Route Leak Detection and Filtering using Roles in Update and Open messages
draft-ymbk-idr-bgp-open-policy-00

The information below is for an old version of the document
Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2016-09-22 (latest revision 2016-03-21)
Replaced by draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy
Stream (None)
Intended RFC status (None)
Formats
Expired & archived
plain text pdf html bibtex
Stream Stream state (No stream defined)
Consensus Boilerplate Unknown
RFC Editor Note (None)
IESG IESG state Expired
Telechat date
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)

This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ymbk-idr-bgp-open-policy-00.txt

Abstract

Route Leaks are propagation of BGP prefixes which violate assumptions of BGP topology relationships; e.g. passing a route learned from one peer to another peer or to a transit provider, passing a route learned from one transit provider to another transit provider or to a peer. Today, approaches to leak prevention rely on marking routes according to some configuration options without any check of the configuration corresponds to that of the BGP neighbor, or enforcement that the two BGP speakers agree on the relationship. This document enhances BGP Open to establish agreement of the (peer, customer, provider, internal) relationship of two BGP neighboring speakers to enforce appropriate configuration on both sides. Propagated routes are then marked with a flag according to agreed relationship allowing detection and mitigation of route leaks.

Authors

Alexander Azimov (aa@qrator.net)
Eugene Bogomazov (eb@qrator.net)
Randy Bush (randy@psg.com)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)