Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Open Threat Signaling Requirements
draft-ietf-dots-requirements-01

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DOTS                                                        A. Mortensen
Internet-Draft                                      Arbor Networks, Inc.
Intended status: Informational                              R. Moskowitz
Expires: September 19, 2016                               HTT Consulting
                                                                T. Reddy
                                                     Cisco Systems, Inc.
                                                          March 18, 2016

Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Open Threat Signaling Requirements
                    draft-ietf-dots-requirements-01

Abstract

   This document defines the requirements for the Distributed Denial of
   Service (DDoS) Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) protocols coordinating
   attack response against DDoS attacks.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 19, 2016.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of

Mortensen, et al.      Expires September 19, 2016               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft              DOTS Requirements                 March 2016

   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Context and Motivation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.1.  General Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.2.  Operational Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.3.  Data Channel Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     2.4.  Security requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   3.  Congestion Control Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   5.  Contributors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   6.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   7.  Change Log  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     7.1.  01 revision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     7.2.  00 revision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     7.3.  Initial revision  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15

1.  Introduction

1.1.  Context and Motivation

   Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks continue to plague
   networks around the globe, from Tier-1 service providers on down to
   enterprises and small businesses.  Attack scale and frequency
   similarly have continued to increase, in part as a result of software
   vulnerabilities leading to reflection and amplification attacks.
   Once staggering attack traffic volume is now the norm, and the impact
   of larger-scale attacks attract the attention of international press
   agencies.

   The greater impact of contemporary DDoS attacks has led to increased
   focus on coordinated attack response.  Many institutions and
   enterprises lack the resources or expertise to operate on-premise
   attack prevention solutions themselves, or simply find themselves
   constrained by local bandwidth limitations.  To address such gaps,
   security service providers have begun to offer on-demand traffic
   scrubbing services.  Each service offers its own interface for
   subscribers to request attack mitigation, tying subscribers to
   proprietary implementations while also limiting the subset of network
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