Route Leak Detection and Filtering using Roles in Update and Open messages
draft-ymbk-idr-bgp-open-policy-00
| Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Replaced".
Expired & archived
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|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Alexander Azimov , Eugene Bogomazov , Randy Bush | ||
| Last updated | 2016-09-22 (Latest revision 2016-03-21) | ||
| Replaced by | draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy, draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy, RFC 9234 | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
Route Leaks are propagation of BGP prefixes which violate assumptions of BGP topology relationships; e.g. passing a route learned from one peer to another peer or to a transit provider, passing a route learned from one transit provider to another transit provider or to a peer. Today, approaches to leak prevention rely on marking routes according to some configuration options without any check of the configuration corresponds to that of the BGP neighbor, or enforcement that the two BGP speakers agree on the relationship. This document enhances BGP Open to establish agreement of the (peer, customer, provider, internal) relationship of two BGP neighboring speakers to enforce appropriate configuration on both sides. Propagated routes are then marked with a flag according to agreed relationship allowing detection and mitigation of route leaks.
Authors
Alexander Azimov
Eugene Bogomazov
Randy Bush
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)