PKIX over Secure HTTP (POSH)
draft-ietf-xmpp-posh-02

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Last updated 2014-10-10
Replaces draft-miller-posh
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XMPP Working Group                                             M. Miller
Internet-Draft                                       Cisco Systems, Inc.
Intended status: Standards Track                          P. Saint-Andre
Expires: April 13, 2015                                             &yet
                                                        October 10, 2014

                      PKIX over Secure HTTP (POSH)
                        draft-ietf-xmpp-posh-02

Abstract

   Experience has shown that it is extremely difficult to deploy proper
   PKIX certificates for TLS in multi-tenanted environments, since
   certification authorities will not issue certificates for hosted
   domains to hosting services, hosted domains do not want hosting
   services to hold their private keys, and hosting services wish to
   avoid liability for holding those keys.  As a result, domains hosted
   in multi-tenanted environments often deploy non-HTTP applications
   such as email and instant messaging using certificates that identify
   the hosting service, not the hosted domain.  Such deployments force
   end users and peer services to accept a certificate with an improper
   identifier, resulting in obvious security implications.  This
   document defines two methods that make it easier to deploy
   certificates for proper server identity checking in non-HTTP
   application protocols.  The first method enables the TLS client
   associated with a user agent or peer application server to obtain the
   end-entity certificate of a hosted domain over secure HTTP as an
   alternative to standard PKIX techniques.  The second method enables a
   hosted domain to securely delegate a non-HTTP application to a
   hosting service using redirects provided by HTTPS itself or by a
   pointer in a file served over HTTPS at the hosted domain.  While this
   approach was developed for use in the Extensible Messaging and
   Presence Protocol (XMPP) as a Domain Name Association prooftype, it
   can be applied to any non-HTTP application protocol.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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Miller & Saint-Andre     Expires April 13, 2015                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                    POSH                      October 2014

   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 13, 2015.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Obtaining Verification Materials  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Source Domain Possesses PKIX Certificate Information  . .   5
     3.2.  Source Domain References PKIX Certificate . . . . . . . .   6
     3.3.  Performing Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   4.  Secure Delegation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   5.  Order of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  Caching Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   7.  Alternates and Roll-over  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   9.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14

1.  Introduction

   We start with a thought experiment.

   Imagine that you work on the operations team of a hosting company
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