A Profile for Autonomous System Provider Authorization
draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-12

Network Working Group                                          A. Azimov
Internet-Draft                                                    Yandex
Intended status: Standards Track                                E. Uskov
Expires: 2 August 2023                                           JetLend
                                                                 R. Bush
                                               Internet Initiative Japan
                                                             J. Snijders
                                                                  Fastly
                                                              R. Housley
                                                          Vigil Security
                                                             B. Maddison
                                                              Workonline
                                                         29 January 2023

         A Profile for Autonomous System Provider Authorization
                   draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-12

Abstract

   This document defines a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) protected
   content type for Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA)
   objects for use with the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI).
   An ASPA is a digitally signed object through which the issuer (the
   holder of an Autonomous System identifier), can authorize one or more
   other Autonomous Systems (ASes) as its upstream providers.  When
   validated, an ASPA's eContent can be used for detection and
   mitigation of route leaks.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 2 August 2023.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  ASPA Content Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  ASPA eContent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.2.  customerASID  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.3.  providers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       3.3.1.  ProviderAS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
         3.3.1.1.  providerASID  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
         3.3.1.2.  afiLimit  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  ASPA Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.1.  SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier registry  . . .   7
     5.2.  SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type registry . . . .   7
     5.3.  RPKI Signed Object registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.4.  RPKI Repository Name Scheme registry  . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.5.  Media Type registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   7.  Implementation status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   8.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   Appendix A.  Example ASPA eContent Payload  . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14

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1.  Introduction

   The primary purpose of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
   is to improve routing security [RFC6480].  As part of this
   infrastructure, a mechanism is needed to facilitate holders of
   Autonomous System (AS) identifiers in their capacity as Customer to
   authorize other ASes as their Provider(s).  A Provider AS (PAS) is a
   network that:

   a.  offers its customers outbound (customer to Internet) data traffic
       connectivity and/or

   b.  further propagates in all directions (towards providers, lateral
       peers, and customers) any BGP Updates that the customer may send.

   The digitally signed Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA)
   object described in this document provides the above-mentioned
   authorization mechanism.  See [I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification]
   for a specification how to use Validated ASPA Payloads (VAPs) to
   filter BGP UPDATE messages.

   An ASPA object is a cryptographically verifiable attestation signed
   by the holder of an Autonomous System identifier (hereafter called
   the "Customer AS", or CAS).  An ASPA contains lists one or more ASes,
   each listing meaning the listed AS is authorized to act as Provider
   network.  When the CAS has multiple Providers, all Provider ASes that
   provide service to the CAS are listed in the ASPA, including any non-
   transparent Internet Exchange Point (IXP) Route Server (RS) ASes.
   The common case for Route Servers (RS) at Internet Exchange Points is
   to operate transparently (see Section 2.2.2.1 [RFC7947]), thus
   usually, the ASNs of IX Route Servers are not listed as PAS in ASPAs.

   The ASPA content type definition conforms to the [RFC6488] template
   for RPKI signed objects.

   In accordance with Section 4 of [RFC6488], this document defines:

   1.  The object identifier (OID) that identifies the ASPA signed
       object.  This OID appears in the eContentType field of the
       encapContentInfo object as well as the content-type signed
       attribute within the signerInfo structure.

   2.  The ASN.1 syntax for the ASPA content, which is the payload
       signed by the CAS.  The ASPA content is encoded using the ASN.1
       [X.680] Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) [X.690].

   3.  The steps required to validate an ASPA beyond the validation
       steps specified in [RFC6488].

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2.  ASPA Content Type

   The content-type for an ASPA is defined as id-ct-ASPA, which has the
   numerical value of 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.49.  This OID MUST appear
   both within the eContentType in the encapContentInfo structure as
   well as the content-type signed attribute within the signerInfo
   structure (see [RFC6488]).

3.  ASPA eContent

   The content of an ASPA identifies the Customer AS (CAS) as well as
   the Set of Provider ASes (SPAS) that are authorized by the CAS to be
   its Providers.

   If a Customer AS is connected to multiple transit providers/non-
   transparent route servers, all Provider ASes MUST be registered in a
   single ASPA object.  This rule is important to avoid possible race
   conditions during updates of ASPAs.

   The eContent of an ASPA is an instance of ASProviderAttestation,
   formally defined by the following ASN.1 [X.680] module:

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   RPKI-ASPA-2022
     { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
        pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-rpki-aspa-2022(TBD) }

   DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
   BEGIN

   IMPORTS
     CONTENT-TYPE
     FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010  -- RFC 6268
       { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
          pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58) } ;

   id-ct-ASPA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
     { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
       pkcs-9(9) id-smime(16) id-ct(1) aspa(49) }

   ct-ASPA CONTENT-TYPE ::=
     { TYPE ASProviderAttestation IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-ASPA }

   ASProviderAttestation ::= SEQUENCE {
     version [0]   INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
     customerASID  ASID,
     providers     ProviderASSet }

   ProviderASSet ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ProviderAS

   ProviderAS ::= SEQUENCE {
     providerASID  ASID,
     afiLimit      AddressFamilyIdentifier OPTIONAL }

   ASID ::= INTEGER (0..4294967295)

   AddressFamilyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE (2))

   END

   Note that this content appears as the eContent within the
   encapContentInfo as specified in [RFC6488].

3.1.  version

   The version number of the ASProviderAttestation MUST be v0.

3.2.  customerASID

   The customerASID field contains the AS number of the Customer
   Autonomous System that is the authorizing entity.

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3.3.  providers

   The providers field contains the listing of ASes that are authorized
   as providers or route servers in the specified address family.

   Each element contained in the providers field is an instance of
   ProviderAS.

   In addition to the constraints described by the formal ASN.1
   definition, the contents of the providers field MUST satisfy the
   following constraints:

   *  The CustomerASID value MUST NOT appear in any providerASID field.

   *  The elements of providers MUST be ordered in ascending numerical
      order by the value of the providerASID field.

   *  Each value of providerASID MUST be unique (with respect to the
      other elements of providers).

3.3.1.  ProviderAS

3.3.1.1.  providerASID

   The providerASID field contains the AS number of an AS that has been
   authorized by the customer AS as its provider or RS in the specified
   address family.

3.3.1.2.  afiLimit

   The afiLimit field optionally constrains the authorization given to
   the provider AS to a single address family.

   If present, it contains the two-octet Address Family Identifier (AFI)
   for which the relation between the customer and provider is
   authorized.  This specification only supports IPv4 and IPv6.
   Therefore, the value MUST be either 0001 or 0002, as specified in the
   Address Family Numbers registry [IANA-AF] maintained by IANA.

   If omitted, the authorization is valid for both IPv4 and IPv6
   announcements.

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4.  ASPA Validation

   Before a relying party can use an ASPA to validate a routing
   announcement, the relying party MUST first validate the ASPA object
   itself.  To validate an ASPA, the relying party MUST perform all the
   validation checks specified in [RFC6488] as well as the following
   additional ASPA-specific validation steps.

   *  The Autonomous System Identifier Delegation Extension [RFC3779]
      MUST be present in the end-entity (EE) certificate (contained
      within the ASPA), and the Customer ASID in the ASPA eContent MUST
      be contained within the set of AS numbers specified by the EE
      certificate's Autonomous System Identifier Delegation Extension.

   *  The EE certificate's Autonomous System Identifier Delegation
      Extension MUST NOT contain any "inherit" elements.

   *  The IP Address Delegation Extension [RFC3779] MUST be absent.

5.  IANA Considerations

5.1.  SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier registry

   Please add the id-mod-rpki-aspa-2022 to the SMI Security for S/MIME
   Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0) registry
   (https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi-
   numbers.xml#security-smime-0) as follows:

       Decimal   | Description                   | Specification
       -----------------------------------------------------------
       TBD2      | id-mod-rpki-aspa-2022         | [RFC-to-be]

5.2.  SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type registry

   Please add the ASPA to the SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type
   (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1) registry (https://www.iana.org/assignments/
   smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xml#security-smime-1) as follows:

       Decimal   | Description                   | Specification
       -----------------------------------------------------------
       49        | id-ct-ASPA                    | [RFC-to-be]

5.3.  RPKI Signed Object registry

   Please add Autonomous System Provider Authorization to the RPKI
   Signed Object registry (https://www.iana.org/assignments/rpki/
   rpki.xhtml#signed-objects) as follows:

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    Name                                     | OID                         | Specification
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Autonomous System Provider Authorization | 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.49  | [RFC-to-be]

5.4.  RPKI Repository Name Scheme registry

   Please add an item for the Autonomous System Provider Authorization
   file extension to the "RPKI Repository Name Scheme" registry created
   by [RFC6481] as follows:

   Filename
   Extension  RPKI Object                               Reference
   --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      .asa    Autonomous System Provider Authorization  [RFC-to-be]

5.5.  Media Type registry

   The IANA is requested to register the media type application/rpki-
   aspa in the "Media Type" registry as follows:

      Type name: application
      Subtype name: rpki-aspa
      Required parameters: N/A
      Optional parameters: N/A
      Encoding considerations: binary
      Security considerations: Carries an RPKI ASPA [RFC-to-be].
          This media type contains no active content. See
          Section 4 of [RFC-to-be] for further information.
      Interoperability considerations: None
      Published specification: [RFC-to-be]
      Applications that use this media type: RPKI operators
      Additional information:
        Content: This media type is a signed object, as defined
            in [RFC6488], which contains a payload of a list of
            AS identifers as defined in [RFC-to-be].
        Magic number(s): None
        File extension(s): .asa
        Macintosh file type code(s):
      Person & email address to contact for further information:
        Job Snijders <job@fastly.com>
      Intended usage: COMMON
      Restrictions on usage: None
      Change controller: IETF

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6.  Security Considerations

   While it is not technically enforcable, it is highly recommended that
   for a given Customer AS, a single ASPA object be maintained which
   contains all providers/route servers.  Administrating all providers
   in a single object helps prevent race conditions during ASPA updates
   that might affect prefix propagation.  The software that provides
   hosting for ASPA records SHOULD support enforcement of this rule.  In
   the case of the transition process between different CA registries,
   the ASPA records SHOULD be kept identical in all registries in terms
   of their authorization contents.

7.  Implementation status

   This section is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   This section records the status of known implementations of the
   protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this
   Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in RFC 7942.
   The description of implementations in this section is intended to
   assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to
   RFCs.  Please note that the listing of any individual implementation
   here does not imply endorsement by the IETF.  Furthermore, no effort
   has been spent to verify the information presented here that was
   supplied by IETF contributors.  This is not intended as, and must not
   be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their
   features.  Readers are advised to note that other implementations may
   exist.

   According to RFC 7942, "this will allow reviewers and working groups
   to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of
   running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation
   and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.
   It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as
   they see fit".

   *  A validator implementation [rpki-client] (version 8.0 and higher),
      written in C was provided by Job Snijders from Fastly.

   *  A signer and decoder implementation [rpkimancer] written in Python
      was provided by Ben Maddison from Workonline.

   *  A signer implementation [krill] written in Rust was provided by
      Tim Bruijnzeels from NLnetLabs.

   *  At IETF114 Ties de Kock from RIPE NCC shared a signer
      implementation had been developed internally.

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   *  Di Ma reported success [rpstir2] in RPSTIR2 validating objects
      produced by Tim Bruijnzeels.

   *  A signer implementation [koenvh] written in PHP based on OpenSSL
      was provided by Koen van Hove.

   *  A signer implementation [aspa-demo] written in Perl based on
      OpenSSL was provided by Tom Harrison from APNIC.

8.  Acknowledgments

   The authors would like to thank Keyur Patel for helping kick-start
   the ASPA profile project, Ties de Kock & Tim Bruijnzeels for
   suggesting that the ProviderASSet be in a canonical form, and
   Kotikalapudi Sriram & Claudio Jeker for review and several
   suggestions for improvements.

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC3779]  Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
              Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3779>.

   [RFC5652]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
              RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.

   [RFC6481]  Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
              Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6481, February 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6481>.

   [RFC6485]  Huston, G., "The Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for
              Use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)",
              RFC 6485, DOI 10.17487/RFC6485, February 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6485>.

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   [RFC6488]  Lepinski, M., Chi, A., and S. Kent, "Signed Object
              Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
              (RPKI)", RFC 6488, DOI 10.17487/RFC6488, February 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6488>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [X.680]    ITU-T, "Information technology - Abstract Syntax Notation
              One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation",
              ITU-T Recommendation X.680, 2021.

   [X.690]    ITU-T, "Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
              Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
              Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
              (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, 2021.

9.2.  Informative References

   [aspa-demo]
              Harrison, T., "RPKI ASPA Demo", 2022,
              <https://github.com/APNIC-net/rpki-aspa-demo>.

   [I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification]
              Azimov, A., Bogomazov, E., Bush, R., Patel, K., Snijders,
              J., and K. Sriram, "BGP AS_PATH Verification Based on
              Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Autonomous
              System Provider Authorization (ASPA) Objects", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-
              verification-11, 24 October 2022,
              <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-
              verification-11.txt>.

   [IANA-AF]  IANA, "Address Family Numbers",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/address-family-numbers/
              address-family-numbers.xhtml>.

   [koenvh]   van Hove, K., "Relying Party Resiliency Platform", 2022,
              <https://gitlab.com/Koenvh/relying-party-resiliency-
              platform/>.

   [krill]    Bruijnzeels, T., "Krill", 2022,
              <https://github.com/NLnetLabs/krill>.

   [RFC4648]  Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
              Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.

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   [RFC6480]  Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
              Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
              February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.

   [RFC7947]  Jasinska, E., Hilliard, N., Raszuk, R., and N. Bakker,
              "Internet Exchange BGP Route Server", RFC 7947,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7947, September 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7947>.

   [rpki-client]
              Snijders, J., "rpki-client", 2022,
              <https://www.rpki-client.org/>.

   [rpkimancer]
              Maddison, B., "rpkimancer-aspa", 2022,
              <https://github.com/benmaddison/rpkimancer-aspa>.

   [rpstir2]  Ma, D., "RPSTIR2", 2022,
              <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/
              pxqAGPmR0MA3NMe-NxYyiEZ7RXw>.

Appendix A.  Example ASPA eContent Payload

   Below an example of a DER encoded ASPA eContent is provided with
   annotation following the '#' character.

$ echo 302002023cca301a300402020b6230040202205b3005020300c7903005020303259e \
  | xxd -r -ps \
  | openssl asn1parse -inform DER -i -dump
    0:d=0  hl=2 l=  32 cons: SEQUENCE
    2:d=1  hl=2 l=   2 prim:  INTEGER      :3CCA    # Customer ASID 15562
    6:d=1  hl=2 l=  26 cons:  SEQUENCE              # ProviderASSet
    8:d=2  hl=2 l=   4 cons:   SEQUENCE             #  ProviderAS
   10:d=3  hl=2 l=   2 prim:    INTEGER     :0B62   #   ASID 2914
   14:d=2  hl=2 l=   4 cons:   SEQUENCE             #  ProviderAS
   16:d=3  hl=2 l=   2 prim:    INTEGER     :205B   #   ASID 8283
   20:d=2  hl=2 l=   5 cons:   SEQUENCE             #  ProviderAS
   22:d=3  hl=2 l=   3 prim:    INTEGER     :C790   #   ASID 51088
   27:d=2  hl=2 l=   5 cons:   SEQUENCE             #  ProviderAS
   29:d=3  hl=2 l=   3 prim:    INTEGER     :03259E #   ASID 206238

   Below is a complete Base64 [RFC4648] encoded RPKI ASPA Signed Object.

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MIIGpAYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIGlTCCBpECAQMxDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwMwYLKoZIhvcNAQkQ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   The above should decode as following:

Azimov, et al.            Expires 2 August 2023                [Page 13]
Internet-Draft              RPKI ASPA Profile               January 2023

Object SHA256 hash:          wsCvp2J+eZeizU8nrXHkLPhcjyqZ5euDlwLssA/nlwg=
EE Subject key identifier:   16:34:9F:E6:15:F5:1A:61:A1:28:CB:BD:00:6E:D6:54:89:7C:9B:53
EE Certificate issuer:       /CN=caa805dbac364749b9b115590ab6ef0f970cdbd8
EE Certificate serial:       A1C7752FF8B1D2E01D
EE Authority key identifier: CA:A8:05:DB:AC:36:47:49:B9:B1:15:59:0A:B6:EF:0F:97:0C:DB:D8
EE Authority info access:    rsync://rpki.ripe.net/repository/DEFAULT/yqgF26w2R0m5sRVZCrbvD5cM29g.cer
EE Subject info access:      rsync://chloe.sobornost.net/rpki/RIPE-nljobsnijders/FjSf5hX1GmGhKMu9AG7WVIl8m1M.asa
EE NotAfter:                 Sat 16 Dec 2023 12:29:57 +0000
ASPA eContent:
  Customer AS:               15562
  Provider Set:              1: AS: 2914
                             2: AS: 8283
                             3: AS: 51088
                             4: AS: 206238

Authors' Addresses

   Alexander Azimov
   Yandex
   Email: a.e.azimov@gmail.com

   Eugene Uskov
   JetLend
   Email: eu@jetlend.ru

   Randy Bush
   Internet Initiative Japan
   Email: randy@psg.com

   Job Snijders
   Fastly
   Amsterdam
   Netherlands
   Email: job@fastly.com

   Russ Housley
   Vigil Security, LLC
   918 Spring Knoll Drive
   Herndon, VA 20170
   United States of America
   Email: housley@vigilsec.com

Azimov, et al.            Expires 2 August 2023                [Page 14]
Internet-Draft              RPKI ASPA Profile               January 2023

   Ben Maddison
   Workonline
   Cape Town
   South Africa
   Email: benm@workonline.africa

Azimov, et al.            Expires 2 August 2023                [Page 15]