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Last Call Review of draft-ietf-opsawg-sap-13
review-ietf-opsawg-sap-13-secdir-lc-petrov-2023-01-11-00

Request Review of draft-ietf-opsawg-sap
Requested revision No specific revision (document currently at 15)
Type Last Call Review
Team Security Area Directorate (secdir)
Deadline 2023-01-09
Requested 2022-12-19
Authors Mohamed Boucadair , Oscar Gonzalez de Dios , Samier Barguil , Qin Wu , Victor Lopez
I-D last updated 2023-01-11
Completed reviews Yangdoctors Early review of -02 by Martin Björklund (diff)
Opsdir Last Call review of -04 by Menachem Dodge (diff)
Rtgdir Last Call review of -04 by Mach Chen (diff)
Genart Last Call review of -12 by Linda Dunbar (diff)
Secdir Last Call review of -13 by Ivaylo Petrov (diff)
Rtgdir Telechat review of -13 by Mach Chen (diff)
Yangdoctors Telechat review of -13 by Martin Björklund (diff)
Assignment Reviewer Ivaylo Petrov
State Completed
Request Last Call review on draft-ietf-opsawg-sap by Security Area Directorate Assigned
Posted at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/secdir/DFGKo36aSGIaR4d1aP95lKaBFiM
Reviewed revision 13 (document currently at 15)
Result Ready
Completed 2023-01-11
review-ietf-opsawg-sap-13-secdir-lc-petrov-2023-01-11-00
Reviewer: Ivaylo Petrov
Review result: Has Nits

Hi,

I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's
ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the
IESG. These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the
security area directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat
these comments just like any other last call comments.

For me the Security considerations section contains enough
information, but what seems to be the recommendations can be made more
explicit. The sentences

> Write operations (e.g., edit-config) to these data nodes without proper
protection can have a negative effect on network operations.

and

>  It is thus important to control read access (e.g., via get, get-config, or
notification) to these data nodes.

don't mention how those goals can be achieved. At the same time the paragraph

> The Network Configuration Access Control Model (NACM) [RFC8341] provides the
means to restrict access for particular NETCONF or RESTCONF users to a
preconfigured subset of all available NETCONF or RESTCONF protocol operations
and content.

is not directly connected to the other ones in the section. My
understanding is that the authors considered the usage of NACM a good
solution for those two, but if so please make that more explicit.

Best regards,
Ivaylo