BGP AS_PATH Verification Based on Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) Objects
draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification-14
The information below is for an old version of the document.
| Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Active".
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Alexander Azimov , Eugene Bogomazov , Randy Bush , Keyur Patel , Job Snijders , Kotikalapudi Sriram | ||
| Last updated | 2023-04-19 (Latest revision 2023-03-27) | ||
| Replaces | draft-azimov-sidrops-aspa-verification | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | In WG Last Call | |
| Document shepherd | Chris Morrow | ||
| IESG | IESG state | I-D Exists | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | morrowc@ops-netman.net |
draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification-14
Network Working Group A. Azimov
Internet-Draft Yandex
Intended status: Standards Track E. Bogomazov
Expires: 21 October 2023 Qrator Labs
R. Bush
IIJ & Arrcus
K. Patel
Arrcus
J. Snijders
Fastly
K. Sriram
USA NIST
19 April 2023
BGP AS_PATH Verification Based on Autonomous System Provider
Authorization (ASPA) Objects
draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification-14
Abstract
This document describes procedures that make use of Autonomous System
Provider Authorization (ASPA) objects in the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to verify the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)
AS_PATH attribute of advertised routes. This type of AS_PATH
verification provides detection and mitigation of route leaks and
improbable AS paths. It also to some degree provides protection
against prefix hijacks with forged-origin or forged-path-segment.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Azimov, et al. Expires 21 October 2023 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft ASPA-based AS_PATH Verification April 2023
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 21 October 2023.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Anomaly Propagation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. BGP Roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Autonomous System Provider Authorization . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. ASPA Registration Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Hop-Check Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. AS_PATH Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6.1. Algorithm for Upstream Paths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.2. Algorithm for Downstream Paths . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. AS_PATH Verification Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8. Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9.1. 4-Byte AS Number Requirement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9.2. Correctness of the ASPA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9.3. Make Before Break . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
10. Comparison to Other Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
10.1. BGPsec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
10.2. Peerlock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
12. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
13. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
14. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
15. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
15.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
15.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Azimov, et al. Expires 21 October 2023 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft ASPA-based AS_PATH Verification April 2023
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1. Introduction
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) as originally designed is known to
be vulnerable to prefix (or route) hijacks and BGP route leaks
[RFC7908]. Some existing BGP extensions are able to partially solve
these problems. For example, Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI) based route origin validation (RPKI-ROV) [RFC6480] [RFC6482]
[RFC6811] [RFC9319] can be used to detect and filter accidental mis-
originations. [RFC9234] or
[I-D.ietf-grow-route-leak-detection-mitigation] can be used to detect
and mitigate accidental route leaks. While RPKI-ROV can prevent
accidental prefix hijacks, malicious forged-origin prefix hijacks can
still occur [RFC9319]. RFC9319 includes some recommendations for
reducing the attack surface for forged-origin prefix hijacks.
This document describes procedures that make use of Autonomous System
Provider Authorization (ASPA) objects [I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile]
in the RPKI to verify the BGP AS_PATH attribute of advertised routes.
These new ASPA-based procedures automatically detect invalid AS_PATHs
in announcements that are received from customers, lateral peers
(defined in [RFC7908]), transit providers, IXP Route Servers (RS),
RS-clients, and siblings. This type of AS_PATH verification provides
detection and mitigation of route leaks and improbable AS paths. It
also to some degree provides protection against prefix hijacks with
forged-origin or forged-path-segment (Section 8). The protections
provided by these procedures (together with RPKI-ROV) are based on
cryptographic techniques, and they are effective against a majority
of accidental and malicious actions.
ASPA objects are cryptographically signed registrations of customer-
to-provider relationships and stored in a distributed database
[I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile]. ASPA-based path verification is an
incrementally deployable technique and provides benefits to early
adopters in the context of limited deployment.
The procedures described in this document are applicable only for BGP
routes with {AFI, SAFI} combinations {AFI 1 (IPv4), SAFI 1} and {AFI
2 (IPv6), SAFI 1} [IANA-AF]. SAFI 1 represents NLRI used for unicast
forwarding [IANA-SAF].
For brevity, the term "provider" is often used instead of "transit
provider" in this document; they mean the same.
Azimov, et al. Expires 21 October 2023 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft ASPA-based AS_PATH Verification April 2023
1.1. Anomaly Propagation
Both route leaks and hijacks have similar effects on ISP operations -
they redirect traffic and can result in denial of service (DoS),
eavesdropping, increased latency, and packet loss. The level of
risk, however, depends significantly on the extent of propagation of
the anomalies. For example, a route leak or hijack that is
propagated only to customers may cause bottlenecking within a
particular ISP's customer cone, but if the anomaly propagates through
lateral (i.e., non-transit) peers and transit providers, or reaches
global distribution through transit-free networks, then the ill
effects will likely be amplified and experienced across continents.
The ability to constrain the propagation of BGP anomalies to transit
providers and lateral peers - without requiring support from the
source of the anomaly (which is critical if the source has malicious
intent) - should significantly improve the robustness of the global
inter-domain routing system.
2. BGP Roles
For path verification purposes in this document, the BGP roles an AS
can have in relation to a neighbor AS are customer, provider, lateral
peer, RS, RS-client, and sibling. These relationships, except
sibling, are defined in [RFC9234]. Sibling ASes MAY export
everything (both customer and non-customer routes) to each other,
i.e., consider each other as a customer. For sibling ASes, the
customer-to-provider relationship applies in each direction.
All roles are configured locally and used for the registration of
ASPA objects (Section 3, Section 4) and/or for path verification
(Section 6). The procedure of BGP Role capability [RFC9234] in the
BGP OPEN message to verify the role with a neighbor is RECOMMENDED.
The procedure is not applied for verifying a sibling-to-sibling role
since it is not specified in [RFC9234]. However, there is little
concern about a pair of sibling ASes, since they have a trusted
relationship. In fact, they are typically managed by a single
entity.
3. Autonomous System Provider Authorization
An ASPA record is a digitally signed object that binds a set of
Provider AS numbers to a Customer AS (CAS) number (in terms of BGP
announcements) and is signed by the CAS
[I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile]. The CAS can choose to specify an
AFI (i.e., afiLimit = 1 for IPv4 or 2 for IPv6) in the ASPA or it may
omit it in which case the ASPA applies to both IPv4 and IPv6. The
ASPA attests that the CAS has a Set of Provider ASes (SPAS) as
Azimov, et al. Expires 21 October 2023 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft ASPA-based AS_PATH Verification April 2023
specified in the ASPA. The definition of Provider AS is given in
Section 1 of [I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile]. A function of a
Provider AS is to propagate a CAS's route announcements onward, i.e.,
to the Provider's upstream providers, lateral peers, or customers.
Another function is to offer outbound (customer to Internet) data
traffic connectivity to the Customer. The ASPA object profile is
described in [I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile].
The notation (AS x, [{AS y1, afiLimit a1}, {AS y2, afiLimit a2},
...]), is used to represent an ASPA object for a CAS denoted as AS x.
In this notation, the set {AS y1, AS y2, ...} represent the Set of
Provider ASes (SPAS) of AS x and each Provider AS has an associated
afiLimit (shown as a1, a2,... etc., respectively). The afiLimit may
have a value of either 1 or 2 (meaning AFI = 1 or AFI = 2). It may
also be left unspecified, in which case the Provider AS applies for
both AFI = 1 and AFI = 2. A CAS is expected to register a single
ASPA listing all its Provider ASes (see Section 4). If a CAS has a
single ASPA, then the SPAS for the CAS is the set of Provider ASes
listed in that ASPA. In case a CAS has multiple ASPAs, then the SPAS
is the union of the Provider ASes listed in all ASPAs of the CAS.
Verified ASPA Payload (VAP) refers to the payload in a
cryptographically verified (i.e., X.509 valid [RFC3779] [RFC5280])
ASPA object. In the procedures for the AS path verification
described in this document (Section 5, Section 6), VAP-SPAS refers to
the set of provider ASes derived from the VAP(s) of the CAS in
consideration.
4. ASPA Registration Recommendations
It is RECOMMENDED that the afiLimit parameter in the ASPA object be
left unspecified (unless there is a compelling reason to specify) so
that the ASPA applies to both IPv4 and IPv6 prefixes. This gives the
CAS significant flexibility, e.g., the need to scramble to modify the
ASPA registrations can be averted when adding or moving IPv4 and IPv6
route announcements across different providers.
An ASPA object showing only AS 0 as a provider AS is referred to as
an AS0 ASPA. A non-transparent Route Server AS (RS AS) is one that
includes its AS number in the AS_PATH. Registering as AS0 ASPA is a
statement by the registering AS that it has no transit providers, and
it is also not an RS-client at a non-transparent RS AS. If that
statement is true for both AFIs (IPv4 and IPv6), then the AS MUST
register an AS 0 ASPA including only AS 0 as a provider. If that
statement is true for only one AFI, then the AS MUST include in its
ASPA only AS 0 as a provider for that AFI and applicable other ASes
as providers for the other AFI. In general, an AS MUST include in
its ASPA all its provider ASes and any non-transparent RS AS(es) at
Azimov, et al. Expires 21 October 2023 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft ASPA-based AS_PATH Verification April 2023
which it is an RS-client. A compliant AS, including a Route Server
AS (RS AS), MUST have an ASPA. An AS SHOULD NOT have more than one
ASPA. An RS AS SHOULD register an AS 0 ASPA without afiLimit.
If, despite the above recommendations, the ASPA(s) of a CAS includes
SPAS for one AFI but not for the other AFI (not even an AS 0), the
ASPA SHALL NOT be rejected just for that reason. However, such an
ASPA(s) will be presumed to imply that the CAS has no providers
(equivalent to AS 0 SPAS) for the AFI that they neglected to include.
As mentioned before, the set of provider ASes contained in the VAP(s)
is referred to as the VAP-SPAS of the AS registering the ASPA(s).
Normally, a VAP-SPAS is not expected to contain both an AS 0 and
other Provider ASes for the same AFI, but an unexpected presence of
AS 0 has no influence on the AS path verification procedures (see
Section 5, Section 6).
Each of the two ASes in a sibling pair MUST register its ASPA
including the other AS in its SPAS. If one of the ASes in the pair
does this registration but the other does not, that contributes to
the risk of not getting the correct AS path verification result for
routes that include the pair.
The ASes on the boundary of an AS Confederation MUST register ASPAs
using the Confederation's global ASN as the CAS.
As specified earlier, a compliant AS should maintain a single ASPA
object that includes all its provider ASes, including any non-
transparent RS ASes. Such a practice helps prevent race conditions
during ASPA updates that might affect prefix propagation. The
software that provides hosting for ASPA records SHOULD support
enforcement of this practice. During a transition process between
different certificate authority (CA) registries, the ASPA records
SHOULD be kept identical in all registries.
5. Hop-Check Function
Let AS(i) and AS(j) represent adjacent unique ASes in an AS_PATH, and
thus (AS(i), AS(j)) represents an AS hop. A hop-check function,
hop(AS(i), AS(j), AFI), checks if the ordered pair of ASNs, (AS(i),
AS(j)), has the property that AS(j) is an attested provider of AS(i)
per VAP-SPAS of AS(i) for the specified AFI. The VAP-SPAS table is
assumed to be organized in such a way that it can be queried to check
(1) if for a specified CAS = AS(i), there is an entry (i.e., SPAS
listed), or (2) if for a given (AS(i), AS(j), AFI) tuple, AS(j) is
listed in the VAP-SPAS as a provider associated with CAS = AS(i) for
the specified AFI value. A provider AS ID included in the SPAS can
correspond to a Provider, a non-transparent RS, or a Sibling. A non-
Azimov, et al. Expires 21 October 2023 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft ASPA-based AS_PATH Verification April 2023
transparent RS is effectively a Provider to its RS-client. Siblings
regard each other as a Provider (see Section 4). The term
"Provider+" in the definition of the hop-check function is meant to
encompass all three possibilities: Provider, non-transparent RS, or
Sibling. This function is specified as follows:
/
| "No Attestation" if there is no entry
| in VAP-SPAS table for CAS = AS(i)
|
hop(AS(i), AS(j), AFI) = / Else, "Provider+" if VAP-SPAS entry for
\ CAS = AS(i) for the mentioned AFI includes AS(j)
|
| Else, "Not Provider+" |
\
Figure 1: Hop-check function.
To be clear, this function checks if AS(j) is included in the VAP-
SPAS of AS(i), and in doing so it does not need to distinguish
between Provider, non-transparent RS, and Sibling.
The hop-check function is AFI dependent because an AS may have
different SPAS for different AFI. This function is used in the ASPA-
based AS_PATH verification algorithms described in Section 6.1 and
Section 6.2. For simplicity, while describing the algorithms, the
function hop(AS(i), AS(j), AFI) is replaced with hop(AS(i), AS(j)) by
dropping the AFI since it is understood that the algorithms are run
for a specific AFI at a time (AFI = 1 or AFI = 2).
For purposes such as computational efficiency, memory savings, etc.,
an implementation may make its own choice regarding maintaining a
single VAP-SPAS table or two separate tables (i.e., one per AFI).
6. AS_PATH Verification
The procedures described in this document are applicable only to
four-octet AS number compatible BGP speakers [RFC6793]. If such a
BGP speaker receives both AS_PATH and AS4_PATH attributes in an
UPDATE, then the procedures are applied on the reconstructed AS path
(Section 4.2.3 of [RFC6793]). So, the term AS_PATH is used in this
document to refer to the usual AS_PATH [RFC4271] as well as the
reconstructed AS path.
If an attacker creates a route leak intentionally, they may try to
strip their AS from the AS_PATH. To partly guard against that, a
check is necessary to match the most recently added AS in the AS_PATH
to the BGP neighbor's ASN. This check MUST be performed as specified
Azimov, et al. Expires 21 October 2023 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft ASPA-based AS_PATH Verification April 2023
in Section 6.3 of [RFC4271]. If the check fails, then the AS_PATH is
considered a Malformed AS_PATH and the UPDATE is considered to be in
error (Section 6.3 of [RFC4271]). The case of transparent RS MUST
also be appropriately taken care of (e.g., by suspending the neighbor
ASN check). The check fails also when the AS_PATH is empty (zero
length) and such UPDATEs will also be considered to be in error.
[I-D.ietf-idr-deprecate-as-set-confed-set] specifies that "treat-as-
withdraw" error handling SHOULD be applied to routes with AS_SET in
the AS_PATH. In this document, routes with AS_SET are given Invalid
evaluation in the AS_PATH verification procedures (Section 6.1 and
Section 6.2).
Wherever AFI is mentioned in the AS_PATH verification algorithms, it
refers to the AFI of the prefix in the route for which the AS_PATH
verification is performed. When an AS_PATH is evaluated as Valid,
Invalid, or Unknown, it pertains only to the AFI for which the
verification was performed. The same AS_PATH can have a different
verification outcome for a different AFI. Since it is understood
that the algorithms described here are run for a single AFI at a time
(pertaining to the route(s) being verified), the AFI in the function
hop(AS(i), AS(j), AFI) is not shown explicitly for the sake of
simplicity.
6.1. Algorithm for Upstream Paths
The upstream verification algorithm described here is applied when a
route is received from a customer or lateral peer, or is received by
an RS from an RS-client, or is received by an RS-client from an RS.
In all these cases, the receiving/validating AS expects the AS_PATH
to consist of only customer-to-provider hops successively from the
origin AS to the neighbor AS (most recently added).
The basic principles of the upstream verification algorithm are
stated here. Let the sequence {AS(N), AS(N-1),..., AS(2), AS(1)}
represent the AS_PATH in terms of unique ASNs, where AS(1) is the
origin AS and AS(N) is the most recently added AS and neighbor of the
receiving/validating AS. For each hop AS(i-1) to AS(i) in this
sequence, the hop-check function, hop(AS(i-1), AS(i)), must equal
"Provider+" (Section 5) for the AS_PATH to be Valid. If the hop-
check function for at least one of those hops is "Not Provider+",
then the AS_PATH is deemed Invalid. If the AS_PATH verification
outcome is neither Valid nor Invalid (per the above principles), then
it is evaluated as Unknown.
The upstream path verification procedure is specified as follows:
Azimov, et al. Expires 21 October 2023 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft ASPA-based AS_PATH Verification April 2023
1. If the AS_PATH has an AS_SET, then the procedure halts with the
outcome "Invalid".
2. Collapse prepends in the AS_SEQUENCE(s) in the AS_PATH (i.e.,
keep only the unique AS numbers). Let the resulting ordered
sequence be represented by {AS(N), AS(N-1), ..., AS(2), AS(1)},
where AS(1) is the first-added (i.e., origin) AS and AS(N) is the
last-added AS and neighbor to the receiving/validating AS.
3. If N = 1, then the procedure halts with the outcome "Valid".
Else, continue.
4. At this step, N >= 2. If there is an i such that 2 <= i <= N and
hop(AS(i-1), AS(i)) = "Not Provider+", then the procedure halts
with the outcome "Invalid". Else, continue.
5. If there is an i such that 2 <= i <= N and hop(AS(i-1), AS(i)) =
"No Attestation", then the procedure halts with the outcome
"Unknown". Else, the procedure halts with the outcome "Valid".
6.2. Algorithm for Downstream Paths
The downstream verification algorithm described here is applied when
a route is received from a transit provider or sibling AS. As
described in Section 4, a sending sibling AS acts towards its
receiving sibling AS in a manner similar to that of a provider
towards its customer.
It is not essential, but the reader may take a look at the
illustrations and formal proof in [sriram1] to develop a clearer
understanding of the algorithm described here.
Here again (as in Section 6.1), let the AS_PATH be simplified and
represented by the ordered sequence of unique ASNs as {AS(N),
AS(N-1),..., AS(2), AS(1)}.
If 1 <= N <= 2, then the AS_PATH is trivially Valid.
The rest of the section assumes that the AS_PATH contains 3 or more
unique ASNs (N >= 3).
*Determination of Invalid AS_PATH:*
Given the above-mentioned ordered sequence, if there exist indices u
and v such that (1) u <= v, (2) hop(AS(u-1), AS(u)) = "Not
Provider+", and (3) hop(AS(v+1), AS(v)) = "Not Provider+", then the
AS_PATH is Invalid.
Azimov, et al. Expires 21 October 2023 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft ASPA-based AS_PATH Verification April 2023
*Determination of Valid AS_PATH:*
As shown in Figure 2, assume that the ASes in the AS_PATH are in the
same physical (locational) order as in the sequence representation
{AS(N), AS(N-1),..., AS(2), AS(1)}, i.e., AS(N) is the left-most and
AS(1) the right-most.
AS(L) ............. AS(K)
/ \
AS(L+1) AS(K-1)
. .
. .
(down-ramp) . . (up-ramp)
. .
. .
AS(N-1) AS(2)
/ \
AS(N) AS(1)
/ (Origin AS)
Receiving & Validating AS
Each ramp has consecutive ASPA-attested
customer-to-provider hops in the bottom-to-top direction
Figure 2: Illustration of up-ramp and down-ramp.
Looking at Figure 2, the UPDATE is received from a provider or a
sibling (i.e., AS(N) is a provider or sibling). The AS_PATH may have
both an up-ramp (on the right starting at AS(1)) and a down-ramp (on
the left starting at AS(N)). The ramps are described as a sequence
of ASes that consists of consecutive customer-to-provider hops. The
up-ramp starts at AS(1) and each AS hop, (AS(i), AS(i+1)), in it has
the property that hop(AS(i), AS(i+1)) = "Provider+" for i = 1, 2,...
, K-1. If such a K does not exist, then K is set to 1. The up-ramp
ends (reaches its apex) at AS(K) because hop(AS(K), AS(K+1)) = "Not
Provider+" or "No Attestation". The down-ramp runs backward from
AS(N) to AS(L). Each AS hop, (AS(j), AS(j-1)), in it has the
property that hop(AS(j), AS(j-1)) = "Provider+" for j = N, N-1,... ,
L+1. If such an L does not exist, then L is set to N. The down-ramp
ends at AS(L) because hop(AS(L), AS(L-1)) = "Not Provider+" or "No
Attestation". Thus, the apex of the down-ramp is AS(L).
If there is an up-ramp that runs across all ASes in the AS_PATH
(i.e., K = N), then clearly the AS_PATH is Valid. Similarly, if
there is a down-ramp that runs across all ASes in the AS_PATH (i.e.,
L = 1), then also the AS_PATH is Valid. However, if both ramps exist
in an AS_PATH with K < N and L > 1, then the AS_PATH is Valid if and
only if L-K <= 1. Note that K could be greater than L (i.e., L-K has
Azimov, et al. Expires 21 October 2023 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft ASPA-based AS_PATH Verification April 2023
a negative value), which means that the up-ramp and down-ramp
overlap, and that could happen when some adjacent AS pairs in the
AS_PATH have mutually registered sibling relationships (i.e., include
each other in their respective SPAS) (see Section 4). If L-K = 0, it
means that the apexes of the up-ramp and down-ramp are at the same
AS. If L-K = 1, it means that the apexes are at adjacent ASes. In
summary, the AS_PATH is Valid if L-K is 0 or 1 or has a negative
value.
*Determination of Unknown AS_PATH:*
If L-K >= 2, then the AS_PATH is either Invalid (route leak) or
Unknown (see illustrations and proof in [sriram1]). However, if L-K
>= 2 and an Invalid outcome was not found by the process described
earlier in this section, then the AS_PATH is determined to be
Unknown.
The downstream path verification procedure is formally specified as
follows:
1. If the AS_PATH has an AS_SET, then the procedure halts with the
outcome "Invalid".
2. Collapse prepends in the AS_SEQUENCE(s) in the AS_PATH (i.e.,
keep only the unique AS numbers). Let the resulting ordered
sequence be represented by {AS(N), AS(N-1), ..., AS(2), AS(1)},
where AS(1) is the first-added (i.e., origin) AS and AS(N) is the
last-added AS and neighbor to the receiving/validating AS.
3. If 1 <= N <= 2, then the procedure halts with the outcome
"Valid". Else, continue.
4. At this step, N >= 3. Given the above-mentioned ordered
sequence, find the lowest value of u (2 <= u <= N) for which
hop(AS(u-1), AS(u)) = "Not Provider+". Call it u_min. If no
such u_min exists, set u_min = N+1. Find the highest value of v
(N-1 >= v >= 1) for which hop(AS(v+1), AS(v)) = "Not Provider+".
Call it v_max. If no such v_max exists, then set v_max = 0. If
u_min <= v_max, then the procedure halts with the outcome
"Invalid". Else, continue.
5. Up-ramp: For 2 <= i <= N, determine the largest K such that
hop(AS(i-1), AS(i)) = "Provider+" for each i in the range 2 <= i
<= K. If such a largest K does not exist, then set K = 1.
6. Down-ramp: For N-1 >= j >= 1, determine the smallest L such that
hop(AS(j+1), AS(j)) = "Provider+" for each j in the range N-1 >=
j >= L. If such smallest L does not exist, then set L = N.
Azimov, et al. Expires 21 October 2023 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft ASPA-based AS_PATH Verification April 2023
7. If L-K <= 1, then the procedure halts with the outcome "Valid".
Else, the procedure halts with the outcome "Unknown".
In the above procedure, the computations in Steps 4, 5, and 6 can be
done at the same time.
7. AS_PATH Verification Recommendations
Conforming implementations of this specification are not required to
implement the AS_PATH verification procedures (step-wise lists)
exactly as described in Section 6.1 and Section 6.2 but MUST provide
functionality equivalent to the external behavior resulting from
those procedures. In other words, the algorithms used in a specific
implementation may differ, for example, for computational efficiency
purposes, but the AS_PATH verification outcomes MUST be identical to
those obtained by the procedures described in Section 6.1 and
Section 6.2.
The above applies to eBGP routers in general, including those on the
boundary of an AS Confederation facing external ASes. However, the
procedures for ASPA-based AS_PATH verification in this document are
NOT RECOMMENDED for use on eBGP links internal to the Confederation.
The procedures described in this document MUST be applied to BGP
routes with {AFI, SAFI} combinations {AFI 1 (IPv4), SAFI 1} and {AFI
2 (IPv6), SAFI 1} [IANA-AF]. The procedures MUST NOT be applied to
other address families by default.
8. Mitigation
If the AS_PATH is determined to be Invalid based on the verification
procedures specified above (Section 6), then the route SHOULD be
rejected. Also, for any route with an Invalid AS_PATH, the cause of
the invalidity SHOULD be logged for monitoring and diagnostic
purposes.
The ASPA-based path verification procedures are able to check routes
received from customers, lateral peers, transit providers, RSes, RS-
clients, and siblings. These procedures combined with BGP Roles
[RFC9234] and RPKI-ROV [RFC6811] [RFC9319] can provide a fully
automated solution to detect and filter many of the ordinary prefix
hijacks, route leaks, and prefix hijacks with forged-origin or
forged-path-segment (see Property 3 below).
The ASPA-based path verification has the following properties
(detection capabilities):
Azimov, et al. Expires 21 October 2023 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft ASPA-based AS_PATH Verification April 2023
Property 1: Let AS A and AS B be any two ASes in the Internet
doing ASPA (registration and verification) and no assumption is
made about the deployment status of other ASes. Consider a route
propagated from AS A to a customer or lateral peer. The route is
subsequently leaked by an offending AS in the AS path before being
received at AS B on a customer or lateral peer interface. The
ASPA-based path verification at AS B always detects such a route
leak though it may not be able to identify the AS that originated
the leak. This assertion is true even when the sender AS A (or
receiver AS B) is an RS AS and the neighbor AS that AS A sent to
(or AS B received from) is an RS-client.
Property 2: Again, let AS A and AS B be any two ASes in the
Internet doing ASPA (registration and verification) and no
assumption is made about the deployment status of other ASes.
Consider a route received at AS B on a customer or lateral peer
interface that is a forged-origin prefix hijack involving AS A as
the forged-origin. The ASPA-based path verification at AS B
always detects such a forged-origin prefix hijack.
Property 3: This is an extension of Property 2 above to the case
of prefix hijacking with a forged-path-segment. Such hijacking
refers to the forging of multiple contiguous ASes in an AS path
beginning with the origin AS. Again, let AS A and AS B be any two
ASes in the Internet doing ASPA (registration and verification).
Let AS A's providers, AS P and AS Q, also be registering ASPA. No
assumption is made about the ASPA deployment status of any other
ASes in the Internet. Consider a route received at AS B on a
customer or lateral peer interface that is a prefix hijack with a
forged-path-segment {AS P, AS A} or {AS Q, AS A}. That is, the
hijacker attaches this path-segment at the beginning of their
route announcement. The ASPA-based path verification at AS B
always detects such a forged-path-segment prefix hijack. For a
chance to be successful (remain undetected by AS B), the hijacker
may resort to a forged-path-segment with three ASes including a
provider AS of AS P (or AS Q). But even that can be foiled
(detected) if the providers of AS P and AS Q also register ASPA.
Having to use a longer forged-path-segment to avoid detection by
AS B diminishes the ability of the hijacked route to compete with
the corresponding legitimate route in path selection.
Azimov, et al. Expires 21 October 2023 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft ASPA-based AS_PATH Verification April 2023
Property 4: Let AS A and AS B be any two ASes in the Internet
doing ASPA (registration and verification). Assume that AS B does
not drop a route detected as a leak, but only lowers its
LOCAL_PREF [RFC4271]. Let such a route, selected and forwarded by
AS B, be subsequently received at AS Z which is also doing ASPA.
No assumption is made about the ASPA compliance of the ASes in the
intervening path from AS B to AS Z. The ASPA-based path
verification at AS Z always detects such received route as a leak
regardless of the direction (type of peer) it was received from.
In the description of the properties listed above, the term
"customer" can be replaced with "RS-client".
An observation that follows from Property #1 above is that if any two
ISP ASes register ASPAs and implement the detection and mitigation
procedures, then any route received from one of them and leaked to
the other by a common customer AS (ASPA compliant or not) will be
automatically detected and mitigated. In effect, if most major ISPs
are compliant, the propagation of route leaks in the Internet will be
severely limited.
The above properties show that ASPA-based path verification offers
significant benefits to early adopters. Limitations of the method
with regard to some forms of malicious AS path manipulations are
discussed in Section 12.
9. Operational Considerations
9.1. 4-Byte AS Number Requirement
The procedures specified in this document are compatible only with
BGP implementations that support 4-byte ASNs in the AS_PATH. This
limitation should not have a real effect on operations since legacy
BGP routers are rare, and it is highly unlikely that they support
integration with the RPKI.
9.2. Correctness of the ASPA
ASPA issuers should be aware of the implications of ASPA-based AS
path verification. Network operators must keep their ASPA objects
correct and up to date. Otherwise, for example, if a provider AS is
left out of the Set of Provider ASes (SPAS) in the ASPA, then routes
containing the CAS (in the ASPA) and said provider AS may be
incorrectly labeled as route leaks and rejected.
Azimov, et al. Expires 21 October 2023 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft ASPA-based AS_PATH Verification April 2023
9.3. Make Before Break
ASPA issuers SHOULD apply the make-before-break principle while
updating an ASPA registration. For example, when adding new Provider
AS(es) in the SPAS, if the new ASPA is meant to replace a previously
created ASPA, the latter SHOULD be decommissioned only after allowing
sufficient time for the new ASPA to propagate to Relying Parties (RP)
through the global RPKI system.
10. Comparison to Other Technologies
10.1. BGPsec
BGPsec [RFC8205] was designed to solve the problem of AS_PATH
verification by including cryptographic signatures in BGP Update
messages. It offers protection against unauthorized path
modifications and assures that the BGPsec Update actually traveled
the path shown in the BGPsec_PATH Attribute. However, it does not
detect route leaks (valley-free violations). In comparison, the
ASPA-based path verification described in this document detects if
the AS path is improbable and focuses on detecting route leaks
(including malicious cases) and forged-origin hijacks.
BGPsec and ASPA are complementary technologies.
10.2. Peerlock
The Peerlock mechanism [Peerlock] [Flexsealing] has a similar
objective as the APSA-based route leak protection mechanism described
in this document. It is commonly deployed by large Internet carriers
to protect each other from route leaks. Peerlock depends on a
laborious manual process in which operators coordinate the
distribution of unstructured Provider Authorizations through out-of-
band means in a many-to-many fashion. On the other hand, ASPA's use
of the RPKI allows for automated, scalable, and ubiquitous
deployment, making the protection mechanism available to a wider
range of network operators.
The ASPA mechanism implemented in router code (in contrast to
Peerlock's AS_PATH regular expressions) also provides a way to detect
anomalies propagated from transit providers and IX route servers.
ASPA is intended to be a complete solution and replacement for
existing Peerlock deployments.
11. IANA Considerations
This document includes no request to IANA.
Azimov, et al. Expires 21 October 2023 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft ASPA-based AS_PATH Verification April 2023
12. Security Considerations
While the ASPA-based mechanism is able to detect and mitigate the
majority of mistakes and malicious activity affecting routes, it
might fail to detect some malicious path modifications, especially
for routes that are received from transit providers.
Since an upstream provider becomes a trusted point, in theory, it
might be able to propagate some instances of hijacked prefixes with
forged-origin or forged-path-segment or even routes with manipulated
AS_PATHs, and such attacks might go undetected by its customers.
This can be illustrated with some examples. In Figure 3, normally
the receiving/validating AS located at the lower left side should
receive a route with AS_PATH {AS(5), AS(4), AS(3), AS(2), AS(1)} and
it would be Valid (Section 6.2) given all the ASPAs that are shown in
the figure. However, if AS(5) which is a transit provider to the
validating AS acts maliciously and sends the route with a shortened
AS_PATH such as {AS(5), AS(3), AS(2), AS(1)} or {AS(5), AS(2),
AS(1)}, such path manipulation would be undetectable (i.e., the
AS_PATH would be considered Valid). Also, if AS(5) were to perform a
forged-origin hijack by inserting an AS_PATH {AS(5), AS(1)}, that
would also be undetectable.
AS(4) - AS(3)
/ \
(down-ramp) / \ (up-ramp)
AS(5) AS(2)
/ \
/ AS(1)
/ (Origin AS)
Receiving & Validating AS
ASPAs: {AS(1), [AS(2)]}, {AS(2), [AS(3)]}, {AS(5), [AS(4)]},
{AS(3), [AS 0]}, {AS(4), [AS 0]}
Figure 3: Illustration for discussion of undetectable AS_PATH
manipulations.
While attacks like the examples above may happen, it does not seem to
be a realistic scenario. Normally a customer and their transit
provider would have a signed agreement, and a policy violation (of
the above kind) should have legal consequences or the customer can
just drop the relationship with such a provider and remove the
corresponding ASPA record.
Azimov, et al. Expires 21 October 2023 [Page 16]
Internet-Draft ASPA-based AS_PATH Verification April 2023
The key properties or strengths of the ASPA method were described in
Section 8. If detection of any and all kinds of path manipulation
attacks is the goal, then BGPsec [RFC8205] would need to be deployed
complementary to the ASPA method. It may be noted that BGPsec in its
current form lacks route leak detection capabilities.
13. Implementation Status
This section is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
This section records the status of known implementations of the
protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this
Internet-Draft. The inclusion of this section here follows the
process described in [RFC7942]. The description of implementations
in this section is intended to assist the IETF in its decision
processes in progressing drafts to RFCs. Please note that the
listing of any individual implementation here does not imply
endorsement by the IETF. Furthermore, no effort has been spent to
verify the information presented here that was supplied by IETF
contributors. This is not intended as, and must not be construed to
be, a catalog of available implementations or their features.
Readers are advised to note that other implementations may exist.
According to [RFC7942], "this will allow reviewers and working groups
to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of
running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation
and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.
It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as
they see fit".
* A BGP implementation OpenBGPD [bgpd] (version 7.8 and higher),
written in C, was provided by Claudio Jeker, Theo Buehler, and Job
Snijders.
* The implementation NIST-BGP-SRx [BGP-SRx] is a software suite that
provides a validation engine (BGP-SRx) and a Quagga-based BGP
router (Quagga-SRx). It includes unit test cases for testing the
ASPA-based path verification. It was provided by Oliver Borchert,
Kyehwan Lee, and their colleagues at US NIST. It requires some
additional work to incorporate the latest changes in the draft
specifications related to IXP RS AS and RS-client.
Azimov, et al. Expires 21 October 2023 [Page 17]
Internet-Draft ASPA-based AS_PATH Verification April 2023
14. Acknowledgments
The authors wish to thank Claudio Jeker, Jakob Heitz, Amir Herzberg,
Igor Lubashev, Ben Maddison, Russ Housley, Jeff Haas, Nan Geng, Nick
Hilliard, Shunwan Zhuang, Yangyang Wang, Martin Hoffmann, Amreesh
Phokeer, Aftab Siddiqui, Dai Zhibin, Doug Montgomery, Rich Compton,
Andrei Robachevsky, and Iljitsch van Beijnum for comments,
suggestions, and discussion on the path verification procedures or
the text in the document. For the implementation and testing of the
procedures in the document, the authors wish to thank Claudio Jeker
and Theo Buehler [bgpd] as well as Kyehwan Lee and Oliver Borchert
[BGP-SRx].
15. References
15.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile]
Azimov, A., Uskov, E., Bush, R., Snijders, J., Housley,
R., and B. Maddison, "A Profile for Autonomous System
Provider Authorization", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-12, 29 January 2023,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sidrops-
aspa-profile-12>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.
[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.
[RFC6793] Vohra, Q. and E. Chen, "BGP Support for Four-Octet
Autonomous System (AS) Number Space", RFC 6793,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6793, December 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6793>.
Azimov, et al. Expires 21 October 2023 [Page 18]
Internet-Draft ASPA-based AS_PATH Verification April 2023
[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.
[RFC7908] Sriram, K., Montgomery, D., McPherson, D., Osterweil, E.,
and B. Dickson, "Problem Definition and Classification of
BGP Route Leaks", RFC 7908, DOI 10.17487/RFC7908, June
2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7908>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC9234] Azimov, A., Bogomazov, E., Bush, R., Patel, K., and K.
Sriram, "Route Leak Prevention and Detection Using Roles
in UPDATE and OPEN Messages", RFC 9234,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9234, May 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9234>.
15.2. Informative References
[BGP-SRx] NIST, "BGP Secure Routing Extension (BGP-SRx) Software
Suite", NIST Open-Source Software , <https://www.nist.gov/
services-resources/software/bgp-secure-routing-extension-
bgp-srx-software-suite>.
[bgpd] Jeker, C., "OpenBGPD", <http://www.openbgpd.org/>.
[Flexsealing]
McDaniel, T., Smith, J., and M. Schuchard, "Flexsealing
BGP Against Route Leaks: Peerlock Active Measurement and
Analysis", November 2020,
<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2006.06576.pdf>.
[I-D.ietf-grow-route-leak-detection-mitigation]
Sriram, K. and A. Azimov, "Methods for Detection and
Mitigation of BGP Route Leaks", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-grow-route-leak-detection-
mitigation-08, 24 October 2022,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-grow-
route-leak-detection-mitigation-08>.
Azimov, et al. Expires 21 October 2023 [Page 19]
Internet-Draft ASPA-based AS_PATH Verification April 2023
[I-D.ietf-idr-deprecate-as-set-confed-set]
Kumari, W. A., Sriram, K., Hannachi, L., and J. Haas,
"Deprecation of AS_SET and AS_CONFED_SET in BGP", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-idr-deprecate-as-set-
confed-set-10, 16 January 2023,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-idr-
deprecate-as-set-confed-set-10>.
[IANA-AF] IANA, "Address Family Numbers",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/address-family-numbers/
address-family-numbers.xhtml>.
[IANA-SAF] IANA, "Subsequent Address Family Identifiers (SAFI)
Parameters", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/safi-
namespace/safi-namespace.xhtml>.
[Peerlock] Snijders, J., "Peerlock", June 2016,
<https://www.nanog.org/sites/default/files/
Snijders_Everyday_Practical_Bgp.pdf>.
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3779>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC7942] Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running
Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205,
RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, July 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7942>.
[RFC8205] Lepinski, M., Ed. and K. Sriram, Ed., "BGPsec Protocol
Specification", RFC 8205, DOI 10.17487/RFC8205, September
2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8205>.
[RFC9319] Gilad, Y., Goldberg, S., Sriram, K., Snijders, J., and B.
Maddison, "The Use of maxLength in the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI)", BCP 185, RFC 9319,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9319, October 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9319>.
Azimov, et al. Expires 21 October 2023 [Page 20]
Internet-Draft ASPA-based AS_PATH Verification April 2023
[sriram1] Sriram, K. and J. Heitz, "On the Accuracy of Algorithms
for ASPA Based Route Leak Detection", IETF SIDROPS
Meeting, Proceedings of the IETF 110, March 2021,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/110/materials/
slides-110-sidrops-sriram-aspa-alg-accuracy-01>.
Authors' Addresses
Alexander Azimov
Yandex
Ulitsa Lva Tolstogo 16
Moscow
119021
Russian Federation
Email: a.e.azimov@gmail.com
Eugene Bogomazov
Qrator Labs
1-y Magistralnyy tupik 5A
Moscow
123290
Russian Federation
Email: eb@qrator.net
Randy Bush
Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus, Inc.
5147 Crystal Springs
Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110
United States of America
Email: randy@psg.com
Keyur Patel
Arrcus
2077 Gateway Place
Suite #400
San Jose, CA 95119
United States of America
Email: keyur@arrcus.com
Job Snijders
Fastly
Amsterdam
Netherlands
Email: job@fastly.com
Azimov, et al. Expires 21 October 2023 [Page 21]
Internet-Draft ASPA-based AS_PATH Verification April 2023
Kotikalapudi Sriram
USA National Institute of Standards and Technology
100 Bureau Drive
Gaithersburg, MD 20899
United States of America
Email: ksriram@nist.gov
Azimov, et al. Expires 21 October 2023 [Page 22]