a mechanism is needed
to validate that a AS has permission from a Customer AS (CAS) holder
to send routes in all directions. The digitally signed Autonomous
System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object provides this validation
mechanism.
The ASPA uses the template for RPKI digitally signed objects
[RFC6488], which defines a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
[RFC5652] wrapper for the ASPA content as well as a generic
validation procedure for RPKI signed objects. As ASPAs need to be
validated with RPKI certificates issued by the current
infrastructure, we assume the mandatory-to-implement algorithms in
[RFC6485], or its successor.
To complete the specification of the ASPA (see Section 4 of
[RFC6488]), this document defines:
1. The object identifier (OID) that identifies the ASPA signed
object. This OID appears in the eContentType field of the
encapContentInfo object as well as the content-type signed
attribute within the signerInfo structure).
2. The ASN.1 syntax for the ASPA content, which is the payload
signed by the CAS. The ASPA content is encoded using the ASN.1
[X680] Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) [X690].
3. The steps required to validate an ASPA beyond the validation
steps specified in [RFC6488]).
2. The ASPA Content Type
The content-type for an ASPA is defined as id-ct-ASPA, which has the
numerical value of 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.49. This OID MUST appear
both within the eContentType in the encapContentInfo structure as
well as the content-type signed attribute within the signerInfo
structure (see [RFC6488]).
3. The ASPA eContent
The content of an ASPA identifies the Customer AS (CAS) as well as
the Set of Provider ASes (SPAS) that are authorized to further
propagate announcements received from the customer.
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Not all route servers at internet exchange points are transparent,
e.g. in some cases they are present in the ASPATH. In this case
route server AS is acting as a provider AS, which propagates routes
between its customers. Thus, a customer MUST add both upstream
providers and non-transparent route sever AS it is connected to its
SPAS.
If customer is connected to multiple transit providers/non-
transparent route servers they MUST be registered in a single ASPA
object. This rule is important to avoid possible race conditions
during updates.
The eContent of an ASPA is an instance of ASProviderAttestation,
formally defined by the following ASN.1 [X680] module:
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RPKI-ASPA-2022
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-rpki-aspa-2020(TBD) }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
CONTENT-TYPE
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010 -- RFC 6268
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58) } ;
id-ct-ASPA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs-9(9) id-smime(16) id-ct(1) 49 }
ct-ASPA CONTENT-TYPE ::=
{ TYPE ASProviderAttestation IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-ASPA }
ASProviderAttestation ::= SEQUENCE {
version [0] ASPAVersion DEFAULT v0,
customerASID ASID,
providers ProviderASSet }
ASPAVersion ::= INTEGER { v0(0) }
ProviderASSet ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ProviderAS
ProviderAS ::= SEQUENCE {
providerASID ASID,
afiLimit AddressFamilyIdentifier OPTIONAL }
ASID ::= INTEGER
AddressFamilyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE (2))
END
Note that this content appears as the eContent within the
encapContentInfo as specified in [RFC6488].
3.1. version
The version number of the ASProviderAttestation MUST be v0.
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3.2. customerASID
The customerASID field contains the AS number of the Autonomous
System (AS) that authorizes a collection of provider ASes (as listed
in the providerASSet) to propagate prefixes in the specified address
family to other ASes.
3.3. providers
The providers field contains the listing of ASes that are authorized
to further propagate announcements in the specified address family
received from the customer.
Each element contained in the providers field is an instance of
ProviderAS.
In addition to the constraints described by the formal ASN.1
definition, the contents of the providers field MUST satisfy the
following constraints:
* The elements of providers MUST be ordered in ascending numerical
order by the value of the providerASID field.
* Each value of providerASID MUST be unique (with respect to the
other elements of providers).
3.3.1. ProviderAS
3.3.1.1. providerASID
The providerASID field contains the AS number of an AS that has been
authorized by the customer AS to propagate prefixes in the specified
address family to other ASes.
3.3.1.2. afiLimit
The afiLimit field optionally constrains the authorization given to
the provider AS to a single address family.
If present, it contains the two-octet Address Family Identifier (AFI)
for which the relation between the customer and provider is
authorized. Only permitted AFI values are the IPv4 and IPv6 AFI
values as specified in [IANA-AF].
If omitted, the authorization is valid for both IPv4 and IPv6
announcements.
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4. ASPA Validation
Before a relying party can use an ASPA to validate a routing
announcement, the relying party MUST first validate the ASPA object
itself. To validate an ASPA, the relying party MUST perform all the
validation checks specified in [RFC6488] as well as the following
additional ASPA-specific validation step.
* The autonomous system identifier delegation extension [RFC3779] is
present in the end-entity (EE) certificate (contained within the
ASPA), and the customer AS number in the ASPA is contained within
the set of AS numbers specified by the EE certificate's autonomous
system identifier delegation extension.
5. IANA Considerations
Please add the id-mod-rpki-aspa-2022 to the SMI Security for S/MIME
Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0) registry
(https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi-
numbers.xml#security-smime-0) as follows:
Decimal | Description | Specification
-----------------------------------------------------------
TBD2 | id-mod-rpki-aspa-2022 | [ThisRFC]
Please add the ASPA to the SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type
(1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1) registry (https://www.iana.org/assignments/
smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xml#security-smime-1) as follows:
Decimal | Description | Specification
-----------------------------------------------------------
49 | id-ct-ASPA | [ThisRFC]
Please add Autonomous System Provider Authorization to the RPKI
Signed Object registry (https://www.iana.org/assignments/rpki/
rpki.xhtml#signed-objects) as follows:
Name | OID | Specification
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Autonomous System Provider Authorization | 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.49 | [ThisRFC]
Please add an item for the Autonomous System Provider Authorization
file extension to the "RPKI Repository Name Scheme" registry created
by [RFC6481] as follows:
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Filename
Extension RPKI Object Reference
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
.asa Autonomous System Provider Authorization [draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile]
6. Security Considerations
While it's not restricted, but it's highly recommended maintaining
for selected Customer AS a single ASPA object that covers all
connected providers/route servers. Such policy should prevent race
conditions during ASPA updates that might affect prefix propagation.
The software that provides hosting for ASPA records SHOULD support
enforcement of this rule. In the case of the transition process
between different CA registries, the ASPA records SHOULD be kept
identical in all registries.
7. Implementation status
This section is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
This section records the status of known implementations of the
protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this
Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in RFC 7942.
The description of implementations in this section is intended to
assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to
RFCs. Please note that the listing of any individual implementation
here does not imply endorsement by the IETF. Furthermore, no effort
has been spent to verify the information presented here that was
supplied by IETF contributors. This is not intended as, and must not
be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their
features. Readers are advised to note that other implementations may
exist.
According to RFC 7942, "this will allow reviewers and working groups
to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of
running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation
and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.
It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as
they see fit".
* A validator implementation [rpki-client] written in C based on the
OpenBSD RPKI Validator was provided by Job Snijders from Fastly.
* A signer and decoder implementation [rpkimancer] written in Python
was provided by Ben Maddison from Workonline.
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* A signer implementation [krill] written in Rust was provided by
Tim Bruijnzeels from NLnetLabs.
* At IETF114 Ties de Kock from RIPE NCC shared a signer
implementation had been developed internally.
* Di Ma reported [rpstir2] success in RPSTIR2 validating objects
produced by Tim Bruijnzeels.
8. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Keyur Patel for helping kickstart the
ASPA profile project; and Ties de Kock & Tim Bruijnzeels for
suggesting that the ProviderASSet be in a canonical form.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[IANA-AF] IANA, "Address Family Numbers",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/address-family-numbers/
address-family-numbers.xhtml>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3779>.
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.
[RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6481, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6481>.
[RFC6485] Huston, G., "The Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for
Use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)",
RFC 6485, DOI 10.17487/RFC6485, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6485>.
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[RFC6488] Lepinski, M., Chi, A., and S. Kent, "Signed Object
Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", RFC 6488, DOI 10.17487/RFC6488, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6488>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[X680] ITU-T, "Information technology -- Abstract Syntax Notation
One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation",
ITU-T Recommendation X.680, 2015.
[X690] ITU-T, "Information Technology -- ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
(DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, 2015.
9.2. Informative References
[krill] Bruijnzeels, T., "Krill", 2022,
<https://github.com/NLnetLabs/krill>.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.
[rpki-client]
Snijders, J., "rpki-client", 2022,
<https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/
Jdowj_bDhN_T993SN4bbsWeDgGA/>.
[rpkimancer]
Maddison, B., "rpkimancer-aspa", 2022,
<https://github.com/benmaddison/rpkimancer-aspa>.
[rpstir2] Ma, D., "RPSTIR2",
<https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/
pxqAGPmR0MA3NMe-NxYyiEZ7RXw>.
Authors' Addresses
Alexander Azimov
Yandex
Email: a.e.azimov@gmail.com
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Eugene Uskov
JetLend
Email: eu@jetlend.ru
Randy Bush
Internet Initiative Japan
Email: randy@psg.com
Job Snijders
Fastly
Amsterdam
Email: job@fastly.com
Russ Housley
Vigil Security, LLC
918 Spring Knoll Drive
Herndon, VA 20170
United States of America
Email: housley@vigilsec.com
Ben Maddison
Workonline
Cape Town
South Africa
Email: benm@workonline.africa
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