Multi Provider DNSSEC models
draft-huque-dnsop-multi-provider-dnssec-03

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (candidate for dnsop WG)
Last updated 2018-07-06 (latest revision 2018-07-01)
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Internet Engineering Task Force                                 S. Huque
Internet-Draft                                                   P. Aras
Intended status: Informational                                Salesforce
Expires: January 2, 2019                                    J. Dickinson
                                                                 Sinodun
                                                               J. Vcelak
                                                                     NS1
                                                            July 1, 2018

                      Multi Provider DNSSEC models
               draft-huque-dnsop-multi-provider-dnssec-03

Abstract

   Many enterprises today employ the service of multiple DNS providers
   to distribute their authoritative DNS service.  Deploying DNSSEC in
   such an environment can have some challenges depending on the
   configuration and feature set in use.  This document will present
   several deployment models that may be suitable.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 2, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect

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   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction and Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Deployment Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Serve Only model  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.2.  Sign and Serve model  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
       2.2.1.  Model 1: Common KSK, Unique ZSK per provider  . . . .   4
       2.2.2.  Model 2: Unique KSK and ZSK per provider  . . . . . .   4
       2.2.3.  Model 3: Shared KSK/ZSK Signing Keys  . . . . . . . .   5
     2.3.  Inline Signing model  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.4.  Hybrid model  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  Signing Algorithm Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Authenticated Denial Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.1.  Single Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.2.  Mixing Methods  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  Validating Resolver Behavior  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  Key Rollover Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     6.1.  Model 1: Common KSK, Unique ZSK per provider  . . . . . .   9
     6.2.  Model 2: Unique KSK and ZSK per provider  . . . . . . . .  10
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   9.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12

1.  Introduction and Motivation

   RFC EDITOR: PLEASE REMOVE THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH BEFORE PUBLISHING:
   The source for this draft is maintained in GitHub at:
   https://github.com/shuque/multi-provider-dnssec

   Many enterprises today employ the service of multiple DNS providers
   to distribute their authoritative DNS service.  Two providers are
   fairly typical and this allows the DNS service to survive a complete
   failure of any single provider.  This document outlines some possible
   models of DNSSEC [RFC4033] [RFC4034] [RFC4035] deployment in such an
   environment.

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