BGPSEC router key rollover as an alternative to beaconing
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-rollover-01

The information below is for an old version of the document
Document Type Active Internet-Draft (sidr WG)
Last updated 2012-10-22
Replaces draft-rogaglia-sidr-bgpsec-rollover
Replaced by rfc8634, draft-ietf-sidrops-bgpsec-rollover
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Network Working Group                                        R. Gagliano
Internet-Draft                                                  K. Patel
Intended status: Standards Track                                 B. Weis
Expires: April 25, 2013                                    Cisco Systems
                                                        October 22, 2012

       BGPSEC router key rollover as an alternative to beaconing
                   draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-rollover-01

Abstract

   BGPSEC will need to address the impact from regular and emergency
   rollover processes for the BGPSEC End-Entity (EE) certificates that
   will be performed by Certificate Authorities (CAs) participating at
   the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI).  This document
   provides general recommendations for that process and specifies how
   this process is used to control BGPSEC's window of exposure to replay
   attacks.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 25, 2013.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must

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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Requirements notation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.  Key rollover in BGPSEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.1.  A proposed process for BGPSEC key rollover . . . . . . . .  5
   4.  BGPSEC key rollover as a measure against replays attacks
       in BGPSEC  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     4.1.  BGPSEC Replay attack window requirement  . . . . . . . . .  8
     4.2.  BGPSEC key rollover as a mechanism to protect against
           replay attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   5.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   6.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   7.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   8.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     8.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     8.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

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1.  Requirements notation

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

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2.  Introduction

   In BGPSEC, a key rollover (or re-keying) is the process of changing a
   router's key pair (or pairs), issuing the corresponding new End-
   Entity certificate and (if the old certificate is still valid)
   revoking the old certificate.  This process will need to happen at
   regular intervals, normally due to local policies at each network.
   This document provides general recommendations for that process that
   Certificate Practice Statements (CPS) documents MAY reference.

   When a router receives (or creates depending of the key provisioning
   mechanism to be selected) a new key pair, this key pair will be used
   to sign new BGP UPDATE messages that are originated or that transit
   through the BGP speaker.  Additionally, the BGP speaker MUST refresh
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